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Two popular approaches for modeling social evolution, evolutionary game theory and quantitative genetics, ask complementary questions but are rarely integrated. Game theory focuses on evolutionary outcomes, with models solving for evolutionarily stable equilibria, whereas quantitative genetics provides insight into evolutionary processes, with models predicting short-term responses to selection. Here we draw parallels between evolutionary game theory and interacting phenotypes theory, which is a quantitative genetic framework for understanding social evolution. First, we show how any evolutionary game may be translated into two quantitative genetic selection gradients, nonsocial and social selection, which may be used to predict evolutionary change from a single round of the game. We show that synergistic fitness effects may alter predicted selection gradients, causing changes in magnitude and sign as the population mean evolves. Second, we show how evolutionary games involving plastic behavioral responses to partners can be modeled using indirect genetic effects, which describe how trait expression changes in response to genes in the social environment. We demonstrate that repeated social interactions in models of reciprocity generate indirect effects and conversely, that estimates of parameters from indirect genetic effect models may be used to predict the evolution of reciprocity. We argue that a pluralistic view incorporating both theoretical approaches will benefit empiricists and theorists studying social evolution. We advocate the measurement of social selection and indirect genetic effects in natural populations to test the predictions from game theory and, in turn, the use of game theory models to aid in the interpretation of quantitative genetic estimates.

Wondrously elaborate weapons and displays that appear to be counter to ecological optima are widespread features of male contests for mates across the animal kingdom. To understand how such diverse traits evolve, here we develop a quantitative genetic model of sexual selection for a male signaling trait that mediates aggression in male‐male contests and show that an honest indicator of aggression can generate selection on itself by altering the social environment. This can cause selection to accelerate as the trait is elaborated, leading to runaway evolution. Thus, an evolving source of selection provided by the social environment is the fundamental unifying feature of runaway sexual selection driven by either male‐male competition or female mate choice. However, a key difference is that runaway driven by male‐male competition requires signal honesty. Our model identifies simple conditions that provide clear, testable predictions for empirical studies using standard quantitative genetic methods.