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  1. Since the mid-1980s it has been known that Byzantine Agreement can be solved with probability 1 asynchronously, even against an omniscient, computationally unbounded adversary that can adaptivelycorruptup tof < n/3parties. Moreover, the problem is insoluble withf ≥ n/3corruptions. However, Bracha’s [13] 1984 protocol (see also Ben-Or [8]) achievedf < n/3resilience at the cost ofexponentialexpected latency2Θ (n), a bound that hasneverbeen improved in this model withf = ⌊ (n-1)/3 ⌋corruptions.

    In this article, we prove that Byzantine Agreement in the asynchronous, full information model can be solved with probability 1 against an adaptive adversary that can corruptf < n/3parties, while incurring onlypolynomial latency with high probability. Our protocol follows an earlier polynomial latency protocol of King and Saia [33,34], which hadsuboptimalresilience, namelyf ≈ n/109 [33,34].

    Resiliencef = (n-1)/3is uniquely difficult, as this is the point at which the influence of the Byzantine and honest players are of roughly equal strength. The core technical problem we solve is to design a collective coin-flipping protocol thateventuallylets us flip a coin with an unambiguous outcome. In the beginning, the influence of the Byzantine players is too powerful to overcome, and they can essentially fix the coin’s behavior at will. We guarantee that after just a polynomial number of executions of the coin-flipping protocol, either (a) the Byzantine players fail to fix the behavior of the coin (thereby ending the game) or (b) we can “blacklist” players such that the blacklisting rate for Byzantine players is at least as large as the blacklisting rate for good players. The blacklisting criterion is based on a simple statistical test offraud detection.

     
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    Free, publicly-accessible full text available April 30, 2025
  2. It is impossible to deterministically solve wait-free consensus in an asynchronous system. The classic proof uses a valency argument, which constructs an infinite execution by repeatedly extending a finite execution. We introduce extension-based proofs, a class of impossibility proofs that are modelled as an interaction between a prover and a protocol and that include valency arguments. Using proofs based on combinatorial topology, it has been shown that it is impossible to deterministically solve k-set agreement among n > k ≥ 2 processes in a wait-free manner. However, it was unknown whether proofs based on simpler techniques were possible. We show that this impossibility result cannot be obtained by an extension-based proof and, hence, extension-based proofs are limited in power. 
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