<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcq="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"><records count="1" morepages="false" start="1" end="1"><record rownumber="1"><dc:product_type>Journal Article</dc:product_type><dc:title>Voting Against Autocracy</dc:title><dc:creator>Svolik, Milan W.</dc:creator><dc:corporate_author/><dc:editor/><dc:description>When and how do voters punish politicians for subverting democracy? To investigate the role of the public in democratic backsliding, I develop a conceptual framework that differentiates among three mechanisms: vote switching, backlash, and disengagement. The first mechanism entails defection by voters from a candidate who undermines democracy to one who does not; the latter two mechanisms entail transitions between voting and abstention. I estimate the magnitude of each mechanism by combining evidence from a series of original survey experiments, traditional surveys, and a quasi-experiment afforded by the rerun of the 2019 Istanbul mayoral election, in which the governing party, akp, attempted to overturn the result of an election that it had lost. I find that although vote switching and backlash contributed to the akp's eventual defeat the most, each of the three mechanisms served as a democratic check in some subset of the Istanbul electorate. Persuasion, mobilization, and even demobilization are all viable tools for curbing the authoritarian tendencies of elected politicians.</dc:description><dc:publisher>Johns Hopkins University Press</dc:publisher><dc:date>2023-10-01</dc:date><dc:nsf_par_id>10484160</dc:nsf_par_id><dc:journal_name>World Politics</dc:journal_name><dc:journal_volume>75</dc:journal_volume><dc:journal_issue>4</dc:journal_issue><dc:page_range_or_elocation>647 to 691</dc:page_range_or_elocation><dc:issn>1086-3338</dc:issn><dc:isbn/><dc:doi>https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2023.a908772</dc:doi><dcq:identifierAwardId>1851524</dcq:identifierAwardId><dc:subject/><dc:version_number/><dc:location/><dc:rights/><dc:institution/><dc:sponsoring_org>National Science Foundation</dc:sponsoring_org></record></records></rdf:RDF>