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The interest in quantum computing has grown rapidly in recent years, and with it grows the importance of securing quantum circuits. A novel type of threat to quantum circuits that dedicated attackers could launch are power trace attacks. To address this threat, this paper presents first formalization and demonstration of using power traces to unlock and steal quantum circuit secrets. With access to power traces, attackers can recover information about the control pulses sent to quantum computers. From the control pulses, the gate level description of the circuits, and eventually the secret algorithms can be reverse engineered. This work demonstrates how and what information could be recovered. This work uses algebraic reconstruction from power traces to realize two new types of single trace attacks: per-channel and total power attacks. The former attack relies on per-channel measurements to perform a brute-force attack to reconstruct the quantum circuits. The latter attack performs a single-trace attack using Mixed-Integer Linear Programming optimization. Through the use of algebraic reconstruction, this work demonstrates that quantum circuit secrets can be stolen with high accuracy. Evaluation on 32 real benchmark quantum circuits shows that our technique is highly effective at reconstructing quantum circuits. The findings not only show the veracity of the potential attacks, but also the need to develop new means to protect quantum circuits from power trace attacks. Throughout this work real control pulse information from real quantum computers is used to demonstrate potential attacks based on simulation of collection of power traces.

 

Proving the equivalence between SQL queries is a fundamental problem in database research. Existing solvers model queries using algebraic representations and convert such representations into first-order logic formulas so that query equivalence can be verified by solving a satisfiability problem. The main challenge lies in unbounded summations, which appear commonly in a query's algebraic representation in order to model common SQL features, such as projection and aggregate functions. Unfortunately, existing solvers handle unbounded summations in an ad-hoc manner based on heuristics or syntax comparison, which severely limits the set of queries that can be supported.

This paper develops a new SQL equivalence prover called SQLSolver, which can handle unbounded summations in a principled way. Our key insight is to use the theory of LIA^*, which extends linear integer arithmetic formulas with unbounded sums and provides algorithms to translate a LIA^* formula to a LIA formula that can be decided using existing SMT solvers. We augment the basic LIA^* theory to handle several complex scenarios (such as nested unbounded summations) that arise from modeling real-world queries. We evaluate SQLSolver with 359 equivalent query pairs derived from the SQL rewrite rules in Calcite and Spark SQL. SQLSolver successfully proves 346 pairs of them, which significantly outperforms existing provers.

 

Principled accountability for autonomous decision-making in uncertain environments requires distinguishing intentional outcomes from negligent designs from actual accidents. We propose analyzing the behavior of autonomous agents through a quantitative measure of the evidence of intentional behavior. We model an uncertain environment as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). For a given scenario, we rely on probabilistic model checking to compute the ability of the agent to influence reaching a certain event. We call this the scope of agency. We say that there is evidence of intentional behavior if the scope of agency is high and the decisions of the agent are close to being optimal for reaching the event. Our method applies counterfactual reasoning to automatically generate relevant scenarios that can be analyzed to increase the confidence of our assessment. In a case study, we show how our method can distinguish between 'intentional' and 'accidental' traffic collisions.

 

Program equivalence checking is the task of confirming that two programs have the same behavior on corresponding inputs. We develop a calculus based on symbolic execution and coinduction to check the equivalence of programs in a non-strict functional language. Additionally, we show that our calculus can be used to derive counterexamples for pairs of inequivalent programs, including counterexamples that arise from non-termination. We describe a fully automated approach for finding both equivalence proofs and counterexamples. Our implementation, Nebula, proves equivalences of programs written in Haskell. We demonstrate Nebula's practical effectiveness at both proving equivalence and producing counterexamples automatically by applying Nebula to existing benchmark properties.