skip to main content
US FlagAn official website of the United States government
dot gov icon
Official websites use .gov
A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.
https lock icon
Secure .gov websites use HTTPS
A lock ( lock ) or https:// means you've safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.

Explore Research Products in the PAR
It may take a few hours for recently added research products to appear in PAR search results.


Title: Brief Announcement: Best-Possible Unpredictable Proof-Of-Stake
{"Abstract":["The proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols aim to reduce the unnecessary computing power waste seen in Bitcoin. Various practical and provably secure designs have been proposed, like Ouroboros Praos (Eurocrypt 2018) and Snow White (FC 2019). However, the essential security property of unpredictability in these protocols remains insufficiently explored. This paper delves into this property in the cryptographic setting to achieve the "best possible" unpredictability for PoS.\r\nWe first present an impossibility result for all PoS protocols under the single-extension design framework, where each honest player extends one chain per round. The state-of-the-art permissionless PoS protocols (e.g., Praos, Snow White, and more), are all under this single-extension framework. Our impossibility result states that, if a single-extension PoS protocol achieves the best possible unpredictability, then this protocol cannot be proven secure unless more than 73% of stake is honest. To overcome this impossibility, we introduce a new design framework called multi-extension PoS, allowing each honest player to extend multiple chains using a greedy strategy in a round. This strategy allows us to construct a class of PoS protocols that achieve the best possible unpredictability. It is noteworthy that these protocols can be proven secure, assuming a much smaller fraction (e.g., 57%) of stake to be honest."]}  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1801470
PAR ID:
10654695
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ; ;
Editor(s):
Alistarh, Dan
Publisher / Repository:
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Date Published:
Volume:
319
ISSN:
1868-8969
Page Range / eLocation ID:
45:1-45:7
Subject(s) / Keyword(s):
blockchain consensus proof-of-stake unpredictability Computing methodologies → Distributed computing methodologies
Format(s):
Medium: X Size: 7 pages; 711887 bytes Other: application/pdf
Size(s):
7 pages 711887 bytes
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
More Like this
  1. ; ; ; (, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik)
    Kowalski, Dariusz R (Ed.)
    Broadcast is a fundamental primitive that plays an important role in secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) area. In this work, we revisit the broadcast with selective abort (hereafter, short for broadcast) proposed by Goldwasser and Lindell (DISC 2002; JoC 2005) and study the round complexity of broadcast under different setup assumptions. Our findings are summarized as follows: - We formally prove that 1-round broadcast is impossible under various widely-used setup assumptions (e.g., plain model, random oracle model, and common reference string model, etc.), even if we consider the static security and the stand-alone framework. More concretely, we formalize a notion called consistent oracle to capture these setups, and prove that our impossibility holds under the consistent oracle. Our impossibility holds in both honest majority setting and dishonest majority setting. - We show that 1-round broadcast protocol is possible in the Universal Composition (UC) framework, by assuming stateful trusted hardwares. Our protocol can be proven secure against all-but-one adaptive and malicious corruptions. We bypass our impossibility result since our stateful trusted hardwares do not satisfy the definition of consistent oracle. - We provide an application of 1-round broadcast: we construct the first 1-round multiple-verifier zero-knowledge (which is a special case of MPC) protocol, without assuming the broadcast hybrid world. 
    more » « less
  2. ; ; ; (, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik)
    Böhme, Rainer; Kiffer, Lucianna (Ed.)
    Cryptographic Self-Selection is a common primitive underlying leader-selection for Proof-of-Stake blockchain protocols. The concept was first popularized in Algorand [Jing Chen and Silvio Micali, 2019], who also observed that the protocol might be manipulable. [Matheus V. X. Ferreira et al., 2022] provide a concrete manipulation that is strictly profitable for a staker of any size (and also prove upper bounds on the gains from manipulation). Separately, [Maryam Bahrani and S. Matthew Weinberg, 2024; Aviv Yaish et al., 2023] initiate the study of undetectable profitable manipulations of consensus protocols with a focus on the seminal Selfish Mining strategy [Eyal and Sirer, 2014] for Bitcoin’s Proof-of-Work longest-chain protocol. They design a Selfish Mining variant that, for sufficiently large miners, is strictly profitable yet also indistinguishable to an onlooker from routine latency (that is, a sufficiently large profit-maximizing miner could use their strategy to strictly profit over being honest in a way that still appears to the rest of the network as though everyone is honest but experiencing mildly higher latency. This avoids any risk of negatively impacting the value of the underlying cryptocurrency due to attack detection). We investigate the detectability of profitable manipulations of the canonical cryptographic self-selection leader selection protocol introduced in [Jing Chen and Silvio Micali, 2019] and studied in [Matheus V. X. Ferreira et al., 2022], and establish that for any player with α < (3-√5)/2 ≈ 0.38 fraction of the total stake, every strictly profitable manipulation is statistically detectable. Specifically, we consider an onlooker who sees only the random seed of each round (and does not need to see any other broadcasts by any other players). We show that the distribution of the sequence of random seeds when any player is profitably manipulating the protocol is inconsistent with any distribution that could arise by honest stakers being offline or timing out (for a natural stylized model of honest timeouts). 
    more » « less
  3. ; ; ; (, Usenix)
    Safety, liveness, and privacy are three critical properties for any private proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain. However, prior work (SP'21) has shown that to obtain safety and liveness, a PoS blockchain must, in theory, forgo privacy. In particular, to obtain safety and liveness, PoS blockchains elect parties proportional to their stake, which, in turn, can potentially reveal the stake of a party even if the transaction processing mechanism is private. In this work, we make two key contributions. First, we present the first stake inference attack that can be actually run in practice. Specifically, our attack applies to both deterministic and randomized PoS protocols and has exponentially lesser running time in comparison with the SOTA approach. Second, we use differentially private stake distortion to achieve privacy in PoS blockchains. We formulate certain privacy requirements to achieve transaction and stake privacy, and design two stake distortion mechanisms that any PoS protocol can use. Moreover, we analyze our proposed mechanisms with Ethereum 2.0, a well-known PoS blockchain that is already operating in practice. The results indicate that our mechanisms mitigate stake inference risks and, at the same time, provide reasonable privacy while preserving required safety and liveness properties. 
    more » « less
  4. ; ; ; (, 32nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 23))
    Safety, liveness, and privacy are three critical properties for any private proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain. However, prior work (SP'21) has shown that to obtain safety and liveness, a PoS blockchain must in theory forgo privacy. In particular, to obtain safety and liveness, PoS blockchains elect parties proportional to their stake, which, in turn, can potentially reveal the stake of a party even if the transaction processing mechanism is private. In this work, we make two key contributions. First, we present the first stake inference attack that can be actually run in practice. Specifically, our attack applies to both deterministic and randomized PoS protocols and has exponentially lesser running time in comparison with the SOTA approach. Second, we use differentially private stake distortion to achieve privacy in PoS blockchains. We formulate certain privacy requirements to achieve transaction and stake privacy, and design two stake distortion mechanisms that any PoS protocol can use. Moreover, we analyze our proposed mechanisms with Ethereum 2.0, a well-known PoS blockchain that is already operating in practice. The results indicate that our mechanisms mitigate stake inference risks and, at the same time, provide reasonable privacy while preserving required safety and liveness properties. 
    more » « less
  5. ; ; ; ; (, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik)
    Dachman-Soled, Dana (Ed.)
    Pseudorandom number generators with input (PRNGs) are cryptographic algorithms that generate pseudorandom bits from accumulated entropic inputs (e.g., keystrokes, interrupt timings, etc.). This paper studies in particular PRNGs that are secure against premature next attacks (Kelsey et al., FSE '98), a class of attacks leveraging the fact that a PRNG may produce an output (which could be seen by an adversary!) before enough entropy has been accumulated. Practical designs adopt either unsound entropy-estimation methods to prevent such attacks (as in Linux’s /dev/random) or sophisticated pool-based approaches as in Yarrow (MacOS/FreeBSD) and Fortuna (Windows). The only prior theoretical study of premature next attacks (Dodis et al., Algorithmica '17) considers either a seeded setting or assumes constant entropy rate, and thus falls short of providing and validating practical designs. Assuming the availability of random seed is particularly problematic, first because this requires us to somehow generate a random seed without using our PRNG, but also because we must ensure that the entropy inputs to the PRNG remain independent of the seed. Indeed, all practical designs are seedless. However, prior works on seedless PRNGs (Coretti et al., CRYPTO '19; Dodis et al., ITC '21, CRYPTO'21) do not consider premature next attacks. The main goal of this paper is to investigate the feasibility of theoretically sound seedless PRNGs that are secure against premature next attacks. To this end, we make the following contributions: 1) We prove that it is impossible to achieve seedless PRNGs that are secure against premature-next attacks, even in a rather weak model. Namely, the impossibility holds even when the entropic inputs to the PRNG are independent. In particular, our impossibility result holds in settings where seedless PRNGs are otherwise possible. 2) Given the above impossibility result, we investigate whether existing seedless pool-based approaches meant to overcome premature next attacks in practical designs provide meaningful guarantees in certain settings. Specifically, we show the following. 3) We introduce a natural condition on the entropic input and prove that it implies security of the round-robin entropy accumulation PRNG used by Windows 10, called Fortuna. Intuitively, our condition requires the input entropy "not to vary too wildly" within a given round-robin round. 4) We prove that the "root pool" approach (also used in Windows 10) is secure for general entropy inputs, provided that the system’s state is not compromised after system startup. 
    more » « less
  • Citation Formats
  • MLA
  • APA
  • Chicago
  • BibTeX
  • Save / Share this Record
  • Send to Email