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  1. ; ; ( , ACM)
    Hartline, Jason (Ed.)
    The arrival of digital commerce has lead to an increasing use of personalization and differentiation strategies. With differentiated products along the quality dimension and/or the quantity dimension comes the need for nonlinear pricing policies or second degree price discrimination. The optimal pricing strategies for quality and quantity differentiated products were first investigated by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984), respectively. The optimal pricing strategies were shown to depend heavily on the prior distribution of the private information regarding the types, and ultimately the willingness-to-pay of the buyers. Yet, frequently the sellers possess only weak and incomplete information about the distribution of demand. This paper aims to develop robust pricing policies that are independent of specific demand distributions and provide revenue guarantees across all possible distributions. 
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  2. ; ; ; ; ( , American Economic Review: Insights)
    We characterize the revenue-maximizing information structure in the second-price auction. The seller faces a trade-off: more information improves the efficiency of the allocation but creates higher information rents for bidders. The information disclosure policy that maximizes the revenue of the seller is to fully reveal low values (where competition is high) but to pool high values (where competition is low). The size of the pool is determined by a critical quantile that is independent of the distribution of values and only dependent on the number of bidders. We discuss how this policy provides a rationale for conflation in digital advertising. (JEL D44, D82, D83, M37) 
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  3. ; ; ( , The RAND Journal of Economics)
    null (Ed.)
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  4. ; ; ; ; ( , Physical Review E)