skip to main content
US FlagAn official website of the United States government
dot gov icon
Official websites use .gov
A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.
https lock icon
Secure .gov websites use HTTPS
A lock ( lock ) or https:// means you've safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.

Explore Research Products in the PAR
It may take a few hours for recently added research products to appear in PAR search results.


  • Home
  • Search Results
  • Page 1 of 1

Search for: All records

Award ID contains: 2149219

Note: When clicking on a Digital Object Identifier (DOI) number, you will be taken to an external site maintained by the publisher. Some full text articles may not yet be available without a charge during the embargo (administrative interval).
What is a DOI Number?

Some links on this page may take you to non-federal websites. Their policies may differ from this site.

  1. (, China Economic Review)
    Ackert, Lucy; Wei, Lijia; QI, Li (Ed.)
    When firm owners delegate decision-making to managers, such as corporate executives who operate firms directly, a firm’s behavior can vary depending on how the owner determines the incentives of the managers. This study employs a lab experiment to investigate the impact of delegation on collusive behavior of firms in a situation where antitrust policies exist. The experiment highlights the following two key findings: (i) Firms form cartels strategically, alternating their collusive and competitive output to evade antitrust regulations, rather than consistently producing collusive output to maximize joint profits; and (ii) Delegation does not necessarily increase the overall number of cartels, but it may change how cartels are formed. 
    more » « less
    Free, publicly-accessible full text available April 1, 2026