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Industry-funded research poses a threat to the validity of scientific inference on carcinogenic hazards. Scientists require tools to better identify and characterize industry sponsored research across bodies of evidence to reduce the possible influence of industry bias in evidence synthesis reviews. We applied a novel large language model (LLM)-based tool named InfluenceMapper to demonstrate and evaluate its performance in identifying relationships to industry in research on the carcinogenicity of benzene, cobalt, and aspartame. MethodsAll epidemiological, animal cancer, and mechanistic studies included in systematic reviews on the carcinogenicity of the three agents by theIARC Monographsprogramme. Selected agents were recently evaluated by theMonographsand are of commercial interest by major industries. InfluenceMapper extracted disclosed entities in study publications and classified up to 40 possible disclosed relationship types between each entity and the study and between each entity and author. A human classified entities as ‘industry or industry-funded’ and assessed relationships with industry for potential conflicts of interest. Positive predictive values described the extent of true positive relationships identified by InfluenceMapper compared to human assessment. ResultsAnalyses included 2,046 studies for all three agents. We identified 320 disclosed industry or industry-funded entities from InfluenceMapper output that were involved in 770 distinct study-entity and author-entity relationships. For each agent, between 4 and 8% of studies disclosed funding by industry and 1–4% of studies had at least one author who disclosed receiving industry funding directly. Industry trade associations for all three agents funded 22 studies published in 16 journals over a 37-year span. Aside from funding, the most prevalent disclosed relationships with industry were receiving data, holding employment, paid consulting, and providing expert testimony. Positive predictive values were excellent (≥ 98%) for study-entity relationships but declined for relationships with individual authors. ConclusionsLLM-based tools can significantly expedite and bolster the detection of disclosed conflicts of interest from industry sponsored research in cancer prevention. Possible use cases include facilitating the assessment of bias from industry studies in evidence synthesis reviews and alerting scientists to the influence of industry on scientific inference. Persistent challenges in ascertaining conflicts of interest underscore the urgent need for standardized, transparent, and enforceable disclosures in biomedical journals. 

Abstract BackgroundTo support public health researchers and advocates seeking to challenge the influence of powerful commercial actors on health, it is necessary to develop a deeper understanding of corporate political activities. This project explores political science scholarship analysing lobbying to identify new datasets and research methods that can be applied to public health and stimulate further research and advocacy. MethodsWe undertook a systematic scoping review of peer-reviewed and grey literature reports analysing the practice of lobbying. Titles and abstracts of 4533 peer-reviewed and 285 grey literature reports were screened, with 233 peer-reviewed and 280 grey literature reports assessed for eligibility. We used a two-stage process for data extraction. In stage 1, we collected two pieces of information from all included studies: data sources and indicators used to measure lobbying. For the second stage, data extraction was limited to 15 studies that focused on meetings. ResultsThe most common indicators used to measure lobbying activity were: registrations of active lobbyists; expenditure on lobbying; meetings; written comments and submissions made to government consultations; bills; and committee participation. A range of different data sources were used to analyse lobbying, including from governments, not-for-profits and commercial sources. All 15 studies analysing lobbyist meetings were from high-income contexts. The studies analysed three key variables: the types of government actors targeted by lobbying; the policies of interest; and the lobbyists and/or their clients. The studies used a range of taxonomies to classify policy issues and the types of actors engaged in lobbying. All studies discussed challenges with accessing and analysing lobbying data. ConclusionsThere is enormous potential for public health research and advocacy concerned with commercial lobbying to learn from political science scholarship. This includes both conceptual frameworks and sources of empirical data. Moreover, the absence of good quality transparency internationally emphasises the importance of advocacy to support policy change to improve the quality of political transparency to make it easier to monitor commercial lobbying. 

Abstract What is unknown about commercial lobbying is far greater than what is known. These omissions distort our understanding of the extent and nature of business influence on politics. Especially when businesses engage in practices that harm health, it is crucial for public health advocates to understand corporate lobbying to counter its influence. Our study proceeded in three phases. First, based on an international audit, we developed a list of the categories of information about lobbying that could be disclosed under four groups (lobby firms, lobbyists, organizations and activities) and benchmarked Australian lobbyist registers against this list. Second, we manually extracted data from lobbyist registers in eight jurisdictions, cleaned the data and created a relational model for analysis. Finally, we classified a sample of organizations as public health organizations or harmful industries to compare their activities. We identified 61 possible categories of information about lobbying in international lobbyist registers. When applied to Australian lobbyist registers, Queensland covered the widest range of categories (13, 21%), though many lacked detail and completeness. Australian lobbyist registers provided data on 462 third-party lobby firms across Australia, currently employing 1036 lobbyists and representing 4101 organizations. Several of these represented harmful industries, with gambling interests hiring the most third-party lobby firms. Ultimately, Australian lobbyist registers do not provide enough information to understand the full extent of lobbying activities taking place. Political transparency is important for public health actors to be able to monitor corporate political activity and to protect policy-making from vested interests. 

Recent years have seen growing interest in market-shaping – the intentional efforts of firms, consumers, governments, and nonprofits to transform, disrupt, or maintain market systems. However, the ‘dark side’ of market shaping – its strategic use to entrench power and shift burdens onto others – remains underexplored. This paper examines the historical case of U.S. beverage container production (1950–1990) using institutional work as a theoretical lens. Analyzing actions taken by container and beverage manufacturers, industry associations, activists, media, and government, we find industry actors collaboratively sustained dominance by simultaneously making and breaking institutions, with little regard for broader environmental and societal consequences. These shaping efforts were systemic, evolving, and increasingly channeled through specialized, strategically focused industry associations. In contrast, opposing actors lacked comparable coordination and influence. We contribute to market-shaping literature and extend critical macromarketing debates by foregrounding asymmetrical shaping and the urgent need to evaluate such strategies through normative frameworks that consider ecological and social limits. 

We identified 28 countries with online lobbyist registers, all from upper or upper-middle income countries. No country fulfilled all 50 indicators in the FOCAL. The category of “scope” had the highest scores across countries, whereas the “revolving door” and “financial” categories had the lowest scores. We found evidence of lobbying by Philip Morris International, British American Tobacco, or one of their subsidiaries in 14 of the 28 countries with online lobbyist registers.