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We study the fair and efficient allocation of a set of indivisible goods among agents, where each good has several copies, and each agent has an additively separable concave valuation function with a threshold. These valuations capture the property of diminishing marginal returns, and they are more general than the well-studied case of additive valuations. We present a polynomial-time algorithm that approximates the optimal Nash social welfare (NSW) up to a factor of e1/e ≈ 1.445. This matches with the state-of-the-art approximation factor for additive valuations. The computed allocation also satisfies the popular fairness guarantee of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) up to a factor of 2 + ε. For instances without thresholds, it is also approximately Pareto-optimal. For instances satisfying a large market property, we show an improved approximation factor. Lastly, we show that the upper bounds on the optimal NSW introduced in Cole and Gkatzelis (2018) and Barman et al. (2018) have the same value. 

We seek tight bounds on the viable parallelism in asynchronous implementations of coordinate descent that achieves linear speedup. We focus on asynchronous coordinate descent (ACD) algorithms on convex functions which consist of the sum of a smooth convex part and a possibly non-smooth separable convex part. We quantify the shortfall in progress compared to the standard sequential stochastic gradient descent. This leads to a simple yet tight analysis of the standard stochastic ACD in a partially asynchronous environment, generalizing and improving the bounds in prior work. We also give a considerably more involved analysis for general asynchronous environments in which the only constraint is that each update can overlap with at most q others. The new lower bound on the maximum degree of parallelism attaining linear speedup is tight and improves the best prior bound almost quadratically. 

We consider the task of assigning indivisible goods to a set of agents in a fair manner. Our notion of fairness is Nash social welfare, i.e., the goal is to maximize the geometric mean of the utilities of the agents. Each good comes in multiple items or copies, and the utility of an agent diminishes as it receives more items of the same good. The utility of a bundle of items for an agent is the sum of the utilities of the items in the bundle. Each agent has a utility cap beyond which he does not value additional items. We give a polynomial time approximation algorithm that maximizes Nash social welfare up to a factor of e^{1/{e}} ~ 1.445. The computed allocation is Pareto-optimal and approximates envy-freeness up to one item up to a factor of 2 + epsilon.