<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcq="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"><records count="1" morepages="false" start="1" end="1"><record rownumber="1"><dc:product_type>Conference Paper</dc:product_type><dc:title>In-network Reinforcement Learning for Attack Mitigation using Programmable Data Plane in SDN</dc:title><dc:creator>Ganesan, Aparna; Sarac, Kamil</dc:creator><dc:corporate_author/><dc:editor/><dc:description>The development of reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms has created a paradigm where the agents are trained to learn directly by observing the environment and learning policies to perform tasks autonomously. In the case of network environments, these agents can control and monitor the traffic as well as help preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of resources and services in the network. In the case of software defined
networks (SDN), the centralized controller in the control plane has become the single point of failure for the entire network. Reactive routing in SDNs makes such networks vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that aim to overwhelm switch memory and the control channel between SDN switches and controllers. One potential solution to cope with such attacks is to use an intelligent mechanism to detect and block them with minimal performance overhead for the controller and control channel. In this work, we investigate the practicality and effectiveness of a reinforcement learning (RL) approach to cope with DoS attacks in SDN networks that utilize programmable switches. Assuming the existence of a reliable reward function, we demonstrate that an RL-based approach can successfully adapt to the changing nature of attack traffic to detect and mitigate attacks without overwhelming switch memory and the control channel in SDN.</dc:description><dc:publisher>IEEE</dc:publisher><dc:date>2024-07-29</dc:date><dc:nsf_par_id>10514465</dc:nsf_par_id><dc:journal_name>The 33rd International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN 2024)</dc:journal_name><dc:journal_volume/><dc:journal_issue/><dc:page_range_or_elocation/><dc:issn/><dc:isbn/><dc:doi>https://doi.org/</dc:doi><dcq:identifierAwardId>1922398</dcq:identifierAwardId><dc:subject/><dc:version_number/><dc:location>Big Island, Hawaii, USA</dc:location><dc:rights/><dc:institution/><dc:sponsoring_org>National Science Foundation</dc:sponsoring_org></record></records></rdf:RDF>