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Abstract Animal communication mediates social interactions with important fitness consequences for individuals. Receivers use signals to detect and discriminate among potential mates. Extensive research effort has focused on how receiver behavior imposes selection on signalers and signals. However, animals communicate in socially and physically complex environments with important biotic and abiotic features that are often excluded from controlled laboratory experiments, including noise. “Noise” is any factor that prevents signal detection and discrimination. The noise caused by aggregates of acoustic signalers is a well-known impediment to receivers, but how many individual signalers are required to produce the emergent effects of chorus noise on receiver behavior? In Teleogryllus oceanicus, the Australian field cricket, we assayed female preferences for a temporal property of male advertisement signals, the number of long chirp pulses, using two-, four-, six-, and eight-choice phonotaxis experiments. We found that, as the number of individual signalers increased, receivers became less likely to respond phonotactically and less likely to express their well-documented preference for more long chirp pulses. We found that very few individual signalers can create a sufficiently noisy environment, due either to acoustic interference or choice overload, to substantially impair female preference expression. Our results suggest that receivers may not always be able to express their well-documented mating preferences in nature. 

Abstract Asymmetries in power (the ability to influence the outcome of conflict) are ubiquitous in social interactions because interacting individuals are rarely identical. It is well documented that asymmetries in power influence the outcome of reproductive conflict in social groups. Yet power asymmetries have received little attention in the context of negotiations between caring parents, which is surprising given that parents are often markedly different in size. Here we built on an existing negotiation model to examine how power and punishment influence negotiations over care. We incorporated power asymmetry by allowing the more-powerful parent, rank 1, to inflict punishment on the less-powerful parent, rank 2. We then determined when punishment will be favored by selection and how it would affect the negotiated behavioral response of each parent. We found that with power and punishment, a reduction in one parent’s effort results in partial compensation by the other parent. However, the degree of compensation is asymmetric: the rank 2 compensates more than the rank 1. As a result, the fitness of rank 1 increases and the fitness of rank 2 decreases, relative to the original negotiation model. Furthermore, because power and punishment enable one parent to extract greater effort from the other, offspring can do better, that is, receive more total effort, when there is power and punishment involved in negotiations over care. These results reveal how power and punishment alter the outcome of conflict between parents and affect offspring, providing insights into the evolutionary consequences of exerting power in negotiations.