<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcq="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"><records count="1" morepages="false" start="1" end="1"><record rownumber="1"><dc:product_type>Conference Paper</dc:product_type><dc:title>AOT: Anonymization by oblivious transfer</dc:title><dc:creator>Javani, Farid; Sherman, Alan T.</dc:creator><dc:corporate_author/><dc:editor>null</dc:editor><dc:description>We introduce AOT, an anonymous communication system based on mix network architecture that uses oblivious transfer (OT) to deliver messages.
Using OT to deliver messages helps AOT resist blending (n-1) attacks and 
helps AOT preserve receiver anonymity, even if a covert adversary controls all nodes in AOT.

AOT comprises three levels of nodes, where nodes at each level perform a different function and can scale horizontally. The sender encrypts their payload and a tag---derived from a secret shared between the sender and receiver---with the public key of a Level-2 node and sends them to a Level-1 node. On a public bulletin board, Level-3 nodes publish tags associated with messages ready to be retrieved.
Each receiver checks the bulletin board, identifies tags, and receives the associated messages using OT. 

A receiver can receive their messages even if the receiver is offline when messages are ready. 
Through what we call a ``handshake'' process, communicants can use the AOT protocol to establish shared secrets anonymously.

Users play an active role in contributing to the unlinkability of messages:
periodically, users initiate requests to AOT to receive dummy messages,
such that an adversary cannot distinguish real and dummy requests.</dc:description><dc:publisher/><dc:date>2021-01-01</dc:date><dc:nsf_par_id>10290934</dc:nsf_par_id><dc:journal_name>Privacy Enhanced Tecologies, submtted</dc:journal_name><dc:journal_volume/><dc:journal_issue/><dc:page_range_or_elocation/><dc:issn/><dc:isbn/><dc:doi>https://doi.org/</dc:doi><dcq:identifierAwardId>1753681</dcq:identifierAwardId><dc:subject/><dc:version_number/><dc:location/><dc:rights/><dc:institution/><dc:sponsoring_org>National Science Foundation</dc:sponsoring_org></record></records></rdf:RDF>