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The present study, conducted immediately after the 2020 presidential election in the United States, examined whether Democrats’ and Republicans’ polarized assessments of election legitimacy increased over time. In a naturalistic survey experiment, people ( N = 1,236) were randomly surveyed either during the week following Election Day, with votes cast but the outcome unknown, or during the following week, after President Joseph Biden was widely declared the winner. The design unconfounded the election outcome announcement from the vote itself, allowing more precise testing of predictions derived from cognitive dissonance theory. As predicted, perceived election legitimacy increased among Democrats, from the first to the second week following Election Day, as their expected Biden win was confirmed, whereas perceived election legitimacy decreased among Republicans as their expected President Trump win was disconfirmed. From the first to the second week following Election Day, Republicans reported stronger negative emotions and weaker positive emotions while Democrats reported stronger positive emotions and weaker negative emotions. The polarized perceptions of election legitimacy were correlated with the tendencies to trust and consume polarized media. Consumption of Fox News was associated with lowered perceptions of election legitimacy over time whereas consumption of other outlets was associated with higher perceptions of election legitimacy over time. Discussion centers on the role of the media in the experience of cognitive dissonance and the implications of polarized perceptions of election legitimacy for psychology, political science, and the future of democratic society. 

Political polarization impeded public support for policies to reduce the spread of COVID-19, much as polarization hinders responses to other contemporary challenges. Unlike previous theory and research that focused on the United States, the present research examined the effects of political elite cues and affective polarization on support for policies to manage the COVID-19 pandemic in seven countries ( n = 12,955): Brazil, Israel, Italy, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Across countries, cues from political elites polarized public attitudes toward COVID-19 policies. Liberal and conservative respondents supported policies proposed by ingroup politicians and parties more than the same policies from outgroup politicians and parties. Respondents disliked, distrusted, and felt cold toward outgroup political elites, whereas they liked, trusted, and felt warm toward both ingroup political elites and nonpartisan experts. This affective polarization was correlated with policy support. These findings imply that policies from bipartisan coalitions and nonpartisan experts would be less polarizing, enjoying broader public support. Indeed, across countries, policies from bipartisan coalitions and experts were more widely supported. A follow-up experiment replicated these findings among US respondents considering international vaccine distribution policies. The polarizing effects of partisan elites and affective polarization emerged across nations that vary in cultures, ideologies, and political systems. Contrary to some propositions, the United States was not exceptionally polarized. Rather, these results suggest that polarizing processes emerged simply from categorizing people into political ingroups and outgroups. Political elites drive polarization globally, but nonpartisan experts can help resolve the conflicts that arise from it. 

Abstract People believe they should consider how their behavior might negatively impact other people, Yet their behavior often increases others’ health risks. This creates challenges for managing public health crises like the COVID-19 pandemic. We examined a procedure wherein people reflect on their personal criteria regarding how their behavior impacts others’ health risks. We expected structured reflection to increase people's intentions and decisions to reduce others’ health risks. Structured reflection increases attention to others’ health risks and the correspondence between people's personal criteria and behavioral intentions. In four experiments during COVID-19, people (N  = 12,995) reported their personal criteria about how much specific attributes, including the impact on others’ health risks, should influence their behavior. Compared with control conditions, people who engaged in structured reflection reported greater intentions to reduce business capacity (experiment 1) and avoid large social gatherings (experiments 2 and 3). They also donated more to provide vaccines to refugees (experiment 4). These effects emerged across seven countries that varied in collectivism and COVID-19 case rates (experiments 1 and 2). Structured reflection was distinct from instructions to carefully deliberate (experiment 3). Structured reflection increased the correlation between personal criteria and behavioral intentions (experiments 1 and 3). And structured reflection increased donations more among people who scored lower in cognitive reflection compared with those who scored higher in cognitive reflection (experiment 4). These findings suggest that structured reflection can effectively increase behaviors to reduce public health risks. 

We (Meltzoff et al., 2018) described how Oostenbroek et al.’s (2016) design likely dampened infant imitation. In their commentary, Oostenbroek et al. (2018) argue that our points are post hoc. It is important for readers to know that they are not. Our paper restated “best practices” described in published papers. Based on the literature, the design used by Oostenbroek et al. (2016) would be predicted to dampen infant imitation. First, Oostenbroek et al.’s (2016) test periods were too brief. The stimulus presentation for each type of gesture was too short to ensure that neonates saw the display. The response measurement period did not allow neonates sufficient time to organize a motor response. Meltzoff and Moore (1983a, 1994) introduced experimental procedures specifically designed to address these issues (also, Simpson, Murray, Paukner, & Ferrari, 2014). Oostenbroek et al. did not capitalize on these procedural advances. Second, Oostenbroek et al. allowed uncontrolled experimenter–infant interactions during the test session itself. Previous papers on imitation provided analyses of how uncontrolled interactions with the experimenter can introduce “noise” in experiments of facial imitation (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983b, 1994). Third, Oostenbroek et al. used suboptimal eliciting conditions. Neonates cannot support their own heads; in Oostenbroek et al., infants’ heads were allowed to flop from side-to-side unsupported on the experimenter’s lap while the experimenter gestured with both hands. In addition, papers have listed techniques for maximizing visual attention (controlled lighting, homogeneous background) (Meltzoff & Moore, 1989, 1994). Oostenbroek et al. tested infants on a couch in the home. Despite a design that would blunt imitation, our reanalysis of Oostenbroek et al.’s data showed a response pattern that is consistent with the imitation of tongue protrusion (TP). In their commentary, Oostenbroek et al. (2018) now propose limiting analyses to a subset of their original controls. We reanalyzed their data accordingly. Again, the results support early imitation. Their cross-sectional data (Oostenbroek et al., 2016, Table S4) collapsed across age show significantly more infant TP in response to the TP demonstration than to the mean of the six dynamic face controls (mouth, happy, sad, mmm, ee, and click): t(104) = 4.62, p = 0.00001. The results are also significant using a narrower subset of stimuli (mouth, happy, and sad): t(104) = 3.20, p = 0.0018. These results rule out arousal, because the adult TP demonstration was significantly more effective in eliciting infant tongue protrusions than the category of dynamic face controls. Tongue protrusion matching is a robust phenomenon successfully elicited in more than two dozen studies (reviews: Meltzoff & Moore, 1997; Nagy, Pilling, Orvos, & Molnar, 2013; Simpson et al., 2014). There are more general lessons to be drawn. Psychology is experiencing what some call a “replication crisis.” Those who attempt to reproduce effects have scientific responsibilities, as do original authors. Both can help psychology become a more cumulative science. It is crucial for investigators to label whether or not a study is a direct replication attempt. If it is not a direct replication, procedural alterations and associated limitations should be discussed. It sows confusion to use procedures that are already predicted to dampen effects, without alerting readers. Psychology will be advanced by more stringent standards for reporting and evaluating studies aimed at reproducing published effects. Infant imitation is a fundamental skill prior to language and contributes to the development of social cognition. On this both Oostenbroek et al. and we agree. 

The meaning, mechanism, and function of imitation in early infancy have been actively discussed since Meltzoff and Moore’s (1977) report of facial and manual imitation by human neonates. Oostenbroek et al. (2016) claim to challenge the existence of early imitation and to counter all interpretations so far offered. Such claims, if true, would have implications for theories of social- cognitive development. Here we identify 11 flaws in Oostenbroek et al.’s experimental design that biased the results toward null effects. We requested and obtained the authors’ raw data. Contrary to the authors’ conclusions, new analyses reveal significant tongue- protrusion imitation at all four ages tested (1, 3, 6, and 9 weeks old). We explain how the authors missed this pattern and offer five recommendations for designing future experiments. Infant imitation raises fundamental issues about action representation, social learning, and brain–be-havior relations. The debate about the origins and development of imitation reflects its importance to theories of developmental science. 

Abstract From birth, human and nonhuman primates attend more to faces with direct gaze compared with averted gaze, and previous studies report that attention to the eyes is linked to the emergence of later social skills. Here, we explored whether early experiences influence attraction to eye contact in infant macaques by examining their attention to face pairs varying in their gaze direction across the first 13 weeks of life. Infants raised by human caretakers had limited conspecific interactions (nursery‐reared;N = 16) and were compared to infants raised in rich social environments (mother‐reared;N = 20). Both groups looked longer to faces and the eyes of direct compared to averted‐gaze faces. Looking to all faces and eyes also increased with age. Nursery‐reared infants did not display age‐associated increases in attention to direct‐gaze faces specifically, suggesting that, while there may be an initial preference for direct‐gaze faces from birth, social experiences may support its early development.