Search for: All records

We study the problem of robust learning under clean-label data-poisoning attacks, where the at-tacker injects (an arbitrary set of) correctly-labeled examples to the training set to fool the algorithm into making mistakes on specific test instances at test time. The learning goal is to minimize the attackable rate (the probability mass of attackable test instances), which is more difficult than optimal PAC learning. As we show, any robust algorithm with diminishing attackable rate can achieve the optimal dependence on ε in its PAC sample complexity, i.e., O(1/ε). On the other hand, the attackable rate might be large even for some optimal PAC learners, e.g., SVM for linear classifiers. Furthermore, we show that the class of linear hypotheses is not robustly learnable when the data distribution has zero margin and is robustly learnable in the case of positive margin but requires sample complexity exponential in the dimension. For a general hypothesis class with bounded VC dimension, if the attacker is limited to add at most t >0 poison examples, the optimal robust learning sample complexity grows almost linearly with t. 

In recent years, federated learning has been embraced as an approach for bringing about collaboration across large populations of learning agents. However, little is known about how collaboration protocols should take agents’ incentives into account when allocating individual resources for communal learning in order to maintain such collaborations. Inspired by game theoretic notions, this paper introduces a framework for incentive-aware learning and data sharing in federated learning. Our stable and envy-free equilibria capture notions of collaboration in the presence of agents interested in meeting their learning objectives while keeping their own sample collection burden low. For example, in an envy-free equilibrium, no agent would wish to swap their sampling burden with any other agent and in a stable equilibrium, no agent would wish to unilaterally reduce their sampling burden. In addition to formalizing this framework, our contributions include characterizing the structural properties of such equilibria, proving when they exist, and showing how they can be computed. Furthermore, we compare the sample complexity of incentive-aware collaboration with that of optimal collaboration when one ignores agents’ incentives.