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With the growing performance and wide application of deep neural networks (DNNs), recent years have seen enormous efforts on DNN accelerator hardware design for platforms from mobile devices to data centers. The systolic array has been a popular architectural choice for many proposed DNN accelerators with hundreds to thousands of processing elements (PEs) for parallel computing. Systolic array-based DNN accelerators for datacenter applications have high power consumption and nonuniform workload distribution, which makes power delivery network (PDN) design challenging. Server-class multicore processors have benefited from distributed on-chip voltage regulation and heterogeneous voltage regulation (HVR) for improving energy efficiency while guaranteeing power delivery integrity. This paper presents the first work on HVR-based PDN architecture and control for systolic array-based DNN accelerators. We propose to employ a PDN architecture comprising heterogeneous on-chip and off-chip voltage regulators and multiple power domains. By analyzing patterns of typical DNN workloads via a modeling framework, we propose a DNN workload-aware dynamic PDN control policy to maximize system energy efficiency while ensuring power integrity. We demonstrate significant energy efficiency improvements brought by the proposed PDN architecture, dynamic control, and power gating, which lead to a more than five-fold reduction of leakage energy and PDN energy overhead for systolic array DNN accelerators. 

Similar to digital circuits, analog and mixed-signal (AMS) circuits are also susceptible to supply-chain attacks, such as piracy, overproduction, and Trojan insertion. However, unlike digital circuits, the supply-chain security of AMS circuits is less explored. In this work, we propose to perform "logic-locking" on the digital section of the AMS circuits. The idea is to make the analog design intentionally suffer from the effects of process variations, which impede the operation of the circuit. Only on applying the correct key, the effect of process variations are mitigated, and the analog circuit performs as desired. To this end, we render certain components in the analog circuit configurable. We propose an analysis to dictate which components need to be configurable to maximize the effect of an incorrect key. We conduct our analysis on the bandpass filter (BPF), low-noise amplifier (LNA), and low-dropout voltage regulator LDO) for both correct and incorrect keys to the locked optimizer. We also show experimental results for our technique on a BPF. We also analyze the effect of aging on our locking technique to ensure the reliability of the circuit with the correct key. 

Similar to digital circuits, analog circuits are also susceptible to supply-chain attacks. There are several analog locking techniques proposed to combat these supply-chain attacks. However, there exists no elaborate evaluation procedure to estimate the resilience offered by these techniques. Evaluating analog defenses requires the usage of non-Boolean variables, such as bias current and gain. Hence, in this work, we evaluate the resilience of the analog-only locks and analog and mixed-signal (AMS) locks using satisfiability modulo theories (SMTs). We demonstrate our attack on five analog locking techniques and three AMS locking techniques. The attack is demonstrated on commonly used circuits, such as bandpass filter (BPF), low-noise amplifier (LNA), and low-dropout (LDO) voltage regulator. Attack results on analog-only locks show that the attacker, knowing the required bias current or voltage range, can determine the key. Likewise, knowing the protected input patterns (PIPs), the attacker can determine the key to unlock the AMS locks. We then extend our attack to break the existing analog camouflaging technique.