

# SCORE Allocations for Bi-objective Ranking and Selection

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The bi-objective ranking and selection (R&S) problem is a special case of the multi-objective simulation optimization problem in which two conflicting objectives are known only through dependent Monte Carlo estimators, the decision space or number of systems is finite, and each system can be sampled to some extent. The solution to the bi-objective R&S problem is a set of systems with non-dominated objective vectors, called the set of Pareto systems. We exploit the special structure of the bi-objective problem to characterize the asymptotically optimal simulation budget allocation, which accounts for dependence between the objectives and balances the probabilities associated with two types of misclassification error. Like much of the R&S literature, our focus is on the case in which the simulation observations are bivariate normal. Assuming normality, we then use a certain asymptotic limit to derive an easily-implementable Sampling Criteria for Optimization using Rate Estimators (SCORE) sampling framework that approximates the optimal allocation and accounts for correlation between the objectives. Perhaps surprisingly, the limiting SCORE allocation exclusively controls for misclassification-by-inclusion events, in which non-Pareto systems are falsely estimated as Pareto. We also provide an iterative algorithm for implementation. Our numerical experience with the resulting SCORE framework indicates that it is fast and accurate for problems having up to ten thousand systems.

CCS Concepts: • **Mathematics of computing** → **Probability and statistics; Probabilistic algorithms**; • **Theory of computation** → **Discrete optimization**; • **Computing methodologies** → **Simulation theory**; • **Applied computing** → **Multi-criterion optimization and decision-making**;

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Multi-objective simulation optimization, ranking and selection

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

The simulation optimization (SO) problem is a nonlinear optimization problem in which the objective and constraint functions can only be observed with error as output from a Monte Carlo simulation. Such problems tend to arise when computer models are used to design complex systems under uncertainty—an increasingly popular practice (Powers et al. 2012). Since the SO formulation is quite general, SO problems arise frequently in a variety of application areas,

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including agriculture (Hunter and McClosky 2016), energy (Marmidis et al. 2008; Subramanyan et al. 2011), and transportation (Osorio and Bierlaire 2013). For additional examples and a library of SO problems, see the [simopt.org](http://simopt.org) website (Henderson and Pasupathy 2017).

Methods to solve the SO problem are often categorized by whether the feasible set contains categorical, integer-ordered, or continuous decision variables (Pasupathy and Henderson 2006). Further, solution methods can be categorized by the number of performance measures posed as objectives and constraints. In the presence of a single objective and deterministic constraints, mature solution methods are available for all types of feasible sets. For an overview of these methods and entry points into this literature, see Pasupathy and Ghosh (2013) and Fu (2015). Recently, solution methods for a single objective with stochastic constraints have been proposed in the case of categorical variables (Andradóttir and Kim 2010; Lee et al. 2012; Pasupathy et al. 2015) and integer-ordered variables (Luo and Lim 2013; Nagaraj and Pasupathy 2016; Park and Kim 2015). For methods with continuous variables, see, e.g., Ruszczyński and Shapiro (2003); Homem-de-Mello and Bayraksan (2015), and references therein. However, despite its mature development in the analogous deterministic context (Miettinen 1999, for example), few articles in the SO literature provide solution methods in the presence of multiple simultaneous objectives—a problem we call the multi-objective simulation optimization (MOSO) problem.

We formulate the MOSO problem as

$$\text{Problem } M : \quad \text{minimize}_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \quad (\mathbf{E}[G_1(\mathbf{x}, \xi)], \dots, \mathbf{E}[G_d(\mathbf{x}, \xi)]),$$

where  $\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^q$  is a known feasible set,  $\xi$  represents a random quantity, and each objective can be estimated as output from a Monte Carlo simulation. Since there may not exist a single point  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}$  that minimizes all objectives simultaneously, the solution to Problem  $M$  is called the efficient set or the Pareto set. We let the *efficient set* be the set of decision points  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}$  for which no other point  $\mathbf{x}' \in \mathcal{X}, \mathbf{x} \neq \mathbf{x}'$  has objective values that are at least as good on all objectives, and strictly better on at least one objective. We refer to the image of the efficient set as the *Pareto set*.

We consider the context of solving Problem  $M$  when the goal is to identify the entire efficient set, the feasible set  $\mathcal{X}$  is finite or composed of categorical variables, and there are two objectives. Methods to solve SO problems in which  $\mathcal{X}$  is finite are often called *ranking and selection* (R&S) methods (see Kim and Nelson (2006) for an overview). Such methods require the feasible set to be small enough to permit simulation of each decision point; the decision points are usually indexed by their objective values and called *systems*. Henceforth, we refer to systems with objective vectors in the Pareto set as *Pareto systems* (see Section 2.2 for terminology). R&S methods can be divided into two types: methods that provide a fixed-precision guarantee on the optimality gap of the returned systems, and methods that allocate a fixed simulation budget in a way that guarantees sampling efficiency (Hunter and Nelson 2017; Pasupathy and Ghosh 2013). We fall in the latter category of fixed simulation budget methods; as such, we do not provide a fixed-precision guarantee on the optimality gap of the returned systems.

## 1.1 Questions Answered

To explore what we mean by allocating a fixed simulation budget in a way that guarantees sampling efficiency, consider a simple algorithm to solve Problem  $M$ : (a) allocate some non-zero proportion of a total sampling budget to each system, (b) sample and construct estimators of the objective vectors for each system, (c) return the indices of systems corresponding to the estimated Pareto set. Ideally, the estimated Pareto systems at the end of this procedure will correspond to the true Pareto systems; if not, then a misclassification occurs. Under mild regularity conditions, as the total sampling budget tends to infinity, the probability of a misclassification decays to zero. Then,

we ask, *what proportion of the total sampling budget should be allocated to each system to maximize the rate of decay of the probability of misclassification, as the sampling budget tends to infinity?*

As may be expected given prior work in other SO contexts, notably, Glynn and Juneja (2004), Szechtman and Yücesan (2008), Hunter and Pasupathy (2013), and Pasupathy et al. (2015), we characterize the asymptotically optimal sampling allocation as the solution to a bi-level optimization problem where the “outer” problem is concave maximization, and the “inner” problems are convex minimization. Importantly, our allocation accounts for dependence between the objectives and balances the probabilities associated with two types of misclassification error: misclassification by exclusion (MCE), in which a Pareto system is falsely excluded from the set of estimated Pareto systems, and misclassification by inclusion (MCI), in which a non-Pareto system is falsely included in the set of estimated Pareto systems. Since solving for the optimal allocation may be computationally burdensome, then we ask, *What is the asymptotically optimal sampling allocation when the number of non-Pareto systems is large?*

As the number of non-Pareto systems tends to infinity in a certain rigorous sense, the Pareto systems receive a larger proportion of the sampling budget than the non-Pareto systems, and the optimal allocations for non-Pareto systems are inversely proportional to an intuitive measure called the score. When the random vectors corresponding to the objectives are bivariate normal, which is our focus, the *score* of a non-Pareto system is its squared standardized “distance” from the Pareto frontier in the objective function space. As in Pasupathy et al. (2015), we determine the relative allocations to the suboptimal systems by their scores. The sampling allocation we propose based on the scores is called the bi-objective Sampling Criteria for Optimization using Rate Estimators (SCORE) allocation.

We also highlight a key insight from this work that may be surprising: *When the number of non-Pareto systems is large relative to the number of Pareto systems, the optimal allocation exclusively controls for the probability of an MCI event.* To understand why this is true, for now, let MCE be the event that a Pareto system is falsely excluded by another Pareto system, while MCI is the event that a non-Pareto system is falsely included among the estimated Pareto systems, whether it is estimated as excluding a Pareto system or not. Further, assume we are in a theoretical framework in which we have access to all information about the systems, including their classifications as Pareto and non-Pareto. Then, loosely speaking, as the number of non-Pareto systems tends to infinity, the Pareto systems each compete with more and more non-Pareto systems. Thus, the Pareto systems receive a larger proportion of the total sampling budget than the non-Pareto systems. Indeed, they receive so many more samples that the probability of a Pareto system falsely excluding another Pareto system is small relative to the probability of a non-Pareto system being falsely included among the estimated Pareto systems. Thus, the Pareto set appears “known” relative to the non-Pareto set, and the optimal allocation exclusively controls for MCI events.

Since the SCORE allocation requires knowing the true system performances on both objectives, which are unknown, we include a sequential sampling framework for implementation. We numerically compare the performance of the SCORE allocation and the sequential sampling framework with other popular allocations in the literature. We find that our implementation of the SCORE allocation performs well numerically. SCORE appears to be a fast and accurate heuristic allocation scheme for bi-objective R&S with 20 to 10,000 systems, inspired by theoretical allocations that have limiting optimality guarantees on efficiency.

## 1.2 Other Relevant Work

When the goal of solving Problem  $M$  is to identify the entire efficient or Pareto set, few solution methods have been proposed in the SO literature. Arguably, the most well-known and popular method is the Multi-objective Optimal Computing Budget Allocation (MOCBA) (Lee et al. 2010),

Table 1. The Table Provides a Categorization of Existing Papers on Multi-objective R&S by How Many Objectives They Consider and Whether They Account for Dependence Between the Objectives

Dependence?	Exactly Two Objectives	Two or More Objectives
No	Hunter and McClosky (2016) and M-MOBA (Branke and Zhang 2015)	MOCBA (Lee et al. 2010)
Yes	This article and its preliminary version, Hunter and Feldman (2015)	Feldman et al. (2015)

which is a multi-objective version of the popular Optimal Computing Budget Allocation (Chen et al. 2000) for a finite feasible set. Other recent work includes (a) M-MOBA (Branke and Zhang 2015; Branke et al. 2016), a multi-objective version of the small-sample expected value of information (EVI) procedures in Chick et al. (2010) for a finite feasible set; (b) MO-COMPASS (Li et al. 2015), which is a multi-objective version of COMPASS (Xu et al. 2010) for integer-ordered feasible sets; (c) Huang and Zabinsky (2014), who provide a branch-and-bound algorithm for integer-ordered or continuous feasible sets; and (d) Kim and Ryu (2011), Fliege and Xu (2011), and Bonnel and Collonge (2014), who provide methods for continuous feasible sets. We note that Butler et al. (2001) provide a utility function approach to multi-objective R&S and refer the reader to Hunter et al. (2017) for an overview of the existing MOSO literature.

Given our context of finite feasible sets, the most appropriate competitors for our proposed sequential algorithm are MOCBA and M-MOBA. We compare the performance of our sequential algorithm with these methods in Section 8.

*Remark 1.* A preliminary version of this work appears in Hunter and Feldman (2015). Also, Hunter and McClosky (2016) contains an asymptotically optimal allocation for the case of two independent objectives in the context of a plant breeding application. This article is a significant outgrowth of Hunter and Feldman (2015) and subsumes the allocation provided in Hunter and McClosky (2016) for independent objectives. Neither Hunter and Feldman (2015) nor Hunter and McClosky (2016) provides a limiting SCORE framework. Feldman et al. (2015) provides analogous MOSO methods on finite sets for more than two objectives. Since the methods in Feldman et al. (2015) are more computationally burdensome than those we propose, we do not advocate using the methods of Feldman et al. (2015) in the bi-objective case. Thus, we do not include these methods in numerical comparisons. Table 1 categorizes these articles according to some of their differences.

*Remark 2.* There is also work on the multi-objective multi-armed bandit problem, for example, Yahyaa et al. (2014a, 2014b, 2014c).

## 2 PROBLEM SETTING AND FORMULATION

We now provide a formal problem statement, describe terminology and notational conventions, and outline our assumptions. Due to space constraints, unless otherwise noted in the text, proofs for all results appear in the Online Appendix.

### 2.1 Problem Statement

We consider the MOSO problem with two objectives on a finite set. That is, we solve

$$\text{Problem } B : \text{ Find } \operatorname{argmin}_{k \in \mathcal{S}} (\mathbf{E}[G(\mathbf{x}_k, \xi)], \mathbf{E}[H(\mathbf{x}_k, \xi)]),$$

where  $\mathcal{S} := \{1, 2, \dots, r\}$  is a finite set of system indices and  $\xi$  is a random quantity. Further, define  $g_k := \mathbf{E}[G(\mathbf{x}_k, \xi)]$  and  $h_k := \mathbf{E}[H(\mathbf{x}_k, \xi)]$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ . The objective vectors  $(g_k, h_k) \in \mathbb{R}^2$  are unknown, but may be estimated by sample means. The solution to Problem  $B$  is the set of Pareto

systems (see Section 2.2),  $\mathcal{P} := \{\text{systems } i : \# \text{system } k \in \mathcal{S} \text{ such that } (g_k, h_k) \leq (g_i, h_i)\}$ , where a vector  $(g_k, h_k)$  dominates  $(g_i, h_i)$ , written as  $(g_k, h_k) \leq (g_i, h_i)$ , if  $g_k \leq g_i$  and  $h_k < h_i$ , or  $g_k < g_i$  and  $h_k \leq h_i$ .

Now, consider a method to solve Problem *B* in which we allocate a proportion  $\alpha_k > 0$  of the total sampling budget to each system  $k$ , where  $\sum_{k=1}^r \alpha_k = 1$ . Once the total sampling budget has been expended, we return the set of estimated Pareto systems,  $\hat{\mathcal{P}}$ , constructed as follows. Let the vector of sample means after  $n$  samples be  $(\bar{G}_k(n), \bar{H}_k(n)) := (\frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^n G_{kj}, \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^n H_{kj})$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ , and define  $(\hat{G}_k, \hat{H}_k) := (\bar{G}(\alpha_k n), \bar{H}(\alpha_k n))$  as the estimators of  $g_k$  and  $h_k$  after scaling the total sample size  $n$  by the proportional allocation to system  $k$ ,  $\alpha_k > 0$ . Then, the set of estimated Pareto systems is  $\hat{\mathcal{P}} := \{\text{systems } i : \# \text{system } k \in \mathcal{S} \text{ such that } (\hat{G}_k, \hat{H}_k) \leq (\hat{G}_i, \hat{H}_i)\}$ .

If  $\hat{\mathcal{P}} \neq \mathcal{P}$ , then at least one system has been misclassified, that is, a Pareto system has been falsely estimated as non-Pareto, or a non-Pareto system has been falsely estimated as Pareto. As the sampling budget tends to infinity, the probability of misclassification tends to zero. Then, we ask, *What sampling budget  $\alpha = (\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_r)$  maximizes the rate of decay of the probability of misclassification?*

*Remark 3.* While we focus on allocating the sample to maximize the rate of decay of the probability of misclassification, one could also allocate to minimize the expected number of misclassifications. Hunter and McClosky (2016) show that these two objectives result in identical asymptotic allocations when the objective estimators are independent. We anticipate that a similar result holds in the context of this article.

## 2.2 Terminology and Notational Conventions

In general, we prefer to call the solution to Problem *M* “the efficient set” and call its image “the Pareto set” (see Ehrgott (2012) for a historical perspective on these terms). However, since R&S methods assume no structure in the decision space, we may work almost entirely in the objective space. Since we work in the objective space and index the systems by their objective function values in Section 3, we omit the term “efficient” in favor of the term “Pareto” throughout the article.

When it is reasonable to do so, uppercase letters denote random variables or matrices, lowercase letters denote fixed quantities, script letters denote sets, and vectors are written in bold. For a set  $C$ , the cardinality of  $C$  is denoted  $|C|$ . For a function  $f$ , let  $\nabla f(\mathbf{x})$  be the gradient of  $f$  with respect to  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^q$ , and  $f'(\mathbf{x})$  the derivative of  $f$  with respect to  $x \in \mathbb{R}$ . For any 2-by-2 matrix  $A$ , let the eigenvalues of  $A$  be  $\lambda_{\min}(A)$  and  $\lambda_{\max}(A)$ . For any  $n$ -by- $n$  matrices  $A$  and  $B$ , let  $A \circ B$  denote their element-wise, or Hadamard, product. For a sequence of real numbers  $\{a_n\}$ , we say that  $a_n = o(1)$  if  $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \{a_n\} = 0$  and  $a_n = O(1)$  if  $\{a_n\}$  is bounded, that is, if there exists  $c > 0$  with  $|a_n| < c$  for all  $n$ . Further,  $a_n = \Theta(1)$  if  $0 < \liminf a_n \leq \limsup a_n < \infty$ . We use iff for “if and only if.” Solutions to optimization problems are usually denoted with an asterisk, e.g.,  $x^*$ . We use  $\mathbb{I}_{[\cdot]}$  to denote the indicator function. Let  $f^+ : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \cup \{\infty\}$  be a function such that  $f^+(x) = x$  if  $x \in \{x \in \mathbb{R} : x > 0\}$  and  $f^+(x) = \infty$  if  $x \leq 0$ . For  $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$ , define  $\min^+[a, b] := \min(f^+(a), f^+(b))$ .

## 2.3 Assumptions

In what follows, we assume that the set of non-Pareto systems is nonempty. To estimate the unknown quantities  $g_k$  and  $h_k$ , we assume we obtain replicates of the random vector  $(G_k, H_k)$  from each system. We also assume the following.

**ASSUMPTION 1.** *Random vectors  $(G_k, H_k)$  are mutually independent for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ .*

That is, we develop a model to guide sampling that does not specifically account for correlation between systems, such as the correlation that would arise with the use of common random

numbers (CRN). However, our model does not preclude the use of CRN during implementation. We also require the following technical assumption, which is standard in optimal allocation literature, since it ensures all Pareto systems are distinguishable on each objective with a finite sample size.

**ASSUMPTION 2.** *We assume  $g_i \neq g_k$  and  $h_i \neq h_k$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{P}, k \in \mathcal{S}$  such that  $k \neq i$ .*

Since we employ a large deviations analysis in Section 3, we require the following Assumptions 3 and 4, included here for completeness. We refer the reader to Dembo and Zeitouni (1998) for further explanation. Let  $\langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle$  denote the dot product, and let  $\Lambda_{(G_k, H_k)}^{(n)}(\theta) = \log \mathbb{E}[e^{\langle \theta, (\bar{G}_k(n), \bar{H}_k(n)) \rangle}]$ ,  $\Lambda_{G_k}^{(n)}(\theta) = \log \mathbb{E}[e^{\theta \bar{G}_k(n)}]$ , and  $\Lambda_{H_k}^{(n)}(\theta) = \log \mathbb{E}[e^{\theta \bar{H}_k(n)}]$  be the cumulant generating functions of  $(\bar{G}_k(n), \bar{H}_k(n))$ ,  $\bar{G}_k(n)$ , and  $\bar{H}_k(n)$ , respectively, where  $\theta \in \mathbb{R}^2$  and  $\theta \in \mathbb{R}$ . Let the effective domain of  $f(\cdot)$  be  $\mathcal{D}_f = \{x : f(x) < \infty\}$ , and its interior  $\mathcal{D}_f^\circ$ . We make the following standard assumption.

**ASSUMPTION 3.** *For each system  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ ,*

- (1) *the limit  $\Lambda_{(G_k, H_k)}(\theta) = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \Lambda_{(G_k, H_k)}^{(n)}(n\theta)$  exists as an extended real number for all  $\theta \in \mathbb{R}^2$ , where  $\Lambda_{G_k}(\theta) = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \Lambda_{G_k}^{(n)}(n\theta)$  and  $\Lambda_{H_k}(\theta) = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \Lambda_{H_k}^{(n)}(n\theta)$  for all  $\theta \in \mathbb{R}$ ;*
- (2) *the origin belongs to the interior of  $\mathcal{D}_{\Lambda_{(G_k, H_k)}}$ ;*
- (3)  *$\Lambda_{(G_k, H_k)}(\theta)$  is strictly convex and  $C^\infty$  on  $\mathcal{D}_{\Lambda_{(G_k, H_k)}}^\circ$ ;*
- (4)  *$\Lambda_{(G_k, H_k)}(\theta)$  is steep, that is, for any sequence  $\{\theta_n\} \in \mathcal{D}_{\Lambda_{(G_k, H_k)}}$  converging to a boundary point of  $\mathcal{D}_{\Lambda_{(G_k, H_k)}}$ ,  $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} |\nabla \Lambda_{(G_k, H_k)}(\theta_n)| = \infty$ .*

Assumption 3 implies that by the Gärtner-Ellis theorem, the probability measure governing  $(\bar{G}_k(n), \bar{H}_k(n))$  obeys the large deviations principle (LDP) with good, strictly convex rate function  $I_k(x, y) = \sup_{\theta \in \mathbb{R}^2} \{\langle \theta, (x, y) \rangle - \Lambda_{(G_k, H_k)}(\theta)\}$  (Dembo and Zeitouni 1998, p. 44). Further,  $\bar{G}_k(n)$  and  $\bar{H}_k(n)$  obey the LDP with good, strictly convex rate functions  $J_k(x) = \sup_{\theta \in \mathbb{R}} \{\langle \theta, x \rangle - \Lambda_{G_k}(\theta)\}$ ,  $K_k(y) = \sup_{\theta \in \mathbb{R}} \{\langle \theta, y \rangle - \Lambda_{H_k}(\theta)\}$ . Let  $(x, y) \in \mathcal{F}_{(G_k, H_k)}^\circ = \text{int}\{\nabla \Lambda_{(G_k, H_k)}(\theta) : \theta \in \mathcal{D}_{\Lambda_{(G_k, H_k)}}^\circ\}$ , and let  $\mathcal{F}_d^c$  denote the closure of the convex hull of the set  $\{(g_k, h_k) : (g_k, h_k) \in \mathbb{R}^2, k \in \mathcal{S}\}$ .

**ASSUMPTION 4.** *The closure of the convex hull of all points  $(g_k, h_k) \in \mathbb{R}^2$  is a subset of the intersection of the interiors of the effective domains of the rate functions  $I_k(x, y)$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ , that is,  $\mathcal{F}_d^c \subset \cap_{k=1}^r \mathcal{F}_{(G_k, H_k)}^\circ$ .*

### 3 CHARACTERIZATION OF THE OPTIMAL BUDGET ALLOCATION

Given that our goal is to determine the sample allocation  $\alpha$  that maximizes the rate of decay of the probability of misclassification, we first formulate the misclassification event in a way that facilitates analysis. We then analyze the rate of decay of the probability of misclassification as a function of  $\alpha$  and provide a characterization of the optimal budget allocation as the solution to a bi-level optimization problem. To avoid mathematical complications, we assume  $n\alpha_k > 1$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$  in this section.

#### 3.1 Formulation of the Misclassification Event

Recall that a misclassification event occurs if, after expending a total of  $n$  samples, the set of estimated Pareto systems,  $\hat{\mathcal{P}}$ , is not equal to the true set of Pareto systems,  $\mathcal{P}$ . If  $\hat{\mathcal{P}} \neq \mathcal{P}$ , then at least one of two events occurs: a Pareto system was falsely excluded from the set of estimated Pareto systems (MCE), or a non-Pareto system was falsely included in the set of estimated Pareto systems




Fig. 1. Pareto systems  $i - 1, i, i + 1$  are solid black dots,  $i \in \{2, \dots, p - 1\}$ . Phantom Pareto systems are solid gray dots,  $\ell = i$ . If the Pareto set were known, then an MCE or MCI event would result from the non-Pareto system  $j$  being falsely estimated in the dark or light gray region, respectively.

(MCI). Therefore, we can formulate the misclassification event as  $MC := MCE \cup MCI$ , where

$$MCE := \underbrace{\bigcup_{i \in \mathcal{P}} \bigcup_{k \in \mathcal{S}, k \neq i} (\hat{G}_k \leq \hat{G}_i) \cap (\hat{H}_k \leq \hat{H}_i)}_{\exists i \in \mathcal{P} \text{ dominated by some } k \in \mathcal{S}}; \quad MCI := \underbrace{\bigcup_{j \in \mathcal{P}^c} \bigcap_{k \in \mathcal{S}, k \neq j} (\hat{G}_j \leq \hat{G}_k) \cup (\hat{H}_j \leq \hat{H}_k)}_{\exists j \in \mathcal{P}^c \text{ not dominated by any } k \in \mathcal{S}}.$$

As the union of pairwise exclusion events, the MCE event is easy to analyze. However, the MCI event requires a non-Pareto system  $j$  to be falsely estimated as better than *every* system  $k$  on at least one objective. This event contains dependence that is difficult to analyze. In this section, we reformulate the MC event for easier analysis. First, we simplify the MCE event to consider only exclusion events between Pareto systems,

$$MCE_{\mathcal{P}} := \bigcup_{i \in \mathcal{P}} \bigcup_{i' \in \mathcal{P}, i' \neq i} (\hat{G}_{i'} \leq \hat{G}_i) \cap (\hat{H}_{i'} \leq \hat{H}_i).$$

Then, we reformulate the MCI event so that it also appears as a union of pairwise exclusion events. We combine these results into the statement of Theorem 3.1, which states the equivalence of the MC and reformulated events.

To reformulate the MCI event as a union of pairwise exclusion events, first, we define new systems called phantom Pareto systems. To define these systems, reserve the indices  $1, \dots, p$  for the Pareto systems, such that  $\mathcal{P} = \{1, \dots, p\}$ ,  $|\mathcal{P}| = p$ . Then, label the true Pareto systems by their ordered objective values,  $g_1 < g_2 < \dots < g_{p-1} < g_p < g_{p+1}$  and  $h_0 > h_1 > h_2 > \dots > h_{p-1} > h_p$ , where  $g_{p+1} := \infty$ , and  $h_0 := \infty$ . Thus, the objective values for the true Pareto systems are  $(g_i, h_i)$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ , where henceforth, we use  $i$  as an ordered index when we wish to refer to the ordered Pareto systems. An example of this labeling appears in Figure 1.

Now, construct the objective value corresponding to the  $\ell$ th *phantom Pareto system* as the coordinates  $(g_{i+1}, h_i)$  for  $i = 0, 1, \dots, p$ , where we also place phantom Pareto systems at  $(g_1, \infty)$  and  $(\infty, h_p)$  for a total of  $p + 1$  phantom Pareto systems. Henceforth, we use  $\mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}} := \{0, 1, \dots, p\}$  as the set of indices corresponding to the phantom Pareto systems, and we use  $\ell$  as an ordered index when we wish to emphasize the ordered *phantom Pareto systems*; notice our labeling is such that  $\ell = i$  (see Figure 1). *For the remainder of the article, the indices  $\ell$  and  $i$  are linked in this way.*

To rewrite the MCI event using the phantom Pareto systems, we must estimate the objective values of the phantom Pareto systems. For the true Pareto systems, define  $\hat{G}_{[i]}$  as the  $i$ th largest estimated first objective value and  $\hat{H}_{[i]}$  as the  $i$ th smallest estimated second objective value. Thus,  $\hat{G}_{[1]} < \dots < \hat{G}_{[p-1]} < \hat{G}_{[p]} < \hat{G}_{[p+1]}$  and  $\hat{H}_{[0]} > \hat{H}_{[1]} > \hat{H}_{[2]} > \dots > \hat{H}_{[p]}$ , where  $\hat{G}_{[p+1]} := \infty$  and  $\hat{H}_{[0]} := \infty$  for all  $n$ . Now, the estimated performances of the phantom Pareto systems are

$(\hat{G}_{[i+1]}, \hat{H}_{[i]})$  for  $i = 0, 1, \dots, p$ . Define misclassification by dominating an estimated phantom Pareto system as

$$\text{MCI}_{\text{ph}} := \bigcup_{j \in \mathcal{P}^c} \bigcup_{\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell=i} (\hat{G}_j \leq \hat{G}_{[i+1]}) \cap (\hat{H}_j \leq \hat{H}_{[i]}),$$

and rewrite the misclassification event as  $\text{MC}_{\text{ph}} := \text{MCE}_{\mathcal{P}} \cup \text{MCI}_{\text{ph}}$ . Theorem 3.1 states the equivalence of the probability of an MC event and the probability of an  $\text{MC}_{\text{ph}}$  event. A similar theorem was stated and proved in Hunter and McClosky (2016) under more restrictive assumptions.

**THEOREM 3.1.**  $\mathbb{P}\{\text{MC}\} = \mathbb{P}\{\text{MC}_{\text{ph}}\}$ .

Henceforth, we use the notation  $\mathbb{P}\{\text{MC}\}$  without loss of clarity.

### 3.2 The Rate of Decay of the Probability of a Misclassification Event

Now that we have formulated the MC event into the union of two MCE-like events, we are ready to analyze the rate of decay of  $\mathbb{P}\{\text{MC}\}$  as a function of the sampling allocation vector  $\alpha$ . Notice that for  $b = \max(\mathbb{P}\{\text{MCE}_{\mathcal{P}}\}, \mathbb{P}\{\text{MCI}_{\text{ph}}\})$ , we have  $b \leq \mathbb{P}\{\text{MC}\} \leq 2b$ , which, assuming the limits exist, implies

$$-\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \log \mathbb{P}\{\text{MC}\} = \min\left(-\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \log \mathbb{P}\{\text{MCE}_{\mathcal{P}}\}, -\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \log \mathbb{P}\{\text{MCI}_{\text{ph}}\}\right). \quad (1)$$

In what follows, we analyze the rate of decay of  $\mathbb{P}\{\text{MCE}_{\mathcal{P}}\}$  and  $\mathbb{P}\{\text{MCI}_{\text{ph}}\}$  separately.

First, consider the rate of decay of  $\mathbb{P}\{\text{MCE}_{\mathcal{P}}\}$  in Equation (1), since it is the most straightforward. For brevity, for all  $i, i' \in \mathcal{P}, i' \neq i$ , define the rate function

$$R_i(\alpha_i, \alpha_{i'}) := \inf_{x_{i'} \leq x_i, y_{i'} \leq y_i} \alpha_i I_i(x_i, y_i) + \alpha_{i'} I_{i'}(x_{i'}, y_{i'}).$$

The following Lemma 3.2 states the rate of decay of  $\mathbb{P}\{\text{MCE}_{\mathcal{P}}\}$  in terms of the pairwise rates  $R_i(\alpha_i, \alpha_{i'})$  corresponding to a Pareto system  $i'$  dominating another Pareto system  $i$ . We do not provide a proof for Lemma 3.2; it follows from an analysis similar to those in Glynn and Juneja (2004), Hunter (2011), Li (2012), and Feldman (2017).

**LEMMA 3.2.** *The rate of decay of  $\mathbb{P}\{\text{MCE}_{\mathcal{P}}\}$  is*

$$-\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \log \mathbb{P}\{\text{MCE}_{\mathcal{P}}\} = \min_{i \in \mathcal{P}} \min_{i' \in \mathcal{P}, i' \neq i} R_i(\alpha_i, \alpha_{i'}).$$

Lemma 3.2 states that the rate of decay of  $\mathbb{P}\{\text{MCE}_{\mathcal{P}}\}$  is the slowest among the pairwise rates corresponding to one Pareto system falsely dominating another.

Now, let us turn our attention to the term corresponding to  $\text{MCI}_{\text{ph}}$  in Equation (1). The analysis for the rate of decay of the probability of an  $\text{MCI}_{\text{ph}}$  event is a bit more involved: in addition to the possibility that a non-Pareto system  $j$  is estimated as dominating a phantom Pareto system, the Pareto systems themselves may be estimated as “out of order.” In what follows, we do not directly state the rate of decay of  $\mathbb{P}\{\text{MCI}_{\text{ph}}\}$ . Instead, we show that the probability of events corresponding to  $\text{MCI}_{\text{ph}}$  in which the Pareto systems are also estimated as out of order have rates of decay greater than or equal to the rate of decay of  $\mathbb{P}\{\text{MCE}_{\mathcal{P}}\}$ , and thus can never be the unique minimum rate in Equation (1).

To explicitly denote the ordering of the Pareto systems, we require the following notation. First, recall that the Pareto systems are labeled “in order” from  $1, 2, \dots, p$ . Then, we define the ordered list  $\mathcal{O} := \{(1, 1), (2, 2), \dots, (p, p)\}$  as the positions of the true Pareto systems on each objective, where the first objective is labeled from smallest to largest, and the second objective is labeled from largest to smallest. Now, define  $\hat{\mathcal{O}}$  as the ordered list of estimated positions of the true Pareto systems. Thus, the event that the Pareto systems are estimated in the correct order is  $\hat{\mathcal{O}} = \mathcal{O}$ . Define  $\text{MCI}_{\text{ph}}$  without order statistics as  $\text{MCI}_{\text{ph}}^* := \bigcup_{j \in \mathcal{P}^c} \bigcup_{\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell=i} (\hat{G}_j \leq \hat{G}_{i+1}) \cap (\hat{H}_j \leq \hat{H}_i)$ , where

$\hat{G}_{p+1} := \infty, \hat{H}_0 := \infty$  for all  $n$ . Then, the event  $\text{MCI}_{\text{ph}}^* \cap \hat{O} = O$  is the event that the Pareto systems are estimated in order, and a non-Pareto system is falsely included in the set of estimated Pareto systems. The following lemma states that only the rate of decay of the probability of this event can be a binding minimum in the overall rate of decay of  $\mathbf{P}\{\text{MC}\}$  in Equation (1).

LEMMA 3.3. *The rate of decay of  $\mathbf{P}\{\text{MC}\}$  is*

$$-\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \log \mathbf{P}\{\text{MC}\} = \min \left( -\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \log \mathbf{P}\{\text{MCE}_{\mathcal{P}}\}, -\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \log \mathbf{P}\{\text{MCI}_{\text{ph}}^* \cap \hat{O} = O\} \right).$$

Again, because the Pareto systems being estimated out of order has a rate of decay that is greater than or equal to the rate of decay of  $\mathbf{P}\{\text{MCE}_{\mathcal{P}}\}$ , the rate of decay of  $\mathbf{P}\{\text{MC}\}$  can be simplified to a rate involving only pairs of non-Pareto systems and phantom Pareto systems. For all non-Pareto systems  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$  and all phantom Pareto systems  $\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}} = \{0, 1, \dots, p\}$ , recall that  $\ell = i$  and define the rate function

$$\begin{aligned} R_{j\ell}(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1}) \\ := \begin{cases} \inf_{x_j \leq x_1} \alpha_j I_j(x_j, y_j) + \alpha_1 J_1(x_1) & \text{if } \ell = 0, \\ \inf_{x_j \leq x_{i+1}, y_j \leq y_i} \alpha_j I_j(x_j, y_j) + \alpha_i K_i(y_i) + \alpha_{i+1} J_{i+1}(x_{i+1}) & \text{if } \ell \in \{1, \dots, p-1\}, \\ \inf_{y_j \leq y_p} \alpha_j I_j(x_j, y_j) + \alpha_p K_p(y_p) & \text{if } \ell = p, \end{cases} \\ = \begin{cases} \inf_x \alpha_j J_j(x) + \alpha_1 J_1(x) & \text{if } \ell = 0, \\ \inf_{x_j \leq x_{i+1}, y_j \leq y_i} \alpha_j I_j(x_j, y_j) + \alpha_i K_i(y_i) + \alpha_{i+1} J_{i+1}(x_{i+1}) & \text{if } \ell \in \{1, \dots, p-1\}, \\ \inf_y \alpha_j K_j(y) + \alpha_p K_p(y) & \text{if } \ell = p, \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

where  $\alpha_0 := 1, \alpha_{p+1} := 1$ , and equality of these two rates is explained in the Online Appendix. The following Theorem 3.4 states the rate of decay of the probability of misclassification,  $\mathbf{P}\{\text{MC}\}$ .

THEOREM 3.4. *The rate of decay of the probability of misclassification is*

$$-\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \log \mathbf{P}\{\text{MC}\} = \min \left( \min_{i \in \mathcal{P}} \min_{i' \in \mathcal{P}, i' \neq i} R_i(\alpha_i, \alpha_{i'}), \min_{j \in \mathcal{P}^c} \min_{\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell = i} R_{j\ell}(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1}) \right).$$

According to Theorem 3.4, we can retrieve the overall rate of decay of the probability of misclassification by calculating (a) the slowest among all pairwise false exclusion rates between the Pareto systems  $i, i' \in \mathcal{P}, i \neq i'$ , and (b) the slowest among the pairwise false inclusion rates between non-Pareto systems  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$  and phantom Pareto systems  $\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}$ . Therefore, the rate of decay of  $\mathbf{P}\{\text{MC}\}$  is determined by the most likely misclassification event between two Pareto systems or between a non-Pareto system and a phantom Pareto system. We remind the reader that the rate in Theorem 3.4 accounts for dependence between the objectives.

### 3.3 Optimal Allocation Strategy

To determine the asymptotically optimal sampling allocation that maximizes the rate of decay of the probability of misclassification,  $\mathbf{P}\{\text{MC}\}$ , we consider the rate of decay of  $\mathbf{P}\{\text{MC}\}$  in Theorem 3.4 as a function of the sampling allocation  $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ . To determine the best value of  $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ , we maximize the rate

of decay of  $\mathbb{P}\{\text{MC}\}$  by solving the following Problem  $Q$ , defined as

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Problem } Q : \quad & \text{maximize } z \text{ s.t.} \\ & R_i(\alpha_i, \alpha_{i'}) \geq z \text{ for all } i, i' \in \mathcal{P} \text{ such that } i' \neq i, \\ & R_{j\ell}(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1}) \geq z \text{ for all } j \in \mathcal{P}^c, \ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell = i, \\ & \sum_{k=1}^r \alpha_k = 1, \alpha_k \geq 0 \text{ for all } k \in \mathcal{S}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, at optimality in Problem  $Q$ ,  $\alpha^*$  is the sampling allocation that maximizes the rate of decay of the probability of misclassification. The optimal rate is represented by  $z^*$ . Given a value of  $(\alpha_i, \alpha_{i'})$ , the value of  $R_i(\alpha_i, \alpha_{i'})$  is obtained by solving

$$\text{Problem } R_{i i'}^{\text{MCE}} : \quad \text{minimize } \alpha_i I_i(x_i, y_i) + \alpha_{i'} I_{i'}(x_{i'}, y_{i'}) \text{ s.t. } x_{i'} \leq x_i, y_{i'} \leq y_i,$$

and given a value of  $(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})$ , the value of  $R_{j\ell}(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})$  is obtained by solving

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Problem } R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}} : \quad & \text{minimize } \alpha_j I_j(x_j, y_j) + \alpha_i K_i(y_i) \mathbb{I}_{[\ell \neq 0]} + \alpha_{i+1} J_{i+1}(x_{i+1}) \mathbb{I}_{[\ell \neq p]} \\ & \text{s.t. } (x_j - x_{i+1}) \mathbb{I}_{[\ell \neq p]} \leq 0, (y_j - y_i) \mathbb{I}_{[\ell \neq 0]} \leq 0, \end{aligned}$$

where, for ease of notation, we write Problem  $R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}}$  in its unsimplified form. We distinguish Problems  $R_{i i'}^{\text{MCE}}$  and  $R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}}$  as strictly convex optimization problems in  $(x_i, y_i, x_{i'}, y_{i'})$  and  $(x_j, y_j, y_i, x_{i+1})$ , respectively, while  $R_i(\alpha_i, \alpha_{i'})$  and  $R_{j\ell}(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})$  are their respective objective values at optimality. In the sections that follow, Problem  $R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}}$  plays a prominent role. Thus, we briefly discuss the properties of Problem  $Q$ . Then, we provide a more in-depth look at the properties of Problem  $R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}}$ .

**3.3.1 Properties of Problem  $Q$ .** Problem  $Q$  has  $p \times (p - 1)$  constraints corresponding to controlling the rate of decay of  $\mathbb{P}\{\text{MCE}_{\mathcal{P}}\}$  and  $(r - p) \times (p + 1)$  constraints corresponding to controlling the rate of decay of  $\mathbb{P}\{\text{MCI}_{\text{ph}}\}$ . Also, each  $R_i(\alpha_i, \alpha_{i'})$  and  $R_{j\ell}(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})$  are concave functions of  $(\alpha_i, \alpha_{i'})$  and  $(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})$ , respectively (Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004, p. 81). Thus, Problem  $Q$  is a concave maximization problem. We emphasize the following important property of the rate  $z$  as a function of the allocation  $\alpha$ : *If  $\alpha_k = 0$  for any system  $k$  in Problem  $Q$ , then the rate  $z = 0$ .* Since equal allocation is feasible and results in a rate  $z > 0$ , at optimality in Problem  $Q$ , we have  $z^* > 0$  and  $\alpha_k^* > 0$  for all systems  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ .

**3.3.2 Properties of Problem  $R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}}$ .** Along with primal feasibility, the following KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for global optimality in the strictly convex Problem  $R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}}$ . Let  $(x_j^*, y_j^*, y_i^*, x_{i+1}^*)$  be the solution to Problem  $R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}}$ , where  $y_0^* := 0$ ,  $x_{p+1}^* := 0$ . Letting  $\lambda_x \geq 0$  and  $\lambda_y \geq 0$  be dual variables, we have complementary slackness conditions  $\lambda_x(x_j^* - x_{i+1}^*) = 0$  if  $\ell \neq p$ ,  $\lambda_y(y_j^* - y_i^*) = 0$  if  $\ell \neq 0$ , and stationarity conditions

$$\alpha_j \frac{\partial I_j(x_j^*, y_j^*)}{\partial x_j} + \lambda_x \mathbb{I}_{[\ell \neq p]} = 0, \quad \alpha_j \frac{\partial I_j(x_j^*, y_j^*)}{\partial y_j} + \lambda_y \mathbb{I}_{[\ell \neq 0]} = 0, \quad (2)$$

$$\alpha_{i+1} \frac{\partial J_{i+1}(x_{i+1}^*)}{\partial x_{i+1}} - \lambda_x = 0 \quad \text{if } \ell \neq p, \quad \alpha_i \frac{\partial K_i(y_i^*)}{\partial y_i} - \lambda_y = 0 \quad \text{if } \ell \neq 0. \quad (3)$$

In the solution to Problem  $R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}}$ , the variables  $x_j^*, y_j^*, y_i^*$ , and  $x_{i+1}^*$  are each functions of the proportional allocations to non-Pareto system  $j$  and Pareto systems  $i$  and  $i + 1$ ,  $(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})$ . When this dependence must explicitly be denoted, for brevity, define

$$\mathfrak{z}_j^*(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1}) := (x_j^*(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1}), y_j^*(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})).$$

Now, notice that under Assumptions 2–4, from the KKT conditions for Problem  $R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}}$ , the value of the rate function  $I_j(\mathfrak{J}_j^*(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})) > 0$  at optimality in Problem  $R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}}$ . This result is stated formally in Lemma 3.5; we omit the proof.

LEMMA 3.5. *If  $\alpha_j > 0, \alpha_i > 0, \alpha_{i+1} > 0$ , then  $I_j(\mathfrak{J}_j^*(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})) > 0$  in Problem  $R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}}$  for all non-Pareto systems  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$  and all phantom Pareto systems  $\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell = i$ .*

A lemma regarding the locations of the solutions to Problem  $R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}}$  appears in the Online Appendix.

## 4 LIMITING APPROXIMATION TO THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION

Since Problem  $Q$  is a bi-level optimization problem, it may take some time to solve for the optimal allocation when the number of systems is large. While the computational time could be reduced by solving the inner problems in parallel, we believe it is useful to see if the optimal allocation can be simplified for large problem instances. In this section, we send the number of non-Pareto systems to infinity while keeping the number of Pareto systems finite and equal to  $p$ . This limiting regime enables us to write the relative allocations between the non-Pareto systems in closed form.

Before proceeding, we emphasize two key points about our limiting regime. First, we do not intend that the SCORE framework be implemented as-written when the number of systems is infinite. We are, after all, providing optimal allocations for R&S problems in which the number of systems is finite. We seek only a simplifying framework that would be a good approximation to the asymptotically optimal allocation when the number of non-Pareto systems is large relative to the number of Pareto systems. Further, it may seem natural that if the number of non-Pareto systems tends to infinity, the number of Pareto systems should also tend to infinity, but perhaps at a slower rate. While such a regime may be intuitively appealing, it is not clear how the Pareto systems should be added to achieve a meaningful limiting allocation framework in a large deviations regime. Thus, in what follows, we keep the number of Pareto systems finite and equal to  $p$ . We also remind the reader that, like much of the R&S literature, our emphasis is on the case in which the underlying distributions are normal. Thus, we make a normality assumption in Section 4.1. This assumption simplifies the proofs and assists our intuition regarding dependence by allowing us to model the dependence between the objectives as correlation.

### 4.1 Preliminaries for the Limiting Allocation

Recall that  $r = |\mathcal{S}| = p + |\mathcal{P}^c|$  is the total number of systems, and in what follows, only  $|\mathcal{P}^c|$  will tend to infinity while  $p$  remains constant.

4.1.1 *Assumptions.* We make four assumptions on the way non-Pareto systems are added to ensure a meaningful limiting allocation.

ASSUMPTION 5. *There exists a compact set  $C_1 \subset \mathbb{R}^2$  such that  $(g_k, h_k) \in C_1$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ , and such that  $C_1 \subset \mathcal{F}_d^c$ . (See Assumption 4 for notation.)*

Since all rate functions are strictly convex with a unique minimum at the location of the mean, there exists another compact set  $C \supseteq C_1$  that contains the locations of the solutions to all Problems  $R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}}$ . Let  $\beta$  be the diameter of a circle that covers  $C$ ;  $\beta$  appears in the Online Appendix.

ASSUMPTION 6. *For all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ , the rate functions  $I_k(x, y)$  have the quadratic form  $I_k(x, y) = \frac{1}{2} [\frac{g_k - x}{h_k - y}]^\top \Sigma_k^{-1} [\frac{g_k - x}{h_k - y}]$  for all  $(x, y) \in \mathbb{R}^2$ , where  $\Sigma_k := [\begin{smallmatrix} \sigma_{g_k}^2 & \rho_k \sigma_{g_k} \sigma_{h_k} \\ \rho_k \sigma_{g_k} \sigma_{h_k} & \sigma_{h_k}^2 \end{smallmatrix}]$ . Further, there exist constants  $c_a < 1$  and  $c_b > 1$  such that the eigenvalues of  $\Sigma_k$  are bounded as  $0 < c_a \leq \lambda_{\min}(\Sigma_k) \leq \lambda_{\max}(\Sigma_k) \leq c_b < \infty$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ .*




Fig. 2. Under Assumption 8, for each Pareto system  $i \in \{2, \dots, p-1\}$ , there exists at least one non-Pareto system  $j$  outside the shaded region.

Assumption 6 implies  $J_k(x) = (x - g_k)^2 / (2\sigma_{g_k}^2)$ ,  $K_k(y) = (y - h_k)^2 / (2\sigma_{h_k}^2)$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ .

ASSUMPTION 7. *There exists  $\epsilon > 0$  such that  $(g_j, h_j)$  satisfies (a)  $\inf\{|h_j - h_i| : i \in \mathcal{P}\} > \epsilon$ ,  $\inf\{|g_j - g_i| : i \in \mathcal{P}\} > \epsilon$ , and (b)  $\inf\{|(h_j - h_i)/\sigma_{h_j} - \rho_j(g_j - g_{i+1})/\sigma_{g_j}| : i \in \mathcal{P}\} > \epsilon$ ,  $\inf\{|(g_j - g_{i+1})/\sigma_{g_j} - \rho_j(h_j - h_i)/\sigma_{h_j}| : i \in \mathcal{P}\} > \epsilon$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ .*

ASSUMPTION 8. *For all Pareto systems  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ , there exists a non-Pareto system  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$  such that  $h_j \leq h_{i-1}$  or  $g_j \leq g_{i+1}$ .*

Assumption 5 ensures that the systems that are added continue to compete with the Pareto systems and do not become irrelevant in the limit. Assumption 7 ensures the non-Pareto systems  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$  are added to  $C_1$  so that they do not systematically approach the Pareto front, and so that they do not approach the lines  $y = h_i + \rho_j(\sigma_{h_j}/\sigma_{g_j})(x - g_{i+1})$  and  $y = h_i + (1/\rho_j)(\sigma_{h_j}/\sigma_{g_j})(x - g_{i+1})$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ . Notice that Assumption 7(b) follows from Assumption 7(a) and Assumption 6 when the correlation  $\rho_j = 0$ . Assumptions 5 and 7 are analogous to assumptions in Pasupathy et al. (2015).

We differ from Pasupathy et al. (2015) in Assumptions 6 and 8. While Pasupathy et al. (2015) assume the rate functions have upper and lower bounding quadratics on a compact set (a mild assumption), we simplify the analysis by assuming the rate functions are quadratic. Sufficient conditions to ensure we have appropriate quadratic rate functions are (a) we obtain i.i.d. replicates of the bivariate normal random vector  $(G_k, H_k)$  with parameters  $(g_k, h_k, \sigma_{g_k}^2, \sigma_{h_k}^2, \rho_k)$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$  where  $\sigma_{g_k}^2, \sigma_{h_k}^2$  denote variance,  $\rho_k$  denotes correlation between the objectives, and (b) the variance and correlation values are uniformly bounded as  $0 < \sigma_a^2 \leq \sigma_{g_k}^2 \leq \sigma_b^2 < \infty$ ,  $0 < \sigma_a^2 \leq \sigma_{h_k}^2 \leq \sigma_b^2 < \infty$  for  $\sigma_a^2 < 1$ ,  $\sigma_b^2 > 1$ , and  $|\rho_k| \leq \rho_b$  for  $\rho_b \in (0.5, 1)$ . (Note that the existence of such bounds follows from the condition on the eigenvalues of  $\Sigma_k$ . The independence of the replicates can be relaxed under the conditions in Assumption 3.) Thus, we require that the systems be added to  $C_1$  in such a way that their corresponding rate functions cannot become too shallow (less than  $\sigma_a^2$ ) or too steep (larger than  $\sigma_b^2$ ), and so that they cannot degenerate to a single dimension ( $|\rho_k|$  approaching 1). We conjecture that our analysis holds in the case of bounding quadratics, but we do not show it.

Finally, Assumption 8 implies that there does not exist a Pareto system  $i \in \{2, \dots, p-1\}$  such that Pareto systems  $i-1$ ,  $i$ , and  $i+1$  dominate *all* of the non-Pareto systems (see Figure 2); note that the assumption always holds for  $i \in \{1, p\}$ . Assumption 8 ensures that when we relax Problem  $Q$  to contain only constraints corresponding to MCI in Section 4.2, Pareto system  $i$  receives a positive sample allocation at optimality for all  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ . To see why, suppose there are three Pareto systems  $i-1$ ,  $i$ , and  $i+1$ , and suppose *all* non-Pareto systems are in the shaded region of Figure 2. Further, suppose all variances associated with Pareto systems  $i-1$ ,  $i+1$  and the non-Pareto systems are relatively small, while the variances associated with Pareto system  $i$

are relatively large. Then, it is expedient for Pareto systems  $i - 1$  and  $i + 1$  to do all the work of excluding the non-Pareto systems. If there exists a non-Pareto system  $j$  outside the shaded region, then Pareto systems  $i - 1$  and  $i + 1$  can no longer do all the work of excluding the non-Pareto systems; hence, Pareto system  $i$  receives positive sample allocation. We view Assumption 8 as mild for two reasons. First, in Section 4.2, we send the cardinality of non-Pareto systems to infinity in an “even” way under Assumption 9. Thus, we view Assumption 8 as requiring an initial level of evenness among the non-Pareto systems. Second, at optimality in Problem  $Q$ , all Pareto systems receive positive allocation due to the constraints corresponding to MCE, regardless of the system configuration. Since the SCORE framework in Section 5 includes the MCE constraints, this assumption does not impact implementation.

**4.1.2 Rate Functions Under the Normality Assumption.** We write  $R_{j\ell}(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})$  under Assumption 6 in the following Proposition 4.1. For brevity, define the indicators  $\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g := \mathbb{I}_{[\lambda_x > 0, \ell \neq p]}$  and  $\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h := \mathbb{I}_{[\lambda_y > 0, \ell \neq 0]}$  at optimality in Problem  $R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}}$ . Recalling that  $\ell = i$ , intuitively,  $\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g > 0$  means that non-Pareto system  $j$  “competes” with Pareto system  $i + 1$  on the  $g$  objective via the phantom Pareto system  $\ell$ , and  $\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h > 0$  means that non-Pareto system  $j$  “competes” with Pareto system  $i$  on the  $h$  objective via phantom Pareto system  $\ell$  (see Figure 2). To further simplify the rate function, when  $\alpha_j > 0, \alpha_i > 0, \alpha_{i+1} > 0$ , for all  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$  and phantom Pareto systems  $\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell = i$ , define

$$w_g(\alpha_j, \alpha_{i+1}) := \frac{\sigma_{gj}^2 / \alpha_j}{\sigma_{gj}^2 / \alpha_j + \sigma_{g_{i+1}}^2 / \alpha_{i+1}} \text{ if } \ell \neq p \quad \text{and} \quad w_h(\alpha_j, \alpha_i) := \frac{\sigma_{hj}^2 / \alpha_j}{\sigma_{hj}^2 / \alpha_j + \sigma_{hi}^2 / \alpha_i} \text{ if } \ell \neq 0,$$

where  $0 < w_g(\alpha_j, \alpha_{i+1}) < 1$  and  $0 < w_h(\alpha_j, \alpha_i) < 1$  can be interpreted as weights. For readability and compactness, we often denote these weights as  $w_g$  and  $w_h$ , respectively, where the appropriate dependencies can be deduced from context.

Notice that the expression for  $R_{j\ell}(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})$  in Proposition 4.1 simplifies to one of three cases: the one-dimensional rate corresponding to system  $j$  being estimated as better than Pareto system  $i + 1$  on objective  $g$ , the one-dimensional rate corresponding to system  $j$  being estimated as better than Pareto system  $i$  on objective  $h$ , or a bivariate rate of  $j$  dominating the phantom Pareto system  $\ell$ . Since  $\hat{G}_{i+1}$  and  $\hat{H}_i$  are independent, only  $\rho_j$  appears in the rate. Further, in the expressions that follow, only  $w_g$  and  $w_h$  are functions of  $(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})$ .

**PROPOSITION 4.1.** *Under Assumption 6, for each non-Pareto system  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$  and phantom Pareto system  $\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell = i$ , if  $\alpha_j > 0, \alpha_i > 0, \alpha_{i+1} > 0$ , then*

(1) *the rate function  $R_{j\ell}(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})$  is*

$$R_{j\ell}(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1}) = \frac{\alpha_j}{2} \begin{bmatrix} (g_j - g_{i+1})\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g \\ (h_j - h_i)\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h \end{bmatrix}^{\top} \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_{gj}^2 / w_g & \rho_j \sigma_{gj} \sigma_{hj} \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h \\ \rho_j \sigma_{gj} \sigma_{hj} \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h & \sigma_{hj}^2 / w_h \end{bmatrix}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} (g_j - g_{i+1})\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g \\ (h_j - h_i)\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h \end{bmatrix} \\ = \frac{\alpha_j}{2(1 - \rho_j^2 w_g w_h \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h)} \left( \frac{(g_j - g_{i+1})^2}{\sigma_{gj}^2} w_g \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g - \frac{2\rho_j(g_j - g_{i+1})(h_j - h_i)}{\sigma_{gj} \sigma_{hj}} w_g w_h \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h + \frac{(h_j - h_i)^2}{\sigma_{hj}^2} w_h \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h \right),$$

where  $\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g > 0, \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h = 0$  iff  $\ell \neq p, g_j > g_{i+1}, \frac{(h_j - h_i)}{\sigma_{hj}} \leq \rho_j \frac{(g_j - g_{i+1})}{\sigma_{gj}} w_g$ ,

$\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g = 0, \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h > 0$  iff  $\ell \neq 0, h_j > h_i, \frac{(g_j - g_{i+1})}{\sigma_{gj}} \leq \rho_j \frac{(h_j - h_i)}{\sigma_{hj}} w_h$ , and

$\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h > 0$  iff  $\ell \notin \{0, p\}, \frac{(g_j - g_{i+1})}{\sigma_{gj}} > \rho_j \frac{(h_j - h_i)}{\sigma_{hj}} w_h, \frac{(h_j - h_i)}{\sigma_{hj}} > \rho_j \frac{(g_j - g_{i+1})}{\sigma_{gj}} w_g$ ;

(2) the rate functions in  $R_{j\ell}(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})$  corresponding to systems  $j$ ,  $i$ , and  $i+1$  are

$$\begin{aligned} I_j(\mathfrak{z}_j^*(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})) &= \frac{(1-\rho_j^2 w_h(2-w_h)\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h)}{2(1-\rho_j^2 w_g w_h \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h)^2} \frac{(g_j-g_{i+1})^2}{\sigma_{g_j}^2} w_g^2 \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g + \frac{(1-\rho_j^2 w_g(2-w_g)\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g)}{2(1-\rho_j^2 w_g w_h \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h)^2} \frac{(h_j-h_i)^2}{\sigma_{h_j}^2} w_h^2 \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h \\ &\quad - \rho_j \frac{[(1-\rho_j^2)w_g w_h - (1-w_g)(1-w_h)]}{(1-\rho_j^2 w_g w_h \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h)^2} \frac{(g_j-g_{i+1})(h_j-h_i)}{\sigma_{g_j} \sigma_{h_j}} w_g w_h \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h, \\ K_i(y_i^*(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})) &= \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h \frac{(1-w_h)^2}{2[1-\rho_j^2 w_g w_h \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h]^2} \frac{\sigma_{h_j}^2}{\sigma_{h_i}^2} \left[ \frac{(h_j-h_i)}{\sigma_{h_j}} - \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g \rho_j \frac{(g_j-g_{i+1})}{\sigma_{g_j}} w_g \right]^2, \\ J_{i+1}(x_{i+1}^*(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})) &= \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g \frac{(1-w_g)^2}{2[1-\rho_j^2 w_g w_h \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h]^2} \frac{\sigma_{g_j}^2}{\sigma_{g_{i+1}}^2} \left[ \frac{(g_j-g_{i+1})}{\sigma_{g_j}} - \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h \rho_j \frac{(h_j-h_i)}{\sigma_{h_j}} w_h \right]^2. \end{aligned}$$

In what follows, we work with  $\alpha$  directly, instead of working with  $w_g$  and  $w_h$ . However, we preview the result of our limiting regime here: by sending the number of non-Pareto systems to infinity,  $w_g \rightarrow 1$  and  $w_h \rightarrow 1$  in  $R_{j\ell}(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ ,  $\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}$ ,  $\ell = i$ .

While the value of  $I_j(\mathfrak{z}_j^*(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1}))$  is always strictly positive at optimality by Lemma 3.5, it may be that  $K_i(y_i^*(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})) = 0$  or  $J_{i+1}(x_{i+1}^*(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})) = 0$ , in which case either Pareto system  $i$  or Pareto system  $i+1$  does not appear in the rate function in Problem  $R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}}$ , respectively. This fact raises the possibility that a particular Pareto system  $i$  does not appear in the rate function for Problem  $R_{j\ell-1}^{\text{MCI}}$  or Problem  $R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}}$ , in which case the non-Pareto system  $j$  does not compete with the Pareto system  $i$  at all (see Figure 2). The following Lemma 4.2 states that such a case is impossible.

LEMMA 4.2. *Under Assumption 6, if the allocations  $\alpha_j > 0$ ,  $\alpha_{i-1} > 0$ ,  $\alpha_i > 0$ , and  $\alpha_{i+1} > 0$ , then  $\max(J_i(x_i^*(\alpha_j, \alpha_{i-1}, \alpha_i)), K_i(y_i^*(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1}))) > 0$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ ,  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ .*

## 4.2 Allocation to Non-Pareto Systems

Since we send the number of non-Pareto systems to infinity, we relax the constraints in Problem  $Q$  that pertain only to Pareto systems and MCE events. Thus, in this section, we concern ourselves not with Problem  $Q$ , but with its relaxation:

Problem  $\tilde{Q}$  : maximize  $\tilde{z}$  s.t.

$$\begin{aligned} R_{j\ell}(\tilde{\alpha}_j, \tilde{\alpha}_i, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}) &\geq \tilde{z} \text{ for all } j \in \mathcal{P}^c, \ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell = i, \\ \sum_{k=1}^r \tilde{\alpha}_k &= 1, \quad \tilde{\alpha}_k \geq 0 \text{ for all } k \in \mathcal{S}. \end{aligned}$$

Under our assumptions, the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for global optimality in Problem  $\tilde{Q}$ . We first use Problem  $\tilde{Q}$  to derive insights on the optimal allocation as the number of non-Pareto systems tends to infinity. In Section 4.4, we show that under mild conditions, for a large enough set of non-Pareto systems, the solutions to Problems  $Q$  and  $\tilde{Q}$  are equal. Since they play a prominent role in the results that follow, we present the KKT conditions for Problem  $\tilde{Q}$  in Theorem 4.3.

THEOREM 4.3. *Let  $\lambda_{j\ell} \geq 0$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$  and all  $\ell \in \{0, 1, \dots, p\}$  be dual variables associated with Problem  $\tilde{Q}$ , and recall that the phantom Pareto labels are  $\ell = i$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ . Under Assumptions 6 and 8, at optimality in Problem  $\tilde{Q}$ ,  $\tilde{\alpha}_k^* > 0$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$  and*

- (1) *for each non-Pareto system  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ , there exists a phantom Pareto system  $\ell^* \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}$ ,  $\ell^* = i^*$  such that  $\lambda_{j\ell^*} > 0$ , which implies that the rate  $\tilde{z}^* = R_{j\ell^*}(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i^*}^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i^*+1}^*) > 0$ ;*
- (2) *for each Pareto system  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ , there exists a non-Pareto system  $j^* \in \mathcal{P}^c$  such that the quantities  $\lambda_{j^*\ell-1} J_i(x_i^*(\tilde{\alpha}_{j^*}^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i-1}^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*)) > 0$  or  $\lambda_{j^*\ell} K_i(y_i^*(\tilde{\alpha}_{j^*}^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*)) > 0$ , which implies that the rate  $\tilde{z}^* = \min(R_{j^*\ell-1}(\tilde{\alpha}_{j^*}^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i-1}^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*), R_{j^*\ell}(\tilde{\alpha}_{j^*}^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*)) > 0$ ;*

(3) for all non-Pareto systems  $j, j' \in \mathcal{P}^c$ ,

$$\frac{\sum_{\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell=i} \lambda_{j\ell} I_j(\mathfrak{z}_j^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*))}{\sum_{\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell=i} \lambda_{j'\ell} I_{j'}(\mathfrak{z}_{j'}^*(\tilde{\alpha}_{j'}^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*))} = 1; \quad (4)$$

(4) for all Pareto systems  $i, i' \in \mathcal{P}$ , letting the phantom Pareto label for  $i'$  be  $\ell'$ ,

$$\frac{\sum_{j \in \mathcal{P}^c} \lambda_{j\ell-1} J_i(x_i^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i-1}^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*)) + \lambda_{j\ell} K_i(y_i^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*))}{\sum_{j \in \mathcal{P}^c} \lambda_{j\ell'-1} J_{i'}(x_{i'}^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i'-1}^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i'}^*)) + \lambda_{j\ell'} K_{i'}(y_{i'}^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i'}^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i'+1}^*))} = 1; \quad (5)$$

(5) for all Pareto systems  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ ,

$$\sum_{j \in \mathcal{P}^c} \frac{\lambda_{j\ell-1} J_i(x_i^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i-1}^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*)) + \lambda_{j\ell} K_i(y_i^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*))}{\sum_{\ell' \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell'=i'} \lambda_{j\ell'} I_j(\mathfrak{z}_j^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i'}^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i'+1}^*))} = 1. \quad (6)$$

PROOF. Let  $v$  and  $\lambda_{j\ell} \geq 0$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c, \ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}$  be dual variables. Then, we have the complementary slackness conditions  $\lambda_{j\ell}(R_{j\ell}(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*) - \tilde{z}^*) = 0$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c, \ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell = i$ , and the (simplified) stationarity conditions

$$\sum_{j \in \mathcal{P}^c} [\lambda_{j\ell-1} J_i(x_i^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i-1}^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*)) + \lambda_{j\ell} K_i(y_i^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*))] = v \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{P}; \quad (7)$$

$$\sum_{\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell=i} \lambda_{j\ell} I_j(\mathfrak{z}_j^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*)) = v \quad \forall j \in \mathcal{P}^c; \quad (8)$$

$$\sum_{j \in \mathcal{P}^c} \sum_{\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}} \lambda_{j\ell} = 1. \quad (9)$$

See the Online Appendix for a complete proof.  $\square$

In Theorem 4.3, Parts (1) and (2) ensure the existence of a binding constraint in Problem  $\tilde{Q}$  for each non-Pareto system  $j$  and Pareto system  $i$ , respectively. Parts (3) and (4) determine the relative allocations between the non-Pareto systems and between the Pareto systems, respectively. Part (5) determines the relative allocation between a Pareto system  $i$  and the non-Pareto systems  $j$  that compete with it.

Observe that as the number of non-Pareto systems added according to Assumptions 5–8 grows, the overall rate of decay of  $\mathbb{P}\{\text{MCI}_{\text{ph}}\}$  in Problem  $\tilde{Q}$  will decrease. If this fact is not intuitive, then it can be seen by noticing that adding non-Pareto systems that compete with the Pareto systems in a non-trivial way implies that we are adding binding constraints to Problem  $\tilde{Q}$  that decrease its optimal value. Thus, under our assumptions, as  $|\mathcal{P}^c| \rightarrow \infty, \tilde{z}^* \rightarrow 0$ . (Notice that now, we consider a sequence of Problems  $\tilde{Q}(r)$  that are indexed by  $r$ , and quantities such as  $\tilde{z}^*, \lambda_{j\ell}$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$  and  $\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}$ , and  $\tilde{\alpha}_k^*$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$  are functions of  $r$  and could be denoted as  $\tilde{z}^*(r), \lambda_{j\ell}(r)$  and  $\tilde{\alpha}_k^*(r)$ , respectively. We often suppress this notation unless it is helpful for clarity.) Proposition 4.5 states the rate at which  $\tilde{z}^* \rightarrow 0$ . Before we state the proposition, we present Lemma 4.4, which provides bounds on  $R_{j\ell}(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*)$  and the rate functions that comprise it; these bounds are useful in the proofs of several subsequent results. The constants used in Lemma 4.4 are defined in the Online Appendix.

LEMMA 4.4. Let  $\kappa_R^L, \kappa_R^U$  be positive, finite constants that do not depend on the system indices, and let  $\min^+$  be an operator that returns the smallest positive element in a list (see Section 2.2 for a definition). Under Assumptions 5–8, for each  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$  and  $\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell = i$ ,

$$\tilde{\alpha}_j^* \kappa_R^L \min^+ \left[ \frac{\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g}{1+\tilde{\alpha}_j^*/\tilde{\alpha}_i^*}, \frac{\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h}{1+\tilde{\alpha}_j^*/\tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*} \right] \leq R_{j\ell}(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*) \leq \tilde{\alpha}_j^* \kappa_R^U \left[ \frac{\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h}{1+\tilde{\alpha}_j^*/\tilde{\alpha}_i^*} + \frac{\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g}{1+\tilde{\alpha}_j^*/\tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*} \right], \quad (10)$$

$$\kappa_R^L \min^+ \left[ \frac{\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g}{(1+\tilde{\alpha}_j^*/\tilde{\alpha}_i^*)^2}, \frac{\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h}{(1+\tilde{\alpha}_j^*/\tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*)^2} \right] \leq I_j(\mathfrak{z}_j^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*)) \leq \kappa_R^U \left[ \frac{\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h}{(1+\tilde{\alpha}_j^*/\tilde{\alpha}_i^*)^2} + \frac{\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g}{(1+\tilde{\alpha}_j^*/\tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*)^2} \right], \quad (11)$$

$$\kappa_R^L \frac{\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h}{(1+\tilde{\alpha}_i^*/\tilde{\alpha}_j^*)^2} \leq K_i(y_i^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*)) \leq \kappa_R^U \frac{\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h}{(1+\tilde{\alpha}_i^*/\tilde{\alpha}_j^*)^2}, \quad (12)$$

$$\kappa_R^L \frac{\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g}{(1+\tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*/\tilde{\alpha}_j^*)^2} \leq J_{i+1}(x_{i+1}^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*)) \leq \kappa_R^U \frac{\mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^g}{(1+\tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*/\tilde{\alpha}_j^*)^2}. \quad (13)$$

PROPOSITION 4.5. *Under Assumptions 5–8, as  $|\mathcal{P}^c| \rightarrow \infty$ ,  $\tilde{z}^* = O(1/|\mathcal{P}^c|)$ .*

Thus, by Proposition 4.5, as the number of non-Pareto systems grows, the asymptotically optimal rate of decay of the probability of MC decreases to zero as  $O(1/|\mathcal{P}^c|)$ .

For each Pareto system  $i \in \mathcal{P}$  and for each value of the total number of systems  $r$ , let  $\mathcal{P}^c(i, r)$  denote the set of non-Pareto systems  $j$  that have a binding constraint with Pareto system  $i$  in Problem  $\tilde{Q}(r)$ ; here, we explicitly denote the dependence of Problem  $\tilde{Q}$  on  $r$ . That is, for all Pareto systems  $i \in \mathcal{P}$  and all  $r$ , define

$$\mathcal{P}^c(i, r) := \{j \in \mathcal{P}^c : \lambda_{j\ell-1}(r) J_i(x_i^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i-1}^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*)) + \lambda_{j\ell}(r) K_i(y_i^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*)) > 0\}.$$

In Problem  $\tilde{Q}(r)$ , we say that non-Pareto system  $j$  and Pareto system  $i$  *bind* with each other if  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c(i, r)$ , and we say that non-Pareto system  $j$  and phantom Pareto system  $\ell$  *bind* with each other if  $\lambda_{j\ell}(r) > 0$ . Notice that the interior expression in the definition of  $\mathcal{P}^c(i, r)$  equals the expression in the numerator of Equation (6). Equation (6) determines the relative allocation between a Pareto system  $i$  and the non-Pareto systems  $j$  that bind with it via phantom Pareto system  $\ell - 1$  or  $\ell$ . By Theorem 4.3, at least one non-Pareto system binds with each Pareto system, so that  $|\mathcal{P}^c(i, r)| \geq 1$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{P}$  and all  $r$ . Also by Theorem 4.3, each non-Pareto system binds with at least one Pareto system, so that each  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$  belongs to at least one set  $\mathcal{P}^c(i, r)$  for all  $r$ .

We make the following additional observations about the set  $\mathcal{P}^c(i, r)$ . First, since  $\tilde{\alpha}_k^* > 0$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$  by Theorem 4.3, then for all  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c, i \in \mathcal{P}$ , a rate function term corresponding to Pareto system  $i$  must appear in one of  $R_{j\ell-1}(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i-1}^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*)$  or  $R_{j\ell}(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*)$  by Lemma 4.2. Thus,  $J_i(x_i^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i-1}^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*)) + K_i(y_i^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*)) > 0$ , which implies  $\mathbb{I}_{j\ell-1}^g(r) + \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h(r) > 0$ , for all  $i \in \mathcal{P}, j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ , and all  $r$ . If we also have non-Pareto system  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c(i, r)$ , then  $\lambda_{j\ell-1}(r) \mathbb{I}_{j\ell-1}^g(r) + \lambda_{j\ell}(r) \mathbb{I}_{j\ell}^h(r) > 0$ . This result follows because for a non-Pareto system  $j$  to bind with a Pareto system  $i$ , we require a rate function corresponding to system  $i$  to appear in the binding constraint in Problem  $\tilde{Q}(r)$ .

To make statements about the limiting relative allocations as  $|\mathcal{P}^c| \rightarrow \infty$ , we require notions of the *limiting allegiances* between non-Pareto systems and Pareto systems. (In what follows, the reader may find it helpful to consult Figure 1 or 2.) First, notice that when a new non-Pareto system  $j$  enters Problem  $\tilde{Q}(r)$ , it will bind with one or more Pareto systems  $i$  via its phantom Pareto systems  $\ell - 1$  or  $\ell$ . Among these phantom Pareto systems, we require that there exists one primary phantom Pareto system for each non-Pareto system  $j$ , defined as follows.

*Definition 4.6.* Let non-Pareto system  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$  enter Problem  $\tilde{Q}(r)$  at  $r = r_{j0} < \infty$ . The phantom Pareto system  $\ell^* \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}$  is the *primary phantom Pareto system* for  $j$  if  $\lambda_{j\ell^*}(r) > 0$  for all  $r \geq r_{j0}$ , and  $\lambda_{j\ell}(r) = o(\lambda_{j\ell^*}(r))$  for all other phantom Pareto systems  $\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell \neq \ell^*$ .

The first condition ensures that the non-Pareto system  $j$  binds with the phantom Pareto system  $\ell^*$  for all  $r \geq r_{j0}$ , so that  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c(i^*, r)$  or  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c(i^* + 1, r)$  for all  $r \geq r_{j0}$ . Using the shadow price interpretation of  $\lambda_{j\ell}$ 's in Problem  $\tilde{Q}$ , the second condition implies that the greatest gain to the rate  $\tilde{z}^*$  will be achieved by perturbing the MCI rate constraint associated with system  $j$  and phantom  $\ell^*$ , by more than a constant. Since the primary phantom Pareto system  $\ell^*$  is a function of the non-Pareto system  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ , we denote it as  $\ell^*(j)$  whenever this notation is helpful for clarity. Otherwise, the dependency on system  $j$  is implied.

While the assumption that each non-Pareto  $j$  has a primary phantom Pareto  $\ell^*$  may feel somewhat artificial, we believe that it will arise naturally, for example, when non-Pareto systems

are added according to a uniform distribution (provided our assumptions are maintained). To understand why, consider what it means for one non-Pareto system  $j$  to bind with more than one phantom Pareto system  $\ell$ . In a scenario with multiple Pareto systems ( $p \geq 2$ ) and only one non-Pareto system  $j_1$ , the non-Pareto system  $j_1$  will bind with *all* of the Pareto systems  $i \in \mathcal{P}$  via at least one of their phantoms  $\ell - 1, \ell$ , due to Theorem 4.3. However, as new non-Pareto systems are added uniformly across the set  $C_1$ , the new non-Pareto systems bind with the Pareto systems “closest” to them, and  $j_1$  will cease to bind with Pareto systems that are “far away” from it—those Pareto systems will bind with other, closer, non-Pareto systems. Therefore, intuitively, non-Pareto systems binding with multiple Pareto systems, and thus multiple phantom Pareto systems, may arise when (a) there are not very many non-Pareto systems, or (b) when the non-Pareto systems are not “evenly distributed,” as might arise when all non-Pareto systems are uniquely dominated by the same Pareto system. Therefore, we anticipate that the number of non-Pareto systems binding with multiple phantom Pareto systems  $\ell$  decreases as non-Pareto systems are added “evenly.”

In addition to assuming each non-Pareto system has a primary phantom Pareto system, we also require that the number of non-Pareto systems binding with each Pareto system increase to infinity. Specifically, for all Pareto systems  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ , define  $\mathcal{P}^c(i)$  as

$$\mathcal{P}^c(i) := \{j \in \mathcal{P}^c : j \in \mathcal{P}^c(i, r) \text{ for all } r \geq r_{j0} \text{ and } \ell^*(j) \in \{\ell - 1, \ell\}\}.$$

The set  $\mathcal{P}^c(i)$  contains the non-Pareto systems  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$  that bind with Pareto system  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ , via phantom Pareto  $\ell^*(j) \in \{\ell - 1, \ell\}$ , in every Problem  $\tilde{Q}(r)$  after  $r_{j0}$ . For each Pareto system  $i \in \{2, \dots, p - 1\}$ , we further require that there exists at least one  $j^* \in \mathcal{P}^c(i)$  such that  $(g_{j^*}, h_{j^*})$  is non-dominated by Pareto systems  $i - 1$  and  $i + 1$  for all  $r$ ; that is,  $j^*$  is outside the shaded region in Figure 2.

In what follows, we send  $|\mathcal{P}^c(i)| \rightarrow \infty$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ . This condition ensures that the number of non-Pareto systems binding with each Pareto system  $i$  in Problem  $\tilde{Q}(r)$  goes to infinity with  $r$ . To ensure evenness of the non-Pareto systems in  $C_1$ , the cardinality of each set  $\mathcal{P}^c(i)$  must remain within a constant of the total number of non-Pareto systems. We formalize these assumptions in Assumption 9, where  $\{r\}$  denotes the sequence of the total number of competing systems. We numerically evaluate such a regime in Section 4.5.

**ASSUMPTION 9.** *We assume that (a) for each non-Pareto system  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ , there exists a primary phantom Pareto system  $\ell^*(j) \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}$ , (b) for each Pareto system  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ , there exists a non-Pareto system  $j^* \in \mathcal{P}^c(i)$  such that  $h_{j^*} \leq h_{i-1}$  or  $g_{j^*} \leq g_{i+1}$  for all  $r$ , and (c) there exists  $\kappa \in (0, \infty)$  such that  $|\mathcal{P}^c(i)| \geq \kappa |\mathcal{P}^c|$  for all Pareto systems  $i \in \mathcal{P}$  and all  $r$ .*

Under the regularity conditions in Assumption 9, we ensure that each system receives nonzero sample in the limit. Theorem 4.7 provides results on the limiting allocations.

**THEOREM 4.7.** *Under Assumptions 5–9, as  $|\mathcal{P}^c(i)| \rightarrow \infty$  for all Pareto systems  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ :*

- (1) *There exists  $\kappa_1 > 0$  such that  $I_j(\mathfrak{z}_j^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i^*(j)}^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i^*(j)+1}^*)) \geq \kappa_1$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$  with primary phantom Pareto system  $\ell^*(j) \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}$ ,  $\ell^*(j) = i^*(j)$ , and all  $r \geq r_{j0}$ .*
- (2) *The allocation  $\tilde{\alpha}_j^* = \Theta(\tilde{z}^*)$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ .*
- (3) *The dual variables  $v = \Theta(1/|\mathcal{P}^c|)$  and  $\lambda_{j^*} = \Theta(1/|\mathcal{P}^c|)$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$  with primary phantom Pareto system  $\ell^*(j) \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}$ .*
- (4) *There exists  $\kappa_4 \in (0, \infty)$  such that  $\tilde{\alpha}_i^*/\tilde{\alpha}_{j^*}^* > \kappa_4$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ ,  $j^* \in \mathcal{P}^c(i)$  such that  $h_{j^*} \leq h_{i-1}$  or  $g_{j^*} \leq g_{i+1}$ , and all  $r \geq r_{j^*0}$ .*
- (5) *There exists  $\kappa_2 < \infty$  such that  $\kappa_1/\tilde{z}^* \leq 1/\tilde{\alpha}_j^* + 1/\tilde{\alpha}_i^* \leq \kappa_2/\tilde{z}^*$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ ,  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ ,  $r \geq r_{j0}$ .*
- (6) *There exists  $\kappa_6 \in (0, \infty)$  such that  $\tilde{\alpha}_i^*/\tilde{\alpha}_{i'}^* < \kappa_6$  for all  $i, i' \in \mathcal{P}$ , and all  $r$ .*

- (7) For all  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ ,  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ , the ratio of squared allocations  $\tilde{\alpha}_j^{*2}/\tilde{\alpha}_i^{*2} = \Theta(1/|\mathcal{P}^c|)$ .
- (8) The rate  $\tilde{z}^* = \Theta(1/|\mathcal{P}^c|)$  and the allocations  $\tilde{\alpha}_j^* = \Theta(1/|\mathcal{P}^c|)$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ .
- (9) In  $R_{j\ell}(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*)$ , the rate function  $K_i(y_i^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*)) = \Theta(1/|\mathcal{P}^c|)$  and the rate function  $J_{i+1}(x_{i+1}^*(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*)) = \Theta(1/|\mathcal{P}^c|)$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ ,  $\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}$ ,  $\ell = i$ .
- (10) In Problem  $R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}}$ ,  $y_i^* \rightarrow h_i$  if  $\ell \neq 0$  and  $x_{i+1}^* \rightarrow g_{i+1}$  if  $\ell \neq p$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ ,  $\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}$ ,  $\ell = i$ .

The primary results in Theorem 4.7 appear in Parts (7)–(10). Because each Pareto system is competing with an increasingly large number of non-Pareto systems, Parts (7) and (8) state that in the limit, each Pareto system  $i$  will receive many more samples than the non-Pareto systems  $j$ . Parts (9) and (10) state that in the limit in Problem  $R_{j\ell}^{\text{MCI}}$ , the rate functions corresponding to both Pareto systems  $i$  and  $i+1$  tend to zero, while we know the rate function corresponding to system  $j$  remains positive by Part (1). Thus, in the limit, the rate function corresponding to  $j$  is evaluated over the region in which non-Pareto system  $j$  would dominate the phantom Pareto system  $\ell$ ,  $x_j \leq g_{i+1}$ ,  $y_j \leq h_i$ . Loosely speaking, in this asymptotic regime, the Pareto systems receive so many samples that, relative to the non-Pareto systems, the Pareto systems appear known.

This last result leads us directly to the main result of the article, presented in Theorem 4.8. We do not provide a proof; notice that it follows by applying Theorem 4.7.

**THEOREM 4.8.** *Under Assumptions 5–9, as  $|\mathcal{P}^c(i)| \rightarrow \infty$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ ,*

$$R_{j\ell}(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*)/\tilde{\alpha}_j^* = \inf_{x_j \leq g_{i+1}, y_j \leq h_i} I_j(x_j, y_j) \quad \text{for all } j \in \mathcal{P}^c, \ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell = i.$$

To see the implications of Theorem 4.8, define the *score*  $\mathbb{S}_j$  as

$$\mathbb{S}_j := \min_{\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell = i} \left( \inf_{x_j \leq g_{i+1}, y_j \leq h_i} I_j(x_j, y_j) \right) \quad \text{for all } j \in \mathcal{P}^c.$$

Then, it follows that in the limit,  $\tilde{z}^* = \min_{\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell = i} R_{j\ell}(\tilde{\alpha}_j^*, \tilde{\alpha}_i^*, \tilde{\alpha}_{i+1}^*)$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ , and we have  $\tilde{z}^*/\tilde{\alpha}_j^* = \min_{\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell = i} (\inf_{x_j \leq g_{i+1}, y_j \leq h_i} I_j(x_j, y_j))$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ . Therefore, the relative allocations between the non-Pareto systems are determined by the score, which is written formally in the following Theorem 4.9.

**THEOREM 4.9.** *Under Assumptions 5–9, as  $|\mathcal{P}^c(i)| \rightarrow \infty$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ , then*

$$\frac{\tilde{\alpha}_{j'}^*}{\tilde{\alpha}_j^*} = \frac{\mathbb{S}_j}{\mathbb{S}_{j'}} = \frac{\min_{\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell = i} \left( \inf_{x_j \leq g_{i+1}, y_j \leq h_i} I_j(x_j, y_j) \right)}{\min_{\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell = i} \left( \inf_{x_{j'} \leq g_{i+1}, y_{j'} \leq h_i} I_j(x_j, y_j) \right)} \quad \text{for all } j, j' \in \mathcal{P}^c.$$

Under Assumption 6, finding each  $\inf_{x_j \leq g_{i+1}, y_j \leq h_i} I_j(x_j, y_j)$  is a quadratic program with box constraints. The following proposition presents its closed form solution. We do not provide a proof of this result, since it is a special case of previous results.

**PROPOSITION 4.10.** *Under Assumption 6, for all non-Pareto systems  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ , the score is calculated as  $\mathbb{S}_j = \min_{\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}} \mathbb{S}_j(\ell)$ , where recalling that  $\ell = i$ ,*

$$\mathbb{S}_j(\ell) := \begin{cases} J_j(g_{i+1}) & \text{iff } \ell \neq p, \frac{(g_j - g_{i+1})}{\sigma_j} > 0, \frac{(h_j - h_i)}{\sigma_{h_j}} \leq \rho_j \frac{(g_j - g_{i+1})}{\sigma_{g_j}}; \\ K_j(h_i) & \text{iff } \ell \neq 0, \frac{(h_j - h_i)}{\sigma_{h_j}} > 0, \frac{(g_j - g_{i+1})}{\sigma_{g_j}} \leq \rho_j \frac{(h_j - h_i)}{\sigma_{h_j}}; \\ I_j(g_{i+1}, h_i) & \text{iff } \ell \notin \{0, p\}, \frac{(g_j - g_{i+1})}{\sigma_{g_j}} > \rho_j \frac{(h_j - h_i)}{\sigma_{h_j}}, \frac{(h_j - h_i)}{\sigma_{h_j}} > \rho_j \frac{(g_j - g_{i+1})}{\sigma_{g_j}}. \end{cases}$$

Thus, in our asymptotic regime, the relative allocations between the non-Pareto systems can be expressed in closed form, where the allocation to a particular non-Pareto system is inversely proportional to its scaled distance from the Pareto frontier in the objective function space. Notice that the value of  $\mathbb{S}_j(\ell)$  in Proposition 4.10 is identical to the value of  $R_{j\ell}(\alpha_j, \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1})$  in Proposition 4.1 when  $w_g = 1$  and  $w_h = 1$ .

### 4.3 Allocation to Pareto Systems

While we express the relative allocations between the non-Pareto systems in closed form, we also require a sense of how much sample to allocate to the Pareto systems. The following Theorem 4.11 states that as the number of non-Pareto systems tends to infinity, the allocations to the Pareto systems also tend to zero, but at a much slower rate than the allocations to the non-Pareto systems.

**THEOREM 4.11.** *Under Assumptions 5–9, as  $|\mathcal{P}^c(i)| \rightarrow \infty$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ ,  $\tilde{\alpha}_i^* = \Theta(1/\sqrt{|\mathcal{P}^c|})$  for all Pareto systems  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ .*

Theorem 4.11 only gives us a sense of the allocation to the Pareto systems in the limit. To solve for a specific allocation to each of the Pareto systems, we require heuristics, discussed in Section 5.

### 4.4 Equivalence of Allocations When the Number of Non-Pareto Systems is Large

Recall that all results presented in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 pertain to Problem  $\tilde{Q}$  and not to the original characterization of the optimal allocation as the solution to Problem  $Q$ . The following Theorem 4.12 states that as the number of non-Pareto systems grows, the optimal allocation provided by Problem  $\tilde{Q}$  is equal to that provided by Problem  $Q$ .

**THEOREM 4.12.** *Under Assumptions 5–9, for large enough  $|\mathcal{P}^c|$ ,  $\tilde{\alpha}^* = \alpha^*$ .*

Intuitively, Theorem 4.12 holds, because in the limiting regime, the Pareto systems receive so many more samples than the non-Pareto systems that MCE events between Pareto systems cannot be the unique minimum in the rate of decay of the  $\mathbb{P}\{\text{MC}\}$ .

### 4.5 Numerical Evaluation of the Limiting Regime

We have shown that under some conditions, as the number of non-Pareto systems tends to infinity, the rate of decay of  $\mathbb{P}\{\text{MCE}_P\}$  becomes non-binding in Problem  $Q$ . Now, we numerically evaluate this effect on a set of randomly-generated test problems.

To create the test problems, first, we place five Pareto systems at equally spaced angles on a circle of radius six. This spacing guarantees the minimum separation between Pareto systems on both objectives is greater than 0.5, so that  $|g_i - g_{i'}| > 0.5$ ,  $|h_i - h_{i'}| > 0.5$  for all  $i, i' \in \mathcal{P}$ . Then, we generate non-Pareto systems by one of two methods: uniform or normal. In the uniform method, non-Pareto systems are generated uniformly in a circle centered at (100,100) with radius six. In the normal method, non-Pareto systems are generated according to an independent bivariate normal distribution with both means equal to 100 and both standard deviations equal to three. Thus, the majority of systems are within six units of the mean. In both methods, non-Pareto systems less than 0.25 units away from the Pareto frontier are rejected. This condition ensures Assumption 7 is satisfied, and that the rate is large enough for us to obtain the optimal allocation numerically from Problem  $Q$ . Figures 3 and 6 show example problem instances in which 445 non-Pareto systems are added according to the uniform and normal methods, respectively. All systems have bivariate normal rate functions under Assumption 6 with independent objectives and unit variance.

As non-Pareto systems are added to 50 problem instances of each type, uniform and normal, we solve Problem  $Q$  for the optimal allocation. We then create two types of plots: Figures 4 and 7, which show the percentage of problem instances with binding MCE constraints, and Figures 5 and 8, which show box plots of the percentage of the dual variable values associated with MCE constraints at optimality in Problem  $Q$ . To better understand what we mean by the percentage of dual variable values associated with MCE constraints, in Problem  $Q$ , let  $\lambda_{ii'}^P$  for all  $i, i' \in \mathcal{P}$  be the dual variables corresponding to MCE constraints and  $\lambda_{j\ell}^{\mathcal{P}^c}$  for all  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ ,  $\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}$  be the dual variables corresponding to MCI constraints. Then, the percentage of dual variable values




Fig. 3. The figure shows an example uniform problem with 445 non-Paretos generated uniformly in a circle of radius six.




Fig. 4. The percentage of 50 uniform problems with MCE constraints binding in Problem  $Q$  decreases as systems increase.




Fig. 5. The percentage of dual variable value associated with MCE constraints, across 50 uniform problems, decreases as systems increase.




Fig. 6. The figure shows an example normal problem with 445 non-Paretos generated via a bivariate normal.




Fig. 7. The percentage of 50 normal problems with MCE constraints binding in Problem  $Q$  decreases as systems increase.




Fig. 8. The percentage of dual variable value associated with MCE constraints, across 50 normal problems, decreases as systems increase.

associated with MCE constraints is  $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{P}} \sum_{i' \in \mathcal{P}, i' \neq i} \lambda_{ik}^{\mathcal{P}} / (\sum_{i \in \mathcal{P}} \sum_{i' \in \mathcal{P}, i' \neq i} \lambda_{ii'}^{\mathcal{P}} + \sum_{\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{P}^c} \lambda_{j\ell}^{\mathcal{P}^c})$  at optimality.

While one could argue that our problems are somewhat artificial, given the nicely spaced Pareto frontier and its buffer away from the non-Pareto systems, we believe there is an important message in Figures 3–8. If the systems can be viewed as coming from a distribution, then the distribution will affect the rate at which the limiting regime kicks in. When the systems are generated according to the normal method, they cluster together near the mean at (100,100). Thus, many of the non-Pareto systems are some distance away from the Pareto frontier, and the limit kicks in slower. When the systems are generated according to the uniform method, the systems are more dispersed in their “allegiances” to Pareto systems and closer to the Pareto frontier, and the limit kicks in faster.

## 5 THE SCORE ALLOCATION

In this section, we describe a heuristic allocation for implementation based on the theory in Section 4 called the SCORE allocation. As in Pasupathy et al. (2015), we use Theorem 4.9 to determine the relative allocations among the non-Pareto systems. We now describe the method by which we determine the remainder of the allocations.

First, notice that if we let the rate of decay of  $\mathbb{P}\{\text{MCI}_{\text{ph}}\}$  be determined by the limiting rates in Theorem 4.8, and let the primary phantom Pareto be determined by the scores as  $\ell^* = \operatorname{argmin}_{\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}} \mathbb{S}_j(\ell)$ , then there exists a version of Problem  $\tilde{Q}$  in which there is exactly one binding constraint corresponding to MCI for each non-Pareto system  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ . Thus, the dual variables  $\lambda_{j\ell} = 0$  for all  $\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}$  such that  $\ell \neq \ell^*$ . Then, for all non-Pareto systems  $j, j' \in \mathcal{P}^c$ , the KKT condition in Equation (4) implies that as  $|\mathcal{P}^c(i)| \rightarrow \infty$ , for all Pareto systems  $i \in \mathcal{P}$ ,  $\lambda_{j\ell^*}/\lambda_{j'\ell^*} = I_{j'}(\mathfrak{z}_j^*(\alpha_j^*, \alpha_{i^*}^*, \alpha_{i^*+1}^*))/I_j(\mathfrak{z}_j^*(\alpha_j^*, \alpha_{i^*}^*, \alpha_{i^*+1}^*)) = \mathbb{S}_{j'}/\mathbb{S}_j = \alpha_j^*/\alpha_{j'}^*$ , so that  $\lambda_j^{\mathbb{S}} := \alpha_j^*/\sum_{j' \in \mathcal{P}^c} \alpha_{j'}^* = \mathbb{S}_j^{-1}/\sum_{j' \in \mathcal{P}^c} \mathbb{S}_{j'}^{-1}$  is the proportion of the “non-Pareto simulation budget” allocated to system  $j$  for all non-Pareto systems  $j \in \mathcal{P}^c$ . Then, we write the allocation to a non-Pareto system  $j$  as  $\alpha_j^* = \lambda_j^{\mathbb{S}}(1 - \sum_{i=1}^p \alpha_i^*)$ .

It is tempting to create a heuristic allocation by solving a reduced version of Problem  $\tilde{Q}$  that only includes one constraint for each non-Pareto system  $j$  and its primary phantom Pareto  $\ell^*$ . However, there are some drawbacks of this approach. First, the assumptions of the limiting score regime may not be satisfied, and some Pareto systems may receive a falsely low allocation by not including constraints corresponding to MCE. Since constraints corresponding to MCE involve only Pareto systems, including these constraints in the allocation heuristic may yield better allocations without adding much computational complexity. Second, while such a version of Problem  $\tilde{Q}$  has reduced complexity, when the number of Pareto systems is large, the number of constraints still grows with the number of non-Pareto systems. We avoid these issues by creating a new reduced version of Problem  $Q$ , called Problem  $Q_{\mathbb{S}}$ , that includes at least one constraint corresponding to MCI for each Pareto system and includes all constraints corresponding to MCE, as follows.

For each phantom Pareto system  $\ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell = i$ , find the “closest” non-Pareto systems

$$\begin{aligned} j_i^*(\ell) &:= \operatorname{argmin}_{j \in \mathcal{P}^c} \{\mathbb{S}_j(\ell) : \mathbb{S}_j(\ell) \in \{K_j(h_i), I_j(g_{i+1}, h_i)\}\} \text{ if } \ell \neq 0, \\ j_{i+1}^*(\ell) &:= \operatorname{argmin}_{j \in \mathcal{P}^c} \{\mathbb{S}_j(\ell) : \mathbb{S}_j(\ell) \in \{J_j(g_{i+1}), I_j(g_{i+1}, h_i)\}\} \text{ if } \ell \neq p, \end{aligned}$$

and let  $\mathcal{J}^*(\ell) := \{j_i^*(\ell)\} \cup \{j_{i+1}^*(\ell)\}$ , where  $\{j_0^*(0)\} := \emptyset$  and  $\{j_{p+1}^*(p)\} := \emptyset$ . The set  $\mathcal{J}^*(\ell)$  contains up to two of the “closest” non-Pareto systems to phantom Pareto system  $\ell$ , as determined by the scores. Because it is possible for a non-Pareto system  $j$  to bind with only one of the Pareto systems  $i$  or  $i + 1$  through the phantom Pareto system  $\ell$ , we ensure that we retain at least one non-Pareto system that binds with each Pareto system  $i$  and  $i + 1$  in the set  $\mathcal{J}^*(\ell)$ . Then, the SCORE allocation we recommend results from solving the following reduced problem for the Pareto system allocations:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Problem } Q_{\mathbb{S}} : \quad & \text{maximize } z \text{ s.t.} \\ & R_i(\alpha_i, \alpha_{i'}) \geq z \text{ for all } i, i' \in \mathcal{P} \text{ such that } i' \neq i, \\ & R_{j^*\ell}(\lambda_{j^*}^{\mathbb{S}}(1 - \sum_{i=1}^p \alpha_i), \alpha_i, \alpha_{i+1}) \geq z \text{ for all } j^* \in \mathcal{J}^*(\ell), \ell \in \mathcal{P}^{\text{ph}}, \ell = i, \\ & \sum_{i=1}^p \alpha_i \leq 1, \alpha_i \geq 0 \text{ for all } i \in \mathcal{P}. \end{aligned}$$

Since we have at most two constraints corresponding to MCI for each phantom Pareto system, the complexity of Problem  $Q_{\mathbb{S}}$  depends only on the number of Pareto systems.

To speed up the computation in Problem  $Q_{\mathbb{S}}$ , we use closed form expressions of the rate functions corresponding to MCI, presented in Proposition 4.1. The following Proposition 5.1 provides corresponding closed form expressions for the rate functions corresponding to MCE, written without weights. Notice that the correlations for both systems,  $\rho_i$  and  $\rho_{i'}$ , appear in the rate.

PROPOSITION 5.1. *Under Assumption 6, the rate function corresponding to the  $\text{MCE}_{\mathcal{P}}$  event for systems  $i, i' \in \mathcal{P}$  is*

$$R_i(\alpha_i, \alpha_{i'}) = \begin{cases} \frac{(g_{i'} - g_i)^2}{2(\sigma_{g_i}^2/\alpha_i + \sigma_{g_{i'}}^2/\alpha_{i'})} & \text{iff } g_{i'} > g_i, h_{i'} \leq h_i + (g_{i'} - g_i) \left( \frac{\rho_i \sigma_{g_i} \sigma_{h_i} / \alpha_i + \rho_{i'} \sigma_{g_{i'}} \sigma_{h_{i'}} / \alpha_{i'}}{\sigma_{g_i}^2 / \alpha_i + \sigma_{g_{i'}}^2 / \alpha_{i'}} \right) \\ \frac{(h_{i'} - h_i)^2}{2(\sigma_{h_i}^2/\alpha_i + \sigma_{h_{i'}}^2/\alpha_{i'})} & \text{iff } h_{i'} > h_i, g_{i'} \leq g_i + (h_{i'} - h_i) \left( \frac{\rho_i \sigma_{g_i} \sigma_{h_i} / \alpha_i + \rho_{i'} \sigma_{g_{i'}} \sigma_{h_{i'}} / \alpha_{i'}}{\sigma_{h_i}^2 / \alpha_i + \sigma_{h_{i'}}^2 / \alpha_{i'}} \right) \\ \left[ \frac{\sigma_{g_i}^2}{\alpha_i} + \frac{\sigma_{g_{i'}}^2}{\alpha_{i'}} \right] (h_{i'} - h_i)^2 - 2 \left[ \frac{\rho_{i'} \sigma_{g_{i'}} \sigma_{h_{i'}}}{\alpha_{i'}} + \frac{\rho_i \sigma_{g_i} \sigma_{h_i}}{\alpha_i} \right] (g_{i'} - g_i)(h_{i'} - h_i) + \left[ \frac{\sigma_{h_i}^2}{\alpha_i} + \frac{\sigma_{h_{i'}}^2}{\alpha_{i'}} \right] (g_{i'} - g_i)^2 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

## 6 TIME TO SOLVE FOR THE SCORE ALLOCATION VERSUS OPTIMALITY GAP

In practice, a decision-maker's choice of simulation budget allocation method is influenced by the amount of time it takes to solve for the allocation, as well as how close that allocation is to the optimal allocation. We now give a sense of how our proposed allocations perform on these metrics as the number of systems increases. (In this section, we assume all rate functions are known.)

For a population of ten problems generated according to the uniform method from Section 4.5, Table 2 reports the average wall-clock time to solve for each allocation, the average rate  $z$  achieved by the resulting allocation, and the average optimality gap. We keep the same Pareto systems as in Section 4.5, but instead of rejecting non-Pareto systems that are less than 0.25 units away, we reject non-Pareto systems that are less than 0.05 units away. Thus, the problems are more realistic while keeping the full Problem  $Q$  solvable for up to a thousand systems. We also let all systems have bivariate normal rate functions with correlated objectives and unit variances. Within each of the 10 problem instances, all systems share the same correlation between the objectives. The correlations between the objectives for the ten problems, rounded to the second digit, are  $-0.81, -0.51, -0.36, -0.21, -0.08, 0.23, 0.26, 0.46, 0.55, 0.80$ . The specified allocation models in Table 2 are BVN True, in which we solve the full Problem  $Q$  for the asymptotically optimal allocation  $\alpha^*$ ; BVN Independent, in which we solve the full Problem  $Q$ , except we model the correlation between the objectives for all systems as  $\rho_k = 0$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ ; SCORE; the non-sequential MOCBA allocations (Lee et al. 2010, p. 661, Lemmas 4 and 5); M-MOBA; and equal allocation.

The timings reported in Table 2 approximate how long it takes to perform one sample allocation update in the sequential algorithm (see Section 7, Algorithm 1, Step 3). Note that M-MOBA is a myopic procedure for which asymptotic allocations are not provided, so we are unable to report its rate. Further, the MOCBA allocations in Lee et al. (2010, p. 661, Lemmas 4 and 5) do not always ensure the allocations to all systems are positive. If there exists a system  $k$  such that  $\alpha_k = 0$ , then the rate is  $z = 0$ . This fact may be responsible for its relatively large theoretical optimality gap.

Interestingly, from Table 2, the BVN Independent allocation is much slower to calculate than SCORE. Further, it often yields an average optimality gap larger than SCORE, which emphasizes the usefulness of incorporating correlation into the allocation model. Since the BVN Independent allocation is not a competitive allocation relative to the others, we do not include the BVN Independent allocation in further numerical experiments. Table 2 also seems to show that SCORE is an extremely competitive allocation scheme whether the number of systems is small, e.g., on the order of 20 systems, or very large, e.g., on the order of 10,000 systems. Further, SCORE is fast—on

Table 2. For Ten Problems Randomly Generated Via the Uniform Method of Section 4.5, the Table Reports the Average Wall-clock Time to Solve for each Allocation, as well as the Average Rate of Decay of the Probability of Misclassification,  $z$ , and the Average Optimality Gap,  $z(\boldsymbol{\alpha}^*) - z(\boldsymbol{\alpha})$ , for  $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$  Specified by Each Allocation

$r$	Metric	BVN True	BVN Indep.	SCORE	MOCBA <sup>†</sup>	M-MOBA <sup>‡</sup>	Equal
20	Time	0.07s	0.06s	0.04s	0.01s	0.06s	0s
	Rate $z \times 10^4$	54.96	44.63	52.52	0.04		13.43
	Opt. Gap $\times 10^4$	0 <sup>a</sup>	10.33	2.44	54.92		41.53
100	Time	0.53s	0.47s	0.06s	0.02s	0.25s	0s
	Rate $z \times 10^4$	12.97	11.83	11.31	2.47		0.66
	Opt. Gap $\times 10^4$	0	1.14	1.66	10.50		12.31
500	Time	43.16s	25.06s	0.08s	0.42s	1.30s	0s
	Rate $z \times 10^4$	1.65	1.37	1.46	0.13		0.021
	Opt. Gap $\times 10^4$	0	0.28	0.19	1.52		1.63
1,000	Time	18.09min	12.31min	0.13s	1.67s	2.64s	0s
	Rate $z \times 10^4$	0.95	0.81	0.82	0.02		0.009
	Opt. Gap $\times 10^4$	0	0.14	0.13	0.93		0.94
2,000	Time	> 6h	> 6h	0.22s	6.71s	5.46s	0s
	Rate $z \times 10^4$	— <sup>b</sup>	—	0.45	0.005		0.004
	Opt. Gap $\times 10^4$	0	—	—	—		—
5,000	Time	> 6h	> 6h	0.48s	42.49s	14.80s	0s
	Rate $z \times 10^4$	—	—	0.22	0.0004		0.001
	Opt. Gap $\times 10^4$	0	—	—	—		—
10,000	Time	> 6h	> 6h	0.92s	2.90min	33.68s	0s
	Rate $z \times 10^4$	—	—	0.11	0.0002		0.0006
	Opt. Gap $\times 10^4$	0	—	—	—		—

Note: We perform all computing on a 2.5GHz Intel Core i7 processor with 16GB 1600MHz DDR3 memory. The algorithms for BVN True, BVN Independent, SCORE, and M-MOBA are written in MATLAB and run in MATLAB R2015b. The algorithm that calculates MOCBA is written in C++.

<sup>†</sup>We compare with Lee et al. (2010, p. 661, Lemmas 4 and 5), which may allocate  $\alpha_k = 0$  for some  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ , implying  $z = 0$ .

<sup>‡</sup>We do not report a rate for M-MOBA, since it is a myopic procedure.

<sup>a</sup>The optimality gap is to the precision of the solver.

<sup>b</sup>The symbol “—” indicates that data is unavailable due to the large computational time.

average, it takes less than a second to solve for the SCORE allocation in a problem with 10,000 systems.

## 7 A SEQUENTIAL ALGORITHM FOR IMPLEMENTATION

Since the SCORE allocation framework requires knowledge of rate functions that we do not know in advance, we present sequential Algorithm 1 for implementation. The broad idea of Algorithm 1 is: (a) obtain an initial sample of size  $\delta_0 \geq 2$  from each system to estimate the SCORE allocation; (b) use the estimated SCORE allocation as a probability distribution from which to obtain the next  $\delta \geq 1$  samples; (c) update the estimated optimal allocation and return to step (b). The minimum-sample proportion  $\alpha_\epsilon > 0$ , which should be small relative to  $1/r$ , ensures that each system is sampled infinitely often as the sequential algorithm progresses. This algorithm proceeds until some total sampling budget specified by the user has been expended. Since implementing such a stopping rule is trivial, we write the sequential algorithm as non-terminating.

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**ALGORITHM 1:** A Sequential Algorithm to Sample from Systems Using the Proposed Allocations

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**Require:** Initial sample size  $\delta_0 \geq 2$ ; sample size between allocation vector updates  $\delta \geq 1$ ; and a minimum-sample proportion  $0 < \alpha_\varepsilon < 1/r$  that is small relative to  $1/r$ .

- 1: *Initialize*: collect  $\delta_0$  simulation replications from each system  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ ; set  $n = r \times \delta_0$ ,  $n_k = \delta_0$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ .
- 2: *Estimate*: Update the parameter estimators  $\hat{H}_k$ ,  $\hat{G}_k$ ,  $\hat{\sigma}_{g_k}^2$ ,  $\hat{\sigma}_{h_k}^2$ , and  $\hat{\rho}_k$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ ; use these estimators to construct estimated rate functions  $\hat{I}_k(x_k, y_k)$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ .
- 3: *Calculate*: Solve an estimated version of Problem  $Q$  or  $Q_{\mathbb{S}}$  using Step 2 estimators to obtain estimated optimal or SCORE allocations,  $\hat{\alpha}_n^*$ .
- 4: **for**  $m = 1, 2, \dots, \delta$  **do**
- 5:   **Sample**: Select a system  $K_m$  from which to obtain the next simulation replication, where each  $K_m$  is an i.i.d. random variable with probability mass function  $\hat{\alpha}_n^*$  and support  $\mathcal{S}$ .
- 6:   **Simulate**: Collect one simulation replication from system  $K_m$  and set  $n_{K_m} = n_{K_m} + 1$ .
- 7: **end for**
- 8: Set  $n = n + \delta$  and update  $\bar{\alpha}_n = \{n_1/n, n_2/n, \dots, n_r/n\}$ . Set  $\delta^+ = 0$ .
- 9: **for**  $k = 1, 2, \dots, r$  **do**
- 10:   If  $n_k/n < \alpha_\varepsilon$ , then collect one simulation replication from system  $k$ . Then, set  $n_k = n_k + 1$  and  $\delta^+ = \delta^+ + 1$ .
- 11: **end for**
- 12: Set  $n = n + \delta^+$  and go to Step 2.

---

## 8 NUMERICAL PERFORMANCE OF SEQUENTIAL ALLOCATIONS

In this section, we evaluate the performance of sequential versions of the proposed allocations on several test problems.

### 8.1 Test Problems

We construct six problems to test our algorithm. First, we generate two problem instances, 1 and 2, of true system performances by uniformly generating 100 systems in a circle of radius six, centered at  $(100, 100)$ . A listing of the  $(g_k, h_k)$  values for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$  is provided in the Online Appendix. We create sub-problems A, B, and C by setting the variances to one and the correlations to  $\rho_k = -0.8$ ,  $\rho_k = 0$ , and  $\rho_k = 0.8$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ , respectively. The system objective values in the first test problem set correspond to the circle centers in Figures 9–11. This test problem set has a high percentage of dual variable values associated with MCE constraints. The second test problem set has a low percentage of dual variable values associated with MCE constraints. Due to space constraints, the second test problem set and results appear in the Online Appendix.

Note that in Figures 9–11, the asymptotically optimal allocations are proportional to the size of the circle. While there is no obvious visible difference in the optimal allocations with different correlations, the allocations do differ slightly.

### 8.2 Estimated Expected Number of Misclassifications

For each algorithm BVN True, SCORE, MOCBA, M-MOBA, and equal allocation, we run 10,000 independent sample paths on each of the test problems 1A, 1B, and 1C. For each algorithm, we calculate the average number of misclassifications, false exclusions, and false inclusions across the sample paths, as a function of sample size. For a particular sample path, the sequence containing the number of misclassifications as a function of the sample size  $n$  is autocorrelated.

In all implementations of Algorithm 1, which include all sample paths of the BVN True and SCORE allocations, we use parameter settings  $\delta_0 = 5$ ,  $\delta = 20$ , and  $\alpha_\varepsilon = 10^{-8}$ . In our implementation of MOCBA (Lee et al. 2010), we use parameter settings  $N_0 = \delta_0 = 5$ ,  $\Delta = \delta = 20$ , and  $\tau = \Delta/2 = 10$ ,




Fig. 9. Test 1A:  $r = 100$ ,  $|\mathcal{P}| = 9$ ,  $\rho_k = -0.8$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ , % dual to MCE = 74.5,  $z^* = 3.46 \times 10^{-4}$ .




Fig. 10. Test 1B:  $r = 100$ ,  $|\mathcal{P}| = 9$ ,  $\rho_k = 0$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ , % dual to MCE = 74.0,  $z^* = 3.44 \times 10^{-4}$ .




Fig. 11. Test 1C:  $r = 100$ ,  $|\mathcal{P}| = 9$ ,  $\rho_k = 0.8$  for all  $k \in \mathcal{S}$ , % dual to MCE = 73.4,  $z^* = 3.42 \times 10^{-4}$ .






Fig. 12. Test 1A: For 10,000 sample paths per algorithm, the graphs show the average % of systems misclassified (MC), % of Paretos falsely excluded (FE), and % of non-Paretos falsely included (FI), respectively.






Fig. 13. Test 1B: For 10,000 sample paths per algorithm, the graphs show the average % of systems misclassified (MC), % of Paretos falsely excluded (FE), and % of non-Paretos falsely included (FI), respectively.

where  $\tau$  is the maximum number of samples one system can receive in a given iteration. In our implementation of M-MOBA (Branke and Zhang 2015), we set  $n_0 = \delta_0 = 5$  and  $\tau = \delta = 20$ , where here,  $\tau$  is the amount of sample given to the alternative with the largest probability of changing the set of Pareto systems. Our stopping rule in M-MOBA is the sampling budget rule. We have chosen  $\delta = 20$  as a reasonable sampling update schedule that is computationally feasible for all algorithms. M-MOBA, however, is designed for  $\delta = 1$ , since all of the samples between updates are allocated to a single system. Ideally, we would run all algorithms with  $\delta = 1$ , unfortunately, doing so would require significant computational resources. The resulting performances are reported in Figures 12–14.

Considering the overall percentage of systems misclassified, all algorithms exhibit close performance in Figures 12–14. (They exhibit even closer performance on the second test problem set in




Fig. 14. Test 1C: For 10,000 sample paths per algorithm, the graphs show the average % of systems misclassified (MC), % of Paretos falsely excluded (FE), and % of non-Paretos falsely included (FI), respectively.

the Online Appendix.) We notice that MOCBA seems to perform particularly well at preventing false exclusions of Pareto systems, but performs less well at preventing false inclusions of non-Pareto systems.

Since the optimality guarantees on the BVN True allocation are asymptotic, it is not clear that allocating according to BVN True will perform better than other allocation schemes for finite  $n$ . However, BVN True seems to perform about as well as its peers, and the performance of the SCORE allocation tracks the BVN True allocation closely. Importantly, since Test Problems 1A–1C have a high percentage of dual constraints to MCE—implying the assumptions required in the limiting SCORE framework may not hold—we do not notice a loss of quality in the SCORE allocation relative to BVN True in Figures 12–14. We remind the reader that these test problems were randomly generated; performance of the algorithms on other problems may vary.

## 9 CONCLUDING REMARKS

SCORE is a fast, approximately optimal allocation for bi-objective R&S that accounts for correlation between the objectives and is derived from an asymptotically optimal allocation framework. We are aware of issues with estimating rate functions in a general context (Glynn and Juneja 2011, 2015). However, our numerical experience in the case of normal rate functions has been overwhelmingly positive (Hunter and McClosky 2016; Pasupathy et al. 2015). Finally, it remains to be seen whether our methods for bi-objective R&S extend cleanly to multi-objective R&S. We rely heavily on the phantom Pareto systems, which are easily constructed only in two objectives. Feldman et al. (2015) and Feldman (2017) provide further insights to the multi-objective case.

## ELECTRONIC APPENDIX

The online appendices are available as supplementary materials in the online version.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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