# What's in a teacher test? Assessing the relationship between teacher licensure test scores and student STEM achievement and course-taking 

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## A R T I C L E I N F O

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#### Abstract

We investigate the relationship between teacher licensure test scores and student test achievement and high school course-taking. We focus on three subject/grade combinations-middle school math, ninthgrade algebra and geometry, and ninth-grade biology-and find evidence that a teacher's basic skills test scores are modestly predictive of student achievement in middle school math and highly predictive of student achievement in high school biology. A teacher's subject-specific licensure test scores are a consistent and statistically significant predictor of student achievement only in high school biology. Finally, we find little evidence that students assigned to middle school teachers with higher basic-skills test scores are more likely to take advanced math and science courses in high school. © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.


An educated, innovative, motivated workforce-human capitalis the most precious resource of any country in this new, flat world. Yet there is widespread concern about our $\mathrm{K}-12$ science and mathematics education system, the foundation of that human capital in today's global economy (National Academies of Sciences, 2007).

## 1. Introduction

There is significant policy focus on the human capital of the nation's STEM teachers. This is motivated both by a desire to improve STEM outcomes for students in $\mathrm{K}-12$ schools and college (e.g., President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 2010) and by the vast body of empirical evidence showing the impor-

[^0]tance of teacher quality for student achievement (Aaronson, Barrow, \& Sander, 2007; Goldhaber \& Hansen, 2013; Rivkin, Hanushek, \& Kain, 2005). ${ }^{1}$ One way that states try to ensure a high-quality teacher workforce is by requiring teacher candidates to pass licensure tests, often of both their basic skills and content knowledge, as a requirement for receiving a teaching license. Although several studies (e.g., Clotfelter, Ladd, \& Vigdor, 2007; Goldhaber \& Hansen, 2010; Goldhaber, 2007) find modest positive correlations between teacher performance on licensure exams and student math achievement gains in elementary grades, there is little evidence on whether licensure tests provide a useful "signal" of the future quality of secondary STEM teachers. Moreover, there is no existing evidence about whether teacher licensure test scores are predictive of longer-term student outcomes like course taking in STEM fields.

In this paper we use data from Washington State to investigate whether STEM teachers with higher licensure test scores are also

[^1]more effective at improving student outcomes. We focus on three subject/grade combinations-middle school (seventh-eighth grade) math, ninth-grade algebra and geometry, and ninth-grade biologyand estimate whether a teacher's score on licensure tests required to teach these subjects are predictive of student test achievement and high school course taking. To our knowledge this is one of the first papers to assess the predictive validity of teacher licensure test scores in secondary math and science classrooms, and the first to investigate the potential longer-term impacts of exposure to teachers with different licensure test scores.

We find that basic skills licensure test scores-which can be considered as a measure a candidate's general skills in math, reading, and writing-are modestly predictive of student achievement in middle and high school math (though only statistically significant in middle school math) and highly predictive of student achievement in high school biology. The relationships between teacher candidate performance on subject-specific licensure test scoreswhich can be considered as a measure of a candidate's job-specific skills in the subject they will be endorsed to teach-and student performance are similar in magnitude to the relationships for basic skills tests, though less consistently statistically significant. Finally, we find little evidence that students assigned to middle school math teachers with higher basic-skills test scores are more likely to take advanced math and science courses in high school.

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide background and context for this study. We introduce our data and discuss summary statistics in Section 3, outline our analytic models in Section 4, and describe our results in Section 5. We then offer some concluding thoughts in Section 6.

## 2. Background

There is overwhelming policy interest in improving student outcomes in STEM fields, exemplified by a Report to the President (President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 2010) stating that "STEM education will determine whether the United States will remain a leader among nations and whether we will be able to solve immense challenges in such areas as energy, health, environmental protection, and national security" (p. v). This focus on STEM outcomes has in turn prompted calls to improve the quality of the nation's STEM teacher workforce (e.g., White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, 2012), since teacher quality has repeatedly been shown to be one of the most important school-related influences on student achievement (Aaronson et al., 2007; Coleman et al., 1966; Rivkin et al., 2005; Rockoff, 2004). Unfortunately, relatively few teacher credentials (like degree level or licensure status) appear to predict whether teachers affect student outcomes in ways that are detectible by student test performance (e.g. Aaronson et al., 2007; Goldhaber \& Brewer, 1997, 2000; Harris \& Sass, 2011). ${ }^{2}$

That said, there is evidence that more nuanced measures of teachers' content knowledge predict student achievement. Monk and King (1994), for instance, find that the number of undergraduate mathematics and physical science courses a teacher takes is positively related with how well students perform on math and science tests, respectively. Goldhaber and Brewer (1997) find that teachers with Baccalaureate and Master's degrees in math are more effective at improving the math performance of their students. Hill, Rowan, and Ball (2005) find that a survey-based measure of teachers' content knowledge for teaching is predictive of student achievement gains in first and third grades. Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff, (2009) find that first-year el-

[^2]ementary teachers from teacher education programs that require mathematics courses are more effective at improving student performance in math.

One way that states try to ensure that prospective teachers have sufficient content knowledge for teaching is through requirements that they pass various licensure tests designed to assess both basic skills and subject area knowledge. Licensure tests have a long history, dating back to the 1930s when the first national licensure exam, the National Teacher Examination, was developed (Ravitch, 2003). Today all but one state require teachers to pass various licensure tests to participate in the public school labor market.

Public debates about teacher licensure often center on the extent to which traditional licensure exams are a useful screen as opposed to an inefficient barrier to entry to the teacher workforce (e.g., Angrist \& Guryan, 2008; Goldhaber, Cowan, \& Theobald, 2017a). Advocates argue that teacher licensure tests are an important quality screen needed to professionalize teaching, often comparing them to tests taken by lawyers and doctors before they are certified to practice (Maeroff, 1985). On the other side, critics often point to empirical evidence that licensure tests may negatively impact efforts to diversify the teacher workforce (e.g., Goldhaber \& Hansen, 2010). We unfortunately have limited ability to test these theories for two reasons. First, our data does not predate the introduction of licensure tests in Washington, so we cannot test whether the existence of licensure tests has an overall impact on the quality of the teacher workforce. Second, as described in the next section, very few candidates in Washington fail the licensure tests that are the focus of this paper, so it is difficult to assess the impact of these tests as a screen for ineffective teachers. That said, the low pass rates we report are important in themselves, as they suggest that this mechanism through which licensure tests could impact the quality of the teacher workforce (i.e, as a pass/fail screen) is unlikely to have much impact.

Although teacher licensure test scores are typically not used for any additional personnel decisions (e.g., hiring or professional development)-and indeed, test developers actively discourage the use of licensure tests for decisions other than licensure itselfteacher test scores may be predictive of student achievement away from the high-stakes cut-point used to determine employment eligibility. ${ }^{3}$ In fact, empirical evidence at the elementary level shows positive and significant relationships between teachers' performance on some licensure exams and student test scores throughout the teacher test score distribution (Clotfelter, Ladd, \& Vigdor, 2006, 2007; Goldhaber \& Hansen, 2010; Goldhaber, 2007; Hendricks, 2014). Goldhaber (2007), for instance, analyzes data from North Carolina and finds that having a teacher who passed the Praxis II tests rather than one who failed is correlated with an increase in a student's mathematics achievement of about $6 \%$ of a standard deviation, and that a one standard deviation increase in a teacher's test score is predictive of an increase in student mathematics achievement of about $3 \%$ of a standard deviation. Most recently, Hendricks (2014) documents increases in student achievement associated with the movement of a teacher with a high licensure score into the student's grade and school. This paper builds on this prior evidence by investigating the extent to which continuous licensure test scores provide a signal of future teacher effectiveness in secondary STEM subjects.

[^3]Most of the existing evidence about the predictive validity of licensure tests for student achievement is focused at the elementary level. But the relative importance of teachers' content knowledge may increase as teachers are expected to teach more complex material in higher grades (Appleton, 2013). This is supported by results in Sass (2015), who finds that teachers who entered Florida's teaching workforce by passing a professional teaching knowledge exam and a subject area exam administered by ABCTE are more effective than the average teacher in the state, and that this result is strongest when the sample is restricted to students in grades 610.

To our knowledge, Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor, (2010) is the only existing evidence about the predictive validity of traditional teacher licensure test scores at the secondary level, but due to data limitations, they use a very different methodology than prior work at the elementary level. ${ }^{4}$ Specifically, Clotfelter et al. (2010) estimate a student fixed-effects model that relies on within-student, cross-subject comparisons (e.g., they find that students in high school math classrooms score higher on a subject test relative to tests in other subjects when they have a teacher in that subject who has high licensure test scores relative to their teachers in other subjects). ${ }^{5}$ In the next section, we describe the data that will allow us to build on this existing work and estimate models predicting student achievement that rely on cross-student, within-subject comparisons (e.g., do students in secondary math classrooms score higher on math tests, all else equal, when they have a math teacher who has higher licensure test scores than a math teacher with lower licensure test scores?) and produce separate estimates for different course levels and subjects. Importantly, we restrict our analysis to grades and subjects in which samesubject prior year test scores are available. This is important because prior work (e.g., Chetty, Friedman, \& Rockoff, 2014a; Kane \& Staiger, 2008; Jackson, 2014) has shown that controlling for prior test scores and other student and course information in a "value added" specification is sufficient to control for bias from the nonrandom sorting of students to classes and teachers.

In addition to concerns about student STEM achievement, there is also considerable policy interest in pushing more students towards STEM pathways. As noted by the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (2010), "It is important to note that the problem is not just a lack of proficiency among American students; there is also a lack of interest in STEM fields among many students" (p. vi). There is some survey evidence relating teacher quality to future student interest in STEM fields (Gross, 1988), suggesting that focusing on STEM teachers may be fruitful.

The impact of teachers on future student STEM pathways could come in one of two forms. First, there is clear evidence that higher-achieving students are more likely to pursue STEM pathways (Gottfried, Bozick, Rose, \& Moore, 2016), so teachers may have an indirect effect on the future STEM interest of their students through their impacts on student achievement. Second, there is a growing literature documenting that teachers have significant impacts on student non-cognitive outcomes independent of their impacts on student achievement (e.g., Blazar \& Kraft, 2016; Gershenson, 2016; Jackson, 2012; Petek \& Pope, 2016), so teachers may similarly have a direct effect on the future STEM interest of their students. We test each of these hypotheses in our investigation of the relationship between teacher licensure test scores and future student course taking in STEM fields.

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## 3. Data and summary statistics

### 3.1. Data

This study combines four databases, all maintained and supplied by the Washington State Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction (OSPI), to construct one panel data set containing student-teacher-classroom-year observations. These databases are the Washington State Credentials Database, the Washington State S-275 personnel report, the Comprehensive Education Data and Research System (CEDARS), and the State Testing database.

The Washington State Credentials Database contains a complete history of scores on the state's teacher licensure tests. In this study, we focus on two tests that have been required for teacher licensing in Washington State in recent years. Since 2002, prospective teachers in Washington have had to pass the Washington Educator Skills Test-Basic (WEST-B)-an assessment of basic skills in reading, writing, and mathematics-as a requirement for admission into teacher education programs. The test is designed to reflect general knowledge and skills described in textbooks, the Washington Essential Academic Learning Requirements, curriculum guides, and licensure standards. Because the state accepts a number of alternative tests that meet the WEST-B testing requirement for receiving a teaching credential, ${ }^{6}$ only $82 \%$ of new teachers from 2006 through 2015 have taken the WEST-B. For these individuals, we observe their scores on the math, reading, and writing subtests for each time they took the test.

From 2010 to 2014, all teacher education program graduates also had to pass the Washington Educator Skills Test-Endorsements (WEST-E), a subject knowledge test for individual teaching endorsements that is intended to measure the job-specific skills in the subject in which the candidate will receive an endorsement, as a requirement for receiving a teaching credential. ${ }^{7}$ Different WESTE exams were required for teachers to become certified in different subject areas and grade levels, but every credentialed teacher had to pass at least one of these tests as a requirement for licensure. For this study, we focus on scores on four WEST-E tests observed most frequently for teachers in our sample: Mathematics, Middle Level Mathematics (MLM), Science, and Biology.

The licensure exam data set is linkable to the state's S-275 database, which contains information from the state's personnelreporting process. It includes a record of all certified employees in school districts and educational service districts (ESDs), their place(s) of employment, annual compensation, and demographic characteristics. The data set also includes highest degree earned and experience, which we consider as other potential predictors of teacher effectiveness.

Since the 2009-10 school year, teachers can be linked to the students in their classrooms using a unique classroom ID in the state's CEDARS database. ${ }^{8}$ For the 2009-10 through 2014-15 school years, the CEDARS database contains information on individual student background variables including gender, race/ethnicity, learning disability status, and free or reduced-priced lunch eligibility, as well as participation in the following programs: gifted/highly capa-

[^5]ble; limited English proficiency (LEP); and special education. These student-level variables are used as control variables in all our models. From this data set, we are also able to create indicators for different course "tracks" (basic, average, or advanced). ${ }^{9}$

Student test score data come from the State Testing database. The database contains annual student test scores on the Measures of Student Progress (MSP) exams for 2009-10 through 2013-14 in reading (Grades 3-8), math (Grades 3-8), and science (Grades 5 and 8 ), as well as high school End-of-Course (EOC) exams in Algebra, Geometry, and Biology. ${ }^{10}$ For 2014-15, the state transitioned to the Smarter Balance Assessment (SBA) for Grades 3-8 in both math and reading. Our student achievement analysis focuses on middle school math (seventh and eighth grade), ninth-grade math (algebra and geometry), and ninth-grade biology, all grades in which both current and same-subject prior-year test scores are available.

The range of years we can consider varies across these different subject/year combinations. Because sixth through eighth grade math test scores are available for the entire range of years that students may be linked to teachers, 2009-10 through 2014-15, and scores from the predecessor to the MSP exam-the Washington Assessment of Student Learning (WASL)-are also available for the 2008-09 academic year (i.e., a prior-year math score for 2009-10), we can estimate models for middle school math in all years of available CEDARS data (2009-10 through 2014-15). On the other hand, the Algebra and Geometry EOC exams were introduced in the 2010-2011 academic year, and the Biology EOC exam started in the 2011-12 school year. Thus we can only estimate models for ninth-grade algebra and geometry for 2010-11 through 201415, and for ninth-grade biology for 2011-12 and 2014-15. Across the different years, subjects, and tests, our analytic datasets include 204,549 student-teacher-year observations (156,210 unique students and 1,687 unique teachers). ${ }^{11}$

We also use the CEDARS data to create several variables that describe student course taking in STEM fields in high school. First, we identify students who take at least one advanced math and science courses in high school by considering all math and science courses taken by students between ninth and twelfth grade as reported in the CEDARS data. We define high school courses as "advanced" following the procedure described in Gottfried (2015), which relies on a taxonomy outlined in Burkham et al. (2003). ${ }^{12}$ In our primary results, advanced math courses include trigonometry, statistics, pre-calculus, and higher courses, while advanced science

[^6]courses include chemistry, physics, and higher courses. We also experiment with other definitions of advanced courses, including the full taxonomy described in Burkham, Lee, and Smerdon, (2003). Finally, we calculate the total number of advanced math courses and advanced science courses each student took over the course of their time in high school.

### 3.2. Summary statistics

The grades and subjects considered in this paper vary considerably both in terms of the number and characteristics of the students and teachers. Table 1 presents student-year-level summary statistics for each of the grade level and subject combinations considered in this analysis. The first column of Table 1, for example, provides summary statistics for all seventh and eighth-grade students in the analytic dataset whose math teacher has at least one valid WEST-B Math score. We standardize all student test scores within grade and year, so the means in column 1 of Table 1 for "Lagged Math" and "Lagged Reading" mean that students in this sample scored about $10 \%$ of a standard deviation higher on last year's tests than the average student in the same grade and year. The other summary statistics in column 1 are broadly representative of the demographics of public school students in Washington state, about $50 \%$ of whom are eligible for free/reduced priced lunch and about $25 \%$ of whom are underrepresented minorities (American Indian, Black, or Hispanic).

Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 illustrate some important differences between the ninth-grade algebra/geometry sample and the ninth-grade biology sample. Specifically, far fewer students in the ninth grade are enrolled in biology than in one of the ninth-grade math courses, and these students tend to be both more advantaged and higher performing. ${ }^{13}$ Roughly $24 \%$ of students take biology in 9th grade compared to about $88 \%$ of students who take algebra or geometry. This is likely because higher-performing students often take biology (and the biology EOC) in 9th grade rather than wait until 10th grade when students are required to take the biology EOC ${ }^{14}$. That students enrolled in different courses appear quite different from each other along observable dimensions suggests the need to carefully consider the implications of tracking (Jackson, 2014) for the estimated achievement and course-taking models described below.

In Table 1 (and in the analytic models described in the next section), teacher licensure test scores come from the first time each teacher took the test and are standardized across all teacher candidates who have ever taken these tests. For example, the mean for "WEST-B Math" in column 1 of Table 1 implies that the average student in the WEST-B Math middle school sample has a teacher who scored over $50 \%$ of a standard deviation higher on their first WEST-B Math test than the average teacher candidate who took this test.

Our decision to standardize licensure test scores across all years of data is important because, as shown in Fig. 1, average scores on all three WEST-B tests have been increasing steadily over time. These trends could be explained by the increased availability and use of test preparation materials, a drop in test difficulty, or an increase in the average qualifications of teachers. The first two explanations would suggest that we should only standardize teacher test scores within years (since the time trends would have nothing to do with the qualifications of different cohorts of teacher candidates), while the latter explanation would suggest that we should

[^7]Table 1
Student-year level summary statistics by course.

|  | 7th \& 8th Grade Middle Sch. Math | 9th Grade <br> Alg./Geo. | 9th Grade Biology |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Student Variables |  |  |  |
| Lagged Math | $\begin{aligned} & 0.105 \\ & (0.928) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.017 \\ & (0.808) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.425 \\ & (0.988) \end{aligned}$ |
| Lagged Reading | $\begin{aligned} & 0.095 \\ & (0.920) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.032 \\ & (0.859) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.356 \\ & (0.914) \end{aligned}$ |
| Lagged Science |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.009 \\ & (0.862) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.378 \\ & (0.970) \end{aligned}$ |
| Female | 0.496 | 0.501 | 0.516 |
| Multi-racial | 0.048 | 0.044 | 0.043 |
| Am. Ind./ Alaska Nat. | 0.017 | 0.018 | 0.017 |
| Asian/ Pac. Isl. | 0.109 | 0.090 | 0.132 |
| Black | 0.059 | 0.060 | 0.052 |
| Hispanic | 0.213 | 0.216 | 0.160 |
| Gifted | 0.074 | 0.027 | 0.075 |
| LEP | 0.050 | 0.044 | 0.023 |
| Spec. Ed. | 0.061 | 0.051 | 0.058 |
| FRL | 0.483 | 0.486 | 0.376 |
| Learning Disability | 0.033 | 0.028 | 0.033 |
| Basic Track | 0.009 | 0.020 | 0.000 |
| Average Track | 0.724 | 0.943 | 0.846 |
| Advanced Track | 0.266 | 0.037 | 0.136 |
| Advanced H.S. Math Course* | 0.539 |  |  |
| Advanced H.S. Science Course* | 0.257 |  |  |
| Number of Advanced High School Math Courses* | $\begin{aligned} & 0.854 \\ & (0.963) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| Number of Advanced High School Science Courses* | $\begin{aligned} & 0.925 \\ & (0.861) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| Teacher Variables |  |  |  |
| Standardized WEST-B Math | $\begin{aligned} & 0.567 \\ & (0.553) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.687 \\ & (0.533) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.635 \\ & (0.506) \end{aligned}$ |
| Standardized WEST-B Reading | $\begin{aligned} & 0.234 \\ & (0.820) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.189 \\ & (0.870) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.593 \\ & (0.641) \end{aligned}$ |
| Standardized WEST-B Writing | $\begin{aligned} & 0.207 \\ & (0.801) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.189 \\ & (0.860) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.584 \\ & (0.672) \end{aligned}$ |
| Proportion with a WEST-E score | 0.375 | 0.367 | 0.413 |
| Standardized WEST-E MLM | $\begin{aligned} & 0.129 \\ & (0.788) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| Standardized WEST-E Math | $\begin{aligned} & -0.024 \\ & (0.812) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.241 \\ & (0.722) \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Standardized WEST-E Science |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.020 \\ & (0.930) \end{aligned}$ |
| Standardized WEST-E Biology |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.189 \\ & (0.956) \end{aligned}$ |
| Observations | 135,079 | 54,354 | 15,116 |

NOTE: Each sample is defined as student-year observations by course type linked to teachers with WESTB scores. Blank cells are ommited due to small sample sizes. ${ }^{*}$ Summary statistics from advanced course models (see Table 4).
standardize teacher test scores across years (as the time trends would reflect differences in average qualifications across test cohorts).

We test these explanations directly by estimating predictive validity models (described in the next section) with and without teacher licensure test-year (or "cohort") fixed effects. The year in which candidates take the WEST-B is highly predictive of the performance of their students ( $\mathrm{F}=36.20$ ), and there is little evidence that the within-cohort relationship between WEST-B scores is any different than the cross-cohort relationship $(\mathrm{t}=0.19) .{ }^{15}$ This suggests that changes in average WEST-B scores over time do reflect true differences in teacher candidate quality. This is consistent with evidence from other studies showing that average SAT scores of prospective teachers have increased over the past two decades

[^8](Goldhaber \& Walch, 2014; Lankford, Loeb, McEachin, Miller, \& Wycoff, 2014), ${ }^{16}$ recent cohorts of prospective teachers have higher undergraduate GPAs than their predecessors (Gitomer, 2007), and new teachers are now coming from more competitive undergraduate institutions than in past years (Lankford et al., 2014). Finally, the developer of the WEST-B and WEST-E (Pearson) describes the tests as "criterion-referenced," meaning that they are "designed to measure a candidate's knowledge and skills in relation to an established standard (a criterion), rather than in relation to the performance of other candidates." ${ }^{17}$ For these reasons, we standardize licensure test scores across all years in our primary analysis. ${ }^{18}$

[^9]

Fig. 1. Average WEST-B scores by subtest and testing year.

Means of the standardized teacher licensure test scores in Table 1 permit some comparisons across different kinds of teachers, but we summarize the complete distribution of scores for each sample with kernel density plots of WEST-B scores (on the original scoring scale) for six mutually exclusive groups of test takers in Fig. 2. The first three groups are considered in this study: middle school math teachers, ninth-grade algebra and geometry teachers, and ninth-grade biology teachers. ${ }^{19}$ For comparison, we also include elementary teachers in tested grades and subjects (analogous to teachers considered in prior studies of teacher licensure tests), all other teachers (i.e., those who are in the workforce but not in one of these other samples), and all test takers who never become teachers in Washington State public schools. The figure shows that ninth-grade teachers tend to score higher on all three WEST-B tests than middle school math teachers, and both groups of teachers tend to score dramatically higher on the WEST-B Math test than elementary teachers, other teachers, and test takers who are never observed in the teaching workforce.

Fig. 3 shows similar kernel density plots for WEST-E tests; again, we include the WEST-E tests required for elementary teachers for comparison purposes. The first two panels of Fig. 3 show that ninth-grade algebra and geometry teachers tend to score considerably higher than middle school math teachers on both WEST-E Math tests, though both groups perform better, on average, than test takers who are not observed in the state's teaching workforce. ${ }^{20}$ For the other WEST-E tests, teachers in our samples do not perform much better, on average, than other teachers or test takers not observed in the workforce. The fact that ninth-grade teachers tend to score higher on both the WEST-B tests and WEST-E tests compared to other teachers is not surprising given the high degree of correlation between these tests; for instance, the correlation be-

[^10]tween the WEST-B math test and the WEST-E Middle Level Math test is $0.59 .{ }^{21}$

The "Cut Score" line in each plot within Figs. 2 and 3 illustrates two important points for our analysis. First, failure rates on these tests for the population of interest (future secondary math and science teachers) are extremely low. As we discuss in the next section, this limits our ability to test the predictive validity of these cut scores. Second, while the passing score is nominally set to the same scale score (240) for all tests, some of these licensure tests appear much more difficult to pass than others. Figs. 4 and 5 show overall passing rates for these tests across all teacher candidates in Washington state and compares these passing rates to those in other states (California, Florida, and Michigan) that report these numbers. Generally speaking, the passing rates on the WEST$B$ tests are much higher than the passing rates for basic skills licensure tests in these other states, while the passing rates on the WEST-E tests considered in our primary analysis are more in line with (and even lower than in some cases) the passing rates for subject-specific licensure tests in these other states. Figs. 4 and 5 illustrate that, unless the underlying skillsets of teacher candidates in these states are wildly different, cut scores for passing licensure tests are set at very different levels in different settings.

We can also directly compare the difficulty of different WESTE tests by comparing the WEST-E performance of candidates who took different WEST-E tests but had similar scores on the WESTB. We find that candidates tend to perform 16-20 points (or about one standard deviation) higher on the Elementary Education WEST-E tests than candidates with similar WEST-B scores perform on the Middle Level Math, Science, or Biology WEST-E exam, and 40 points (or about two standard deviations) higher than candidates with similar WEST-B scores perform on the Mathematics WEST-E test. These differences in test difficulty have important policy implications that we discuss in the conclusion. ${ }^{22}$

As a final exploration, we explore the extent to which there is non-random sorting of different students to teachers with different

[^11]




Fig. 2. WEST-B scores by subtest and teacher type.
licensure test scores. Table 2 focuses on the middle school sample, and presents summary statistics of students assigned to a teacher in different quartiles of the distribution of WEST-B Math scores (where Q1 in column 1 represents the lowest quartile). We see clear evidence that students with higher prior performance and in advanced tracks are more likely to be assigned to teachers in the highest quartile of WEST-B scores; for example, the average student assigned to a top quartile teacher scored over $20 \%$ of a standard deviation higher on the previous year's math test than the average student assigned to a bottom quartile teacher. As discussed in Section 4c, this evidence of non-random sorting strongly informs the analytic approach we describe in the next section and the robustness checks outlined in Section 5.

## 4. Analytic approach

### 4.1. Student achievement models

Our student achievement models can be situated within a larger literature that attempts to separate the impact of various interventions (including teacher characteristics) from other variables that influence student test performance. ${ }^{23}$ Following the existing

[^12]







Fig. 3. WEST-E scores by subtest and teacher type.


Fig. 4. Basic skills licensure test passing rates by subtest and state.


Fig. 5. Subject-specific licensure test passing rates by subtest and state.
Table 2
Summary statistics by teacher quartile of basic skills math licensure test

|  | Teacher Q1 (168-282) | Teacher Q2 (283-289) | Teacher Q3 (291-294) | Teacher Q4 (295-300) |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Lagged Math | 0.015 | 0.078 | 0.082 | 0.235 |
|  | $(0.919)$ | $(0.906)$ | $(0.914)$ | $(0.954)$ |
| Lagged Reading | 0.027 | 0.079 | 0.081 | $(0.98)$ |
|  | $(0.930)$ | $(0.911)$ | $(0.909)$ | 0.492 |
| Female | 0.497 | 0.499 | 0.497 | 0.048 |
| Multi-racial | 0.047 | 0.052 | 0.047 | 0.019 |
| Am. Ind./ Alaska Nat. | 0.017 | 0.014 | 0.017 |  |
| Asian/ Pac. Isl. | 0.095 | 0.106 | 0.108 | 0.057 |
| Black | 0.056 | 0.063 | 0.060 | 0.176 |
| Hispanic | 0.233 | 0.064 | 0.231 | 0.111 |
| Gifted | 0.047 | 0.049 | 0.071 | 0.038 |
| LEP | 0.057 | 0.486 | 0.055 | 0.444 |
| Spec. Ed. | 0.066 | 0.031 | 0.502 | 0.030 |
| FRL | 0.504 | 0.244 | 0.032 | 0.325 |
| Learning Disability | 0.036 | 0.008 | 0.727 | 0.672 |
| Advanced Track | 0.236 | 30,813 | 0.018 | 35,998 |
| Average Track | 0.755 |  | 33,858 |  |
| Basic Track | 0.009 |  |  |  |
| Observations | 34,410 |  |  |  |

Note: The summary statistics reported here are from the middle school math sample and are student-year averages. Quartiles are calculated within the sample.
literature about the predictive validity of teacher licensure tests at the elementary level (e.g., Clotfelter et al., 2007; Goldhaber \& Hansen, 2010; Goldhaber, 2007), we estimate variants of the following student achievement model for each subject/grade combination (middle school math, ninth-grade algebra and geometry, and ninth-grade biology):
$Y_{i j g s t}=\beta_{0}+\beta_{1} Y_{i, g-1, t-1}+\beta_{2} X_{i g t}+\beta_{3} Z_{j t}+\beta_{4}$ Score $_{j}+\varepsilon_{i j g s t}$

In Eq. (1), $Y_{i j g s t}$ is the test score (MSP, SBA, or EOC) of student $i$ in grade $g$, subject $s$, and year $t$, while in teacher $j$ 's class-

[^13]room. $Y_{i, g-1, t-1}$ is a vector of student $i$ 's prior test scores in reading, mathematics, and (for ninth-graders) science. The student test scores in both $Y_{i j g s t}$ and $Y_{i, g-1, t-1}$ are standardized by test, grade, and year across all test takers. Therefore, the units of the coefficients on the right hand side of Eq. (1) are standard deviations of student performance (relative to other scores on the same test in the same grade and year). $X_{i g t}$ is a vector of student covariates for student $i$, in grade $g$, and year $t$, which includes indicators for student race/ethnicity, gender, free or reduced-priced lunch eligibility, gifted/highly capable, limited English proficiency (LEP), special education, and learning disabled. In some specifications, we include a vector $Z_{j t}$ of additional teacher covariates that includes indicators for teacher experience level in year $t$ and an indicator for whether or not the teacher possesses an advanced degree in year $t$. We estimate the model in Eq. (1) by ordinary least squares (OLS) and
cluster the error terms $\varepsilon_{i j g s t}$ at the teacher level to account for correlation between the errors of students taught by the same teacher.

In our primary specifications of the model in Eq. (1), Score $_{j}$ is the licensure test score of teacher $j$ standardized across all years of test takers. The coefficient $\beta_{4}$ in these specifications can be interpreted as the extent to which continuous licensure test scores provide a "signal" of future teacher effectiveness (i.e., the expected increase in student performance associated with a one standard deviation increase in the licensure test score of teacher $j$ ). We can also mitigate concerns about nonlinearities and ceiling effects in test scores (see Fig. 2) by estimating additional specifications that replace Score $_{j}$ with a vector of indicators for the quartile of the distribution of test scores for teachers in that sample (Q2, Q3, or Q4, with the reference category being Q 1 ) that the test score of teacher $j$ falls into. ${ }^{24}$ In these specifications, $\beta_{4}$ is actually a vector of coefficients, each of which represents the expected increase in a student's test score associated with having a teacher with a test score in the second, third, or fourth quartile (respectively), relative to having a teacher with a test score in the lowest quartile. ${ }^{25}$ We do not consider indicators for whether candidates passed the test because, as discussed in the previous section and as illustrated by Figs. 2 and 3, very few candidates in the sample failed these tests on the first attempt.

We estimate a number of different specifications of the model in Eq. (1). We first estimate a specification without any teacher covariates, so teachers are compared to all other teachers in the sample, and then a specification that adds teacher covariates, so teachers are compared to all other teachers in the sample with the same experience and degree level. We also estimate a specification that controls for student "track" (basic, regular, or advanced), so comparisons are only made within the same types of courses; note that this makes comparisons between teachers and students in the same track but across schools.

Finally, we consider a number of specifications that add various fixed effects intended to account for potential sources of bias (discussed in Section 4c). We estimate one specification with school fixed effects (so teachers are compared to other teachers in the sample in the same school), and another with school-byyear fixed effects (so teachers are compared to other teachers in the same school and year). Finally, we follow Jackson (2014) and Protik, Walsh, Resch, Isenberg, and Kopa, (2013) and estimate models that explicitly control for student tracking within schools by including school-year-grade-track fixed effects. These specifications only make comparisons within the same track within the same grade, year, and school. ${ }^{26}$

As a preliminary check on the extent to which the different model specifications above control for non-random sorting of students to teachers by student performance and teacher licensure test scores, we estimate the specifications of the model in Eq. (1) but using student prior performance as the outcome variable (and dropping it from the list of predictor variables). We find that teacher WEST-B scores are a statistically-significant predictor of student prior performance in all specifications in middle school math, but are not consistently statistically-significant

[^14]in ninth-grade algebra and geometry or ninth-grade biology. This suggests that there is more non-random sorting by student performance and teacher licensure test scores in our middle school sample than in our high school sample. This is likely because our high school samples focus on students in specific courses (i.e., Algebra, Geometry, and Biology) because the high-school tests are coursespecific, and much of the non-random sorting at the high school level is likely to be between different kinds of courses.

### 4.2. Student course taking models

To investigate the relationships between teacher licensure test scores and STEM course taking in high school, we first estimate variants of the following model predicting whether seventh grade students in 2009-2010 and eighth grade students in 2009-10 and 2010-11 take an advanced math or science course in high school ${ }^{27}$ :
$f\left(p_{i j g k t}\right)=\gamma_{0}+\gamma_{1} Y_{i, t-1}+\gamma_{2} X_{i g t}+\gamma_{3} Z_{j t}+\gamma_{4}$ Score $_{j}+\gamma_{5} S_{k}$

In Eq. (2), $p_{i j g t}$ is the probability that student $i$ who has teacher $j$ in middle school in year $t$ takes an advanced course in high school $k$ (conditional on the observed values of the variables on the right side of Eq. (2)), while $S_{k}$ is the number of advanced math or science courses offered by high school $k$ (to control for differential opportunities to take advanced STEM courses for students in different high schools). All other control variables are the same as the model in Eq. (1), and we also consider similar specifications for Eq. (2) as those described above. For example, we estimate models in which Score ${ }_{j}$ is the licensure test score of teacher $j$ standardized across all years of test takers. The coefficient $\gamma_{4}$ in these specifications can be interpreted as the expected increase in the probability that student $i$ takes an advanced course in subject $s$ in high school associated with a one standard deviation increase in the licensure test score of teacher $j$. Our primary specifications of the model in Eq. (2) is a linear probability model (i.e., $\left.f\left(p_{i j g k t}\right)=p_{i j g k t}\right)$ because this allows us to isolate teacher effects by grade as outlined by Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff, (2014b), but we also experiment with logistic regression models (i.e., $\left.f\left(p_{i j g k t}\right)=\log \left(\frac{p_{i j g k t}}{1-p_{i j g k t}}\right)\right)$ and find qualitatively similar results.

Finally, we estimate variants of a model predicting the number of advanced math and science courses taken by the same cohorts of seventh and eighth-grade students once they get to high school:

$$
\begin{align*}
f\left(C_{i j g k t}\right)= & \alpha_{0}+\alpha_{1} Y_{i, g-1, t-1}+\alpha_{2} X_{i g t}+\alpha_{3} Z_{j t}+\alpha_{4} \text { Score }_{j} \\
& +\gamma_{5} S_{k}+\varepsilon_{i j g t} \tag{3}
\end{align*}
$$

In Eq. (3), $C_{i j g t}$ is the number of advanced STEM courses taken in high school by student $i$ who has teacher $j$ in eighth grade in year $t$. As with the model in Eq. (2), our primary specifications of the model in Eq. (3) is an OLS model (i.e., $f\left(C_{i j g k t}\right)=C_{i j g k t}$ ) so we can isolate teacher effects by grade (Chetty et al. (2014b), but we also experiment with Poisson regression models for count data (i.e., $f\left(C_{i j g k t}\right)=\log \left(C_{i j g k t}\right)$ ) and find qualitatively similar results.

An important issue in both sets of course-taking models is modeling the error terms in Eqs. (2) and (3). While in the achievement models our primary concern was with dependence between students taught by the same teacher (so we clustered errors at the teacher level), in the course-taking models we are concerned both with dependence between students taught by the same teacher and dependence between students who attend the same high

[^15]school. We therefore cluster the error terms $\varepsilon_{i j g s t}$ in Eqs. (2) and (3) at both the teacher and high school level using two-way cluster robust standard errors described in Cameron \& Miller (2015).

### 4.3. Potential sources of bias

We conclude this section by discussing four potential sources of bias in the estimates from the models described above. ${ }^{28}$ First, as we discuss in Section 3, candidates can submit scores on other tests (e.g., PRAXIS or SAT) to satisfy the state's WEST-B requirement, and not all teacher candidates go on to take the WESTE to get a teaching credential in Washington. In each case, this means that a nonrandom subset of teacher candidates in Washington State has taken each test. This could lead to bias if the relationship between licensure test scores and student outcomes for the group of test takers is different than it would have been for nontest takers. We have no way to account for the potential source of bias, so all results reported in this paper are only generalizable to the population of candidates who take these licensure tests.

Second, teacher candidates who take these tests-and particularly, teacher candidates who do not pass a given test on the first attempt-may non-randomly select into the public teaching workforce, raising the concern that candidates with a given licensure score who enter the workforce are not representative of all teacher candidates with that score. It is not clear that there is a convincing way to account for this potential sample selection bias. ${ }^{29}$ Indeed, it is quite plausible teacher candidates who fail a given test the first time may be more likely to re-take the test and ultimately enter the workforce if they have a greater commitment to teaching. ${ }^{30}$ If these individuals become more effective teachers than teacher candidates with similar scores but who did not enter the workforce would have been had they entered the workforce, this would cause a downward bias in the estimated relationships between licensure test scores and student outcomes. We are more concerned about this potential sample selection bias in models that consider licensure tests with low passing rates (such as the WEST-E tests shown in Fig. 3) than in models that consider the WEST-B tests that most candidates in the sample passed on the first attempt.

Third, ample evidence suggests that teacher candidates who enter the teaching workforce are non-randomly sorted into different schools and classrooms (e.g., Clotfelter, Ladd, \& Vigdor, 2005; Goldhaber, Lavery, \& Theobald, 2015b; Kalogrides \& Loeb, 2013). ${ }^{31}$ While this sorting on observables does not bias our estimates (since we explicitly control for a suite of observables), our estimates will be biased if there are unobserved variables that are correlated both with teachers' licensure scores and the student outcomes we in-

[^16]vestigate. A broad literature has considered this potential source of bias in estimating the impacts of individual teachers on student test performance (e.g., Bacher-Hicks, Kane, \& Staiger, 2014; Chetty et al., 2014a; Jackson, 2014; Kane \& Staiger, 2008; Kane, McCaffrey, Miller, \& Staiger, 2013; Koedel, Mihaly, \& Rockoff, 2015; Rothstein, $2010,2014)$ and generally suggests that the student achievement models described above are sufficient to control for non-random sorting, though the evidence is more tenuous at the higher grade levels considered in this paper. Jackson (2014), for instance, illustrates that the prevalence of ability tracking at the high school level can bias the estimates from models that do not explicitly account for these tracks.

We aim to minimize and/or bound this potential source of bias in four ways. First, the specifications with school and school-byyear fixed effects compare students and teachers within the same school, and thus minimize the impact of sorting across different schools. Further, the models that include school-year-grade-track fixed effects help account for potential bias due to non-random sorting across tracks within schools. Third, we follow Clotfelter et al. (2006) and Horvath (2015) and estimate models restricted to schools in which students are distributed relatively equitably across classrooms according to observable characteristics, on the assumption that these schools are also the least likely to nonrandomly sort students to classrooms along unobserved dimensions. Finally, we follow the approach of Altonji, Elder, and Taber, $(2005,2008)$ and estimate the relative amount of sorting on unobservables that is required to explain the relationships we find. Our general conclusion (discussed in Section 5c) is that, given the extent of non-random sorting in middle school grades, our results in middle school may be more sensitive to this potential source of bias than the high school results.

A final potential source of bias arises from non-random teacher attrition. A relationship between licensure tests, unobserved teacher traits associated with effectiveness, and the propensity of teachers to leave the profession would bias our findings. ${ }^{32}$ We check for this potential source of bias in two ways. First, we estimate models predicting teacher attrition as a function of experience, degree level, prior estimated effectiveness, WEST-B scores, and an interaction between prior effectiveness and WEST-B scores. If there exists a relationship between attrition, licensure tests, and teacher effectiveness, we would expect a significant interaction term. However, we do not find evidence that teachers with different WEST-B scores are any more or less likely to leave the workforce as a function of their prior estimated effectiveness. We also estimate models solely for first-year teachers (before any teachers have left the workforce), and generally find stronger relationships between licensure test scores and student outcomes. ${ }^{33}$ This could reflect the decreasing importance of teachers' preservice experiences and skills as they gain teaching experience (see Goldhaber, Liddle, \& Theobald, 2013), but could also suggest that non-random teacher attrition biases the estimates discussed in the next section downwards.

## 5. Results

Before describing the results relating teacher licensure test scores to student achievement in secondary STEM subjects, we first provide some context for our findings note two peripheral that lend context to our findings. First, estimates from the models in Eq. (1) predict that students taught by a first-year teacher will score 0.08 standard deviations lower in middle school math,

[^17]0.07 standard deviations lower in high school math, and 0.02 standard deviations lower in ninth-grade biology, all else equal, than students taught by teachers with 5 or more years of experience. Second, when we estimate models with a teacher fixed effect and calculate the standard deviation of these estimated teacher effects (the teacher "effect size"), we find that the teacher effect size is 0.17 in middle school math, 0.39 in high school math, and 0.29 in ninth-grade biology. ${ }^{34}$ Finally, when we estimate similar models in elementary math and middle school reading (both considered in the prior literature), we find that the expected difference in student test performance associated with a one standard deviation increase in a teacher's basic-skills licensure test score is 0.03 standard deviations in elementary math and 0.01 standard deviations in middle school reading.

### 5.1. Licensure tests and student achievement

Table 3 shows the estimated relationships between different licensure test scores and student performance in middle school math (Panel A), ninth-grade algebra and geometry (Panel B), and ninth-grade biology (Panel C). ${ }^{35}$ We first focus on the results for the general basic-skills tests (the WEST-B Math). The results in middle school math and ninth-grade algebra and geometry are broadly consistent with the findings from the existing literature discussed in Section 2, and quite robust across different specifications of our student achievement model, though only the results in middle school math are statistically significant. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in a teacher's WEST-B Math score is correlated with a 0.01-0.03 standard deviation increase in student math performance, and importantly, statistically significant even in the specification with school-year-grade-track fixed effects (in which teachers are compared only with teachers in the same school, year, grade, and track). Thus, the expected increase in student performance associated with a one standard deviation increase in the teacher's WEST-B score is roughly equivalent to one-seventh to one-third of the expected increase in student performance associated with having a teacher with 5 or more years of experience relative to a first-year teacher. Though we would characterize these relationships as modest, they are quite comparable to relationships reported at the elementary level (e.g., Goldhaber, 2007) and greater than the only reported relationship at the secondary level (Clotfelter et al., 2010). ${ }^{36}$

We plot estimated effects on student achievement by quartile of teacher WEST-B Math score in Fig. 6, derived from a model that includes quartile indicators rather than the continuous licensure test score. This figure illustrates that the expected difference in student performance associated with having a teacher who scored in the top quartile of the WEST-B Math relative to the bottom quartile is 0.05 standard deviations of student performance in middle school

[^18]math. ${ }^{37}$ This is roughly one-third of a standard deviation of teacher performance in these grades. On the other hand, the comparable difference in ninth-grade algebra and geometry is just 0.01 standard deviations of student performance (see Fig. 6).. ${ }^{38}$

Perhaps surprisingly, the relationships in Table 3 between WEST-B Math scores and student performance in ninth-grade biology are considerably stronger than in other grade levels; a one standard deviation increase in a teacher's WEST-B Math score is correlated with a .072 to .161 standard deviation increase in student biology performance. ${ }^{39}$ As illustrated in Fig. 6, the expected difference in student performance associated with having a teacher who scored in the top quartile of the WEST-B Math relative to the bottom quartile is 0.19 standard deviations of student performance, which is almost four times as large as the comparable relationship in middle school. To put this in context, this means that the expected difference in student biology performance associated with having a teacher in the top quartile of the WEST-B Math distribution relative to the bottom quartile is about two thirds a standard deviation of teacher effectiveness in ninth-grade biology, or roughly equivalent to the expected difference associated with having a teacher at the 75th percentile of the ninth-grade biology value-added distribution relative to an average teacher.

We now turn our attention to the estimated relationships between WEST-E (the subject-specific licensure tests) scores and student performance in middle and high school math. The estimates in Panel A of Table 3 give somewhat mixed evidence about the relationship between WEST-E Middle-Level Math (MLM) scores and student performance in middle school math (note that we do not consider MLM scores in high school math due to low sample sizes). Specifically, the relationships between WEST-E MLM scores and student performance tend to be statistically significant (and comparable in magnitude to the WEST-B estimates) when comparisons are made within schools, but not in the models without school or school-by-year fixed effects. The estimates in Panels A and B of Table 3 show little evidence that WEST-E Math scores are predictive of student performance in middle school math or ninth-grade algebra and geometry, although the magnitude of the cross-school estimates for ninth-grade algebra and geometry-shown in the margin plots in Fig. 7-are positive, relatively large, and marginally statistically significant. ${ }^{40}$

Finally, Panel C of Table 3 presents estimates of the relationships between each of the WEST-E tests that teachers can pass to teach high school biology (the Science and Biology tests) and student biology performance in ninth grade. Echoing the results for the WEST-B Math, the relationships between these test scores and student performance in ninth-grade biology tend to be large and statistically significant. The magnitudes of these coefficients are striking; for example, the expected increase in student test scores associated with a one standard deviation increase in a Bi ology teacher's WEST-E Science score is over one third of a stan-

[^19]Table 3
OLS student achievement models.

| Panel A: Predicting student achievement in middle school math |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| WEST-B Math Standardized Score | $\begin{aligned} & \hline .024^{*} \\ & (.012) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .026^{*} \\ & (.012) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline .027^{*} \\ & (.011) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .031^{* *} \\ & (.010) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .026^{* *} \\ & (.010) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .033^{* *} \\ & (.011) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| WEST-E MLM Standardized Score |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & .017 \\ & (.011) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .017 \\ & (.011) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .029^{* *} \\ & (.011) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .029^{*} \\ & (.014) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .026 \\ & (.018) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| WEST-E Math Standardized Score |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -.004 \\ & (.013) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -.011 \\ & (.012) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -.000 \\ & (.013) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -.015 \\ & (.015) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .020 \\ & (.017) \end{aligned}$ |
| Teacher controls | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Course track | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| School fixed effects | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| School-year fixed effects | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Schl-track-yr fixed effects | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Number of unique teachers | 914 | 914 | 914 | 820 | 701 | 595 | 387 | 387 | 285 | 223 | 163 | 256 | 256 | 161 | 106 | 83 |
| Number of unique students | 119,411 | 119,411 | 119,411 | 109,323 | 84,430 | 54,574 | 47,011 | 47,011 | 33,656 | 20,444 | 11,326 | 34,273 | 34,273 | 21,061 | 11,445 | 7,072 |
| Panel B: Predicting student achievement in ninth grade math |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| WEST-B Math Standardized Score | $\begin{aligned} & .033 \\ & (.022) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .031 \\ & (.023) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .031 \\ & (.023) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .013 \\ & (.016) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .012 \\ & (.015) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .018 \\ & (.016) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| WEST-E Math Standardized Score |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & .040+ \\ & (.022) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .040+ \\ & (.022) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .010 \\ & (.013) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .013 \\ & (.014) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .013 \\ & (.016) \end{aligned}$ |
| Teacher controls | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |  |  |  |  |  | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Course track | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |  |  |  |  |  | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| School fixed effects | No | No | No | Yes | No | No |  |  |  |  |  | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| School-year fixed effects | No | No | No | No | Yes | No |  |  |  |  |  | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Schl-track-yr fixed effects | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |  |  |  |  |  | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Number of unique teachers | 767 | 767 | 767 | 686 | 596 | 516 |  |  |  |  |  | 425 | 425 | 331 | 248 | 211 |
| Number of unique students | 53,794 | 53,794 | 53,794 | 48,650 | 39,147 | 30,651 |  |  |  |  |  | 24,689 | 24,689 | 19,680 | 12,363 | 9,925 |
| Panel C: Predicting student achievement in ninth grade biology |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| WEST-B Math Standardized Score | $\begin{aligned} & .161^{* * *} \\ & (.033) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .155^{* * *} \\ & (.033) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .152^{* * *} \\ & (.032) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .072^{*} \\ & (.028) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .081^{* * *} \\ & (.018) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .085^{* * *} \\ & (.017) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| WEST-E Biology Standardized Score |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & .067+ \\ & (.040) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .072+ \\ & (.040) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .018 \\ & (.021) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .038^{*} \\ & (.018) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .047^{*} \\ & (.019) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| WEST-E Science Standardized Score |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & .100^{* *} \\ & (.033) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .106^{* *} \\ & (.035) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .010 \\ & (.048) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -.002 \\ & (.079) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -.005 \\ & (.078) \end{aligned}$ |
| Teacher controls | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Course track | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| School fixed effects | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| School-year fixed effects | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Schl-track-yr fixed effects | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Number of unique teachers | 185 | 185 | 185 | 141 | 113 | 113 | 92 | 92 | 48 | 39 | 39 | 90 | 90 | 47 | 25 | 25 |
| Number of unique students | 15,116 | 15,116 | 15,116 | 11,391 | 8,302 | 8,075 | 6,046 | 6,046 | 3,692 | 2,705 | 2,592 | 5,141 | 5,141 | 3,042 | 1,543 | 1,460 |

 indicators for gifted/highly capable, limited English proficiency (LEP), and special education. Teacher controls include experience level and degree type. Standard errors are clustered at the teacher level.


Fig. 6. Non-linear relationships between WEST-B math scores and student achievement.
NOTE: All models control for prior year test scores, gender, race/ethnicity, learning disability status, and free or reduced-priced lunch eligibility, program indicators for gifted/highly capable, limited English proficiency (LEP), and special education, teacher experience level and degree type, and course track. Error bars illustrate $95 \%$ confidence intervals calculated from standard errors that are clustered at the teacher level.
dard deviation of teacher effectiveness in ninth-grade biology (29). Fig. 7 reinforces that, as for the WEST-B Math, the WEST-E tests are a much stronger predictor of student performance in ninth-grade biology than in the other grade levels we consider.

### 5.2. Licensure tests and student high school course taking

We next consider relationships between teacher licensure test scores and the probability that students take advanced STEM courses in high school by variants of the linear probability model described in Eq. (2). The estimates from these models are presented in Table 4. In Panel A, we consider the relationship between the WEST-B score of the student's middle school math teacher and the probability that the student takes an advanced math course in high school, while Panel B considers the probability that the student takes an advanced science course in high school. Since none of these coefficients are statistically significant, our interpretation is that the results in Table 4 provide little to no evidence of a relationship between middle school teachers' licensure test scores and the probability that their students take an advanced math or science course in high school.

Finally, Table 5 explores estimated relationships between a middle school math teacher's WEST-B math test and the number of advanced science or math courses taken in high school by their students from the OLS regression in Eq. (3). Basic skills test scores are marginally predictive of taking more advanced math courses when school-year and school-year-track controls are included, and the magnitudes of these relationships are relatively large; for example, the coefficient of .154 in the school-year-grade-track fixed effects model represents an $18 \%$ increase over the mean number of advanced courses taken in high school. However, given that this
result is not consistent across specifications, our overall conclusion from Table 5 is that there is only mixed evidence of a relationship between middle school teachers' licensure test scores and the number of advanced math or science courses that their students take in high school.

### 5.3. Extensions and robustness checks

We pursue a number of extensions and robustness checks to the results described in Sections 5a and 5b. First, given that the achievement results for the subject-specific WEST-E tests are quite similar to the results for the basic skills WEST-B tests, a natural question is whether WEST-E test scores provide any more signal about future teacher effectiveness than is already contained in the WEST-B test scores. To investigate this, we estimate models of the relationships between WEST-E scores and student performance in middle and high school math controlling for each teacher's WESTB scores. In middle school math, estimates from models based on within-school comparisons suggest that WEST-E MLM and WEST-E Math test scores do provide additional signal about future teacher effectiveness beyond WEST-B scores. That said, this does not appear to be the case in high school math, and perhaps more surprisingly, it does not appear to be the case when we investigate relationships between WEST-E scores and student performance in ninth-grade biology controlling for each teacher's WEST-B scores. This suggests that the large and statistically significant relationships between WEST-E scores and student performance in ninthgrade biology can largely be explained by the portion of the WESTE scores that are already captured in the basic-skills test.

In another extension of the achievement results in Table 3, we consider models that interact teacher licensure test scores with dif-

Middle School Math Sample



Ninth Grade Alg. \& Geo. Sample



$$
\begin{array}{ll}
----- \text { WEST-E MLM } & - \\
-\quad-\quad \text { - } \\
- \text { WEST-E Sci. WEST-E Math } \\
-\quad-\quad-\quad \text { WEST-E Bio. }
\end{array}
$$

Fig. 7. Non-linear relationships between WEST-E scores and student achievement.
NOTE: All models control for prior year test scores, gender, race/ethnicity, learning disability status, and free or reduced-priced lunch eligibility, program indicators for gifted/highly capable, limited English proficiency (LEP), and special education, teacher experience level and degree type, and course track. Error bars illustrate $95 \%$ confidence intervals calculated from standard errors that are clustered at the teacher level.

Table 4
Linear probability model of advanced STEM course taking in high school

| Panel A: Middle school math teacher predicting probability of advanced high school math course |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| WEST-B Math Standardized Score | .014 | .017 | .019 | .012 | .008 | .016 |
|  | $(.030)$ | $(.028)$ | $(.026)$ | $(.024)$ | $(.026)$ | $(.031)$ |
| Teacher controls | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Course Track | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| School fixed effects | No | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| School-year fixed effects | No | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| School-track-year fixed effects | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Number of unique teachers | 357 | 357 | 357 | 238 | 214 | 161 |
| Number of unique students | 19,994 | 19,994 | 19,994 | 14,679 | 12,276 | 7,415 |

Panel B: Middle school math teacher predicting probability of advanced high school science course
WEST-B Math Standardized Score . 021 . 023 . 023 . 007 . 003 . 002

|  | $(.027)$ | $(.027)$ | $(.026)$ | $(.018)$ | $(.019)$ | $(.025)$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Teacher controls | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Course Track | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| School fixed effects | No | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| School-year fixed effects | No | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| School-track-year fixed effects | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Number of unique teachers | 359 | 359 | 359 | 241 | 213 | 157 |
| Number of unique students | 20,223 | 20,223 | 20,223 | 14,955 | 12,236 | 7,356 |

NOTE: p-values from two-sided t-test: ${ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.001$. All models control for prior year test scores, gender, race/ethnicity, learning disability status, and free or reduced-priced lunch eligibility, along with program indicators for gifted/highly capable, limited English proficiency (LEP), special education, and number of advanced courses offered in the student's high school. Teacher controls include experience and degree type. Coefficients are reported as average marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered at the middle school teacher level and the high school level.

Table 5
OLS model of number of advanced STEM courses taken in high school

| Panel A: Middle school math teacher predicting number of high school math courses |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| WEST-B Math Standardized Score | .034 | .038 | .045 | .064 | $.078+$ | $.154 *$ |
|  | $(.057)$ | $(.053)$ | $(.050)$ | $(.042)$ | $(.047)$ | $(.082)$ |
| Teacher controls | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Course Track | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| School fixed effects | No | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| School-year fixed effects | No | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| School-track-year fixed effects | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Number of unique teachers | 357 | 357 | 357 | 238 | 214 | 161 |
| Number of unique students | 19,994 | 19,994 | 19,994 | 14,679 | 12,276 | 7,415 |
| Panel B: Middle school math teacher predicting number of high school science courses |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| WEST-B Math Standardized Score | .019 | .024 | .023 | .014 | .004 | .019 |
|  | $(.053)$ | $(.054)$ | $(.053)$ | $(.031)$ | $(.034)$ | $(.038)$ |
| Teacher controls | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Course Track | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| School fixed effects | No | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| School-year fixed effects | No | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| School-track-year fixed effects | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Number of unique teachers | 359 | 359 | 359 | 241 | 213 | 157 |
| Number of unique students | 20,223 | 20,223 | 20,223 | 14,955 | 12,236 | 7,356 |

NOTE: p-values from two-sided t-test: ${ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.001$. All models control for prior year test scores, gender, race/ethnicity, learning disability status, and free or reduced-priced lunch eligibility, along with program indicators for gifted/highly capable, limited English proficiency (LEP), special education, and number of advanced courses offered in the student's high school. Teacher controls include experience and degree type. Coefficients are reported as average marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered at the middle school teacher level and the high school level.
ferent student characteristics (e.g., prior performance, participation in FRL, student URM indicator) to test whether licensure test scores are differentially predictive of student performance for different types of students. ${ }^{41}$ We find little evidence of differential effects by student prior performance or demographics. Likewise, to test whether the predictive power of subject-specific licensure tests for student achievement might matter more depending on the track of the course, we estimate models that interact teacher licensure test scores with the track indicators discussed in Section 3. Due to sample size limitations, we were able to estimate these models only for middle and high school math classes. We find little evidence of differential impacts between course track and subjectspecific licensure exams.

As discussed in Section 4c, we also perform several robustness checks of the achievement results designed to investigate whether the estimates described above may be biased by the non-random assignment of students to teachers (Rothstein, 2009, 2010). Because both robustness checks require large sample sizes, we restrict these checks to the WEST-B models. We first pursue the approaches of Clotfelter et al. (2006) and Horvath (2015), who create "apparently random samples" by dropping students and teachers in schools that display considerable tracking of students to classroom along observed dimensions. ${ }^{42}$ This approach works well in the ninth-grade samples (both algebra/geometry and biology), and we find that all statistically-significant coefficients reported in Table 3 are still statistically-significant when the models are estimated in the apparently random sample. This suggests that the ninth-grade results are not driven solely by the nonrandom sorting of students to classrooms. Unfortunately, as discussed in Section 4a, apparent within-school sorting of students with low prior performance to teachers with low WEST-B scores

[^20]is more prevalent in the middle school math sample than in the ninth-grade samples. As a consequence, both the Clotfelter et al. (2006) and Horvath (2015) approaches drop at least $90 \%$ of the middle schools in the sample, meaning that the apparently random sample in middle school is not large enough to make a meaningful comparison to the results in Table 3. ${ }^{43}$

As a second robustness check we adopt the approach of Altonji et al. $(2005,2008)$, who calculate the relative amount of selection on unobservables required to explain a given effect. Given that this approach requires a dichotomous treatment variable, we first create a binary indicator for whether a teacher scored in the lowest quartile of the distribution of WEST-B scores, and estimate the model in Eq. (1) with this indicator as the variable of interest $\left(\right.$ Score $\left._{j}\right){ }^{44}$ We then use the Altonji et al. $(2005,2008)$ approach to estimate that the magnitude of sorting on unobservables would need to be at least $13 \%$ of the magnitude of the observed sorting on observables to explain the estimated relationship between WEST-B Math scores and student math performance reported in Table 3. ${ }^{45}$ While this may seem like a small percentage, the magnitude of sorting on observables is quite large in middle school grades due to the relationship between teacher WEST-B scores and student prior performance, and as discussed in Section IV, the prior literature that explores bias due to the sorting of students to teachers along unobservable dimensions (e.g., Bacher-Hicks et al., 2014; Chetty et al., 2014a; Jackson, 2014; Kane \& Staiger, 2008; Kane et al., 2013; Koedel et al., 2015; Rothstein, 2010, 2014) suggests that this magnitude of sorting on unobservables is unlikely.

## 6. Conclusions

The results from this study suggest several broad conclusions and directions for future research. First, the achievement findings

[^21]from middle and high school math about the modest, positive relationships between the WEST-B Math scores and student math performance reinforce conclusions from the existing literature (e.g., Clotfelter et al., 2007; Goldhaber, 2007; Hendricks, 2014) that basic skills licensure test scores provide a significant, if modest, signal about future math teacher effectiveness. Given the very limited evidence about pre-service predictors of future teacher effectiveness (e.g., Harris \& Sass, 2011), this suggests that basic skills test scores could be used for reasons beyond the pass/fail requirement for initial teacher credentialing (for example, as a measure of candidates' general skills for hiring and other personnel decisions). Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to consider other measures of candidate skills that may be observable to hiring officials (e.g., GPA and letters of recommendation), so further research that considers licensure test scores alongside these additional measures that have been considered in prior work (e.g., Goldhaber, Grout, \& Huntington-Klein, 2014; Jacob, Rockoff, Taylor, Lindy, \& Rosen, 2016) could provide more information about whether licensure tests provide information about future teacher effectiveness beyond these other measures.

The second broad conclusion is that subject-specific licensure test scores provide some additional signal about student achievement in some subjects, although the relationships are not always statistically significant. The key policy question, then, is whether these results justify the barrier to entry they represent to potential STEM teachers. Our preliminary analysis in Section 3 suggests that the WEST-E tests in STEM fields are much more difficult to pass than the WEST-E tests in other fields like elementary education. Moreover, teachers who fail the WEST-E the first time they take it are about 10 percentage points less likely to enter the workforce, and teacher candidates of color tend to be more likely to fail these tests than white teacher candidates (Goldhaber \& Hansen, 2010), so are disproportionately impacted by this barrier to entry. These trends could be particularly problematic given the well-documented difficulty of school districts, and districts in Washington State in particular, to attract STEM teachers and teachers of color (Goldhaber, Krieg, Theobald, \& Brown, 2015a, Goldhaber, Theobald, \& Tien 2015c). Thus policymakers must balance the positive (and only sometimes statistically significant) relationships between subject-specific licensure tests and student achievement documented in this paper with the potential impact of these licensure test requirements on the pool of potential STEM teachers in the state.

Another conclusion, and a unique contribution of this paper, relates to our investigation of the impact of teachers on science test scores and, specifically, the finding that relationships between licensure test scores and student performance in ninth-grade biology are considerably stronger than in math classrooms. One possible explanation is that teacher content knowledge (as measured by licensure tests) is simply more important to student performance in science than in math, but given that there is so little evidence about what predicts the effectiveness of science teachers, we caution against such a broad interpretation based on the relatively small ninth-grade biology sample sizes in this paper.

Finally, our investigation of the relationship between teacher licensure test scores and student high school STEM course taking suggests little relationship between basic licensure test performance and students' STEM course taking in high school. That said, the development of P-20 data warehouses across the country might allow researchers to investigate the role of STEM teachers in influencing other important (Long, Conger, \& Iatarola, 2012; Federman, 2007, Schneider, Swanson, \& Riegle-Crumb, 1998) long-term student outcomes, such as majoring in STEM fields and employment in STEM industries.

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[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ This focus on the human capital of STEM teachers is not new. In fact, there exists an extensive body of literature tracking the progress that the nation is (or is not) making toward having a high-capacity STEM teacher workforce. Unfortunately, the indicators often used to evaluate this progress-e.g., teacher credentials and degree type-have not been found to be highly predictive of student achievement (e.g., Wilson, Floden, \& Ferrini-Mundy, 2001).

[^2]:    ${ }^{2}$ For instance, prior work has found little relationship between teacher degree type (e.g., Monk \& King, 1994; Aaronson et al., 2007) or college entrance exam scores (e.g., Kane et al., 2008) and student achievement in mathematics.

[^3]:    ${ }^{3}$ The test developer (Pearson) for the WEST-B (a basic skills test used in Washington state), for instance, states: "The subtest scores indicated on this report are only for the purposes of admission to state-approved teacher preparation programs and for teacher certification. They are NOT intended to be used for employment decisions, other college admissions decisions, or any other purpose." http://www.west.nesinc.com/Content/Docs/WESTB_ScoreReport_backer.pdf.

[^4]:    ${ }^{4}$ Sass (2015) also finds that teachers who entered Florida's teaching workforce by passing a professional teaching knowledge exam and a subject area exam administered by ABCTE are more effective than the average teacher in the state, and this result holds when the sample is restricted to students in grades 6-10.
    ${ }^{5}$ Clotfelter et al. (2010) consider the average of a teacher's normalized licensure test scores across all tests the teacher has taken.

[^5]:    ${ }^{6}$ Passing scores for Praxis I, California Basic Educational Skills Test (CBEST), or the Pearson NES Essential Academic Skills test, as well as scores on the SAT and ACT above certain cutoffs (e.g., 515 on the math SAT) can be submitted as alternatives to the WEST-B exam (RCW 28A.410.220 \& WAC 181-01-002).
    ${ }^{7}$ Prior to the WEST-E, the state required a passing score on the Praxis-II tests. Beginning in September 2014, thestate replaced some WEST-E tests with assessments from the National Evaluation Series (NES). For parsimony, we only consider WEST-E scores in this paper.
    ${ }^{8}$ CEDARS data includes fields designed to link students to their individual teachers, based on reported schedules. However, limitations of reporting standards and practices across the state may result in ambiguities or inaccuracies around these links.

[^6]:    ${ }^{9}$ Tracks are classified by the use of course names and grade levels in the CEDARS schedule files. In middle school, courses in a "basic" track are courses below grade level and math courses labeled "Basic", "Remedial", or "LAP". Courses in an "average" track are all general math courses at grade level, while courses in an "advanced" track are math courses above grade level or courses at or above algebra 1. In high school algebra, geometry, and biology, courses are considered in an "average" track unless labeled as "Honors", "Advanced", "Accelerated ", or "IB", in which case they are considered in an "advanced" track, or are labeled as "Basic", "Support", and"Remedial", in which case they are considered in a "basic" track.
    ${ }^{10}$ Approximately one-third of Washington state schools serving Grades 3-8 participated in a pilot of the SBA in the 2013-2014 school year, and the state did not collect student test scores from these schools. Students from these schools therefore are not included in the 2013-14 data (because they are missing current-year test scores) or the 2014-15 data (because they are missing prior-year test scores).
    ${ }^{11}$ We make a number of additional restrictions to the data set to derive these analytic datasets. Specifically, we only include student/teacher/year combinations in which the student has valid current and prior-year test scores, received instruction from a single teacher in that subject and year, and (in the case of ninth-graders) was enrolled in the course aligned with the EOC test we consider (Algebra, Geometry, or Biology). Likewise, for each combination of grade level and teacher licensure test, we only consider student/teacher/year combinations in which the teacher has at least one valid licensure test score.
    ${ }^{12}$ At the high school level, courses are classified via state course codes and state course names. In cases where a course is not mentioned in Burkham et al. (2003) we use out best judgment to determine which level a course aligns with, and delete observations in schools with all missing state course names.

[^7]:    ${ }^{13}$ The most common science courses taken in 9th grade are "Physical Science" (39.9\%) followed by "General Science" (24.2\%) and then "Biology" ( $23.8 \%$ ). The most common math courses taken in 9th grade are "Algebra" (61.1\%), "Geometery" (28.1\%), and "General Math" (15.5\%).
    ${ }^{14}$ www.k12.wa.us/assessment/StateTesting/BiologyEnd-of-CourseExams.aspx

[^8]:    ${ }^{15}$ We note that recent cohorts of teachers appear to be more effective conditional on other observed covariates, which does not support the narrative that the "war on teachers" (e.g., Gamson, 2015) is having detrimental impacts on the teacher workforce.

[^9]:    ${ }^{16}$ The increase in SAT scores documented in Lankford et al. (2014) is 0.10 standard deviations from 2002 to 2010, which is not as dramatic as the 0.19 standard deviation increase in WEST-B scores over the same time period.
    17 https://www.west.nesinc.com/PageView.aspx?f=GEN_AboutTheTests.html.
    ${ }^{18}$ We also experiment with models that consider test scores standardized within year, and the results are qualitatively similar (results available from authors upon request).

[^10]:    ${ }^{19}$ For the purposes of this figure, teacher type was determined by the number of students in each subject-grade combination taught in the analytic sample or elementary sample.
    ${ }^{20} 39.6 \%$ of teacher candidates who fail the WEST-E Math on their first test administration eventually pass it, while another $31.8 \%$ eventually pass the WEST-E MLM test.

[^11]:    ${ }^{21}$ Correlations between the licensure tests we consider range from 0.44 (between the WEST-E Biology and Middle Level Math test) to 0.80 (between the WEST-E Math and the Middle Level Math test).
    ${ }^{22}$ These comparisons are calculated from predicted values from separate regressions of each individual WEST-E score against WEST-B scores in math, reading, and writing.

[^12]:    ${ }^{23}$ In the case of individual teacher evaluation, estimates from these modelscommonly called "value-added models", or VAMs-have been shown to be unbiased despite the presence of student sorting (Chetty et al. 2014a; Kane \& Staiger, 2008), and a recent review of the literature surrounding value-added methodologies concluded, "To date, the studies that have used the strongest research designs provide compelling evidence that estimates of teacher value-added from standard models

[^13]:    are not meaningfully biased by student-teacher sorting along observed or unobserved dimensions" and that "there is not any direct counter evidence indicating that value-added estimates are substantially biased" (Koedel et al., 2015).

[^14]:    ${ }^{24}$ We calculate quartiles within each sample because very few teachers in the analytic sample scored in the bottom quartile of the overall distribution of WEST-B Math scores.
    ${ }^{25}$ As a further check for nonlinearities, we also estimate models that replace the licensure scores with a teacher fixed effect and plot the resulting value-added estimates against teacher licensure scores.
    ${ }^{26}$ We also experiment with the models described in Hendricks (2014) that are identified by the movement of teachers between school-grade-year-subject combinations. However, our relatively sparse data on licensure test scores means that these cells do not capture the average licensure test score for all teachers within the cell, so within-cell changes could be due to true changes in teacher skills or changes in the composition of teachers with an observed licensure test score.

[^15]:    ${ }^{27}$ We focus on seventh and eighth graders in these years because we observe all four years of high school for these students.

[^16]:    ${ }^{28}$ If our primary goal was to estimate the relationship between a teacher's math and science skills (as opposed to the observed licensure test scores) and student outcomes, we would be concerned about a fifth potential source of biasattenuation bias due to the fact that teacher licensure test scores are an imperfect measure of a candidate's true basic skills or content knowledge. However, given that the relationship between the observed licensure test scores and student outcomes is the relevant relationship for most policy purposes, we are not concerned about this source of bias in our application.
    ${ }^{29}$ For instance, while attempts have been made to account for sample selection of this type in prior work in Washington State (e.g. Goldhaber et al., 2014, 2017b), there is not an obvious instrumental variable in this context that could be used to predict workforce entry for teacher candidates who fail the test on the first attempt.
    ${ }^{30}$ Along observable dimensions, candidates who pass the WEST-E Math test on the first attempt scored $31 \%$ of a standard deviation higher on the WEST-B math test than candidates who fail the first time and eventually pass, and $56 \%$ of a standard deviation higher on the WEST-B math test than candidates who never pass the test.
    ${ }^{31}$ In particular, prior work in Washington (Goldhaber et al., 2015b) has shown that low-performing students are more likely to be assigned to teachers with low WEST-B scores than higher-performing students in other districts, in other schools in the same district, and-particularly in middle school math-in other classrooms within the same school. This is borne out in the specification checks described in Section 4a.

[^17]:    ${ }^{32}$ Goldhaber et al. (2011) find that teachers who leave the profession tend to have higher licensure scores but lower prior estimates of value-added. See also Feng and Sass (2016) and Hanushek et al. (2016).
    ${ }^{33}$ This parallels findings from Goldhaber (2007).

[^18]:    ${ }^{34}$ These statistics come from Empirical Bayes shrunken VAM estimates. The middle school effect size is comparable to earlier estimates from the elementary level in Washington State (Goldhaber et al., 2012), while the high school effect sizes are about twice as large as comparable effect sizes reported in Mansfied (2015). The effect sizes calculated from a model with school fixed effects is 0.32 for middle school math, 0.45 for 9th grade Algebra and Geometry, and 0.27 for 9 th grade Biology teachers.
    ${ }^{35}$ We also estimate models that consider other WEST-B tests, separately and jointly, the mean WEST-B score across subtests, and the maximum WEST-B score rather than the first WEST-B score. These results are available from the authors upon request. One important conclusion is that the relationships between WESTB math scores and student math performance are robust to controlling for WEST-B reading and writing scores, and the coefficients on the WEST-B reading and writing scores are not statistically significant in these specifications.
    ${ }^{36}$ The coefficient on teacher test score from the base model in Clotfelter et al. (2010) is 0.0071 .

[^19]:    ${ }^{37}$ The quartile models estimated for Fig. 6 include the same suite of of covariates in the models estimated in column 3 of Table 3.
    ${ }^{38}$ Estimates from a student fixed-effects model in middle school math are broadly consistent with these results (available from the authors upon request).
    ${ }^{39}$ These results are robust to controlling for WEST-B reading and writing scores, though WEST-B writing scores are also a statistically-significant predictor of student biology performance in some specifications. The stronger results in biology may suggest that the lagged science test score does not adequately control for prior performance when compared to the lagged math score in the 9th grade Algebra and Geometry models. By comparing the correlation between prior performance and performance on the EOC, we do not find this to be the case. The correlation of a student's lagged science test and his or her EOC biology exam is 0.759 , and the correlation between a student's lagged math score and their EOC algebra exam is 0.633 . Similarly, the correlation between a student's lagged math score and their EOC geometry exam is 0.627 .
    ${ }^{40}$ These results are not robust to the inclusion of school, school-by-year, or school-year-grade-track fixed effects.

[^20]:    ${ }^{41}$ These estimates are available from the authors upon request.
    42 In our application of the Clotfelter et al. (2006) approach, we drop all schools in which at least one Chi-square test rejects the null hypothesis that classrooms within schools do not predict student gender, race, FRL status, or an indicator for scoring above the mean on the prior year test. In our application of the Horvath (2015) approach, we drop all schools in which an F-test rejects the null hypothesis that classrooms within schools do not predict student prior performance. In both approaches, we reject at the $\alpha=0.05$ level.

[^21]:    ${ }^{43}$ Both the Clotfelter et al. (2006) approach and the Horvath (2015) approach drop $91 \%$ of middle schools.
    ${ }^{44}$ The estimated coefficient of interest in this model is 0.025 .
    ${ }^{45}$ This estimate uses the specification from column 3 of Panel A of Table 3. For reference, the corresponding estimates from the analogous specification is $50 \%$ in ninth-grade Algebra/Geometry and $70 \%$ in ninth-grade Biology. See Altonji et al. (2008), pp. 348-349, for a succinct summary of this methodology.

