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Despite hundreds of studies examining belief in conspiracy theories, it is still unclear who—demographically—is most likely to believe such theories. To remedy this knowledge gap, we examine survey data containing various operationalizations of conspiracism across diverse sociopolitical contexts. Study 1 employs a 2021 U.S. survey (n = 2021) to examine associations between sociodemographic characteristics and beliefs in 39 conspiracy theories. Study 2 similarly employs a survey of 20 countries (n = 26,416) and 11 conspiracy theory beliefs. Study 3 reports results from a 2020 U.S. survey (n = 2015) measuring perceptions about which groups are engaging in conspiracies. Study 4 interrogates data from nine U.S. surveys (2012–2022; n = 14,334) to examine the relationships between sociodemographic characteristics and generalized conspiracy thinking. Study 5 synchronizes studies 1–4 to provide an intersectional analysis of conspiracy theory belief. Across studies, we observe remarkably consistent patterns: education, income, age (older), and White identification are negatively related to conspiracism, while Black identification is positively related. We conclude by discussing why conspiracy theories may appeal most to historically marginalized groups and how our findings can inform efforts to mitigate the negative effects of conspiracy theories.

 

The “White Replacement” conspiracy theory, that governments and corporations are “replacing” white people, is linked to several mass shootings. Given its recent ubiquity in elite rhetoric, concerns have arisen about the popularity of this conspiracy theory among the United States mass public. Further, political scientists have noted a need to understand why people believe or act upon this conspiracy theory. Using a 2022 US national survey (n = 2001), we find that a third of Americans agree that leaders are replacing white people with people of color. These beliefs are related to anti-social personality traits, various forms of nationalist and authoritarian sentiments, and negative sentiments toward immigrants, minorities, women, and the political establishment. Regression analysis however fails to find significant effects of partisanship and ideology on these beliefs. Further, we observed that these beliefs are related to a desire to engage in both normative (e.g., run for political office) and nonnormative political participation (e.g., commit violence). Given the popularity of White Replacement conspiracy theories in the US and elsewhere, our findings suggest new avenues for research into potentially dangerous beliefs, as well as xenophobia, antisemitism, racism, sexism, extremism, and political violence. 

While a robust literature on the psychology of conspiracy theories has identified dozens of characteristics correlated with conspiracy theory beliefs, much less attention has been paid to understanding the generalized predisposition towards interpreting events and circumstances as the product of supposed conspiracies. Using a unique national survey of 2015 U.S. adults from October 2020, we investigate the relationship between this predisposition—conspiracy thinking—and 34 different psychological, political, and social correlates. Using conditional inference tree modeling—a machine learning-based approach designed to facilitate prediction using a flexible modeling methodology—we identify the characteristics that are most useful for orienting individuals along the conspiracy thinking continuum, including (but not limited to): anomie, Manicheanism, support for political violence, a tendency to share false information online, populism, narcissism, and psychopathy. Altogether, psychological characteristics are much more useful in predicting conspiracy thinking than are political and social characteristics, though even our robust set of correlates only partially accounts for variance in conspiracy thinking.

 

The current system of peer review drives racial and gender disparities in publication and funding outcomes and can suppress the perspectives of marginalized scholars. Established researchers have an opportunity to help to build a fairer and more inclusive peer review culture by advocating for and empowering their trainees. 

Some people share misinformation accidentally, but others do so knowingly. To fully understand the spread of misinformation online, it is important to analyze those who purposely share it. Using a 2022 U.S. survey, we found that 14 percent of respondents reported knowingly sharing misinformation, and that these respondents were more likely to also report support for political violence, a desire to run for office, and warm feelings toward extremists. These respondents were also more likely to have elevated levels of a psychological need for chaos, dark tetrad traits, and paranoia. Our findings illuminate one vector through which misinformation is spread.

 

Abstract Understanding the individual-level characteristics associated with conspiracy theory beliefs is vital to addressing and combatting those beliefs. While researchers have identified numerous psychological and political characteristics associated with conspiracy theory beliefs, the generalizability of those findings is uncertain because they are typically drawn from studies of only a few conspiracy theories. Here, we employ a national survey of 2021 U.S. adults that asks about 15 psychological and political characteristics as well as beliefs in 39 different conspiracy theories. Across 585 relationships examined within both bivariate (correlations) and multivariate (regression) frameworks, we find that psychological traits (e.g., dark triad) and non-partisan/ideological political worldviews (e.g., populism, support for violence) are most strongly related to individual conspiracy theory beliefs, regardless of the belief under consideration, while other previously identified correlates (e.g., partisanship, ideological extremity) are inconsistently related. We also find that the correlates of specific conspiracy theory beliefs mirror those of conspiracy thinking (the predisposition), indicating that this predisposition operates like an ‘average’ of individual conspiracy theory beliefs. Overall, our findings detail the psychological and political traits of the individuals most drawn to conspiracy theories and have important implications for scholars and practitioners seeking to prevent or reduce the impact of conspiracy theories. 

Using data from 15 countries, this article investigates whether descriptive and prescriptive gender norms concerning housework and child care (domestic work) changed after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Results of a total of 8,343 participants ( M = 19.95, SD = 1.68) from two comparable student samples suggest that descriptive norms about unpaid domestic work have been affected by the pandemic, with individuals seeing mothers’ relative to fathers’ share of housework and child care as even larger. Moderation analyses revealed that the effect of the pandemic on descriptive norms about child care decreased with countries’ increasing levels of gender equality; countries with stronger gender inequality showed a larger difference between pre- and post-pandemic. This study documents a shift in descriptive norms and discusses implications for gender equality—emphasizing the importance of addressing the additional challenges that mothers face during health-related crises.

 

Four studies examine the faculty–student relationship as a mechanism through which students ascertain their place in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields. Studies 1 and 2 use experimental methods to demonstrate STEM faculty who behave communally, relative to independently, increase undergraduates’ belonging and interest in STEM roles through anticipation of greater role-specific support (i.e., support that emphasizes guiding students through structures and activities of field-specific roles). Study 3 then examined the consequences of role-specific support for undergraduates’ belonging and interest in STEM. Students anticipated more belonging and interest in STEM roles when faculty provided high levels of role-specific support. Finally, STEM doctoral students’ perception of role-specific support from faculty related to their belonging and future identification in STEM fields (Study 4). Taken together, these studies demonstrate the importance of students’ construals of role-specific support from faculty, and how faculty behavior signals role-specific support, with benefits for student involvement in STEM. 

Psychological science is at an inflection point: The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated inequalities that stem from our historically closed and exclusive culture. Meanwhile, reform efforts to change the future of our science are too narrow in focus to fully succeed. In this article, we call on psychological scientists—focusing specifically on those who use quantitative methods in the United States as one context for such conversations—to begin reimagining our discipline as fundamentally open and inclusive. First, we discuss whom our discipline was designed to serve and how this history produced the inequitable reward and support systems we see today. Second, we highlight how current institutional responses to address worsening inequalities are inadequate, as well as how our disciplinary perspective may both help and hinder our ability to craft effective solutions. Third, we take a hard look in the mirror at the disconnect between what we ostensibly value as a field and what we actually practice. Fourth and finally, we lead readers through a roadmap for reimagining psychological science in whatever roles and spaces they occupy, from an informal discussion group in a department to a formal strategic planning retreat at a scientific society.