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Abstract We continue the program of proving circuit lower bounds via circuit satisfiability algorithms. So far, this program has yielded several concrete results, proving that functions in$$\mathsf {Quasi}\text {-}\mathsf {NP} = \mathsf {NTIME}[n^{(\log n)^{O(1)}}]$$ $\mathrm{Quasi}-\mathrm{NP}=\mathrm{NTIME}\left[n^{{\left(\log n\right)}^{O\left(1\right)}}\right]$and other complexity classes do not have small circuits (in the worst case and/or on average) from various circuit classes$$\mathcal { C}$$ $C$, by showing that$$\mathcal { C}$$ $C$admits non-trivial satisfiability and/or#SAT algorithms which beat exhaustive search by a minor amount. In this paper, we present a new strong lower bound consequence of having a non-trivial#SAT algorithm for a circuit class$${\mathcal C}$$ $C$. Say that a symmetric Boolean functionf(x₁,…,x_n) issparseif it outputs 1 onO(1) values of$${\sum }_{i} x_{i}$$ ${\sum }_i{x}_i$. We show that for every sparsef, and for all “typical”$$\mathcal { C}$$ $C$, faster#SAT algorithms for$$\mathcal { C}$$ $C$circuits imply lower bounds against the circuit class$$f \circ \mathcal { C}$$ $f\circ C$, which may bestrongerthan$$\mathcal { C}$$ $C$itself. In particular:#SAT algorithms forn^k-size$$\mathcal { C}$$ $C$-circuits running in 2ⁿ/n^ktime (for allk) implyNEXPdoes not have$$(f \circ \mathcal { C})$$ $(f\circ C)$-circuits of polynomial size.#SAT algorithms for$$2^{n^{{\varepsilon }}}$$ $2^{n^{\epsilon }}$-size$$\mathcal { C}$$ $C$-circuits running in$$2^{n-n^{{\varepsilon }}}$$ $2^{n-n^{\epsilon }}$time (for someε> 0) implyQuasi-NPdoes not have$$(f \circ \mathcal { C})$$ $(f\circ C)$-circuits of polynomial size. Applying#SAT algorithms from the literature, one immediate corollary of our results is thatQuasi-NPdoes not haveEMAJ∘ACC⁰∘THRcircuits of polynomial size, whereEMAJis the “exact majority” function, improving previous lower bounds againstACC⁰[Williams JACM’14] andACC⁰∘THR[Williams STOC’14], [Murray-Williams STOC’18]. This is the first nontrivial lower bound against such a circuit class. 

Multiple known algorithmic paradigms (backtracking, local search and the polynomial method) only yield a 2n(1-1/O(k)) time algorithm for k-SAT in the worst case. For this reason, it has been hypothesized that the worst-case k-SAT problem cannot be solved in 2n(1-f(k)/k) time for any unbounded function f. This hypothesis has been called the "Super-Strong ETH", modelled after the ETH and the Strong ETH. It has also been hypothesized that k-SAT is hard to solve for randomly chosen instances near the "critical threshold", where the clause-to-variable ratio is such that randomly chosen instances are satisfiable with probability 1/2. We give a randomized algorithm which refutes the Super-Strong ETH for the case of random k-SAT and planted k-SAT for any clause-to-variable ratio. For example, given any random k-SAT instance F with n variables and m clauses, our algorithm decides satisfiability for F in  2n(1-c*log(k)/k) time with high probability (over the choice of the formula and the randomness of the algorithm). It turns out that a well-known algorithm from the literature on SAT algorithms does the job: the PPZ algorithm of Paturi, Pudlak, and Zane (1999).   The Unique k-SAT problem is the special case where there is at most one satisfying assignment. Improving prior reductions, we show that the Super-Strong ETHs for Unique k-SAT and k-SAT are equivalent. More precisely, we show the time complexities of Unique k-SAT and k-SAT are very tightly correlated: if Unique k-SAT is in  2n(1-f(k)/k) time for an unbounded f, then k-SAT is in 2n(1-f(k)/(2k)) time. 

We give a new algorithm for approximating the Discrete Fourier transform of an approximately sparse signal that has been corrupted by worst-case L0 noise, namely a bounded number of coordinates of the signal have been corrupted arbitrarily. Our techniques generalize to a wide range of linear transformations that are used in data analysis such as the Discrete Cosine and Sine transforms, the Hadamard transform, and their high-dimensional analogs. We use our algorithm to successfully defend against well known L0 adversaries in the setting of image classification. We give experimental results on the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) and the Carlini Wagner (CW) L0 attack on the MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets as well as the Adversarial Patch on the ImageNet dataset.