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A theoretical investigation is conducted on the s- and p-wave elastic scatterings of positronium by a lithium ion Li+ with the scattering energy below 1.41 eV, corresponding to the threshold of the e+-Li channel. The confined variational method is applied to serve as the theoretical framework for this study. To accurately account for correlations between involved particles, explicitly correlated Gaussians are employed as basis functions, which are optimized through a hybrid approach combining stochastic variational and energy-gradient-based methods. Additionally, a straightforward yet effective algorithm is developed for the automatic adjustment of confining potentials. The s-wave zero-energy pickoff annihilation parameter 1Zeff,0 is accurately determined to be 0.126 ± 0.002, which yields an enhancement factor of 1.88 compared with the value 0.067 obtained using the fixed-core stochastic variational method [Phys. Rev. A 65, 034709 (2002)]. Finally, a broad p-wave resonance structure is predicted at the incident energy of approximately 0.27 eV, with the annihilation parameter 1Zeff,1 at the resonance center estimated to be around 0.034. 

With the recent report of erroneous content in 3GPP specifications leading to real-world vulnerabilities, attention has been drawn to not only the specifications but also the way they are maintained and adopted by manufacturers and carriers. In this paper, we report the first study on this 3GPP ecosystem, for the purpose of understanding its security hazards. Our research leverages 414,488 Change Requests (CRs) that document the problems discovered from specifications and proposed changes, which provides valuable information about the security assurance of the 3GPP ecosystem. Analyzing these CRs is impeded by the challenge in finding security-relevant CRs (SR-CRs), whose security connections cannot be easily established by even human experts. To identify them, we developed a novel NLP/ML pipeline that utilizes a small set of positively labeled CRs to recover 1,270 high-confidence SR-CRs. Our measurement on them reveals serious consequences of specification errors and their causes, including design errors and presentation issues, particularly the pervasiveness of inconsistent descriptions (misalignment) in security-relevant content. Also important is the discovery of a security weakness inherent to the 3GPP ecosystem, which publishes an SR-CR long before the specification has been fixed and related systems have been patched. This opens an "attack window", which can be as long as 11 years! Interestingly, we found that some recently reported vulnerabilities are actually related to the CRs published years ago. Further, we identified a set of vulnerabilities affecting major carriers and mobile phones that have not been addressed even today. With the trend of SR-CRs not showing any sign of abating, we propose measures to improve the security assurance of the ecosystem, including responsible handling of SR-CRs.