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We investigate the determinants of radical (“creative”) innovations that break new ground in knowledge creation. We develop a model focusing on the choice between incremental and radical innovation and on how managers of different ages and human capital are sorted across firms. Firm- and patent-level evidence reveals that firms that are more “open to disruption” are significantly more likely to engage in radical innovation and hire younger managers and inventors with a comparative advantage in radical innovation. However, once the effect of the sorting is factored in, the (causal) impact of manager age on creative innovations, though positive, is small. (JEL D22, L26, M10, M14, O31, O34) 

We document that between 50% and 70% of changes in the U.S. wage structure over the last four decades are accounted for by relative wage declines of worker groups specialized in routine tasks in industries experiencing rapid automation. We develop a conceptual framework where tasks across industries are allocated to different types of labor and capital. Automation technologies expand the set of tasks performed by capital, displacing certain worker groups from jobs for which they have comparative advantage. This framework yields a simple equation linking wage changes of a demographic group to the task displacement it experiences. We report robust evidence in favor of this relationship and show that regression models incorporating task displacement explain much of the changes in education wage differentials between 1980 and 2016. The negative relationship between wage changes and task displacement is unaffected when we control for changes in market power, deunionization, and other forms of capital deepening and technology unrelated to automation. We also propose a methodology for evaluating the full general equilibrium effects of automation, which incorporate induced changes in industry composition and ripple effects due to task reallocation across different groups. Our quantitative evaluation explains how major changes in wage inequality can go hand‐in‐hand with modest productivity gains. 

Abstract We argue theoretically and document empirically that aging leads to greater (industrial) automation, because it creates a shortage of middle-aged workers specializing in manual production tasks. We show that demographic change is associated with greater adoption of robots and other automation technologies across countries and with more robotics-related activities across U.S. commuting zones. We also document more automation innovation in countries undergoing faster aging. Our directed technological change model predicts that the response of automation technologies to aging should be more pronounced in industries that rely more on middle-aged workers and those that present greater opportunities for automation and that productivity should improve and the labor share should decline relatively in industries that are more amenable to automation. The evidence supports all four of these predictions. 

We extend the canonical model of skill-biased technical change by modeling the allocation of tasks to factors and allowing for automation and the creation of new tasks. In our model, factor prices depend on the set of tasks they perform. Automation can reduce real wages and generate sizable changes in inequality associated with small productivity gains. New tasks can increase or reduce inequality depending on whether they are performed by skilled or unskilled workers. Industry-level data suggest that automation significantly contributed to the rising skill premium, while new tasks reduced inequality in the past but have contributed to inequality recently. 

Great claims have been made about the benefits of dematerialization in a digital service economy. However, digitalization has historically increased environmental impacts at local and planetary scales, affecting labor markets, resource use, governance, and power relationships. Here we study the past, present, and future of digitalization through the lens of three interdependent elements of the Anthropocene: ( a) planetary boundaries and stability, ( b) equity within and between countries, and ( c) human agency and governance, mediated via ( i) increasing resource efficiency, ( ii) accelerating consumption and scale effects, ( iii) expanding political and economic control, and ( iv) deteriorating social cohesion. While direct environmental impacts matter, the indirect and systemic effects of digitalization are more profoundly reshaping the relationship between humans, technosphere and planet. We develop three scenarios: planetary instability, green but inhumane, and deliberate for the good. We conclude with identifying leverage points that shift human–digital–Earth interactions toward sustainability. 

We study the firm-level implications of robot adoption in France. Of 55,390 firms in our sample, 598 adopted robots between 2010 and 2015, but these firms accounted for 20 percent of manufacturing employment. Adopters experienced significant declines in labor shares, the share of production workers in employment, and increases in value added and productivity. They expand their overall employment as well. However, this expansion comes at the expense of competitors, leading to an overall negative association between adoption and employment. Robot adoption has a large impact on the labor share because adopters are larger and grow faster than their competitors.