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This content will become publicly available on May 1, 2026

Title: Cover crops as climate insurance: Exploring the role of crop insurance discounts to promote climate adaptation and mitigate risk https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2024.123506
Award ID(s):
2206086
PAR ID:
10638563
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ;
Publisher / Repository:
Elselvier
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Journal of Environmental Management
ISSN:
1095-8630
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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