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We present Seq2Parse, a language-agnostic neurosymbolic approach to automatically repairing parse errors. Seq2Parse is based on the insight that Symbolic Error Correcting (EC) Parsers can, in principle, synthesize repairs, but, in practice, are overwhelmed by the many error-correction rules that are not relevant to the particular program that requires repair. In contrast, Neural approaches are fooled by the large space of possible sequence level edits, but can precisely pinpoint the set of EC-rules that are relevant to a particular program. We show how to combine their complementary strengths by using neural methods to train a sequence classifier that predicts the small set of relevant EC-rules for an ill-parsed program, after which, the symbolic EC-parsing algorithm can make short work of generating useful repairs. We train and evaluate our method on a dataset of 1,100,000 Python programs, and show that Seq2Parse is accurate and efficient : it can parse 94% of our tests within 2.1 seconds, while generating the exact user fix in 1 out 3 of the cases; and useful : humans perceive both Seq2Parse-generated error locations and repairs to be almost as good as human-generated ones in a statistically-significant manner.

Software sandboxing or software-based fault isolation (SFI) is a lightweight approach to building secure systems out of untrusted components. Mozilla, for example, uses SFI to harden the Firefox browser by sandboxing third-party libraries, and companies like Fastly and Cloudflare use SFI to safely co-locate untrusted tenants on their edge clouds. While there have been significant efforts to optimize and verify SFI enforcement, context switching in SFI systems remains largely unexplored: almost all SFI systems use heavyweight transitions that are not only error-prone but incur significant performance overhead from saving, clearing, and restoring registers when context switching. We identify a set of zero-cost conditions that characterize when sandboxed code has sufficient structured to guarantee security via lightweight zero-cost transitions (simple function calls). We modify the Lucet Wasm compiler and its runtime to use zero-cost transitions, eliminating the undue performance tax on systems that rely on Lucet for sandboxing (e.g., we speed up image and font rendering in Firefox by up to 29.7% and 10% respectively). To remove the Lucet compiler and its correct implementation of the Wasm specification from the trusted computing base, we (1) develop a static binary verifier , VeriZero, which (in seconds) checks that binaries produced by Lucetmore »satisfy our zero-cost conditions, and (2) prove the soundness of VeriZero by developing a logical relation that captures when a compiled Wasm function is semantically well-behaved with respect to our zero-cost conditions. Finally, we show that our model is useful beyond Wasm by describing a new, purpose-built SFI system, SegmentZero32, that uses x86 segmentation and LLVM with mostly off-the-shelf passes to enforce our zero-cost conditions; our prototype performs on-par with the state-of-the-art Native Client SFI system.« less

We present STORM, a web framework that allows developers to build MVC applications with compile-time enforcement of centrally specified data-dependent security policies. STORM ensures security using a Security Typed ORM that refines the (type) abstractions of each layer of the MVC API with logical assertions that describe the data produced and consumed by the underlying operation and the users allowed access to that data. To evaluate the security guarantees of STORM, we build a formally verified reference implementation using the Labeled IO (LIO) IFC framework. We present case studies and end-to- end applications that show how STORM lets developers specify diverse policies while centralizing the trusted code to under 1% of the application, and statically enforces security with modest type annotation overhead, and no run-time cost.

We introduce Blade, a new approach to automatically and efficiently eliminate speculative leaks from cryptographic code. Blade is built on the insight that to stop leaks via speculative execution, it suffices to cut the dataflow from expressions that speculatively introduce secrets ( sources ) to those that leak them through the cache ( sinks ), rather than prohibit speculation altogether. We formalize this insight in a static type system that (1) types each expression as either transient , i.e., possibly containing speculative secrets or as being stable , and (2) prohibits speculative leaks by requiring that all sink expressions are stable. Blade relies on a new abstract primitive, protect , to halt speculation at fine granularity. We formalize and implement protect using existing architectural mechanisms, and show how Blade’s type system can automatically synthesize a minimal number of protect s to provably eliminate speculative leaks. We implement Blade in the Cranelift WebAssembly compiler and evaluate our approach by repairing several verified, yet vulnerable WebAssembly implementations of cryptographic primitives. We find that Blade can fix existing programs that leak via speculation automatically , without user intervention, and efficiently even when using fences to implement protect .

We consider the problem of type-directed component-based synthesis where, given a set of (typed) components and a query type , the goal is to synthesize a term that inhabits the query. Classical approaches based on proof search in intuitionistic logics do not scale up to the standard libraries of modern languages, which span hundreds or thousands of components. Recent graph reachability based methods proposed for Java do scale, but only apply to monomorphic data and components: polymorphic data and components infinitely explode the size of the graph that must be searched, rendering synthesis intractable. We introduce type-guided abstraction refinement (TYGAR), a new approach for scalable type-directed synthesis over polymorphic datatypes and components. Our key insight is that we can overcome the explosion by building a graph over abstract types which represent a potentially unbounded set of concrete types. We show how to use graph reachability to search for candidate terms over abstract types, and introduce a new algorithm that uses proofs of untypeability of ill-typed candidates to iteratively refine the abstraction until a well-typed result is found. We have implemented TYGAR in H+, a tool that takes as input a set of Haskell libraries and a query type, and returnsmore »a Haskell term that uses functions from the provided libraries to implement the query type. Our support for polymorphism allows H+ to work with higher-order functions and type classes, and enables more precise queries due to parametricity. We have evaluated H+ on 44 queries using a set of popular Haskell libraries with a total of 291 components. H+ returns an interesting solution within the first five results for 32 out of 44 queries. Our results show that TYGAR allows H+ to rapidly return well-typed terms, with the median time to first solution of just 1.4 seconds. Moreover, we observe that gains from iterative refinement over exhaustive enumeration are more pronounced on harder queries.« less