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Creators/Authors contains: "Chen, Yihsu"

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  1. Utilizing distributed renewable and energy storage resources via peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has long been touted as a solution to improve energy system’s resilience and sustainability. Consumers and prosumers (those who have energy generation resources), however, do not have expertise to engage in repeated P2P trading, and the zero-marginal costs of renewables present challenges in determining fair market prices. To address these issues, we propose a multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework to help automate consumers’ bidding and management of their solar PV and energy storage resources, under a specific P2P clearing mechanism that utilizes the so-called supply-demand ratio. In addition, we show how the MARL framework can integrate physical network constraints to realize decentralized voltage control, hence ensuring physical feasibility of the P2P energy trading and paving ways for real-world implementations. 
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  2. Under the ruling of FERC Order 2222, prosumers who own distributed energy resources are expected to play an essential role that can significantly affect the market outcomes. This paper assesses the market power potential of a risk-averse prosumer by designating it as a Stackelberg leader in the market. We formulate the problem as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints with a distributionally robust chance-constrained framework to account for the renewable generation uncertainty. The numerical results demonstrate that the prosumer’s strategy depends on the magnitude of renewable generation uncertainty and the degree of risk aversion, which jointly affect the perceived quantity of its renewable resources. The risk-averse Stackelberg case always yields a higher payoff for the prosumer compared to the Cournot and perfect competition cases. Moreover, it is more potent for the prosumer to exercise buyer’s market power rather than seller’s market power. The situation worsens when the prosumer is less risk averse. This highlights the importance of understanding the role of the prosumer acting either as a consumer or as a producer and the risk faced by the prosumer when evaluating its interaction with the wholesale market. 
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