Search for: All records

The fast-growing installation of solar PVs has a significant impact on the operation of distribution systems. Grid-tied solar inverters provide reactive power capability to support the voltage profile in a distribution system. In comparison with traditional inverters, smart inverters have the capability of real time remote control through digital communication interfaces. However, cyberattack has become a major threat with the deployment of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in a smart grid. The past cyberattack incidents have demonstrated how attackers can sabotage a power grid through digital communication systems. In the worst case, numerous electricity consumers can experience a major and extended power outage. Unfortunately, tracking techniques are not efficient for today’s advanced communication networks. Therefore, a reliable cyber protection system is a necessary defense tool for the power grid. In this paper, a signature-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is developed to detect cyber intrusions of a distribution system with a high level penetration of solar energy. To identify cyberattack events, an attack table is constructed based on the Temporal Failure Propagation Graph (TFPG) technique. It includes the information of potential cyberattack patterns in terms of attack types and time sequence of anomaly events. Once the detected anomaly events are matched with any of the predefined attack patterns, it is judged to be a cyberattack. Since the attack patterns are distinguishable from other system failures, it reduces the false positive rate. To study the impact of cyberattacks on solar devices and validate the performance of the proposed IDS, a realistic Cyber-Physical System (CPS) simulation environment available at Virginia Tech (VT) is used to develop an interconnection between the cyber and power system models. The CPS model demonstrates how communication system anomalies can impact the physical system. The results of two example cyberattack test cases are obtained with the IEEE 13 node test feeder system and the power system simulator, DIgSILENT PowerFactory. 

In this paper, a signature-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is developed to detect cyber intrusions of a distribution system with a high level penetration of solar energy. To identify cyberattack events, an attack table is constructed based on the Temporal Failure Propagation Graph (TFPG) technique. It includes the information of potential cyberattack patterns in terms of attack types and time sequence of anomaly events. Once the detected anomaly events are matched with any of the predefined attack patterns, it is judged to be a cyberattack. Since the attack patterns are distinguishable from other system failures, it reduces the false positive rate. To study the impact of cyberattacks on solar devices and validate the performance of the proposed IDS, a realistic Cyber-Physical System (CPS) simulation environment available at Virginia Tech (VT) is used to develop an interconnection between the cyber and power system models. The CPS model demonstrates how communication system anomalies can impact the physical system. The results of two example cyberattack test cases are obtained with the IEEE 13 node test feeder system and the power system simulator, DIgSILENT PowerFactory. 

A<sc>bstract</sc> A measurement of the angular structure of inclusive jets and those containing a prompt D⁰meson in proton-proton collisions at the LHC at a center-of-mass energy of 5.02 TeV is presented. The data corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 301 pb⁻¹were collected by the CMS experiment in 2017. Two jet grooming algorithms, late-k_Tand soft drop, are used to study the intrajet radiation pattern using iterative Cambridge-Aachen declustering. The splitting-angle distributions of jets with transverse momentum (p_T) of around 100 GeV, obtained with these two algorithms, show that there is a shift of the distribution for jets containing a prompt D⁰meson with respect to inclusive jets. The suppression of emissions at small angles observed in the late-k_Tgrooming approach is consistent with the dead-cone effect, whereas the similar suppression for splittings selected with the soft-drop algorithm appears to be induced by gluon splitting to charm quark-antiquark pairs at large angles. The measured distributions are corrected to the particle level and can be used to constrain model predictions for the substructure of high-p_Tcharm quark jets.