<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcq="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"><records count="1" morepages="false" start="1" end="1"><record rownumber="1"><dc:product_type>Journal Article</dc:product_type><dc:title>Multiparty Private Set Intersection Cardinality and Its Applications</dc:title><dc:creator>Gao, Jiahui; Trieu, Ni; Yanai, Avishay</dc:creator><dc:corporate_author/><dc:editor/><dc:description>&lt;p&gt;We describe a new paradigm for multi-party private set intersection cardinality (PSI-CA) that allows $n$ parties to compute the intersection size of their datasets without revealing any additional information. We explore a variety of instantiations of this paradigm. By operating under the assumption that a particular subset of parties refrains from collusion, our protocols avoid computationally expensive public-key operations and are secure in the presence of a semi-honest adversary. We demonstrate the practicality of our PSI-CA with an implementation. For $n=16$ parties with data-sets of $2^{20}$ items each, our server-aided variant takes 71 seconds. Interestingly, in the server-less setting, the same task takes only 7 seconds. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first `special purpose' implementation of a multi-party PSI-CA from symmetric-key techniques (i.e. an implementation that does not rely on a generic underlying MPC).We study two interesting applications -- heatmap computation and associated rule learning (ARL) -- that can be computed securely using a dot-product as a building block. We analyse the performance of securely computing heatmap and ARL using our protocol and compare that to the state-of-the-art.&lt;/p&gt;</dc:description><dc:publisher>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</dc:publisher><dc:date>2024-04-01</dc:date><dc:nsf_par_id>10523722</dc:nsf_par_id><dc:journal_name>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</dc:journal_name><dc:journal_volume>2024</dc:journal_volume><dc:journal_issue>2</dc:journal_issue><dc:page_range_or_elocation>73 to 90</dc:page_range_or_elocation><dc:issn>2299-0984</dc:issn><dc:isbn/><dc:doi>https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2024-0041</dc:doi><dcq:identifierAwardId>2115075</dcq:identifierAwardId><dc:subject/><dc:version_number/><dc:location/><dc:rights/><dc:institution/><dc:sponsoring_org>National Science Foundation</dc:sponsoring_org></record></records></rdf:RDF>