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STEM refers to four fields of study and occupation: science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. But STEM has taken on social and political meaning far beyond the sum of its component parts. Public and policy discussions of STEM, whether in education or employment, rest on a startling lack of clarity about what counts as STEM. Most studies of postsecondary STEM education focus on students’ programs of study as the measure of STEM education, but we find this metric leads to substantial mismeasurement. Instead, we argue that examining STEM course taking is a more accurate measure of STEM preparation among college students. This descriptive study establishes conceptual and operational definitions of STEM coursework and uses nationally representative college student transcript data to develop a more accurate measure STEM course taking. Finally, we analyze the extent of potential mismeasurement and estimate STEM course taking using this revised classification system. Among bachelor’s degree students, we find wide variation in the number of STEM courses completed by students both within and between programs of study. Moreover, we find that many students in non-STEM programs of study complete substantial amounts of STEM coursework at levels comparable to that of many STEM students. 

The education and training of students and workers for careers in STEM fields is a longstanding concern of educators, development practitioners, analysts, and policymakers around the world. This chapter focuses on STEM workforce development in the United States in the context of global education migration and global enterprises that employ STEM graduates. It begins by addressing the politicized history of STEM workforce development, finding the STEM crisis theme is a perennial policy favorite in the US, appearing every few years as an urgent concern in the nation's competition with whatever other nation is ascendant, or as the cause of whatever problem is ailing the domestic economy. Turning to the measurement of STEM supply and demand, we find it is fraught with difficulty and inconsistency. The entry concludes by considering the need for, and the obstacles to increasing the supply of STEM students at US colleges and universities. Overall, we find that STEM policy is often a response to broader anxieties and politics—whether about international threats or domestic economic crises—and is seldom based on substantial empirical analysis. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-818630-5.13065-9 

STEM acronymically refers to four areas of inquiry – Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics. But as its use has become ubiquitous, STEM has taken on social and political meaning far beyond the sum of its component parts. In this paper, we take a first step in clarifying the analytic categories of STEM in education. This, we propose, is a necessary first building block for STEM analysis – to understand what constitutes STEM coursework, the constituent element of a STEM education. We first review the STEM definitional problems we have identified in the process of examining two sets of NCES nationally-representative data, provide analysis of the extent of potential mismeasurement, and estimates of impact. We then outline an approach to resolving the mismeasurement problems in nationally-representative postsecondary student surveys. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7282/00000318 

"STEM" is a term that has intuitive appeal but lacks an agreed-upon definition. As such, it has become a term whose ubiquity and ambiguity allow it to be used for a range of policy and political purposes. The longstanding focus on STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) as a focal point of education and workforce policy makes it important to understand what is considered a STEM field, for what purposes the STEM designation is used, and how it has become a highly politicized term that lacks practical meaning. The use of STEM in policy historically and currently is used to support a range of policy objectives beyond improving science and engineering education or workforce development. 

Collectively solving problems shared by many nations requires a new global science and technology commons, which could be modeled on successful past experiences. 

The global challenges now facing all nations transcend national boundaries. Summoning the global talent and resources necessary to addresses these problems will require global science, technology, and innovation (STI) collaboration. Whether climate change, global poverty, or the threats from cyber technologies, effectively dealing with these challenges and opportunities will increasingly require advanced industrialized nations to move beyond their historical techno-nationalist STI policies. Currently, STI policies being proposed in the US and elsewhere assume a " zero-sum " competition where one nation's STI successes are assumed to come at the expense of other nations. They seek ways to outcompete other nations in the production of new STI and restrict foreign access to their STI. History suggests that such policies had, at best, limited success, and the current environment for them seems even less promising. When China was a global STI leader, its tecno-nationalistic policies failed to prevent the spread of its advanced technologies and the rise of other nations. England was unable to use techno-nationalist policies to monopolize the skills and technology it pioneered during the industrial revolution. America pursued its own techno-nationalist polices in the post-World War II years, attempting to maintain the leadership it enjoyed as other countries recovered from World War II devastation. Today new centers of STI development are rapidly emerging and expanding in China, India, Southeast Asia, and other parts of the world. In response, many US policy makers and business leaders harken back to prior failed strategies and advocate intensifying the techno-nationalistic STI policies. This paper proposes a more techno-globalistic approach through the development of a global STI commons, an approach that holds the promise of benefiting people all over the world, including those in currently dominant nations. 

Abstract As a cold war with China heats up, the U.S. and other members of the G7 need new approaches to their science and technology innovation (STI) policies. Dominance on the innovation frontier is no longer possible through traditional techno‐nationalist policies that view nations as ‘competing’ through exclusive STI development. Instead, we must recognise that talent and intellectual property are globally distributed, and thus build global collaborations that draw on the world's greatest talent while providing benefits equitably in a global STI commons. We need to recognise this new reality, not only for the benefits this would confer on humankind, but also to contend with China's growing STI capabilities and, eventually perhaps, integrating China into a system of global collaboration. Additionally, and importantly, national policies must recognise the geographically untethered operations of multinational enterprises that are the developers and/or repositories of STI but have weak ties to any one nation, thus blunting policies that try to contain STI within a country's borders. In this paper, we suggest approaches to advance these goals for global STI based on theories and cases of collective action. 

Technology has advanced through global exchanges, with different nations technologically ascendant at different periods. Nations’ perceptions of and policies about achieving and maintaining technological leadership have been based on zero-sum assumptions that ultimately have proved futile and may lead to their decline in the face of emergent technology powers. In the first fifteen or so centuries BCE, China led the world in the development and use of the world’s most consequential technologies, including printing, gunpowder, the compass, and the production of superior iron and steel. These technologies spread as far as Western Europe, especially as the network of trade routes known as “the Silk Roads” were brought under the control of the Mongol empire in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The Mongols radically reduced travel and trade barriers over the four thousand miles from the Sea of Japan to the Mediterranean, spanning widely diverse countries and cultures. In effect, they developed the first global technology trade system. The roads were blocked by the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth century, and China’s technological dynamism stagnated. From the eighteenth through the twentieth centuries, the West became the primary center for the development and use of military and industrial technologies that enabled a substantial Western domination of the world. The Western domination may now be coming to an end as China and other Asia countries have achieved new levels of technological strength and, as emerging economies, are increasingly challenging the Western domination of the rules of intellectual property rights and technology trade. This article describes the China- and Western-centric eras of technology diffusion, noting prevailing zero-sum assumptions about sharing technology and the perceived need for nations to maintain technological “superiority” over other nations. The article concludes with suggestions for the development of a global commons of technology development and sharing. 

Mathematics is an important and hotly contested aspect of U.S. postsecondary education. Its importance for academics and careers and the extent and impact of math achievement disparities are all subject of longstanding debate. Yet there is surprisingly little research into how much and what types of mathematics courses are taken by U.S. undergraduates and the extent of math achievement differentials among students. This article advances the understanding of math course taking by developing course-taking metrics for a nationally representative cohort of bachelor’s graduates. Using NCES transcript data to construct consistent measures of mathematics and quantitative course taking, our analysis finds large variability both within and between STEM/non-STEM majors and a large population of non-STEM graduates earning mathematics credits comparable to their peers in STEM fields. Mathematics course taking differs substantially from course taking in other subjects. We also find that often-observed gender differentials are a function of major, not gender, with females in the most mathematics-intensive programs earning as many or more mathematics credits than their male peers. 

The relationship between education policy and workforce policy has long been uneasy. It is widely believed in many quarters of American society that the U.S. education system is in decline and, what’s more, that it bears significant responsibility for a wide range of social ills, including stagnant wages, increasing inequality, high unemployment, and overall economic lethargy. However, as analyzed in this paper, the preponderance of evidence suggests that the U.S. education system has produced ample supplies of students to respond to STEM labor market demand. The “pipeline” of STEM-potential students is similarly strong and expanding.