Journal ArticleCan Transitional Justice Improve the Quality of Representation in New DemocraciesNalepa, Monika; And, MilenaCan transitional justice enhance democratic representation in countries recovering from authoritarian rule? We argue that lustration, the policy of revealing secret collaboration with the authoritarian regime, can prevent former authoritarian elites from extorting policy concessions from past collaborators who have become elected politicians. Absent lustration, former elites can threaten to reveal information about past collaboration unless politicians implement policies these elites desire. In this way, lustration laws enable politicians to avoid blackmail and become responsive to their constituents, improving the quality of representation. We show that whether lustration enhances representation depends on its severity and the extent to which dissidents- turned-politicians suffer if their skeletons come out. We also find that the potential to blackmail politicians increases as the ideological distance between authoritarian elites and politicians decreases. We test this theory with original data from the Global Transitional Justice Datast spanning 84 countries that transitioned to democracy since 1946.2020-10-0110108288World politics7143-281086-3338https://doi.org/1658170National Science Foundation