skip to main content
US FlagAn official website of the United States government
dot gov icon
Official websites use .gov
A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.
https lock icon
Secure .gov websites use HTTPS
A lock ( lock ) or https:// means you've safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.


Search for: All records

Creators/Authors contains: "Perreault, Brooke"

Note: When clicking on a Digital Object Identifier (DOI) number, you will be taken to an external site maintained by the publisher. Some full text articles may not yet be available without a charge during the embargo (administrative interval).
What is a DOI Number?

Some links on this page may take you to non-federal websites. Their policies may differ from this site.

  1. Google Search is an important way that people seek information about politics [8], and Google states that it is “committed to providing timely and authoritative information on Google Search to help voters understand, navigate, and participate in democratic processes.”1 This paper studies the extent to which government-maintained web domains are represented in the online electoral information environment, as captured through 3.45 Google Search result pages collected during the 2022 US midterm elections for 786 locations across the United States. Focusing on state, county, and local government domains that provide locality-specific information, we study not only the extent to which these sources appear in organic search results, but also the extent to which these sources are correctly targeted to their respective constituents. We label misalignment between the geographic area that non-federal domains serve and the locations for which they appear in search results as algorithmic mistargeting, a subtype of algorithmic misjudgement in which the search algorithm targets locality-specific information to users in different (incorrect) locations. In the context of the 2022 US midterm elections, we find that 71% of all occurrences of state, county, and local government sources were mistargeted, with some domains appearing disproportionately often among organic results despite providing locality-specific information that may not be relevant to all voters. However, we also find that mistargeting often occurs in low ranks. We conclude by considering the potential consequences of extensive mistargeting of non-federal government sources and argue that ensuring the correct targeting of these sources to their respective constituents is a critical part of Google’s role in facilitating access to authoritative and locally-relevant electoral information. 
    more » « less
  2. How do Google Search results change following an impactful real-world event, such as the U.S. Supreme Court decision on June 24, 2022 to overturn Roe v. Wade? And what do they tell us about the nature of event-driven content, generated by various participants in the online information environment? In this paper, we present a dataset of more than 1.74 million Google Search results pages collected between June 24 and July 17, 2022, intended to capture what Google Search surfaced in response to queries about this event of national importance. These search pages were collected for 65 locations in 13 U.S. states, a mix of red, blue, and purple states, with respect to their voting patterns. We describe the process of building a set of circa 1,700 phrases used for searching Google, how we gathered the search results for each location, and how these results were parsed to extract information about the most frequently encountered web domains. We believe that this dataset, which comprises raw data (search results as HTML files) and processed data (extracted links organized as CSV files) can be used to answer research questions that are of interest to computational social scientists as well as communication and media studies scholars. 
    more » « less