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Problem definition: Inventory management problems with periodic and controllable resets occur in the context of managing water storage in the developing world and dynamically optimizing endcap promotion duration in retail outlets. In this paper, we consider a set of sequential decision problems in which the decision maker must not only balance holding and shortage costs but discard all inventory before a fixed number of decision epochs with the option for an early inventory reset. Methodology/results: Finding optimal policies for these problems through dynamic programming presents unique challenges because of the nonconvex nature of the resulting value functions. Moreover, this structure cannot be readily analyzed even with extended convexity definitions, such as K-convexity. Managerial implications: Our key contribution is to present sufficient conditions that ensure the optimal policy has an easily interpretable structure, which generalizes the well-known [Formula: see text] policy from the operations management literature. Furthermore, we demonstrate that, under these rather mild conditions, the optimal policy exhibits a four-threshold structure. We then conclude with computational experiments, thereby illustrating the policy structures that can be extracted in various inventory management scenarios. Funding: This work was supported by the National Science Foundation [Grant CMMI-1847666] and the Division of Graduate Education [Grant DGE-2125913]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0318 . 

The rapid growth of electric vehicles (EVs) is driving the expansion of charging infrastructure globally. As charging stations become ubiquitous, their substantial electricity consumption can influence grid operation and electricity pricing. Naturally, some groups of charging stations, which could be jointly operated by a company, may coordinate to decide their charging profile. While coordination among all charging stations is ideal, it is unclear if coordination of some charging stations is better than no coordination. In this paper, we analyze this intermediate regime between no and full coordination of charging stations. We model EV charging as a non-cooperative aggregative game, where each station’s cost is determined by both monetary payments tied to reactive electricity prices on the grid and its sensitivity to deviations from a desired charging profile. We consider a solution concept that we call C-Nash equilibrium, which is tied to a coalition C of charging stations coordinating to reduce their costs. We provide sufficient conditions, in terms of the demand and sensitivity of charging stations, to determine when independent (aka uncoordinated) operation of charging stations could result in lower overall costs to charging stations, coalition and charging stations outside the coalition. Somewhat counter to common intuition, we show numerical instances where allowing charging stations to operate independently is better than coordinating a subset of stations as a coalition. Jointly, these results provide operators of charging stations insights into how to coordinate their charging behavior, and open several research directions. 

A large fraction of total healthcare expenditure occurs due to end-of-life (EOL) care, which means it is important to study the problem of more carefully incentivizing necessary versus unnecessary EOL care because this has the potential to reduce overall healthcare spending. This paper introduces a principal-agent model that integrates a mixed payment system of fee-for-service and pay-for-performance in order to analyze whether it is possible to better align healthcare provider incentives with patient outcomes and cost-efficiency in EOL care. The primary contributions are to derive optimal contracts for EOL care payments using a principal-agent framework under three separate models for the healthcare provider, where each model considers a different level of risk tolerance for the provider. We derive these optimal contracts by converting the underlying principal-agent models from a bilevel optimization problem into a single-level optimization problem that can be analytically solved. Our results are demonstrated using a simulation where an optimal contract is used to price intracranial pressure monitoring for traumatic brain injuries.