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In this work, we investigate stochastic approximation (SA) with Markovian data and nonlinear updates under constant stepsize. Existing work has primarily focused on either i.i.d. data or linear update rules. We take a new perspective and carefully examine the simultaneous presence of Markovian dependency of data and nonlinear update rules, delineating how the interplay between these two structures leads to complications that are not captured by prior techniques. By leveraging the smoothness and recurrence properties of the SA updates, we develop a fine-grained analysis of the correlation between the SA iterates and Markovian data. This enables us to overcome the obstacles in existing analysis and establish for the first time the weak convergence of the joint process. Furthermore, we present a precise characterization of the asymptotic bias of the SA iterates. As a by-product of our analysis, we derive finite-time bounds on higher moment and present non-asymptotic geometric convergence rates for the iterates, along with a Central Limit Theorem. 

Stochastic Approximation (SA) is a widely used algorithmic approach in various fields, including optimization and reinforcement learning (RL). Among RL algorithms, Q-learning is particularly popular due to its empirical success. In this paper, we study asynchronous Q-learning with constant stepsize, which is commonly used in practice for its fast convergence. By connecting the constant stepsize Q-learning to a time-homogeneous Markov chain, we show the distributional convergence of the iterates in Wasserstein distance and establish its exponential convergence rate. We also establish a Central Limit Theory for Q-learning iterates, demonstrating the asymptotic normality of the averaged iterates. Moreover, we provide an explicit expansion of the asymptotic bias of the averaged iterate in stepsize. Specifically, the bias is proportional to the stepsize up to higher-order terms and we provide an explicit expression for the linear coefficient. This precise characterization of the bias allows the application of Richardson-Romberg (RR) extrapolation technique to construct a new estimate that is provably closer to the optimal Q function. Numerical results corroborate our theoretical finding on the improvement of the RR extrapolation method. 

We study robust Markov games (RMG) with 𝑠-rectangular uncertainty. We show a general equivalence between computing a robust Nash equilibrium (RNE) of a 𝑠-rectangular RMG and computing a Nash equilibrium (NE) of an appropriately constructed regularized MG. The equivalence result yields a planning algorithm for solving 𝑠-rectangular RMGs, as well as provable robustness guarantees for policies computed using regularized methods. However, we show that even for just reward-uncertain two-player zero-sum matrix games, computing an RNE is PPAD-hard. Consequently, we derive a special uncertainty structure called efficient player-decomposability and show that RNE for two-player zero-sum RMG in this class can be provably solved in polynomial time. This class includes commonly used uncertainty sets such as 𝐿1 and 𝐿∞ ball uncertainty sets. 

We study security threats to Markov games due to information asymmetry and misinformation. We consider an attacker player who can spread misinformation about its reward function to influence the robust victim player's behavior. Given a fixed fake reward function, we derive the victim's policy under worst-case rationality and present polynomial-time algorithms to compute the attacker's optimal worst-case policy based on linear programming and backward induction. Then, we provide an efficient inception (""planting an idea in someone's mind"") attack algorithm to find the optimal fake reward function within a restricted set of reward functions with dominant strategies. Importantly, our methods exploit the universal assumption of rationality to compute attacks efficiently. Thus, our work exposes a security vulnerability arising from standard game assumptions under misinformation. 

We study the game modification problem, where a benevolent game designer or a malevolent adversary modifies the reward function of a zero-sum Markov game so that a target deterministic or stochastic policy profile becomes the unique Markov perfect Nash equilibrium and has a value within a target range, in a way that minimizes the modification cost. We characterize the set of policy profiles that can be installed as the unique equilibrium of a game and establish sufficient and necessary conditions for successful installation. We propose an efficient algorithm that solves a convex optimization problem with linear constraints and then performs random perturbation to obtain a modification plan with a near-optimal cost.