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Abstract Causal reasoning is a fundamental cognitive ability that enables individuals to learn about the complex interactions in the world around them. However, the mechanisms that underpin causal reasoning are not well understood. For example, it remains unresolved whether children's causal inferences are best explained by Bayesian inference or associative learning. The two experiments and computational models reported here were designed to examine whether 5‐ and 6‐year‐olds will retrospectively reevaluate objects—that is, adjust their beliefs about the causal status of some objects presented at an earlier point in time based on the observed causal status of other objects presented at a later point in time—when asked to reason about 3 and 4 objects and under varying degrees of information processing demands. Additionally, the experiments and models were designed to determine whether children's retrospective reevaluations were best explained by associative learning, Bayesian inference, or some combination of both. The results indicated that participants retrospectively reevaluated causal inferences under minimal information‐processing demands (Experiment 1) but failed to do so under greater information processing demands (Experiment 2) and that their performance was better captured by an associative learning mechanism, with less support for descriptions that rely on Bayesian inference. Research HighlightsFive‐ and 6‐year‐old children engage in retrospective reevaluation under minimal information‐processing demands (Experiment 1).Five‐ and 6‐year‐old children do not engage in retrospective reevaluation under more extensive information‐processing demands (Experiment 2).Across both experiments, children's retrospective reevaluations were better explained by a simple associative learning model, with only minimal support for a simple Bayesian model.These data contribute to our understanding of the cognitive mechanisms by which children make causal judgements. 

Abstract This study examines how parents' and children's explanatory talk and exploratory behaviors support children's causal reasoning at a museum in San Jose, CA in 2017. One‐hundred‐nine parent–child dyads (3–6 years; 56 girls, 53 boys; 32 White, 9 Latino/Hispanic, 17 Asian‐American, 17 South Asian, 1 Pacific Islander, 26 mixed ethnicity, 7 unreported) played at an air flow exhibit with a nonobvious causal mechanism. Children's causal reasoning was probed afterward. The timing of parents' explanatory talk and exploratory behaviors was related to children's systematic exploration during play. Children's exploratory behavior, and parents' goal setting during play, were related to children's subsequent causal reasoning. These findings support the hypothesis that children's exploration is related to both internal learning processes and external social scaffolding. 

We examined how 5- to 8-year-olds ( N = 51; M_age= 83 months; 27 female, 24 male; 69% White, 12% Black/African American, 8% Asian/Asian American, 6% Hispanic, 6% not reported) and adults ( N = 18; M_age= 20.13 years; 11 female, 7 male) accepted or rejected different distributions of resources between themselves and others. We used a reach-tracking method to track finger movement in 3D space over time. This allowed us to dissociate two inhibitory processes. One involved pausing motor responses to detect conflict between observed information and how participants thought resources should be divided; the other involved resolving the conflict between the response and the alternative. Reasoning about disadvantageous inequities involved more of the first system, and this was stable across development. Reasoning about advantageous inequities involved more of the second system and showed more of a developmental progression. Generally, reach tracking offers an on-line measure of inhibitory control for the study of cognition. 

There is a long-standing interest in the role that children’s understanding of pretense plays in their more general theory of mind development. Some argue that children understand pretense as a mental state, and the capacity to pretend is indicative of children possessing the capacity for mental representations. Others argue that children understand pretense in terms of actions and appearances, and an understanding of the mental states involved in pretending has a prolonged developmental trajectory. The goal of this paper is to integrate these ideas by positing that children understand pretense as a form of causal inference, which is based on both their general causal reasoning capacities and specific knowledge of mental states. I will first review literature on children’s understanding of pretense, and how such understanding can be conceptualized as integrating with children’s causal reasoning ability. I will then consider how children’s causal knowledge affects the ways they make inferences about others’ pretense. Next, I will consider the role of causal knowledge more broadly in children’s reasoning about pretense worlds, judgments of possibility, and counterfactual reasoning. Taken together the goal of this review is to synthesize how children understand pretending into a rational constructivist framework for understanding social cognitive development in a more integrative manner. 

The unexpected contents task is a well-established measure for studying young children's developing theory of mind. The task measures whether children understand that others have a false belief about a deceptive container and whether children can track the representational change in their own beliefs about the container's contents. Performance on both questions improves between the ages of 3 and 4. A previous meta-analysis (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001) found little evidence for a difference in children's responses on these questions, but did not investigate the weak effect size that was reported for the interaction between age and question type. The two meta-analyses reported here update the literature review, and find a more robust interaction between question type and age. Three-year-olds showed better performance on questions about their own representational change than others' false belief, while older children showed the reverse pattern. A mega-analysis of a sample of over 1200 children between the ages of 36–60 months then showed the same result. This response pattern requires novel theoretical interpretations, which include reframing the development of children's understanding of false belief. 

Research in both laboratory and museum settings suggests that children’s exploration and caregiver–child interaction relate to children’s learning and engagement. Most of this work, however, takes a third-person perspective on children’s exploration of a single activity or exhibit, and does not consider children’s perspectives on their own exploration. In contrast, the current study recruited 6-to 10-year-olds (N = 52) to wear GoPro cameras, which recorded their first-person perspectives as they explored a dinosaur exhibition in a natural history museum. During a 10-min period, children were allowed to interact with 34 different exhibits, their caregivers and families, and museum staff however they wished. Following their exploration, children were asked to reflect on their exploration while watching the video they created and to report on whether they had learned anything. Children were rated as more engaged when they explored collaboratively with their caregivers. Children were more likely to report that they learned something when they were more engaged, and when they spent more time at exhibits that presented information didactically rather than being interactive. These results suggest that static exhibits have an important role to play in fostering learning experiences in museums, potentially because such exhibits allow for more caregiver–child interaction. 

Microaggressions are subtle, offensive comments that are directed at minority group members and are characteristically ambiguous in meaning. In two studies, we explored how observers interpreted such ambiguous statements by comparing microaggressions to faux pas, offenses caused by the speaker having an incidental false belief. In Experiment 1, we compared third-party observers’ blame and intentionality judgments of microaggressions with those for social faux pas. Despite judging neither microaggressions nor social faux pas to be definitively intentional, participants judged microaggressions as more blameworthy. In Experiment 2, microaggressions without explicit mental state information elicited a similar profile of judgments to those accompanied by explicit prejudiced or ignorant beliefs. Although they were, like faux pas, judged not to cause harm intentionally, microaggressive comments appeared to be judged more blameworthy on account of enduring prejudice thought to be lurking behind a speaker's false beliefs. Our current research demonstrates a distinctive profile of moral judgment for microaggressions. 

How do young children develop a concept of equity? Infants prefer dividing resources equally and expect others to make such distributions. Between the ages of 3–8, children begin to exhibit preferences to avoid inequitable outcomes in their distributions, dividing resources unequally if the result of that distribution is a more equitable outcome. Four studies investigated children’s developing preferences for generating equitable distributions, focusing on the mechanisms for this development. Children were presented with two characters with different amount of resources, and then a third character who will distribute more resources to them. Three- to 8-year-olds were asked whether the third character should give an equal number of resources to the recipients, preserving the inequity, or an unequal number to them, creating an equitable outcome. Starting at age 7, children showed a preference for equitable distributions (Study 1, N = 144). Studies 2a (N = 72) and 2b (N = 48) suggest that this development is independent of children’s numerical competence. When asked to take the perspective of the recipient with fewer resources, 3- to 6-year-olds were more likely to make an equitable distribution (Study 3, N = 122). These data suggest that social perspective taking underlies children’s prosocial actions, and supports the hypothesis that their spontaneous capacity to take others’ perspectives develops during the early elementary-school years.