skip to main content

Search for: All records

Creators/Authors contains: "Kaestner, Christian"

Note: When clicking on a Digital Object Identifier (DOI) number, you will be taken to an external site maintained by the publisher. Some full text articles may not yet be available without a charge during the embargo (administrative interval).
What is a DOI Number?

Some links on this page may take you to non-federal websites. Their policies may differ from this site.

  1. Data science pipelines to train and evaluate models with machine learning may contain bugs just like any other code. Leakage between training and test data can lead to overestimating the model’s accuracy during offline evaluations, possibly leading to deployment of low-quality models in production. Such leakage can happen easily by mistake or by following poor practices, but may be tedious and challenging to detect manually. We develop a static analysis approach to detect common forms of data leakage in data science code. Our evaluation shows that our analysis accurately detects data leakage and that such leakage is pervasive among over 100,000 analyzed public notebooks. We discuss how our static analysis approach can help both practitioners and educators, and how leakage prevention can be designed into the development process. 
    more » « less
  2. The notion of forking has changed with the rise of distributed ver- sion control systems and social coding environments, like GitHub. Traditionally forking refers to splitting off an independent devel- opment branch (which we call hard forks); research on hard forks, conducted mostly in pre-GitHub days showed that hard forks were often seen critical as they may fragment a community. Today, in so- cial coding environments, open-source developers are encouraged to fork a project in order to contribute to the community (which we call social forks), which may have also influenced perceptions and practices around hard forks. To revisit hard forks, we identify, study, and classify 15,306 hard forks on GitHub and interview 18 owners of hard forks or forked repositories. We find that, among others, hard forks often evolve out of social forks rather than being planned deliberately and that perception about hard forks have indeed changed dramatically, seeing them often as a positive non- competitive alternative to the original project. 
    more » « less
  3. Open source is ubiquitous and many projects act as critical in- frastructure, yet funding and sustaining the whole ecosystem is challenging. While there are many different funding models for open source and concerted efforts through foundations, donation platforms like PayPal, Patreon, and OpenCollective are popular and low-bar platforms to raise funds for open-source development. With a mixed-method study, we investigate the emerging and largely unexplored phenomenon of donations in open source. Specifically, we quantify how commonly open-source projects ask for donations, statistically model characteristics of projects that ask for and re- ceive donations, analyze for what the requested funds are needed and used, and assess whether the received donations achieve the intended outcomes. We find 25,885 projects asking for donations on GitHub, often to support engineering activities; however, we also find no clear evidence that donations influence the activity level of a project. In fact, we find that donations are used in a multitude of ways, raising new research questions about effective funding. 
    more » « less
  4. With an increased level of automation provided by package managers, which sometimes allow updates to be installed automatically, malicious package updates are becoming a real threat in software ecosystems. To address this issue, we propose an approach based on anomaly detection, to identify suspicious updates based on security-relevant features that attackers could use in an attack. We evaluate our approach in the context of Node.js/npm ecosystem, to show its feasibility in terms of reduced review effort and the correct identification of a confirmed malicious update attack. Although we do not expect it to be a complete solution in isolation, we believe it is an important security building block for software ecosystems. 
    more » « less