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The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has displaced more than a quarter of the population. Assessing disease burdens among displaced people is instrumental in informing global public health and humanitarian aid efforts. We estimated the disease burden in Ukrainians displaced both within Ukraine and to other countries by combining a spatiotemporal model of forcible displacement with age- and gender-specific estimates of cardiovascular disease (CVD), diabetes, cancer, HIV, and tuberculosis (TB) in each of Ukraine’s 629 raions (i.e., districts). Among displaced Ukrainians as of May 13, we estimated that more than 2.63 million have CVDs, at least 615,000 have diabetes, and over 98,500 have cancer. In addition, more than 86,000 forcibly displaced individuals are living with HIV, and approximately 13,500 have TB. We estimated that the disease prevalence among refugees was lower than the national disease prevalence before the invasion. Accounting for internal displacement and healthcare facilities impacted by the conflict, we estimated that the number of people per hospital has increased by more than two-fold in some areas. As regional healthcare systems come under increasing strain, these estimates can inform the allocation of critical resources under shifting disease burdens. 

Two of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccines currently approved in the United States require 2 doses, administered 3 to 4 weeks apart. Constraints in vaccine supply and distribution capacity, together with a deadly wave of COVID-19 from November 2020 to January 2021 and the emergence of highly contagious Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variants, sparked a policy debate on whether to vaccinate more individuals with the first dose of available vaccines and delay the second dose or to continue with the recommended 2-dose series as tested in clinical trials. We developed an agent-based model of COVID-19 transmission to compare the impact of these 2 vaccination strategies, while varying the temporal waning of vaccine efficacy following the first dose and the level of preexisting immunity in the population. Our results show that for Moderna vaccines, a delay of at least 9 weeks could maximize vaccination program effectiveness and avert at least an additional 17.3 (95% credible interval [CrI]: 7.8–29.7) infections, 0.69 (95% CrI: 0.52–0.97) hospitalizations, and 0.34 (95% CrI: 0.25–0.44) deaths per 10,000 population compared to the recommended 4-week interval between the 2 doses. Pfizer-BioNTech vaccines also averted an additional 0.60 (95% CrI: 0.37–0.89) hospitalizations and 0.32 (95% CrI: 0.23–0.45) deaths per 10,000 population in a 9-week delayed second dose (DSD) strategy compared to the 3-week recommended schedule between doses. However, there was no clear advantage of delaying the second dose with Pfizer-BioNTech vaccines in reducing infections, unless the efficacy of the first dose did not wane over time. Our findings underscore the importance of quantifying the characteristics and durability of vaccine-induced protection after the first dose in order to determine the optimal time interval between the 2 doses. 

Since the emergence of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), unprecedented movement restrictions and social distancing measures have been implemented worldwide. The socioeconomic repercussions have fueled calls to lift these measures. In the absence of population-wide restrictions, isolation of infected individuals is key to curtailing transmission. However, the effectiveness of symptom-based isolation in preventing a resurgence depends on the extent of presymptomatic and asymptomatic transmission. We evaluate the contribution of presymptomatic and asymptomatic transmission based on recent individual-level data regarding infectiousness prior to symptom onset and the asymptomatic proportion among all infections. We found that the majority of incidences may be attributable to silent transmission from a combination of the presymptomatic stage and asymptomatic infections. Consequently, even if all symptomatic cases are isolated, a vast outbreak may nonetheless unfold. We further quantified the effect of isolating silent infections in addition to symptomatic cases, finding that over one-third of silent infections must be isolated to suppress a future outbreak below 1% of the population. Our results indicate that symptom-based isolation must be supplemented by rapid contact tracing and testing that identifies asymptomatic and presymptomatic cases, in order to safely lift current restrictions and minimize the risk of resurgence. 

Abstract Direct pathogen and parasite transmission is fundamentally driven by a population’s contact network structure and its demographic composition and is further modulated by pathogen life-history traits. Importantly, populations are most often concurrently exposed to a suite of pathogens, which is rarely investigated, because contact networks are typically inferred from spatial proximity only. Here, we use 5 years of detailed observations of Indo-Pacific bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops aduncus) that distinguish between four different types of social contact. We investigate how demography (sex and age) affects these different social behaviors. Three of the four social behaviors can be used as a proxy for understanding key routes of direct pathogen transmission (sexual contact, skin contact, and aerosol contact of respiratory vapor above the water surface). We quantify the demography-dependent network connectedness, representing the risk of exposure associated with the three pathogen transmission routes, and quantify coexposure risks and relate them to individual sociability. Our results suggest demography-driven disease risk in bottlenose dolphins, with males at greater risk than females, and transmission route-dependent implications for different age classes. We hypothesize that male alliance formation and the divergent reproductive strategies in males and females drive the demography-dependent connectedness and, hence, exposure risk to pathogens. Our study provides evidence for the risk of coexposure to pathogens transmitted along different transmission routes and that they relate to individual sociability. Hence, our results highlight the importance of a multibehavioral approach for a more complete understanding of the overall pathogen transmission risk in animal populations, as well as the cumulative costs of sociality. 

Social network analysis is an invaluable tool to understand the patterns, evolution, and consequences of sociality. Comparative studies over a range of social systems across multiple taxonomic groups are particularly valuable. Such studies however require quantitative social association or interaction data across multiple species which is not easily available. We introduce the Animal Social Network Repository (ASNR) as the first multi-taxonomic repository that collates 790 social networks from more than 45 species, including those of mammals, reptiles, fish, birds, and insects. The repository was created by consolidating social network datasets from the literature on wild and captive animals into a consistent and easy-to-use network data format. The repository is archived athttps://bansallab.github.io/asnr/. ASNR has tremendous research potential, including testing hypotheses in the fields of animal ecology, social behavior, epidemiology and evolutionary biology.

 

In the wake of community coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) transmission in the United States, there is a growing public health concern regarding the adequacy of resources to treat infected cases. Hospital beds, intensive care units (ICUs), and ventilators are vital for the treatment of patients with severe illness. To project the timing of the outbreak peak and the number of ICU beds required at peak, we simulated a COVID-19 outbreak parameterized with the US population demographics. In scenario analyses, we varied the delay from symptom onset to self-isolation, the proportion of symptomatic individuals practicing self-isolation, and the basic reproduction number R 0 . Without self-isolation, when R 0 = 2.5, treatment of critically ill individuals at the outbreak peak would require 3.8 times more ICU beds than exist in the United States. Self-isolation by 20% of cases 24 h after symptom onset would delay and flatten the outbreak trajectory, reducing the number of ICU beds needed at the peak by 48.4% (interquartile range 46.4–50.3%), although still exceeding existing capacity. When R 0 = 2, twice as many ICU beds would be required at the peak of outbreak in the absence of self-isolation. In this scenario, the proportional impact of self-isolation within 24 h on reducing the peak number of ICU beds is substantially higher at 73.5% (interquartile range 71.4–75.3%). Our estimates underscore the inadequacy of critical care capacity to handle the burgeoning outbreak. Policies that encourage self-isolation, such as paid sick leave, may delay the epidemic peak, giving a window of time that could facilitate emergency mobilization to expand hospital capacity.