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ABSTRACT This paper examines approaches for influencing people's confidence in their knowledge without influencing knowledge. Three studies examined the relative effectiveness of training and false feedback approaches. Participants chose which of two IKEA products they thought was more expensive and indicated their confidence in that judgment for 50 product pairs. In Study 1, participants took part in one of five conditions designed to manipulate their confidence: false feedback‐increasing, false feedback‐decreasing, training‐increasing, training‐decreasing, or control. For false feedback, we told participants they did very well or poorly on the task. For training‐increasing, we gave participants information about IKEA pricing that appeared useful but was difficult to implement. For training‐decreasing, we developed an automated calibration training technique that provided personalized calibration feedback consisting of a calibration diagram accompanied by textual summary information and advice. Neither the false feedback nor training approach increased confidence on 50 subsequent knowledge‐confidence judgments. However, both manipulations designed to reduce confidence were successful, with a substantially larger effect in the calibration training condition. In Study 2, we adapted the calibration training approach to provide false feedback indicating participants were either underconfident or overconfident. Both the original calibration training pproach and the new false feedback approach indicating overconfidence reduced confidence, and the false feedback approach indicating underconfidence increased confidence. Study 3 tested the effectiveness of this new false feedback approach on an on‐line rather than student sample, finding essentially the same results as those in Study 2. Throughout the three studies, the effects of the manipulations extended to overconfidence, overall calibration, and the Brier score. The results provide a potential tool for research and practice regarding confidence in knowledge. 

ABSTRACT A cursory read of the popular press and the JDM research field suggest that they have very different beliefs regarding the consequences of confidence. And these beliefs have important consequences themselves. For individuals, how one views the consequences of confidence (and whether they are positive or negative) likely influences the extent to which one pursues the development of confidence and how one interprets confidence in others. For JDM researchers, their beliefs about the consequences of confidence inform research programs. For example, a belief that overconfidence leads to inappropriate medical treatments, legal advice, or investments suggests an emphasis on reducing overconfidence rather than on developing confidence. This paper aims to improve understanding of both the general public's and JDM researchers' beliefs about the consequences of confidence in knowledge. We present a general theoretical framework for thinking about the consequences of confidence, followed by two exploratory studies designed to access these beliefs, first with the general public and then with JDM researchers. We used structured, open‐ended questioning to generate a large dataset (over 10,000 responses) of potential consequences of low confidence, high confidence, overconfidence, and underconfidence. Qualitative coding identified a broad set of respondent‐generated beliefs regarding psychological and behavioral consequences, organized into antonym pairs (e.g., arrogant/high self‐image vs. low self‐image). Respondents made few distinctions between low confidence and underconfidence, viewing both negatively. However, the general public drew a sharp distinction between high confidence (described positively) and overconfidence (described negatively), a trend less prevalent among JDM researchers.