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  1. Current best practices for the assessment of the cyclic response of plastic silts are centered on the careful sampling and cyclic testing of natural, intact specimens. Side-by-side evaluation of in-situ and laboratory element test responses are severely limited, despite the need to establish similarities and differences in their characteristics. In this paper, a coordinated laboratory and field-testing campaign that was undertaken to compare the strain-controlled cyclic response of a plastic silt deposit at the Port of Longview, Longview, WA is described. Following a discussion of the subsurface conditions at one of several test panels, the responses of laboratory test specimens to resonant column and cyclic torsional shear testing, and constant-volume, strain-controlled cyclic direct simple shear testing are described in terms of shear modulus nonlinearity and degradation, and excess pore pressure generation with shear strain. Several months earlier, the in-situ cyclic response of the same deposit was investigated by applying a range of shear strain amplitudes using a large mobile shaker. The in-situ response is presented and compared to the laboratory test results, highlighting similarities and differences arising from differences in mechanical (e.g., constant-volume shearing; strain rate-effects) and hydraulic (e.g., local drainage) boundary conditions and the spatial variability of natural soilmore »deposits.« less
    Free, publicly-accessible full text available May 1, 2023
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  3. Free, publicly-accessible full text available January 1, 2023
  4. Filipe J. ; Ghosh A. ; Prates R. O. ; Zhou L. (Ed.)
    This paper considers a parallel wireless network in which multiple individuals exchange confidential information through independent sender-receiver links. An eavesdropper can intercept encrypted information through a degraded channel of each sender-receiver link. A friendly jammer, by applying interference to the eavesdropping channels, can increase the level of secrecy of the network. The optimal power allocation strategy of the friendly jammer under a power constraint is derived. A convex optimization model is used when all channels are under the threat of an eavesdropping attack and a non-zero sum game model is analyzed when the eavesdropper can only attack a limited quantity of channels.
  5. Free, publicly-accessible full text available January 1, 2023
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  7. Free, publicly-accessible full text available December 1, 2022
  8. Considered is a multi-channel wireless network for secret communication that uses the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) as the performance measure. An eavesdropper can intercept encoded messages through a degraded channel of each legitimate transmitter-receiver communication pair. A friendly interferer, on the other hand, may send cooperative jamming signals to enhance the secrecy performance of the whole network. Besides, the state information of the eavesdropping channel may not be known completely. The transmitters and the friendly interferer have to cooperatively decide on the optimal jamming power allocation strategy that balances the secrecy performance with the cost of employing intentional interference, while the eavesdropper tries to maximize her eavesdropping capacity. To solve this problem, we propose and analyze a non-zero-sum game between the network defender and the eavesdropper who can only attack a limited number of channels. We show that the Nash equilibrium strategies for the players are of threshold type. We present an algorithm to find the equilibrium strategy pair. Numerical examples demonstrate the equilibrium and contrast it to baseline strategies.