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People overaccept information that supports their identity and underaccept information that opposes their identity—a phenomenon known as partisan bias. Although partisan-bias effects in judgments of misinformation are robust and pervasive, there is ongoing debate about whether partisan-bias effects arise from identity-protective motivated reasoning or differential knowledge of identity-congenial versus identity-uncongenial information. Prior empirical work has been unable to differentiate the two accounts because of a reliance on groups with pre-existing differences in knowledge (e.g., Democrats and Republicans). The current research addresses this issue by using randomly assigned rather than pre-existing identities. Across two experiments (N = 1,411), adult U.S. Prolific workers showed lower thresholds for accepting information that is congenial versus uncongenial to a randomly assigned identity, despite having no differences in prior knowledge. These results support theories that emphasize identity protection as a factor underlying partisan bias in the acceptance of misinformation, with important practical implications for misinformation interventions.
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Continuity and Change in Trust in Scientists in the United States: Demographic Stability and Partisan Polarization
Abstract Americans’ trust in scientists has been stable and high, relative to other political and social institutions, for the last half century (Krause, Brossard, and Scheufele 2019). Yet, underlying this stability lies a dramatic change such that a partisan gap has emerged, with Democrats exhibiting substantially more trust than Republicans. Fifty years ago, Republicans in fact exhibited more relative trust in scientists. This article explains this continuity and change. First, we demonstrate that the demographic correlates of trust in scientists have been remarkably stable for more than a half century: women, Black, rural, religious, non-college educated, and lower/working-class individuals exhibit less trust than their counterparts. Second, we show that the partisan relationship with trust in scientists has flipped (over that same time period) as low-trusting demographic strata shifted partisan allegiances. This is particularly the case when it comes to education and religiosity. Concomitant with the emergent partisan gap is a massive perceptual gap among Democrats, who perceive a partisan divide more than double its actual size. Democrats vastly underestimate Republicans’ trust in scientists. The enduring demographic basis of trust in scientists provides an opportunity to bridge partisan divides by addressing demographic inequities in the practice and application of science.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2241885
- PAR ID:
- 10681472
- Publisher / Repository:
- Public Opinion Quarterly
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Public Opinion Quarterly
- Volume:
- 89
- Issue:
- 4
- ISSN:
- 0033-362X
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 1200 to 1238
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
-
Accepted Manuscript
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfaf059
