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While the stable marriage problem and its variants model a vast range of matching markets, they fail to capture complex agent relationships, such as the affiliation of applicants and employers in an interview marketplace. To model this problem, the existing literature on matching with externalities permits agents to provide complete and total rankings over matchings based off of both their own and their affiliates' matches. This complete ordering restriction is unrealistic, and further the model may have an empty core. To address this, we introduce the Dichotomous Affiliate Stable Matching (DASM) Problem, where agents' preferences indicate dichotomous acceptance or rejection of another agent in the marketplace, both for themselves and their affiliates. We also assume the agent's preferences over entire matchings are determined by a general weighted valuation function of their (and their affiliates') matches. Our results are threefold: (1) we use a human study to show that real-world matching rankings follow our assumed valuation function; (2) we prove that there always exists a stable solution by providing an efficient, easily-implementable algorithm that finds such a solution; and (3) we experimentally validate the efficiency of our algorithm versus a linear-programming-based approach. 

We provide a polynomial-time, scalable algorithm for equilibrium computation in multi-agent influence games on networks, extending work of Bindel, Kleinberg, and Oren (2015) from the single-agent to the multi-agent setting. In games of influence, agents have limited advertising budget to influence the initial predisposition of nodes in some network towards their products, but the eventual decisions of the nodes are determined by the stationary state of DeGroot opinion dynamics on the network, which takes over after the seeding (Ahmadinejad et al. 2014, 2015). In multi-agent systems, how should agents spend their budgets to seed the network to maximize their utility in anticipation of other advertising agents and the network dynamics? We show that Nash equilibria of this game are pure and (under weak assumptions) unique, and can be computed in polynomial time; we test our model by computing equilibria using mirror descent for the two-agent case on random graphs. 

Generating and executing temporal plans is difficult in uncertain environments. The current state-of-the-art algorithm for probabilistic temporal networks maintains a high success rate by rescheduling frequently as uncertain events are resolved, but this approach involves substantial resource overhead due to computing and communicating new schedules between agents. Aggressive rescheduling could thus reduce overall mission duration or success in situations where agents have limited energy or computing power, and may not be feasible when communication is limited. In this paper, we propose new approaches for heuristically deciding when rescheduling is most efficacious. We propose two compatible approaches, Allowable Risk and Sufficient Change, that can be employed in combination to compromise between the computation rate, the communication rate, and success rate for new schedules. We show empirically that both approaches allow us to gracefully trade success rate for lower computation and/or communication as compared to the state-of-the-art dynamic scheduling algorithm.