Search for: All records

Evidence-accumulation models (EAMs) are powerful tools for making sense of human and animal decision-making behavior. EAMs have generated significant theoretical advances in psychology, behavioral economics, and cognitive neuroscience and are increasingly used as a measurement tool in clinical research and other applied settings. Obtaining valid and reliable inferences from EAMs depends on knowing how to establish a close match between model assumptions and features of the task/data to which the model is applied. However, this knowledge is rarely articulated in the EAM literature, leaving beginners to rely on the private advice of mentors and colleagues and inefficient trial-and-error learning. In this article, we provide practical guidance for designing tasks appropriate for EAMs, relating experimental manipulations to EAM parameters, planning appropriate sample sizes, and preparing data and conducting an EAM analysis. Our advice is based on prior methodological studies and the our substantial collective experience with EAMs. By encouraging good task-design practices and warning of potential pitfalls, we hope to improve the quality and trustworthiness of future EAM research and applications. 

The measurement of individual differences in specific cognitive functions has been an important area of study for decades. Often the goal of such studies is to determine whether there are cognitive deficits or enhancements associated with, for example, a specific population, psychological disorder, health status, or age group. The inherent difficulty, however, is that most cognitive functions are not directly observable, so researchers rely on indirect measures to infer an individual’s functioning. One of the most common approaches is to use a task that is designed to tap into a specific function and to use behavioral measures, such as reaction times (RTs), to assess performance on that task. Although this approach is widespread, it unfortunately is subject to a problem of reverse inference: Differences in a given cognitive function can be manifest as differences in RTs, but that does not guarantee that differences in RTs imply differences in that cognitive function. We illustrate this inference problem with data from a study on aging and lexical processing, highlighting how RTs can lead to erroneous conclusions about processing. Then we discuss how employing choice-RT models to analyze data can improve inference and highlight practical approaches to improving the models and incorporating them into one’s analysis pipeline.