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Differential privacy is a popular privacy-enhancing technology that has been deployed both by industry and government agencies. Unfortunately, existing explanations of differential privacy fail to set accurate privacy expectations for data subjects, which depend on the choice of deployment model. We design and evaluate new explanations of differential privacy for the local and central models, drawing inspiration from prior work explaining other privacy-enhancing technologies such as encryption. We reflect on the challenges in evaluating explanations and on the tradeoffs between qualitative and quantitative evaluation strategies. These reflections offer guidance for other researchers seeking to design and evaluate explanations of privacy-enhancing technologies. 

Synthetic control is a causal inference tool used to estimate the treatment effects of an intervention by creating synthetic counterfactual data. This approach combines measurements from other similar observations (i.e., donor pool) to predict a counterfactual time series of interest (i.e., target unit) by analyzing the relationship between the target and the donor pool before the intervention. As synthetic control tools are increasingly applied to sensitive or proprietary data, formal privacy protections are often required. In this work, we provide the first algorithms for differentially private synthetic control with explicit error bounds. Our approach builds upon tools from non-private synthetic control and differentially private empirical risk minimization. We provide upper and lower bounds on the sensitivity of the synthetic control query and provide explicit error bounds on the accuracy of our private synthetic control algorithms. We show that our algorithms produce accurate predictions for the target unit and that the cost of privacy is small. Finally, we empirically evaluate the performance of our algorithm, and show favorable performance in a variety of parameter regimes, as well as provide guidance to practitioners for hyperparameter tuning. 

In this work we first show that the classical Thompson sampling algorithm for multi-arm bandits is differentially private as-is, without any modification. We provide per-round privacy guarantees as a function of problem parameters and show composition over T rounds; since the algorithm is unchanged, existing O( √ NT logN) regret bounds still hold and there is no loss in performance due to privacy. We then show that simple modifications – such as pre-pulling all arms a fixed number of times, increasing the sampling variance – can provide tighter privacy guarantees. We again provide privacy guarantees that now depend on the new parameters introduced in the modification, which allows the analyst to tune the privacy guarantee as desired. We also provide a novel regret analysis for this new algorithm, and show how the new parameters also impact expected regret. Finally, we empirically validate and illustrate our theoretical findings in two parameter regimes and demonstrate that tuning the new parameters substantially improve the privacy-regret tradeoff. 

Despite recent widespread deployment of differential privacy, relatively little is known about what users think of differential privacy. In this work, we seek to explore users' privacy expectations related to differential privacy. Specifically, we investigate (1) whether users care about the protections afforded by differential privacy, and (2) whether they are therefore more willing to share their data with differentially private systems. Further, we attempt to understand (3) users' privacy expectations of the differentially private systems they may encounter in practice and (4) their willingness to share data in such systems. To answer these questions, we use a series of rigorously conducted surveys (n=2424).   We find that users care about the kinds of information leaks against which differential privacy protects and are more willing to share their private information when the risks of these leaks are less likely to happen.  Additionally, we find that the ways in which differential privacy is described in-the-wild haphazardly set users' privacy expectations, which can be misleading depending on the deployment. We synthesize our results into a framework for understanding a user's willingness to share information with differentially private systems, which takes into account the interaction between the user's prior privacy concerns and how differential privacy is described.