skip to main content


Search for: All records

Creators/Authors contains: "Schuckers, Stephanie"

Note: When clicking on a Digital Object Identifier (DOI) number, you will be taken to an external site maintained by the publisher. Some full text articles may not yet be available without a charge during the embargo (administrative interval).
What is a DOI Number?

Some links on this page may take you to non-federal websites. Their policies may differ from this site.

  1. Free, publicly-accessible full text available December 15, 2024
  2. Free, publicly-accessible full text available May 1, 2024
  3. As account compromises and malicious online attacks are on the rise, multi-factor authentication (MFA) has been adopted to defend against these attacks. OTP and mobile push notification are just two examples of the popularly adopted MFA factors. Although MFA improve security, they also add additional steps or hardware to the authentication process, thus increasing the authentication time and introducing friction. On the other hand, keystroke dynamics-based authentication is believed to be a promising MFA for increasing security while reducing friction. While there have been several studies on the usability of other MFA factors, the usability of keystroke dynamics has not been studied. To this end, we have built a web authentication system with the standard features of signup, login and account recovery, and integrated keystroke dynamics as an additional factor. We then conducted a user study on the system where 20 participants completed tasks related to signup, login and account recovery. We have also evaluated a new approach for completing the user enrollment process, which reduces friction by naturally employing other alternative MFA factors (OTP in our study) when keystroke dynamics is not ready for use. Our study shows that while maintaining strong security (0% FPR), adding keystroke dynamics reduces authentication friction by avoiding 66.3% of OTP at login and 85.8% of OTP at account recovery, which in turn reduces the authentication time by 63.3% and 78.9% for login and account recovery respectively. Through an exit survey, all participants have rated the integration of keystroke dynamics with OTP to be more preferable to the conventional OTP-only authentication. 
    more » « less
    Free, publicly-accessible full text available April 24, 2024
  4. The ubiquity of mobile devices nowadays necessitates securing the apps and user information stored therein. However, existing one-time entry-point authentication mechanisms and enhanced security mechanisms such as Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) are prone to a wide vector of attacks. Furthermore, MFA also introduces friction to the user experience. Therefore, what is needed is continuous authentication that once passing the entry-point authentication, will protect the mobile devices on a continuous basis by confirming the legitimate owner of the device and locking out detected impostor activities. Hence, more research is needed on the dynamic methods of mobile security such as behavioral biometrics-based continuous authentication, which is cost-effective and passive as the data utilized to authenticate users are logged from the phone's sensors. However, currently, there are not many mobile authentication datasets to perform benchmarking research. In this work, we share two novel mobile datasets (Clarkson University (CU) Mobile datasets I and II) consisting of multi-modality behavioral biometrics data from 49 and 39 users respectively (88 users in total). Each of our datasets consists of modalities such as swipes, keystrokes, acceleration, gyroscope, and pattern-tracing strokes. These modalities are collected when users are filling out a registration form in sitting both as genuine and impostor users. To exhibit the usefulness of the datasets, we have performed initial experiments on selected individual modalities from the datasets as well as the fusion of simultaneously available modalities. 
    more » « less
    Free, publicly-accessible full text available April 24, 2024
  5. Free, publicly-accessible full text available April 19, 2024
  6. Free, publicly-accessible full text available April 1, 2024