Under what conditions do rebel organizations control territory during civil war? How do civilians influence the distribution of territorial control? Why do rebels invest in governance, and why do they target civilians with violence, in some locations but not others? This dissertation advances a political accountability theory to explain how civilians influence the distribution of territorial control and governance during civil war. Existing research explaining variation in rebel territorial control and behavior have emphasized structural and organizational factors, identity politics, economic conditions, and geography. However, the classic insurgency literature and recent counterinsurgency doctrine emphasize the importance of securing civilian support and protecting the population to achieving military objectives in civil war. If true, civilians retain at least some power over rebel personnel. The accountability theory of rebel conduct provides a unified framework linking inter-related conflict processes associated with rebel groups’ territorial control, governance, and strategic use of violence during civil war. It argues that community collective action capacity, the ease with which communities facilitate collective action to pursue common interests, influences the distribution territorial control and belligerent conduct during civil war. The empirical strategy draws upon complementary quantitative and qualitative methods to test the accountability against plausible alternatives using village-level data from the communist insurgency in the Philippines. The results provide robust support for the accountability theory over plausible alternatives, and yield policy implications for peace-building and economic development in conflict-affected states.
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This content will become publicly available on June 27, 2026
A fundamental cognitive bias increases support for violence against civilians in Gaza and Israel
Abstract War is often characterised by indiscriminate violence against civilians. It is critical to understand why ordinary people might support acts such as ethnic cleansing or genocide, as popular support facilitates campaigns of indiscriminate violence. Theory suggests that support may rest on ideologies and narratives that portray the target group as less than human and threatening, thereby creating a moral mandate for killing. However, there has been little empirical study of these mechanisms during outbreaks of extreme violence. Here we report studies carried out in an ongoing campaign of violence in Gaza and Israel (n = 2462), showing that alongside such narratives, popular support for violence against civilians derives from a common cognitive error we term the hate-motive bias: the tendency to overestimate hate motives, and underestimate defensive motives, of outgroup aggression. Hate-motive bias predicted support for various forms of violence against civilians even while statistically accounting for other predictors such as ideological orientation, dehumanisation of outgroups and perceived threat. Our results suggest that a common attribution bias may contribute to ordinary citizens supporting behaviour they might typically deplore. Efforts to correct this bias may offer a behavioural science lever for reducing popular support for violence against civilians.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1949467
- PAR ID:
- 10650023
- Publisher / Repository:
- Research Square
- Date Published:
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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