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While distributed application-layer tracing is widely used for performance diagnosis in microservices, its coarse granularity at the service level limits its applicability towards detecting more fine-grained system level issues. To address this problem, cross-layer stitching of tracing information has been proposed. However, all existing cross-layer stitching approaches either require modification of the kernel or need updates in the application-layer tracing library to propagate stitching information, both of which add further complex modifications to existing tracing tools. This paper introduces Deepstitch, a deep learning based approach to stitch cross-layer tracing information without requiring any changes to existing application layer tracing tools. Deepstitch leverages a global view of a distributed application composed of multiple services and learns the global system call sequences across all services involved. This knowledge is then used to stitch system call sequences with service-level traces obtained from a deployed application. Our proof of concept experiments show that the proposed approach successfully maps application-level interaction into the system call sequences and can identify thread-level interactions. 

Emerging microservices-based workloads introduce new security risks in today's data centers as attacks can propagate laterally within the data center relatively easily by exploiting cross-service dependencies. As countermeasures for such attacks, traditional perimeterization approaches, such as network-endpoint-based access control, do not fare well in highly dynamic microservices environments (especially considering the management complexity, scalability and policy granularity of these earlier approaches). In this paper, we propose eZTrust, a network-independent perimeterization approach for microservices. eZTrust allows data center tenants to express access control policies based on fine-grained workload identities, and enables data center operators to enforce such policies reliably and efficiently in a purely network-independent fashion. To this end, we leverage eBPF, the extended Berkeley Packet Filter, to trace authentic workload identities and apply per-packet tagging and verification. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach through extensive evaluation of our proof-of-concept prototype implementation. We find that, when comparable policies are enforced, eZTrust incurs 2--5 times lower packet latency and 1.5--2.5 times lower CPU overhead than traditional perimeterization schemes.