In this survey, the authors review the main quantum algorithms for solving the computational problems that serve as hardness assumptions for cryptosystem. To this end, the authors consider both the currently most widely used classically secure cryptosystems, and the most promising candidates for post‐quantum secure cryptosystems. The authors provide details on the cost of the quantum algorithms presented in this survey. The authors furthermore discuss ongoing research directions that can impact quantum cryptanalysis in the future.
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Abstract 
A proof of work (PoW) is an important cryptographic construct enabling a party to convince others that they invested some effort in solving a computational task. Arguably, its main impact has been in the setting of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and its underlying blockchain protocol, which received significant attention in recent years due to its potential for various applications as well as for solving fundamental distributed computing questions in novel threat models. PoWs enable the linking of blocks in the blockchain data structure and thus the problem of interest is the feasibility of obtaining a sequence (chain) of such proofs. In this work, we examine the hardness of finding such chain of PoWs against quantum strategies. We prove that the chain of PoWs problem reduces to a problem we call multisolution Bernoulli search, for which we establish its quantum query complexity. Effectively, this is an extension of a threshold direct product theorem to an averagecase unstructured search problem. Our proof, adding to active recent efforts, simplifies and generalizes the recording technique of Zhandry (Crypto'19). As an application, we revisit the formal treatment of security of the core of the Bitcoin consensus protocol, the Bitcoin backbone (Eurocrypt'15), against quantum adversaries, while honest parties are classical and show that protocol's security holds under a quantum analogue of the classical “honest majority'' assumption. Our analysis indicates that the security of Bitcoin backbone is guaranteed provided the number of adversarial quantum queries is bounded so that each quantum query is worth O ( p − 1 / 2 ) classical ones, where p is the success probability of a single classical query to the protocol's underlying hash function. Somewhat surprisingly, the wait time for safe settlement in the case of quantum adversaries matches the safe settlement time in the classical case.more » « less

null (Ed.)A fundamental pursuit in complexity theory concerns reducing worstcase problems to averagecase problems. There exist complexity classes such as PSPACE that admit worstcase to averagecase reductions. However, for many other classes such as NP, the evidence so far is typically negative, in the sense that the existence of such reductions would cause collapses of the polynomial hierarchy(PH). Basing cryptographic primitives, e.g., the averagecase hardness of inverting oneway permutations, on NPcompleteness is a particularly intriguing instance. As there is evidence showing that classical reductions from NPhard problems to breaking these primitives result in PH collapses, it seems unlikely to base cryptographic primitives on NPhard problems. Nevertheless, these results do not rule out the possibilities of the existence of quantum reductions. In this work, we initiate a study of the quantum analogues of these questions. Aside from formalizing basic notions of quantum reductions and demonstrating powers of quantum reductions by examples of separations, our main result shows that if NPcomplete problems reduce to inverting oneway permutations using certain types of quantum reductions, then coNP ⊆ QIP ( 2 ) .more » « less