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Abstract Population structure affects the outcome of natural selection. These effects can be modeled using evolutionary games on graphs. Recently, conditions were derived for a trait to be favored under weak selection, on any weighted graph, in terms of coalescence times of random walks. Here we consider isothermal graphs, which have the same total edge weight at each node. The conditions for success on isothermal graphs take a simple form, in which the effects of graph structure are captured in the ‘effective degree’—a measure of the effective number of neighbors per individual. For two update rules (death-Birth and birth-Death), cooperative behavior is favored on a large isothermal graph if the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds the effective degree. For two other update rules (Birth-death and Death-birth), cooperation is never favored. We relate the effective degree of a graph to its spectral gap, thereby linking evolutionary dynamics to the theory of expander graphs. Surprisingly, we find graphs of infinite average degree that nonetheless provide strong support for cooperation. 

A population’s spatial structure affects the rate of genetic change and the outcome of natural selection. These effects can be modeled mathematically using the Birth-death process on graphs. Individuals occupy the vertices of a weighted graph, and reproduce into neighboring vertices based on fitness. A key quantity is the probability that a mutant type will sweep to fixation, as a function of the mutant’s fitness. Graphs that increase the fixation probability of beneficial mutations, and decrease that of deleterious mutations, are said to amplify selection. However, fixation probabilities are difficult to compute for an arbitrary graph. Here we derive an expression for the fixation probability, of a weakly-selected mutation, in terms of the time for two lineages to coalesce. This expression enables weak-selection fixation probabilities to be computed, for an arbitrary weighted graph, in polynomial time. Applying this method, we explore the range of possible effects of graph structure on natural selection, genetic drift, and the balance between the two. Using exhaustive analysis of small graphs and a genetic search algorithm, we identify families of graphs with striking effects on fixation probability, and we analyze these families mathematically. Our work reveals the nuanced effects of graph structure on natural selection and neutral drift. In particular, we show how these notions depend critically on the process by which mutations arise. 

Prosocial behaviors are encountered in the donation game, the prisoner's dilemma, relaxed social dilemmas, and public goods games. Many studies assume that the population structure is homogeneous, meaning all individuals have the same number of interaction partners, or that the social good is of one particular type. Here, we explore general evolutionary dynamics for arbitrary spatial structures and social goods. We find that heterogeneous networks, wherein some individuals have many more interaction partners than others, can enhance the evolution of prosocial behaviors. However, they often accumulate most of the benefits in the hands of a few highly-connected individuals, while many others receive low or negative payoff. Surprisingly, selection can favor producers of social goods even if the total costs exceed the total benefits. In summary, heterogeneous structures have the ability to strongly promote the emergence of prosocial behaviors, but they also create the possibility of generating large inequality. 

We study a general setting of neutral evolution in which the population is of finite, constant size and can have spatial structure. Mutation leads to different genetic types (``traits"), which can be discrete or continuous. Under minimal assumptions, we show that the marginal trait distributions of the evolutionary process, which specify the probability that any given individual has a certain trait, all converge to the stationary distribution of the mutation process. In particular, the stationary frequencies of traits in the population are independent of its size, spatial structure, and evolutionary update rule, and these frequencies can be calculated by evaluating a simple stochastic process describing a population of size one (i.e. the mutation process itself). We conclude by analyzing mixing times, which characterize rates of convergence of the mutation process along the lineages, in terms of demographic variables of the evolutionary process.