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Abstract Constraining the actions of AI systems is one promising way to ensure that these systems behave in a way that is morally acceptable to humans. But constraints alone come with drawbacks as in many AI systems, they are not flexible. If these constraints are too rigid, they can preclude actions that are actually acceptable in certain, contextual situations. Humans, on the other hand, can often decide when a simple and seemingly inflexible rule should actually be overridden based on the context. In this paper, we empirically investigate the way humans make these contextual moral judgements, with the goal of building AI systems that understand when to follow and when to override constraints. We propose a novel and general preference-based graphical model that captures a modification of standarddual processtheories of moral judgment. We then detail the design, implementation, and results of a study of human participants who judge whether it is acceptable to break a well-established rule:no cutting in line. We then develop an instance of our model and compare its performance to that of standard machine learning approaches on the task of predicting the behavior of human participants in the study, showing that our preference-based approach more accurately captures the judgments of human decision-makers. It also provides a flexible method to model the relationship between variables for moral decision-making tasks that can be generalized to other settings. 

Abstract We introduce Flexible Representative Democracy (FRD), a novel hybrid of Representative Democracy and Direct Democracy in which voters can alter the issue-dependent weights of a set of elected representatives. In line with the literature on Interactive Democracy, our model allows the voters to actively determine the degree to which the system is direct versus representative. However, unlike Liquid Democracy, Flexible Representative Democracy uses strictly non-transitive delegations, making delegation cycles impossible, and maintains a fixed set of accountable, elected representatives. We present Flexible Representative Democracy and analyze it using a computational approach with issues that are binary and symmetric. We compare the outcomes of various voting systems using Direct Democracy with majority voting as an ideal baseline. First, we demonstrate the shortcomings of Representative Democracy in our model. We provide NP-Hardness results for electing an ideal set of representatives, discuss pathologies, and demonstrate empirically that common multi-winner election rules for selecting representatives do not perform well in expectation. To analyze the effects of adding delegation to representative voting systems, we begin by providing theoretical results on how issue-specific delegations determine outcomes. Finally, we provide empirical results comparing the outcomes of various voting systems: Representative Democracy, Proxy Voting, and FRD with issue-specific delegations. Our results show that variants of Proxy Voting yield no discernible benefit over unweighted representatives and reveal the potential for Flexible Representative Democracy to improve outcomes as voter participation increases. 

We consider the problem of determining a binary ground truth using advice from a group of independent reviewers (experts) who express their guess about a ground truth correctly with some independent probability (competence) 𝑝 . In this setting, when all reviewers 𝑖 are competent with 𝑝 ≥ 0.5, the Condorcet Jury Theorem tells us that adding more reviewers increases the overall accuracy, and if all 𝑝 ’s are known, then there exists an optimal weighting of the 𝑖 reviewers. However, in practical settings, reviewers may be noisy or incompetent, i.e., 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 0.5, and the number of experts may be small, so the asymptotic Condorcet Jury Theorem is not practically relevant. In such cases we explore appointing one or more chairs ( judges) who determine the weight of each reviewer for aggregation, creating multiple levels. However, these chairs may be unable to correctly identify the competence of the reviewers they oversee, and therefore unable to compute the optimal weighting. We give conditions on when a set of chairs is able to weight the reviewers optimally, and depending on the competence distribution of the agents, give results about when it is better to have more chairs or more reviewers. Through simulations we show that in some cases it is better to have more chairs, but in many cases it is better to have more reviewers. 

There is a critical need for community engagement in the process of adopting artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in public health. Public health practitioners and researchers have historically innovated in areas like vaccination and sanitation but have been slower in adopting emerging technologies such as generative AI. However, with increasingly complex funding, programming, and research requirements, the field now faces a pivotal moment to enhance its agility and responsiveness to evolving health challenges. Participatory methods and community engagement are key components of many current public health programs and research. The field of public health is well positioned to ensure community engagement is part of AI technologies applied to population health issues. Without such engagement, the adoption of these technologies in public health may exclude significant portions of the population, particularly those with the fewest resources, with the potential to exacerbate health inequities. Risks to privacy and perpetuation of bias are more likely to be avoided if AI technologies in public health are designed with knowledge of community engagement, existing health disparities, and strategies for improving equity. This viewpoint proposes a multifaceted approach to ensure safer and more effective integration of AI in public health with the following call to action: (1) include the basics of AI technology in public health training and professional development; (2) use a community engagement approach to co-design AI technologies in public health; and (3) introduce governance and best practice mechanisms that can guide the use of AI in public health to prevent or mitigate potential harms. These actions will support the application of AI to varied public health domains through a framework for more transparent, responsive, and equitable use of this evolving technology, augmenting the work of public health practitioners and researchers to improve health outcomes while minimizing risks and unintended consequences. 

Public sector leverages artificial intelligence (AI) to enhance the efficiency, transparency, and accountability of civic operations and public services. This includes initiatives such as predictive waste management, facial recognition for identification, and advanced tools in the criminal justice system. While public-sector AI can improve efficiency and accountability, it also has the potential to perpetuate biases, infringe on privacy, and marginalize vulnerable groups. Responsible AI (RAI) research aims to address these concerns by focusing on fairness and equity through participatory AI. We invite researchers, community members, and public sector workers to collaborate on designing, developing, and deploying RAI systems that enhance public sector accountability and transparency. Key topics include raising awareness of AI's impact on the public sector, improving access to AI auditing tools, building public engagement capacity, fostering early community involvement to align AI innovations with public needs, and promoting accessible and inclusive participation in AI development. The workshop will feature two keynotes, two short paper sessions, and three discussion-oriented activities. Our goal is to create a platform for exchanging ideas and developing strategies to design community-engaged RAI systems while mitigating the potential harms of AI and maximizing its benefits in the public sector.