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Creators/Authors contains: "Feinstein, Zachary"

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1. In this work we present an equilibrium formulation for price impacts. This is motivated by the Bühlmann equilibrium in which assets are sold into a system of market participants, for example, a fire sale in systemic risk, and can be viewed as a generalization of the Esscher premium. Existence and uniqueness of clearing prices for the liquidation of a portfolio are studied. We also investigate other desired portfolio properties including monotonicity and concavity. Price per portfolio unit sold is also calculated. In special cases, we study price impacts generated by market participants who follow the exponential utility and power utility.
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2. Nonzero sum games typically have multiple Nash equilibriums (or no equilibrium), and unlike the zero-sum case, they may have different values at different equilibriums. Instead of focusing on the existence of individual equilibriums, we study the set of values over all equilibriums, which we call the set value of the game. The set value is unique by nature and always exists (with possible value [Formula: see text]). Similar to the standard value function in control literature, it enjoys many nice properties, such as regularity, stability, and more importantly, the dynamic programming principle. There are two main features in order to obtain the dynamic programming principle: (i) we must use closed-loop controls (instead of open-loop controls); and (ii) we must allow for path dependent controls, even if the problem is in a state-dependent (Markovian) setting. We shall consider both discrete and continuous time models with finite time horizon. For the latter, we will also provide a duality approach through certain standard PDE (or path-dependent PDE), which is quite efficient for numerically computing the set value of the game.
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