In many predictive decision-making scenarios, such as credit scoring and academic testing, a decision-maker must construct a model that accounts for agents' incentives to ``game'' their features in order to receive better decisions. Whereas the strategic classification literature generally assumes that agents' outcomes are not causally dependent on their features (and thus strategic behavior is a form of lying), we join concurrent work in modeling agents' outcomes as a function of their changeable attributes. Our formulation is the first to incorporate a crucial phenomenon: when agents act to change observable features, they may as a side effect perturb unobserved features that causally affect their true outcomes. We consider three distinct desiderata for a decision-maker's model: accurately predicting agents' post-gaming outcomes (accuracy), incentivizing agents to improve these outcomes (improvement), and, in the linear setting, estimating the visible coefficients of the true causal model (causal precision). As our main contribution, we provide the first algorithms for learning accuracy-optimizing, improvement-optimizing, and causal-precision-optimizing linear regression models directly from data, without prior knowledge of agents' possible actions. These algorithms circumvent the hardness result of Miller et al. (2019) by allowing the decision maker to observe agents' responses to a sequence of decision rules, in effect inducing agents to perform causal interventions for free.
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Finite-Time Convergence Rates in Stochastic Stackelberg Games with Smooth Algorithmic Agents
Decision-makers often adaptively influence downstream competitive agents' behavior to minimize their cost, yet in doing so face critical challenges: decision-makers might not *a priori* know the agents' objectives; agents might *learn* their responses, introducing stochasticity and non-stationarity into the decision-making process; and there may be additional non-strategic environmental stochasticity. Characterizing convergence of this complex system is contingent on how the decision-maker controls for the tradeoff between the induced drift and additional noise from the learning agent behavior and environmental stochasticity. To understand how the learning agents' behavior is influenced by the decision-maker’s actions, we first consider a decision-maker that deploys an arbitrary sequence of actions which induces a sequence of games and corresponding equilibria. We characterize how the drift and noise in the agents' stochastic algorithms decouples from their optimization error. Leveraging this decoupling and accompanying finite-time efficiency estimates, we design decision-maker algorithms that control the induced drift relative to the agent noise. This enables efficient finite-time tracking of game theoretic equilibrium concepts that adhere to the incentives of the players' collective learning processes.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2229876
- PAR ID:
- 10715248
- Publisher / Repository:
- Forty-second International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML 2025)
- Date Published:
- Subject(s) / Keyword(s):
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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