

Rebel Territorial Control, Governance, and Political Accountability in Civil War:  
Evidence from the Communist Insurgency in the Philippines

Michael A. Rubin

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## ABSTRACT

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Michael A. Rubin

Under what conditions do rebel organizations control territory during civil war? How do civilians influence the distribution of territorial control? Why do rebels invest in governance, and why do they target civilians with violence, in some locations but not others? This dissertation advances a political accountability theory to explain how civilians influence the distribution of territorial control and governance during civil war. Existing research explaining variation in rebel territorial control and behavior have emphasized structural and organizational factors, identity politics, economic conditions, and geography. However, the classic insurgency literature and recent counterinsurgency doctrine emphasize the importance of securing civilian support and protecting the population to achieving military objectives in civil war. If true, civilians retain at least some power over rebel personnel. The accountability theory of rebel conduct provides a unified framework linking inter-related conflict processes associated with rebel groups' territorial control, governance, and strategic use of violence during civil war. It argues that community *collective action capacity*, the ease with which communities facilitate collective action to pursue common interests, influences the distribution territorial control and belligerent conduct during civil war. The empirical strategy draws upon complementary quantitative and qualitative methods to test the accountability against plausible alternatives using village-level data from the communist insurgency in the Philippines. The results provide robust support for the accountability theory over plausible alternatives, and yield policy implications for peace-building and economic development in conflict-affected states.

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## **Introduction**

“At core, all civil wars are a battle for control between a government and its competitors over civilians and the territory upon which they reside” (Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly 2015, p. 1). Rebel groups, politically-motivated organizations using the threat of armed force to challenge the authority of an incumbent government, control territory in order to extract resources to finance the rebellion and enhance bargaining power vis-a-vis the state. Territorial control is a crucial determinant of belligerents’ strategic use of violence (Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006), intensity and duration of armed conflict (Buhaug, Gates and Lujala 2009), and rebel governance (Mampilly 2011; Stewart 2018). In territory under their control, rebels recruit supporters, train fighters, and extract resources to fuel their rebellion. Belligerent territorial control also shapes civilian behavior, including collaboration with civil war belligerents (Kalyvas 2006; Arjona and Kalyvas 2009, 2012), recruitment into state or rebel armed forces (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008), and resistance against rebels or counterinsurgents (Arjona 2015).

The process of seeking territorial control involves an inherent trade-off for civil war belligerents, especially for rebel organizations in asymmetric “irregular” civil wars, in which the rebels are considerably weaker in terms of military capacity and material

resources relative to the state (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010, p. 418). On the one hand, by expanding territorial control rebels accrue resources to fund their campaign and strategic victories in service of their political and military goals. But, as rebels expand their operations to new areas, they necessarily stretch their scarce resources, expose themselves to new vulnerabilities, and incur responsibilities to manage local populations. Because of the asymmetry in capabilities, as rebel groups seek to incrementally increase their control over territory within the conflict zone, they must risk armed confrontation with the (usually more powerful) state adversary, which threatens rebels' very organizational survival. Even where rebels avoid or survive confrontation with the state, they incur costs associated with diverting resources away from their military bread-and-butter towards governing new civilian populations.

Given these tremendous costs associated with contesting a more powerful state, what motivates rebel organizations to seek territorial control in particular areas of the conflict zone? Under what conditions do rebel organizations successfully seize and maintain territory during civil war? Under what conditions do non-combatants influence the spread and conduct of insurgency?

Despite obvious relevance to the onset, conduct, and perpetuation of civil war, political science and economics scholarship has devoted little attention to understanding the causes of local-level variation in territorial control in the context of intrastate armed conflict. While scholars have investigated territorial conflict between states in great depth,<sup>1</sup> far less attention has been granted to understand the origins and dynamics of competition over territory within states in the context of civil war and insurgency. This gap persists despite the centrality of territorial control to civil war

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<sup>1</sup>See, among others, Tilly (1990), Diehl and Goertz (1992), Vasquez (1995), Vasquez and Henahan (2001), Hensel (2001), Simmons (2005) Carter (2010), Carter and Goemans (2011), Abramson and Carter (2016), and Abramson (2017).

(Arjona 2015, p. 1) and the frequency and scale of intrastate armed conflict relative to interstate conflict (Themnér and Wallensteen 2011). Even using a very high bar for inclusion, approximately 34% of rebel groups controlled territory during intrastate conflict (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013).

If the distribution of territorial control is as crucial a factor for explaining subsequent conflict processes and the outcomes of civil war as the literature suggests, it is essential to understand its origins. Crucially, the processes by which insurgency expands or contracts represents the crucial first stage that determines the context in which belligerents make subsequent decisions in the conduct of war. Failure to consider the determinants of rebel territorial control presents clear inferential challenges for existing theories of insurgent and counterinsurgent behavior; including the strategic use of violence, rebel governance, political negotiations and concessions, conflict termination, and the stability of post-war peace.

Until recently, prevailing theories of conflict processes focused primarily, if not exclusively, on the strategic interaction between states and rebel organizations, assuming civilians are powerless to influence armed actors with overwhelming capacity to use coercive violence. And yet, both revolutionary manifestos (Mao 2007 [1937]; Guevara 2002 [1961]) and counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine (Galula 2006 [1964]; Nagl et al. 2008) not only emphasize the strategic necessity of popular support to attaining military success, but also make clear that belligerents cannot secure civilian collaboration by coercive force alone.<sup>2</sup> Precisely because rebels are dependent on support from the population, and because at least partial resistance to armed belligerents is ubiquitous in conflict zones (Arjona 2016), civilians possess power to influence

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<sup>2</sup>Kalyvas (2006) also makes a similar point regarding the self-defeating nature of coercive, especially indiscriminate, civilian-targeted violence.

civil war belligerents' incentives and actions during civil war even under threat of civilian-targeted violence. A burgeoning literature has challenged the conventional approaches that marginalized the strategic role civilians play in conflict processes by emphasizing civilian agency to shape armed groups' behavior during civil war Petersen (2001); Wood (2003); Parkinson (2013); Arjona (2016); Kaplan (2017); Balcells (2017). While these contributions have provided valuable insights into the ways in which civilians shape rebel conduct in areas of rebel presence, the civilian agency literature has yet to investigate how, and the extent to which, non-combatants may shape where and when rebels seek and maintain territorial control in the first place.

This dissertation contributes to the literature by emphasizing the role of strategic civilian communities in shaping the distribution of territorial control; the expansion and contraction of insurgency. It builds on the existing literature addressing civilian agency in civil war, which illustrates the ways in which civilians shape rebels' investment in governance and use of violence in occupied territory. In particular, I advance a political accountability theory of rebellion. *Collective action capacity*, the ability to mobilize resources and participation to pursue common interests, enhances civilian communities' power to hold rebels accountable to their interests. Communities leverage collective action to incentivize rebels to invest the effort and resources required to protect civilians from civil war violence and maintain access to basic services. Accountability enforcement involves both carrots and sticks. Communities attempt to credibly commit to provide rebels with the collaboration necessary to make territorial control profitable, conditional on rebels' investment in adequate protection and governance. At the same time, communities threaten to resist rebel control in the area in response to rebel actions that neglect community interests or threaten community security.

I argue that because they are aware of the various constraints on their power in areas under their control, and because they have scarce resources available to advance the insurgency, rebels have incentives to collect any and all available information about particular localities to estimate the expected benefits, costs, and risks in advance of any decision to seek territorial control. Rebels draw upon observable indicators of community collective action capacity to inform these decisions regarding where and when to allocate scarce resources to establish territorial control. The accountability theory of rebel conduct explains the conditions under which civilian collective action capacity encourages, and the conditions under which it deters, rebel territorial control. The argument engages a broader debate regarding the effects of social capital and local collective action on political outcomes by focusing on an as yet under-explored environment: rebel-occupied territory during civil war. By contributing an explanation for the origins of territorial control during civil war, the theory provides crucial insights essential to understanding subsequent belligerent conduct during armed conflict.

The empirical research presented in this dissertation tests the accountability theory of rebel conduct by investigating the extent to which its community-level empirical implications are consistent with village-level quantitative and qualitative data from the communist insurgency in the Philippines, collected during fieldwork in 2014 and 2015. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) intelligence assessments measure village-level communist insurgent territorial control on a yearly basis from 2011-2014. Census data provided by the Government of the Philippines Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) is used to construct social networks at the village level to measure collective action capacity from its micro-foundations in kinship ties, or local clan structures. I explore the correlation between communist insurgent control and community social structure in a regression framework, and find support

for the accountability theory's expectations. I complement the quantitative analysis with qualitative analysis of Key-Informant Interviews in 75 randomly selected villages from within 3 provinces of Eastern Mindanao. In select villages, I use process tracing methods to probe the mechanisms linking community collective action capacity and social structure to communist insurgents' conduct in order to adjudicate between the accountability theory and plausible alternatives.

Civilians' strategic role in the expansion and contraction of insurgency is crucial to an understanding of civil conflict processes, and carries important implications for foreign policy and international security. Consider the contrast between American-led counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan during the 2006-2009 period. In Afghanistan, the Bush administration followed overwhelming military victory over the Taliban in 2001-2002 not by leveraging combat success to encourage state-building, but by decisively avoiding "nation-building" abroad while shifting resources to Iraq (Jones 2010). Despite a severe disadvantage in military capabilities and reliance on clandestine networks, the Taliban gradually re-emerged in Pashtun areas in peripheral southern and eastern provinces by securing local civilian collaboration, especially through alliances with tribal leaders, using both persuasive and coercive methods. The Taliban capitalized on the government's inability to deliver on access to basic services and protect civilians from conflict-related violence to secure local support or acquiescence. Regional Taliban leaders offered protection from violence and service delivery in some areas in order to secure the population's collaboration, while also imposing harsh punishments, including extrajudicial killings, on those refusing to collaborate. As a result, many communities that rejected harsh Taliban leadership and sided with NATO forces in 2001-2002 actively supported the Taliban insurgency. Local collaboration proved decisive in rolling back NATO and Afghan National Army victories outside Kabul (Jones 2010).

Though the current status in Iraq does not appear much more promising, the trends in 2006-2009 represent a stark contrast to Afghanistan. The U.S. and Iraqi government shift towards strategic alignment with tribal leaders in the “Anbar Awakening” contributed to strategic COIN success against Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2007 (Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro 2012). Despite enmity for the Shi'a-dominated Iraqi government and foreign U.S. military involvement, and in some cases deep ties to the Sunni co-coreligionists leading AQI, Sunni tribal leaders shifted to support the embattled government. Though the concentration of personnel and resources were certainly essential to operational success, local tribal and civilian collaboration proved instrumental in nearly eliminating AQI territorial control in Sunni-majority provinces. The tides turned towards the breakdown of the Iraqi state’s control only after Iraqi and American leadership, once again, followed operational victory by withdrawing troops and resources leading to the loss of local civilian support for their rule and the (re-)emergence of Sunni rebel groups including the Islamic State.

That the political gains from combat success tend to collapse as counterinsurgents abandon the sustained investments in relationships with local populations reinforces the essential role that civilians play in shaping the distribution of territorial control and the conduct of civil war. Neither underlying identity politics nor local balance of military capabilities can fully account for the patterns of civilian collaboration and insurgent territorial control both across these cases as well as within cases (across regions and over time). Rather, these factors must be placed in context with role of strategic civilian action in shaping the prospects for territorial control on the conflict zones.

Recent history of civil wars has made painfully apparent the potential mortal

consequences for civilians when rebels control territory in peripheral regions of fragile or failed states. Consider the Taliban in Afghanistan and Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria, each of which have imposed draconian laws and medieval punishments in territory under their control. However, in other cases rebel organizations can, and do, divert resources to provide basic services and security to civilians during ongoing fighting. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) provided security and public goods and services to civilians in occupied territory during its civil war with Ethiopia. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), though infamous for their brutality, also set up schools, health clinics, and justice systems in areas of Tamil-majority Sri Lanka under their control (Mampilly 2011, Ch. 4). In many cases rebel organizations vary the level of service provision and use of civilian-targeted violence across communities under their control. For example, the Taliban regained territory in southern and eastern Afghanistan by exploiting corruption and the absence of government services; they stepped in to provide security and judicial institutions to retain local civilian support. By contrast, in areas in which they met initial resistance, Taliban personnel often subdued the community by deploying coercive violence.

These examples debunk the myth that areas outside state control are necessarily “ungoverned” territory. Rather, all rebel organizations use a mixture of coercive violence and programmatic politics to convince civilians to support their rebellion. Both service provision and the deployment of violence are costly means of governing populated territory. Governance in either form requires rebels divert scarce resources away from military competition with the state, where they are already at a severe disadvantage. The political accountability theory of rebellion provides a framework to explain rebel territorial control and governance, typically studied in isolation, within a single framework. It departs from the existing explanations by emphasizing the strategic role civilians play in shaping civil conflict processes.

## 1.1 Preview of the Argument

Why do rebels maintain territorial control by investing in governance through service provision in some areas, but rely more heavily on coercion in others? And crucially, if rebels have limited resources with which to conduct the insurgency, under what conditions do they operate in areas where costly governance is necessary to maintain territorial control?

In this dissertation, I argue that local non-combatant populations exercise agency over conflict processes in their communities. I introduce a political accountability framework to the study of rebel-civilian interaction, providing a novel theory to explain how civilian populations influence the distribution of belligerent territorial control and conduct during irregular civil war. Communities engage in collective action to hold belligerents accountable to particular standards of governance in the community. Communities organize to provide (contingent) material and political collaboration as incentives for belligerents to provide adequate protection from civil war violence and access to basic goods and services. At the same time, communities also threaten to mobilize resistance in response to actions that threaten civilians' security and interests.

The theory draws upon an open economy politics model of strategic belligerent challenges for territorial control during irregular civil war: belligerents expand the geography of their operations until the marginal costs of controlling territory exceed the marginal benefit. They select where, specifically, to seek territorial control in order to maximize the expected *return-on-investment*, the material benefits less the costs,

associated with territorial control; identifying areas in which the marginal benefits exceed marginal cost by the greatest magnitude. Rebels seek to control territory that will yield greater access to financial or military resources, impose higher costs on the state, and yield greater opportunity to expand the insurgency further. At the same time, rebels seek to control territory in which the costs associated with providing governance and mobilizing popular support are lowest. When deciding whether to invest the resources and accept the accompanying risks in order to establish territorial control in a particular area, belligerents consider not only the expected costs and benefits associated with the structural factors addressed at length in the existing literature, but also the governance costs revealed through bargaining with the local population.

For their part, civilians are interested primarily in physical security, as well as in maintaining access to basic goods and services, during civil war. Because rebels prioritize military and political objectives, civilians cannot trust rebels to protect the public interest. To hold rebels accountable to their interests, civilians mobilize collective action to influence rebels' return-on-investment associated with operating in their communities. Just as voters in electoral democracy exercise their power at the polls to enforce the incumbent government's responsive policy-making, communities in conflict zones use the tools at their disposal to influence rebels' (and counterinsurgents') incentives to protect community interests.

Civil war disrupts or eradicates formal institutions of accountability. In an environment plagued by institutional instability, civilian collective action capacity represents a technology of mobilization; the foundation upon which communities manufacture political accountability during war. I operationalize collective action capacity by examining underlying community social structure, focusing in particular on kinship

ties as a technology for mobilization and communication. Existing social network theory suggests the structure of social ties within communities influences information transmission and collective action in situations in which costly individual actions are required to achieve common interests (Gould 1993; Chwe 1999; Siegel 2009; Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer and Tan 2012); including protest, revolution, and conflict situations (Chwe 2000; Larson 2016; Larson and Lewis forthcoming). I measure collective action capacity from its micro-level foundations in kinship networks, which represent a crucial technology for mobilization and the foundation of social capital in the Philippines, using a household-level census provided by the Department of Social Welfare and Development. The importance of kinship networks to collective action capacity is by no means unique to the Philippines. In fact, relationships between family groups play a fundamental role in the “control-collaboration” model of civil war violence Kalyvas (2006, 2012) and are central to a variety of conflicts from Spain and Greece to Iraq and Afghanistan (Kalyvas 2006, p. 179-180).

On the one hand, civilian collective action capacity increases the prospective benefits rebels expect from territorial control. Broad and extensive mobilization among community members yields a greater pool of resources to contribute to the belligerent that wins local support. Robust communication networks ensure the community members can collectively control the flow of information to counterinsurgents, critical to clandestine rebels’ guerrilla warfare strategy. All else equal, rebels prioritize territorial control in communities with greater capacity for collective action because they represent more valuable and reliable partners.

On the other hand, community collective action capacity may also enhance civilian bargaining power to demand rebels invest in local governance and protection from violence in exchange for that valuable collaboration. To influence rebel actions, com-

munities must be able to hold rebels accountable to their interests by articulating an expected standard of rebel government performance and *credibly* committing to an accountability enforcement mechanism. Accountability enforcement constitutes both a commitment to support rebels if, and only if, rebels invest in responsive governance and a related commitment to resist rebel presence if, and only if, rebels neglect or threaten community interests.<sup>3</sup>

Unlike political regimes governing sovereign states, *rebel regimes*—the norms and institutions converging expectations and establishing political order in territory under rebel control during civil war—lack the stability of broadly accepted legitimacy and entrenched institutions. Therefore, communities under rebel regimes rely on their own capacity to mobilize collective action in order to manipulate rebel incentives. Collective action capacity strengthens the credibility of the community’s commitment to contingent action required for effective accountability enforcement. Communities with greater collective action capacity identify common reference points for galvanizing popular support for, or resistance against, belligerents operating the area.<sup>4</sup>

Whether collective action capacity encourages or deters rebel territorial control hinges on the community’s bargaining leverage to demand services and protection in exchange for their collaboration. The community’s bargaining power is determined in large part by its outside options; the expected benefits associated with alternatives

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<sup>3</sup>This conceptualization of political accountability is drawn from the established literature on accountability in democratic and authoritarian (state-based) political regimes. See especially Ferejohn (1986); Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999, 2005); Besley (2006), among others.

<sup>4</sup>Fearon (2011) notes the importance of publicly observable common reference points for regime stability and political accountability to the public. Because individuals will only participate in popular resistance when they expect a sufficient number of others will join them, they need commonly acknowledged events or outcomes designed to converge expectations on triggers for popular resistance. If those excluded from political influence cannot coordinate on these signals, the credibility of their commitment to hold political authority figures accountable through costly popular resistance is limited.

to rebel control, especially but not exclusively the state. To access essential services and protection, communities may align with the state and/or local power brokers.<sup>5</sup> Where the state or local power brokers lack capacity to deliver basic services and protect the population from civil war violence, collective action capacity increases rebel territorial control. Under these conditions, even minimal rebel governance improves community security; rebels' expected benefits from local collaboration exceeds the expected governance costs to secure it. However, as state and local governance and security provision increase, the community's bargaining power over rebels grows; collective action capacity increases community demands for investment in governance and cuts against rebels' expected return-on-investment.

## **1.2 Contribution to the Civil Wars and Conflict Processes Literature**

This dissertation investigates the local dynamics of territorial control during *irregular* civil wars. Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) define irregular wars as those in which a materially weaker non-state political organization challenges the state using primarily guerrilla tactics, avoiding direct confrontation with the state's armed forces. Unlike conventional civil wars, fought between regular armies, irregular wars do not have clear front lines and fighting occurs across porous, ill-defined demarcations of control. Unlike symmetric non-conventional civil wars, fought between two or more guerrilla forces, irregular wars are characterized by stark asymmetry among the belligerents in terms of military capabilities.

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<sup>5</sup>Local power brokers may range from warlords with private armies to grassroots civil protection units that mobilize local resources to assert autonomy through self-governance (Kaplan 2017).

The accountability theory contributes to the literature by exposing an as yet overlooked process by which civilians influence conflict processes: in particular, the ways in which civilians influence the distribution of belligerent territorial control through their power to demand investment in belligerent (rebel) governance. This theoretical framework reconciles existing findings in the literature that suggest community cohesion and civilian collective action may deter rebel territorial control (Kaplan 2017; Kalyvas 2006) as well as enhance rebel governance (Mampilly 2011) and social order (Arjona 2016) under certain conditions, while encouraging rebel territorial control under alternative conditions (Mao 2007 [1937]; Guevara 2002 [1961]; Galula 2006 [1964]; Kilcullen 2009). Though scholars have focused on the effects of territorial control on rebels' subsequent governance, I argue that rebels' expectation of the benefits and (governance) costs required to maintain control in particular communities influences the decision whether to establish territorial control in the first place. Civilians strategically influence rebel territorial control by mobilizing collective action to either encourage rebel territorial control by collaborating with rebel personnel, or deter rebel territorial control by demanding rebels invest in costly governance (protection from civil war violence and access to basic services) or collaborating with the state.

The existing literature privileges structural factors to explain variation in territorial control, especially the local balance of military capabilities. In the context of irregular war, weaker rebels seek and successfully maintain control over areas in which the state cannot project its power effectively. Because of the state's overall military advantage, rebels are generally confined to remote areas in which they possess a *localized* military advantage, or at least relative parity with, state forces. Local state weakness reduces the costs to seizing territory and extends the rebels' expected time horizon of territorial control. Mountainous terrain, forest cover, swampland and other geographic impediments to moving troops and heavy equipment contribute to

the *loss of strength gradient* (Boulding 1962) and reduce the state’s power advantage. These “conditions favoring insurgency” increase the costs to counterinsurgent operations and increase the likelihood of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003). As a result, conflicts originate in areas remote from the centers of state power (Buhaug 2010; Holtermann 2016), where rebels can seize territory to establish a base for insurgency or sanctuary from counterinsurgent reprisals.

These structural factors explain why rebels are especially likely to control territory in remote areas distant from centers of state power, but cannot account for variation in territorial control within the periphery. Civil conflict remains intractable precisely because the state is unable to project power throughout its sovereign territory. Explaining variation in territorial control within the periphery is crucial to understanding conflict processes and civil war outcomes. Similarly, the structural factors cannot explain why rebels contest, and successfully wrest control from the state, in some areas close to centers of state power while they avoid contesting others.

Civil war erupts in countries in which there exist valuable lootable natural resources or other economic endowments that rebel groups can exploit to finance the rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). By implication, rebels may seek to control territory where these resources are concentrated, especially if they are unprotected by state military or administrative capacity. Le Billon (2001) finds that even in conflicts that are motivated by political and identity-based grievances, resources become important in prolonging war. Weinstein (2007) implies that rebel organizations chase economic endowments to fund the organization and therefore will seek territorial control in areas of the conflict zone that provide economic opportunities. These arguments suggest that regardless of political objectives, rebels may seek out territory within the state that contains lootable resources or economic endowments. Rebel groups also

seek to control territory where local wealth and economic productivity present the opportunity to collect income by levying “revolutionary taxes” to support the rebellion. Berman et al. (2011) find that rebel violence increases in response to increases in local employment and economic activity. Moreover, economic development programs (Crost, Felter and Johnston 2014; Berman et al. 2013) and aid to war-ravaged populations (Nielsen et al. 2011; Nunn and Qian 2014) designed to increase local populations’ economic security may actually increase exposure to violence, at least in the short term.

These arguments cannot account for why rebels seek to control particular pieces of territory with valuable economic endowments, but neglect or fail to invest resources to control territory in others. Furthermore, the empirical support for these “greed” mechanisms are mixed. Ross (2004) finds no evidence that supports rebels finance their start-up costs by exploiting natural resources or primary commodities. Humphreys (2005) interrogates the mechanisms behind the country-level correlation between natural resource endowments and civil war and finds that, actually, state weakness explains both natural resource dependence and civil war, rather than the conventional “greed” motivations for rebellion. Fearon (2005), similarly skeptical of the greed mechanisms, suggests that states with natural resources experience civil wars because control over the state apparatus represents a valuable “prize” because those in power may consume the rents from the resource economy; therefore, those excluded from political power may be motivated to fight in order to seize control over the state. Economic endowments provide important insights into local-level variation regarding incentives to seek territorial control, but cannot fully explain why rebels are more likely to seize territorial control rather than states identifying similar incentives.

Theories that do acknowledge civilian agency in shaping territorial control have

proposed a number of *interest*-based mechanisms linking community action to local-level variation in control. Humphreys and Weinstein (2008), in particular, find a correlation between poverty and individual recruitment into rebel or paramilitary organizations. Rebels control territory in which individuals identify low economic opportunity costs associated with participating in the rebellion (Collier and Hoeffer 2004; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). However, evidence is mixed regarding the economic opportunity costs mechanism. Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) find that groups from either end of the income distribution are more likely to participate in fighting compared to those at the average national income level. Blair et al. (2013) and Shapiro and Fair (2010) find that those more economically well off are actually more, rather than less, likely to express support for militants, possibly consistent with an argument that economic security sufficiently exceeding subsistence is necessary for individuals to divert attention to political matters. In fact, identity-based grievances and “greed” incentives interact in complex ways. According to Morelli and Rohner (2015), rebel groups prefer to establish control in villages where *both* resources and co-ethnic supporters are concentrated.

Where the population suffers from relative deprivation in quality of life (Gurr 1970), communities may mobilize support for rebel territorial control. Communities exposed to repression may harbor moral and emotional motivations to rebel against their oppressors (Petersen 2001; Wood 2003). Political and economic exclusion based on ethnic or identity categories are particularly prone to conflict (Horowitz 1985; Buhaug, Cederman and Rød 2008; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012), especially when identity categories correspond to divisions in economic hierarchy (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011; Gubler and Selway 2012).

Vertical social ties linking rebels to communities (Staniland 2014; Sarbahi 2014),

local institutional efficacy (Arjona 2016), organizational capacity (Parkinson 2013; Kaplan 2013, 2017), and the configuration of local political power (Balcells 2017) shape rebel conduct and the costs of territorial control. Parkinson (2013) argues that social networks affect not only individuals' participation in the rebellion, but also their organizational roles and, by extension, the rebellion's durability. Staniland (2012, 2014) offers a social-institutional theory; the social structure in which the rebel organization is embedded shapes rebel governance and military effectiveness. Strong horizontal links pull activist organizers together and centralize authority while strong vertical links tie the organizers to the local population. In these overlapping social structures, rebels can better manage resources and provide good governance while advancing their campaign. By contrast, where the underlying social structure lacks horizontal and/or vertical links, the resulting divided society is prone to disintegration in the face of the challenges common to insurgent campaigns. Sarbahi (2014) distinguishes between "anchored" and "floating" rebel organizations, which also emphasizes the structure of the central leadership's ties to the population. Arjona (2016) argues that the efficacy and legitimacy of local institutions influences communities' interests and incentives to collaborate or support local belligerents (rebels), and rebels' incentives to invest resources to exert greater levels of social control in occupied territory.

These arguments that relate local grievances, social network ties, and local institutions to conflict processes do emphasize civilian community characteristics with implications for the motive and opportunity for territorial control. However, these arguments assume fairly fixed and immutable characteristics and interests related to vertical social connections and identity politics. Civilian agency to influence rebel incentives independent of structural conditions is largely absent from explanations for the conditions under which rebels will seek and retain territorial control during conflict. Rebels invest in political mobilization efforts, propaganda campaigns, and

service provision in communities without social ties or political alignment with rebel goals in order to shape local conditions in their favor, and may convince skeptical populations to support their cause.

Kalyvas (2006) argues that individuals in conflict-affected areas are prone to collaborate with the belligerent exerting control in the area, and typically fall prey to pressures to denounce community members from rival groups as defectors, in a strategic effort to survive the conflict. Balcells (2017) argues that the incentives for denunciation also follow a strategic logic of maximizing power within the community; where politically relevant groups approach parity, the incentives to foment violence to eliminate rivals in order to entrench political power in the post-conflict era is greatest. These arguments emphasizing the “settling of scores” and pressures towards community breakdown overlook community members’ incentives and capabilities to pursue security goals by *cooperating* with other, even rival, groups rather than aggravate communal conflict. For Kalyvas (2006), even communities that enjoy “low levels of social conflict and high levels of solidarity may not prevent denunciations from taking place given the small number of people required to set this process in motion, (Kalyvas 2006, p. 192). But this premise neglects the power of the majority, especially if particularly cohesive, to prevent the denunciation process from spiraling out of control beyond initial actions by the few anti-social members. Cohesive communities may engage in collective action to leverage resources and information for influence over belligerents in need of popular collaboration during the conduct of war.

This dissertation contributes to the literature by advancing an alternative *capabilities*-based mechanism linking community collective action capacity to the expansion and contraction of rebel territorial control during civil war. The political accountability theory of rebellion suggests local collective action capacity increases the efficacy of

cooperative strategies to manage conflict processes and hold belligerents accountable to community interests. Weak or divisive communities may be vulnerable to the pressures of civil war violence unraveling local norms and institutions of cooperation, but stronger and more cohesive communities may not be so brittle, even in the context of armed conflict among more powerful belligerent organizations.

Petersen (2001) and Kaplan (2017) highlight underlying community social structure to explain popular participation in resistance against occupying forces and the emergence of community autonomy (self-protection strategies), respectively. Zhukov (2013) argues that civilian communities that are able to clearly communicate their strategies and actions are able to avoid costly civil war violence and better manage relations with the combatants. Rueda (2017) argues that communities with strong, centralized leadership, one indicator of strong collective action capacity, are better positioned to commit to supporting only one belligerent in order to obtain protection, thereby experience less violence. Clear and credible signaling and the capacity to commit to restricting collaboration to one belligerent are each key elements in a non-combatant polity's efforts to establish political accountability to their interests in the midst of armed conflict.

Whereas these prominent arguments explain civilian strategic action under the pressures of armed group occupation, and the extent to which these strategies may succeed, the accountability theory of rebellion advanced in this dissertation presents a distinct logic to understand the ways in which community collective action shapes whether and to what extent armed groups establish territorial control in the first place. In addition, rather than assuming communities prefer to retain autonomy, I assume only that communities are interested in maximizing physical and economic security. The accountability theory, therefore, carries implications for civilians' strategic

choice whether to pursue security interests through the autonomy strategies advanced by Kaplan (2017) or through alignment with one belligerent or the other through collaboration. The accountability theory sheds new light on subsequent rebel behavior by providing a theoretically informed first stage. Variation in rebel governance occurs among areas in which rebels have successfully controlled territory (Kasfir 2015; Stewart 2018), and territorial control shapes the strategic incentives for the use of selective and indiscriminate violence (Kalyvas 2006). The accountability theory explains how areas in which rebels achieve territorial control differ from the broader conflict zone in ways that influence rebel conduct. The effect of community collective action on belligerents' decisions to invest in territorial control in the first place carries important theoretical and empirical implications for the dynamics of belligerent and civilian actions within particular zones of belligerent control, in ways that force a reckoning with existing theories of civil war conduct.

## 1.3 Contribution to the Political Accountability

### Literature

The existing political accountability literature mainly focuses on the politics of stable regimes within relatively strong states, beginning with electoral democracy and extended to authoritarian regimes. Leaders are accountable to members of a *selectorate*, the citizens that possess access to the institutions of political leadership and policy selection (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2005). In democracies, the instruments of accountability are free and fair elections and the electorate includes (ideally) the entire adult population (Ferejohn 1986; Fearon 1999; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999; Maravall 1999; Besley 2006). Authoritarian regimes come in a variety of forms, but typically the electorate includes only a small cadre of elites; party leaders in a single-

party state, the generals in a military dictatorship, for example.

In authoritarian regimes, political leadership and policy selection occurs in a closed process. Leaders are formally and practically accountable to the enfranchised subset of the population included in the selectorate. Citizens' power to enforce political accountability operates through the *rebellion constraint* (Boix 2003): dictators are accountable to the public only to the extent that the population is willing to mobilize broad-based costly collective action, usually extreme measures such as mass protest or violent resistance against the state. Many scholars have argued that the population's capacity for collective action, necessary to mobilize rebellion, increases the elites' redistribution of wealth to the poor under a wide variety of circumstances and increases the probability of regime transition to democracy.<sup>6</sup> In order to coordinate such broad-based resistance to hold a dictator accountable, vulnerable politically excluded members of society must be fairly certain that a sufficient number of others will join in the resistance. Otherwise, individuals that do engage in protest or rebellion are easy targets for the state's repressive apparatus. As Fearon (2011) notes, polities require widely acknowledged, observable regime behaviors and outcomes that represent a threshold for popular protest and rebellion in order for a sufficient number of individuals to be confident that others will support the collective effort to hold the dictator accountable through the rebellion constraint.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001, 2006) offer a notable exception to the claim that underlying capacity for collective action increases the likelihood of democratization. They argue that the population's collective action capacity may reduce the probability of democratization; counter to Boix (2003); Gandhi and Przeworski

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<sup>6</sup>See, for example, Boix (2003); Gandhi and Przeworski (2006); Gehlbach and Keefer (2011); Fearon (2011)

(2006); Gehlbach and Keefer (2011); Fearon (2011).<sup>7</sup> The logic is that a transition to democracy is a commitment device: elites opt to devolve power in the form of a democratic transition *only* when it represents the best option for the elites to credibly commit to keep in place indefinitely the level of redistribution that is required to head off rebellion during a time of crisis. Elites facing populations with the capacity for collective action constantly face the threat of rebellion if they reduce the level of redistribution, and expect to continue facing that threat indefinitely. Therefore, the regime can credibly commit to keep the level of redistribution at the equilibrium level sufficient to pacify the politically marginalized public. Elites facing a population that lacks the underlying capacity for collective action necessary to foment rebellion in the future will respond to a rare crisis by liberalizing the political system because otherwise they cannot credibly commit to retain the generous redistribution policy in the future when the threat of rebellion subsides.

Nevertheless, in the Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001, 2006) model, collective action capacity increases the authoritarian regime's redistribution of wealth from elites to the poor (policy responsiveness to public interests), even if it does not ultimately lead to a transition to democracy. In other words, a population with high collective action capacity is able to demand a higher level of redistribution in equilibrium, compared to a population with lower collective action capacity. Thus, there appears to be some consensus at least that collective action capacity enhances the population's ability to hold authoritarian leaders accountable to public interests, even if the accountability mechanisms available are strictly informal and extra-legal.

This dissertation contributes to the discipline by investigating political account-

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<sup>7</sup>The debate in the literature regarding the effect of collective action capacity on regime transition is summarized and empirically investigated in Castañeda Dower et al. (2018).

ability in polities under rebel group territorial control within active war zones. Zones of rebel control represent a subset of the larger class of political environments lacking the institutions and norms that underwrite political accountability. Similar to authoritarian regimes, rebel regimes typically restrict both membership in the electorate granted influence over political leadership as well as over policy selection, though rebel regimes do vary based on the extent to which they include civilians in these processes (Weinstein 2007). However, rebel regimes differ from authoritarian regimes in important ways unexplored in the existing political accountability literature. Whereas state-based regimes base their political legitimacy on providing political stability and protection from anarchic violence, rebel regimes base their legitimacy on their efforts to impose at least short-term regime instability in order to achieve future political revisions in the status quo. Instability obfuscates public efforts to construct the institutions, or publicly observable reference points (Fearon 2011), required to converge individual citizens' expectations regarding when and how to resist those in power.

Furthermore, existing models of political accountability necessarily treat the incumbent regime as exogenous. As will become clear in the conceptual and theoretical discussions on the dynamics of territorial control, rebel groups make strategic decisions where and when to seek and maintain territorial control during civil war, and these choices are influenced by the expectation of the benefits and costs associated with controlling territory in a particular community. In other words, the selection into a rebel regime is endogenous to conflict processes, and the conditions are highly variant and ever-evolving, especially compared to the processes that lead to regime transitions within states. The dissertation sets out to enhance understanding of political accountability in the shadow of elite decision-making whether to enter or exit the political competition that leads, ultimately, to the precise local political regime.

## 1.4 Empirical Research Design and Case Selection

### Quantitative Analysis: Collective Action Capacity and Rebel Territorial Control

First, I present econometric analysis of nation-wide quantitative village-level data collected from a variety of government agencies and the military based in the metro-Manila area. During fieldwork, I was able to negotiate access to Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) military intelligence assessments from 2011-2014 that record communist insurgent presence at the village level, a rare opportunity to measure the elusive concept of rebel territorial control with precision.<sup>8</sup> The AFP data categorize villages based on the presence of communist party-affiliated political committees, estimates of armed personnel and firearms, and information gathered from local contacts. The data are used to inform civilian peace-building and economic development agencies of the areas in which to avoid implementing programs for security reasons related to insurgent presence. Therefore, the dataset conforms to definition of territorial control during armed conflict, one important dimension of which is a combatant's "capacity... to keep its enemies out of a specific area," (Kasfir 2015, p. 26).

To measure village collective action capacity from its micro-level foundations, I construct extended kinship networks from a Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) census conducted during 2008-2010. Kinship networks represent the primary currency of social capital in the Philippines; the foundation of collective action and clientelist systems designed to access political power and distribute economic resources. Using basic network analysis, I construct kinship networks using household head family names drawn from the census and summarize village social

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<sup>8</sup>AFP intelligence data were provided to the author by the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP).

structure. In 1849, the Spanish colonial Governor, facing difficulty tracking household tax contributions, directed local officials to assign new unique surnames to each family in their municipality using a list of over 60,000 approved (Spanish-origin) family names. This peculiar history of name reassignment along with strict naming conventions suggests households sharing a surname within the same municipality can be confidently identified as members of the same family line, which allows identification of kinship networks.<sup>9</sup> The kinship networks constructed from this information provides leverage to measure measure collective action capacity by summarizing the structure of marriage ties throughout the network; an even distribution of marriage ties throughout the village represents a cohesive community, while stark divisions across which marriage ties do not occur represents a divisive community<sup>10</sup> with barriers to broad-based collective action across social cleavage divides.

I fit a series of multilevel models which regress insurgent territorial control on measures of community social network structure, and find initial empirical support for the accountability theory of rebel regimes. The multilevel analysis adjusts coefficient and uncertainty (standard error) estimates by modeling spatial, administrative unit-level clustering of communist insurgent territorial control, and controlling for potential confounding factors. In the Philippines, collective action capacity *increases* communist rebel control in villages in which the quality and extent of state-provided protection and services is lowest, the state's local administrative and counterinsurgent capabilities are weakest, and during time periods in which the military used primarily enemy-centric COIN. This positive association declines and reverses direction as

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<sup>9</sup>See Cruz, Labonne and Querubin (2017) for an example, and appropriate justification, of this process of building social networks from the census in a peer-reviewed article.

<sup>10</sup>To illustrate, think of community divisions such as those between the Hatfields and the McCoys or the Montagues and Capulets. Deep rivalries in the community generate patterns of marriage and kinship connections in which families that form social connections with the Hatfields are unlikely to also form social connections with the McCoys, and vice versa, creating social cleavages difficult to bridge even to pursue common goals.

the community's access to state protection and services increases, the government's investments in state-building increase, and the counterinsurgency strategy shifts from enemy- to population-centric. These patterns are consistent with the theory's predictions.

The econometric analysis suffers three key limitations. First, inferences drawn from the observed correlations may be biased if prior exposure to communist insurgents, or alternative omitted variables, increase both the likelihood of subsequent communist territorial control *and* community collective action capacity. Second, the observable kinship network measures of community-level collective action capacity are limited to specific dimensions of the broader concept. Third, the available quantitative data cannot verify the causal mechanisms linking community collective action capacity to territorial control through expected governance costs. To support or falsify the accountability theory, I specify alternative theories for rebel conduct that are consistent with the correlations between collective action capacity and communist insurgent territorial control detected in the econometric analysis and distinguish these alternatives from the accountability theory by emphasizing each theory's proposed mechanisms linking collective action capacity to rebel territorial control.

## **Qualitative Analysis: Collective Action Capacity and Rebel Governance**

I complement the econometric analysis with qualitative analysis of interviews, conducted between December 2015 and May 2016, with community leaders from a selection of 75 villages selected randomly from three historically conflict-affected provinces in Eastern Mindanao: Agusan del Sur, Davao Oriental, and Compostela Valley. I developed a semi-structured questionnaire designed to encourage respondents to provide

information necessary to trace the processes by which communist insurgents sought and established territorial control, and engaged in local governance, in the community. I primarily targeted Village elders as interview respondents because they were present in the community prior to the arrival of communist insurgents, lived through periods of communist control, and were present in the village at the time of data collection.

Qualitative analysis adjudicates between the accountability theory and plausible alternative explanations by investigating the extent to which the evidence from selected village cases are consistent with the causal process proposed.<sup>11</sup> I focus on two primary alternative explanations. First, I use the qualitative interviews with village leaders to determine whether the econometric results may be explained by the effect of prior rebel control on both community social structure and subsequent rebel territorial control, rather than the theory's proposed independent effect of community collective action capacity. Overall, the effect of prior rebel territorial control on community social structure cannot fully account for the relationship observed in the econometric analysis. While the evidence does appear to support the possibility that conflict exposure shapes community cohesion, it also supports the independent effect of social cohesion on future territorial control. In addition, many interview respondents suggested that exposure to rebel territorial control or civil war violence actually reduced community cohesion, consistent with the spiral of denunciation logic outlined in detail in Kalyvas (2006). By extension, the qualitative evidence suggests the econometric results may actually underestimate the independent effect of community collective action on rebel territorial control.

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<sup>11</sup>The alternatives raised are interesting in their own right, and I explore their logic and unpack empirically the conditions under which these alternative mechanisms may be at work. Nonetheless, the primary purpose of the qualitative empirical section is to investigate possible threats to the validity of inferences supporting the accountability theory of rebel regimes.

Second, the qualitative empirical investigation tests the accountability theory's mechanisms underlying the proposed relationship between community collective action capacity and territorial control against an alternative *predatory* theory of rebel conduct. The predatory rebel theory proposes that rebels may control territory in communities with high collective action capacity because cohesive local social and political structures simply allow rebels to apply coercion more efficiently in order to achieve community collaboration at a lower cost. This theory represents a stark contrast to the accountability theory's proposed mechanism. I investigate in depth the accountability and predatory theories' competing predictions regarding the local-level variation in rebel governance observable in the qualitative interview data. I find the testimony drawn from village expert interviews is consistent with the mechanism proposed in the accountability theory. The qualitative analysis cannot eliminate the possibility of bias, but complements the necessarily limited quantitative analysis, increasing confidence in the inferences drawn in support of the accountability theory of rebel conduct.

## Case Selection

The Philippines has a long history of local tribal groups retaining political power and jealously guarding their autonomy from outsiders, which has plagued efforts to centralize political power in Manila. The Philippines exhibits tremendous variation in geography, natural resource and economic endowments, and ethno-linguistic and tribal culture and institutions. Furthermore, state-building efforts to overcome these barriers have been implemented unevenly, concentrating on the state's political and economic centers and leaving the periphery behind. These characteristics generate variation in the state's administrative and counterinsurgent capacity throughout the

country, necessary to explore the conditional effect of community collective action proposed in the theory.

Though the current communist insurgency has been ongoing since at the mid-to-late 1960's, there has been a great deal of variation in the location, intensity and duration of conflict at the community level across the Philippines and over time. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), and its armed wing, the New People's Army (NPA), expand into new areas by exploiting local grievances and a persistent lack of state service provision. They maintain organizational survival by fleeing counterinsurgent reprisals as the state attempts to strengthen its reach into the periphery, creating a fluid distribution of territorial control. These conditions are representative of a wide variety of intrastate conflicts. The patchwork of insurgent and counterinsurgent presence provides leverage to test the theory and permits empirical investigation across variation in historical legacies of prior exposure to conflict.

Despite cultural and ethno-linguistic diversity across the country, extended family networks represent a common foundation for social, political, and economic life across regions and tribes in the Philippines. Extending back to the pre-colonial era, communities were organized in groups of families with over-lapping kinship ties under the leadership of a local *datu*, or headman. Strong norms of trust based on family ties and suspicion of outsiders generates a context in which kinship represents a crucial foundation of social capital and collective action in communities throughout the Philippines. This consistency provides the basis to measure collective action capacity quantitatively nation-wide for inclusion in econometric analysis as well as the conceptual foundation for detailed investigation of the dynamics of collective action in qualitative analysis.

## 1.5 Scope

The accountability theory of rebel regimes is designed to explain rebel conduct in *irregular* (asymmetric) civil wars (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010), in which the state maintains a material advantage over the rebel organization. In asymmetric conflicts, rebels are especially sensitive to civilian support and therefore community action is most relevant to rebel incentives and constraints regarding territorial control. Consistent with the literature, I assume rebels rely on at least a minimum level of civilian collaboration to survive counterinsurgency. Even rebels with revenue sources or external support rely upon civilian support to prevent information reaching counterinsurgents.

The framework applies most directly to ideological conflicts, in which the civilian population may plausibly align with either the state or the rebels based on which actor's conduct during the civil war advances civilian interests to a greater extent. Ideological conflict includes not only those over political ideology (communist, revolutionary, or reactionary movements) but also conflicts involving rebels or states with politicized religious ideology.<sup>12</sup> Though there are crucial philosophical differences political and religious ideological groups, religious ideological groups likewise advance a gradual advancement in territorial control and movement legitimacy at the state's expense by convincing the population to support an alternative political system with the ultimate goal of regime overthrow. While not always purely fence-sitters, a majority of communities may plausibly support either side in the conflict.

Generalizability to ethno-nationalist secessionist groups, especially those representing marginalized groups without recourse to align with the state, may be more limited. Social groups that have been deliberately and systematically marginalized

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<sup>12</sup>Examples include the radical Islamist groups such as the Taliban, Islamic State, the variety of groups in Pakistan as well as Christian radical groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda.

from power may have weaker outside options to align with the state, which is essential to leveraging collective action to hold rebels accountable. However, even in identity conflicts political allegiances are fluid, as demonstrated in Kalyvas (2006). Communities may still choose to align with a state dominated by an ethnic out-group if the state's provision of services and protection exceed that expected under co-ethnic rebels. Identity-based conflict adds a layer of complexity to the population's outside options. Future research will engage with the extent to which the accountability theory applies in ethno-nationalist conflicts.

# CHAPTER 2

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## Defining Key Concepts

This chapter introduces the concepts essential to the accountability theory of rebellion, which provides a new framework for understanding the relationship between rebel organizations and non-combatant citizens. It starts by introducing the political foundations of state *sovereignty* in order to motivate the discussion of its (violent) challengers during *civil war*. Civil war belligerents compete for *territorial control* within the conflict zone, and the argument presented in this dissertation focuses on the politics of rebel-controlled territory.

Maintaining territorial control requires not only that rebels defeat or deter enemy combatants with military force, but also that rebels manage the non-combatant population. The rebel-civilian relationship within territory under rebel control is structured by the peculiarities of *rebel regimes*—the norms and institutions converging expectations and establishing political order in territory under rebel control during civil war—as well as the form and extent of *rebel governance*—the provision of rules and basic goods and services in rebel-controlled territory. I introduce the new concept of the rebel regime to present the competition over territory during civil war as a political selection process. The institutions and norms governing non-combatants’ actions in support or opposition to conflict belligerents in the community structure

the benefits and costs each belligerent faces regarding efforts to maintain territorial control in the area.

Political *accountability* and policy *responsiveness* at the local level directly impact civilians' experience during war, and therefore represent crucial political outcomes of interest, requiring explanation in their own right. But they also represent key mechanisms driving variation in local-level belligerent territorial control. I define each in order to provide conceptual clarity required to extend the canonical political accountability framework to the unique rebel regime environment. Finally, the chapter defines community-level *collective action capacity* and describes its foundation in community social structure and *social capital*.

## 2.1 Varieties of Sovereignty and Civil War

In the modern international system, independent states enjoy *juridical sovereignty*, the exclusive *de jure* right to govern and deploy violence within defined territorial boundaries. Juridical sovereignty is assigned through a joint process by which 1) a political organization announces a claim to exclusive political authority in a defined territory and 2) the existing states in the international system provide collective recognition of that claim. It is not enough for political entrepreneurs to espouse the right to political authority or establish a *de facto* monopoly of violence; juridical sovereignty and political independence require other states support or acquiesce to the claim. New states are created when the international community accepts the legitimacy of the political organization's claim to sovereignty and state death occurs when existing states dissolve or are conquered by other states (Fazal 2011).

Sovereignty is founded not only on international recognition, but also on internal recognition among the constituent population residing within the territory. Domestic challenges to state sovereignty are as old as the state-based system of sovereignty itself. It is often the non-state sources of political authority that pre-date statehood, such as tribal, ethnic, or religious leadership, that emerge to challenge state sovereignty. Due to both capacity constraints and domestic resistance, states face challenges projecting *empirical sovereignty*, the *de facto* monopoly of violence and political legitimacy, uniformly across the entire territory under its juridical sovereignty. Strong states possess empirical sovereignty throughout the entire territory while weak states face internal challenges. Challengers may seek to replace state authority only in specific geographic (secessionist or irredentist conflicts) or policy areas, while others aim to overthrow the central government and impose regime change (center-seeking or ideological conflicts).

Civil war, defined as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of hostilities” (Kalyvas 2006, p. 5), emerges when an organized challenge to state sovereignty escalates to the sustained use of violence. Just what constitutes sufficiently violent or sufficiently sustained to qualify as civil war is far from settled in the discipline (Sambanis 2004). Civil war is territorial nature: rebel forces attempt to seize and hold territory in order to advance their military and political objectives.

“Center-seeking” civil wars are those in which the political goal of the armed opposition movement is to overthrow the existing government and replace the regime with an alternative political system. Because center-seeking movements are often rooted in a political ideology with alternative foundations for legitimate political authority, they are often referred to as ideological wars; including communist, leftist, and reactionary armed groups as well as armed groups that profess politicized religious

ideology. Current examples include the Naxalite insurgency in India (the “Red Corridor”), communist insurgent groups in Colombia,<sup>1</sup> and the New People’s Army (NPA) in the Philippines (the focus of the empirical investigation in this dissertation). But the Taliban’s insurgency against the NATO-backed government in Afghanistan also represents a center-seeking conflict because the Taliban aim to reclaim control over the state apparatus and replace the existing regime with one based on a particular interpretation of Sharia.

In secessionist and irredentist civil wars, non-state challengers have geographically limited goals to revise or remove the state’s juridical sovereignty over particular regions rather than to achieve complete regime overthrow. The boundaries of territory over which rebels claim sovereignty in secessionist wars are usually based on territorial concentration of politically relevant ethnic, religious, or other identity group cleavages. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) seeking Irish independence from the United Kingdom and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) which fought for Basque independence from Spain are well documented examples. The most recent successful examples are South Sudan’s independence from Sudan in 2011, Kosovo’s independence from Serbia in the early 2000’s, and East Timor’s independence from Indonesia in 1999. Though none obtained outright military victory, each of these successful secession bids were the result of armed insurrection leading to international acceptance of a new state. Less successful though intractable examples include the movement for Kurdish independence in Turkey (as well as Syria and Iraq), the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia, and the Moro conflict in the Philippines.

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<sup>1</sup>A recent peace agreement between the government and the largest insurgent group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC), remains in the process of implementing rebel demobilization and transition to peaceful political competition and has not completely resolved conflict with other groups such as the (Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN).

## 2.2 Territorial Control

*Territorial control* is defined by a political actor's ability to move freely, access information and resources, and prevent its enemies' movement and access in particular place and time.<sup>2</sup> Operationally, territorial control is captured by "the level of, presence of, and access enjoyed by political actors in a given place and time," (Kalyvas 2006, p. 210), most importantly the actor's "capacity... to keep its enemies out of a specific area," (Kasfir 2015, p. 26). Territorial control is a continuous concept: a combatant may have partial control if it can restrict its enemy's access to local resources and information, even if it cannot eliminate enemy presence altogether. *Segmented* territorial control corresponds to areas in which one belligerent exercises complete access to resources to the exclusion of the other, while *fragmented* control describes conditions in which two or more belligerents each possess partial access (Kalyvas 2006; Staniland 2012).

Kasfir (2015) differentiates territorial control, defined by the enemy's absence from an area (above), from the concept of (political) domination. For Kasfir (2015), domination "refers to the degree of civilian compliance an insurgent organization [generally, combatant] can elicit within territory it controls" (Kasfir 2015, p. 26), consistent with the definition in Weber (1978). Distinguishing political dominance over the local population from the balance of capabilities and access among competing civil war belligerents is crucial, because variation in civilian compliance within areas under an actor's control is an important outcome that requires explanation. Nevertheless, removing civilians' role entirely from the definition of territorial control ignores the importance of locals' eligibility to control territory, their incentives

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<sup>2</sup>This definition incorporates components from Race (1973, p. 277), Kalyvas (2006, p. 210), and Kasfir (2015, p. 26). Race (1973, p. 277) defined territorial control by the "probability that a certain... class of events will not occur within a defined area within a defined period of time, for example... the probability that there will be no movement of external hostile individuals," which also provides the basis for the definition of territorial control in (Kalyvas 2006, p. 210).

to do so, and empirical examples of successful civilian efforts to establish empirical sovereignty independent from armed groups. Taking strategic civilian action seriously requires considering communities on equal conceptual footing with belligerents as contenders for political power and autonomy to pursue particular interests, even if they are typically disadvantaged at the bargaining table due to a deficit in the resources and capability to deploy coercive violence.

I adopt a definition of an actor's territorial control that includes the capability to exclude both the main belligerent adversary (for rebels, typically the government and its counterinsurgent forces) as well as local rivals for power from access to territory and resources among the population. The dimensions of political dominance that constitute the possible consequences of rebel presence, such as civilian compliance and allocation of resources and information, are excluded from the definition of territorial control. But, the definition does generalize the "enemy" to include not only the counterinsurgents but also local power brokers that may threaten rebel interests by challenging the hierarchy of political authority, or that aim to curtail the rebels' freedom of movement and access to information and resources. In order to meaningfully control territory, rebels must limit the local population's efforts to oust rebels from the community. Kaplan (2017) provides a crucial step in this direction by examining in depth the dynamics of civilian *autonomy* in conflict zones.

## 2.3 Rebel Regimes

The dissertation's framework interrogates the politics of rebel-civilian interaction in areas of rebel territorial control as a political regime. I introduce the concept of rebel regime here because the formal and informal institutions that structure the power

balance among rebels and civilians within areas of rebel territorial control is essential to understanding the incentives and constraints on a rebel group's decision to seek territorial control in the first place, to maintain control once established, and to implement particular forms of governance in areas under rebel control. In particular, the characteristics of the rebel regime structure the rebels' accountability to civilian interests.<sup>3</sup> The definition of political regime encompasses two main pillars: 1) the formal institutions of political leadership and policy selection, along with the norms of behavior with respect to these institutions; 2) the informal institutions and norms that structure participation in efforts to influence leadership and policy selection outside (in defiance) of these formal institutions.

The first pillar represents the more commonly used definition of political regime: "a mechanism employed to aggregate individual preferences about the ideal distribution of assets among those individuals governed by this institutional mechanism," (Boix 2003, p. 10).<sup>4</sup> Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) provide a simple, elegant classification scheme by defining three nested subsets of the polity's population: 1) the *residents*, 2) the *selectorate*, and 3) the *winning coalition*. The selectorate is defined as the subset of residents (full population) that are granted the opportunity to participate in the formal political selection process. Institutions defining the selectorate, then, divide the population into the enfranchised and disenfranchised. Nearly all regimes restrict selectorate membership to adults, which disenfranchises children, and to *citizens*, which disenfranchises legal and illegal non-citizen residents.

The winning coalition represents the subset of the selectorate whose support is sufficient to secure the selection of a particular leader to a position of political power

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<sup>3</sup>More on Rebel Governance and Accountability in the next two sections.

<sup>4</sup>See also Gandhi (2015), which emphasizes the institutions and norms that determine "the process by which the ruled select their rulers," (Gandhi 2015, p. 448).

(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). Political regimes are differentiated by the set of institutions that 1) divide the resident population into the selectorate and the disenfranchised and 2) determine the relative size of the winning coalition compared to the selectorate. For example, in ideal type majoritarian electoral democracies, the selectorate includes the entire adult population of citizens and the winning coalition must contain a number of members representing at least  $50\% + 1$  of the selectorate.

Rebel groups vary a great deal in the extent to which they include members of the civilian population in political selection, usually restricted to policy rather than leadership selection. Weinstein (2007) emphasizes variation in rebel regimes according to the inclusiveness of, and the extent of power-sharing with, civilians (Chapter 5).<sup>5</sup> The National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda formalized local democratic institutions, revolutionary councils, to encourage grassroots participation in the rebellion and restructure Uganda's local political systems to provide individuals the opportunity to participate in leader selection and policy formation. By contrast, Renamo in Mozambique instituted strict hierarchical control over communities and excluded civilians from participating in decisions regarding the selection of local leadership and policy (Weinstein 2007, Chapter 5).

The institutions and norms that determine the selectorate and winning coalition are insufficient to completely define the regime. The second pillar structures the conditions under which a subset of the resident population may mobilize political action outside the sanctioned channels. The winning coalition cannot merely select political leadership and policy that satisfies the interests of the coalition members,

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<sup>5</sup>Weinstein (2007) discusses inclusiveness and power-sharing with civilians in his definition of rebel governance. But, this dimension fits more appropriately with what I introduce here as the rebel regime, since it relates to political selection, the rebels' vulnerability to costs imposed by the community.

since the rest of the population may respond with actions to impose costs on the incumbents, even if they cannot engage in the formally institutionalized political selection processes to pursue their interests. Even in strong authoritarian regimes, the incumbent must either distribute some benefits to, or deploy overwhelming repressive violence against, the population excluded from the winning coalition. For example, the al-Saud family retains political authority in Saudi Arabia at least partially by using oil wealth to deliver adequate public goods and services without taxing the population. The Communist Party in China has retained political power by delivering a high rate of economic growth over the decades of its rule. A rational winning coalition may deviate from their ideal policy preferences no more than is necessary to remove enough of the excluded population's incentives to participate in rebellion, but this still suggests an important role for the politically disenfranchised in shaping the content of the political regime.

The literature has commonly explored this pathway through what is commonly referred to as the *rebellion constraint* (Boix 2003); typically, the population excluded from power may choose to mobilize mass protest or foment violent rebellion to attempt to overthrow the existing regime. The term “rebellion constraint” is likely to create confusion in the context of the argument advanced in this dissertation. The dissertation examines the political relationship between rebel organizations and civilian populations, which of course occurs in the context of rebellion. In the context of rebel regimes, the “rebellion constraint” concept refers to the civilians’ resistance against rebel rulers—“rebelling against rebellion,” (Arjona and Kalyvas 2009)—*not* the rebellion against the state. Furthermore, rebellion represents only one tool available to civilians to hold political organizations and leaders accountable to public interest; it ignores non-violent strategies of resistance as well as violent strategies short of full-scale rebellion. Because the term “rebellion” is being used to refer to the conflict

waged by the rebel organization against the state, I refer to the second part of the definition of political regime using the language of informal institutions; the mechanisms through which citizens take action outside of formal institutions.

Authoritarian and democratic regimes alike deploy violent and non-violent means to prevent at least the most serious extra-legal challenges to the regime. Because resistance is costly, especially in repressive regimes, communities may face a severe free-rider problem with respect to institutionalizing and acting upon the rebellion constraint. Even if individuals share grievances against the incumbent regime and wish to punish or oust leaders, many will prefer others in society bear the costs of engaging in resistance, in order to avoid the risk of being targeted with violence. Individuals will only take up arms against the regime if they expect a sufficient number of others will do the same. The risks of being targeted with violence shrink as the number of participants increases, and the probability of success grows. Furthermore, individuals within the community may harbor distinct, competing preferences over the distributional consequences within the regime, creating a *common agency* (Bernheim and Whinston 1986) problem. Distinct social groups may be tempted to bargain separately with rebels in order to serve narrow interests. Unfortunately, civilians' inability to cooperate may empower the rebels to pit social groups against each other in ways that reduce social welfare.

To overcome these barriers to collective action required to establish a credible threat to oust rebels through informal mechanisms (resistance), the members of a polity may identify, and institutionalize, publicly observable common *reference points* that serve to coordinate civilian expectations that others will participate in popular collective action designed to punish the incumbent regime (Fearon 2011). For example, Fearon (2011) argues that the rules surrounding elections are one possible

coordination mechanism: if the regime fails to hold elections at expected intervals or tampers with the results, the population is much more likely to reach the tipping point of collective action to foment rebellion. Electoral authoritarian regimes use this strategy to bolster legitimacy without surrendering the power of political selection to the population at large (Gandhi 2015).

Election rules serve as an appropriate institutionalized reference point in democracies and electoral autocracies, but are neither the only possible reference points in these regimes nor are they appropriate for other types of authoritarian regimes. In rebel regimes, communities may select a specific threshold of civilian casualties resulting from rebel-counterinsurgent clashes as a reference point for popular resistance. The informal institutions guiding citizen action to influence political selection and policy formation outside formal channels are produced jointly by elites and citizens. Citizens may construct reference points from bottom-up processes; for example, the “subsistence ethic” in Scott (1977). But, incumbent rulers may also strategically set the common reference points in order to build legitimacy and take control over the conditions for their maintenance of power. For example, the incumbent members of the winning coalition may strategically manipulate the distribution of resources or access to power among those outside the winning coalition in order to create conflicting incentives and sow mistrust among those whose participation is required to effectively utilize informal mechanisms of influencing political selection. Consider South Africa’s Apartheid regime, in which the government granted certain (still limited) privileges to the Colored and Indian populations not granted to the majority Black population as a strategy to prevent cooperation among the marginalized groups in society.

Though states do, of course, occasionally undergo regime transitions, state-based regimes are considerably more durable than rebel regimes and base their legitimacy

on delivering stability and public order. In stable state-based regimes, there is a clear social contract with the population that at minimum guarantees relative security. The public can predict their benefits under the incumbent regime, and develop common reference points for regime performance that trigger the selection of alternative political leadership or, in extreme cases, foment popular resistance to support regime change (Fearon 2011). In heavy-handed, centralized authoritarian regimes, the common reference points triggering rebellion may, unhappily, be episodes of widespread state repression, such as happened across the Middle East during the Arab Spring (with mixed results). But, nonetheless, the public symbols are at least clear. Most dictatorships avoid the kind of widespread and excessive repression that would trigger popular protest. Consider Iran's violent, even abhorrent, but nonetheless limited response to protests surrounding the 2009 election.

Civil war disturbs pre-existing institutions and norms in society, including both formal institutions relevant to selecting political leadership and policy as well as informal institutions that serve to coordinate expectations of civilians' willingness to engage in popular resistance. The resulting uncertainty may lead to collective failure to converge expectations on common reference points, as confidence that others will eschew selfish action erodes. Whereas states stake their claims to legitimacy among those excluded from power on the ability to guarantee security and political stability, rebel regimes exist, by definition, during wartime and base their legitimacy on delivering short-term *instability* for the incumbent regime. As a consequence, the common reference points regarding security are less clear-cut, as the rebel regime comes part and parcel with civil war, and less stable, as shifting realities on the ground affect the level of security that civilians can expect belligerents to provide changes endogenously with conflict processes. Attempting to hold rebels to a standard of security that is impossible to guarantee would negate the rebels' incentives to protect com-

munity welfare at all, while permitting rebels to engage in wanton use of violence that disproportionately threatens community security renders the social contract essentially useless to the civilians. Finding the intermediate level of security to serve as a common reference point for community collaboration with, or resistance to, the rebel regime represents a much greater challenge in the context of civil war.

These tensions aggravate problems inherent in a diffuse public attempting to hold political leaders accountable (more on accountability below). Part of the social contract that provides the foundation for the rebel regime is the delivery of services and the protection from civil war violence during the fighting (more on rebel governance below), but there is an understanding that present conditions represent a temporary sacrifice to achieve broader political objectives. Citizens may find it challenging to determine whether current sacrifices to support the rebel regime are worth the long-term benefits if it is not clear what these future benefits will be, how likely they are to be realized, and what the costs must be borne in the mean time. Successful rebellion is a very rare event; convincing the public it is worth alienating themselves from the more powerful state is a crucial, and exceptionally challenging, goal for rebel organizations. Rebels must not only convince the population that their alternative political system will better serve public interests in both the short- and long-term, but also that the rebellion has a chance of success with civilian support.

Though the two concepts are intimately related, the rebel regime is distinct from the *wartime social order*, explored in Arjona (2016). Arjona (2016) defines wartime social order as “the particular set of institutions that underlie order in a war zone, giving place to distinct patterns of being and relating,” (Arjona 2016, p. 22). *Order* is further defined by the predictability of others’ actions and outcomes (Arjona 2016, p. 21). Social order, in particular, focuses on “institutions that regulate civilian af-

fairs... referring to any realm of private and public life, including politics, economics, social relations, religious practices, and sexual behavior," (Arjona 2016, p. 23). Arjona (2016) identifies two types of wartime social order in areas of rebel territorial control, *rebelocracy* and *aliocracy*, and differentiates each from the condition of *disorder*, in which the rebels rely nearly exclusively on coercive violence to extract resources without any intention of retaining long-term territorial control, akin to the "roving bandit" in Olson (1993). In a rebelocracy, rebels take a direct rule approach to controlling local civilian affairs, while in an aliocracy the rebels engage in indirect rule-by-proxy, allowing local leaders to manage daily governance.

The form of social order refers to the manner by which political leadership (rebels) influence the actions and expectations of those under their rule (civilians), and structures how civilians interact with each other under the established order in daily life. The rebel regime also represents a set of institutions in rebel-controlled territory, but is distinguished by structuring not the daily interactions among residents, but rather the process by which civilian preferences influence belligerent actors' policy choices and, especially, the process by which belligerents seize, maintain, and lose power (political selection) in the community. The distinction between social order and political regime is important because the lack of attention to the qualities of rebel regimes remains a barrier to understanding the role civilians play in shaping conflict processes by influencing belligerent behaviors; including the form of wartime social order.

## 2.4 Rebel Governance

I first define the more general concept of *governance*, of which *rebel governance* is a specific subset. In this dissertation, I use the definition of governance advanced in

Risse (2012, p. 700): “the various institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods.”<sup>6</sup> This definition encompasses states and non-state actors engaging in relevant processes of social control and focuses on the “intentional provision of rules and collective goods for a particular community,” without incorporating the effectiveness, legitimacy or motivation behind rules and goods provision as part of the definition of governance (Risse 2012). Rather, governance can be judged effective or ineffective, legitimate or illegitimate, and actors may harbor a wide variety of motivations for engaging in, or refraining from, providing governance.

Rebel governance, specifically, refers to rebel actors’ intentional provision of rules and goods targeting non-combatant populations residing within territory under rebel control during civil war.<sup>7</sup> Rebels may provide the community a measure of security from external threats, maintain public order through policing, establish and enforce mechanisms for dispute resolution, and may even provide basic medical care, education, and access to food and clean water (Mampilly 2011, p. 17). Rebel governance also includes the use of symbols to influence civilian behavior and coordinate expectations that reinforce a political actor’s sovereignty (Mampilly 2011, 2015). In other words, though researchers commonly focus on the provision of public goods, rebel governance may include, but does not require, the provision of basic goods and services. As in state-based regimes, the (limited) use or threat of violence to enforce

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<sup>6</sup>As Fukuyama (2016) notes, the discipline has used the term “governance” to refer to a variety of distinct concepts, including international cooperation among sovereign state entities, governments’ domestic public administration within their sovereign territory, and the (typically non-state) regulation of social behavior through networks and other non-hierarchical mechanisms (Fukuyama 2016, p. 90). What each of these definitions share is a conceptualization of governance as a form of control that political actors, whether state or non-state actors, exert over social, economic, and political interactions in the constituent population (Kahler and Lake 2004, p. 409).

<sup>7</sup>This definition is similar to that adopted in Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly (2015, p. 3), which defines rebel governance as “the set of actions insurgents engage in to regulate the social, political, and economic life of non-combatants during war.”

rules represents a legitimate tool of social control. But, to qualify as governance the rebels' intervention in society must extend beyond just pillage and plunder. Thus, rebel governance is intimately related to processes of Tillyan state-building and the concept of parallel, or shadow, government (Tilly 1975, 1985, 1990).

The definition adopted in this dissertation departs from the definition advanced in Weinstein (2007), which characterizes rebel governance by its inclusiveness of, and the extent of power-sharing with, civilians (Chapter 5). This conceptualization equates rebel governance with what is introduced here as the rebel regime; the formal institutions delineating access to the processes of political leadership and policy selection. Rebel governance represents the rules structuring daily interactions as well as provision of goods and services in the polity; this concept is distinct from the rebel regime, which refers to the institutions structuring the civilian population's role in shaping elites' access to political power, belligerents' territorial control during civil war, and policy selection. Rebels may provide governance instrumentally in order to bolster civilians' incentives to support rebels and converge expectations and behaviors that reinforce rebel control, but the form of governance provided is distinct from the regime type.

Kasfir (2015) identifies three scope conditions to identify rebel governance: 1) territorial control, 2) in a populated area, and 3) the organization's use or threat of armed violence. The first criterion simply suggests that rebel organizations must obtain adequate territorial control in order to be in the position to set up an infrastructure for governance. The second criterion follows from the definition of governance as managing a population; it differentiates rebel operations in populated areas from rebel conduct in sparsely populated areas, such as mountainous terrain or dense forests in which rebels set up training camps and bases of operations in order to main-

tain territorial concealment from the counterinsurgents rather than support from a population. The third criterion differentiates rebel governance from governance by other types of actors, including states as well as non-state actors such as warlords, criminal syndicates, and NGOs. To qualify as a rebel group, the organization must have engaged in at least one initial act of organized violence against the state or an organized, politically motivated non-state adversary.

It is worth noting in advance the limitations on rebel governance. Compared to the state's enforcement and goods provision in its centers of power, rebel groups typically lack the resources to enforce rules as effectively, and to provide goods and services on the same scale, even in its areas of complete control. Except in extreme cases, rebels do not possess the capacity to build infrastructure such as paved roads or bridges, implement economic development programs, or construct large-scale health-care and education systems. However, in peripheral areas with a history of minimal state penetration, or of state repression, even low-level service provision and interventions to maintain public safety can make a meaningful difference in the community. Under these conditions, rebels may achieve a *local* advantage in governance provision over the state. For example, rebels may transport doctors and medicines to communities lacking health clinics, provide food (often diet staples such as rice), assist in the harvest or in constructing irrigation systems, build simple dirt roads, staff and operate local schools, among other low capital-intensity services.

At the height of its power, the CPP-NPA instituted land reform policies in some areas under their control (Santos et al. 2010). Where the state judicial system is ill-equipped to handle these disputes, as local government units lack the resources and the legitimacy to effectively mitigate family conflicts, rebel groups' establishment of rules to adjudicate disputes represents a crucial public good. In many areas

of Muslim-majority Mindanao, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), in their respective zones of influence, established systems to resolve disputes as a means of establishing legitimacy, courting support, and maintaining stability.<sup>8</sup> Resource-constrained rebels may choose to co-opt pre-existing service delivery infrastructure, taking a middling approach that retains state bureaucratic and administrative presence in the area while attempting to monopolize violence. For example, the LTTE allowed the Sri Lankan government to continue operating its schools and hospitals in Tamil areas under their control; the LTTE feared losing public support if it was seen as severing its constituents' access to basic goods and services (Mampilly 2011, ch. 4.).

## 2.5 Accountability and Responsiveness

Political *accountability* is defined by the extent to which an actor in a position of power must take actions or pursue outcomes that are responsive to the interests of a constituent population over which it rules. *Responsiveness* is defined by the congruence between the powerful actor's actions and the constituency's preferences on particular dimensions of governance. Political accountability, then, is "a property of institutional structures" that shape an actor's incentives to take responsive actions (Ferejohn 1999, p. 131). Standard political accountability theories are built on the foundation of political agency models; a specific class of Principal-Agent models. The simplest Principal-Agent structure represents a contract between two actors, principal and agent, in which the principal attempts to design an optimal incentive scheme to motivate the agent to take (costly) actions that are against the agent's direct interests but serve the principal's interests.

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<sup>8</sup>Interview with Brigadier General Alejandro Estomo (Ret.) 9/14/2015.

Ferejohn (1986) provides the canonical model of political accountability in a representative democracy. Politicians do not exert effort to serve the public interest purely out of the goodness of their hearts. Rather, they are primarily motivated to serve private interests, including personal policy preferences that may diverge from the electorate's interests or personal wealth, whether associated with legitimate rents from holding office (salary, speaking fees, book deals, etc.) or illegitimate rent-seeking through abuse of political office. In order to motivate the politician-agent to take costly action to serve the public interest, the citizen-principal must possess some leverage to manipulate politician incentives and enforce responsive behavior. In a functioning democracy, the primary tool through which citizens hold politicians accountable is the free and fair election.

The dissertation investigates rebel group accountability to civilian interests: the civilian-principal attempts to incentivize the rebel-agent to invest in responsive governance; physical protection from civil war violence and access to basic goods and services. Rebel organizations' priorities defined by organizational survival and political objectives may occasionally compete with community members' physical and economic security interests. For example, rebel personnel prioritize funding to enhance the organization's military capabilities to confront the state and counterinsurgents, whereas citizens place a higher priority on resources dedicated to protecting communities from violence. In service of military objectives, rebels may be more willing to incur risks of collateral damage than non-combatants themselves would accept. Because the principal and agent interests are not aligned, observed variation in rebel governance can be characterized along a continuum of responsiveness.

In the rebel regime context, rebel personnel are accountable to a civilian pop-

ulation if the civilians possess means to effectively punish rebels for inadequate responsiveness on key dimensions of governance and reward rebels for responsive governance. A community's capacity to influence the rebels' returns to territorial control is limited to the extent that rebels possess resources to coerce community members into collaboration, but rebels remain dependent on civilians' willingness to collaborate. By relying too heavily on coercion to secure local collaboration, rebels risk driving the population to support the adversary (Kalyvas 2006). In addition to providing damning intelligence to the counterinsurgents, civilians in certain cases have organized resistance to rebel presence in their communities. Examples include the "zones of peace" in the Philippines (Avruch and Jose 2007) and community resistance in Colombia (Kaplan 2013; Arjona 2015) and western Ukraine (Zhukov 2013). Arjona (2015) argues that at least partial resistance to particular aspects of rebel governance is nearly ubiquitous in conflict zones. In extreme cases, local communities may even violently resist armed belligerents with their own civil protection forces. The theory advanced in this dissertation explores the conditions under which rebels may be willing to invest in protecting the community from civil war violence and provide basic governance in order to avoid or minimize the costs of community resistance.

The existing literature emphasizes two main components of political accountability: 1) Enforcement and 2) Monitoring. In what follows, I highlight the crucial differences in how these components apply outside the context of stable institutions to unstable, weakly institutionalized environments such as rebel regimes in the midst of civil conflict.

## Accountability Enforcement

Enforcement includes two components: 1) the magnitude with which the citizens' actions (rewards and punishments) influence the agent's payoffs and 2) the citizens' ability to collectively enact these rewards and punishments. In the classic Ferejohn (1986) model, the first condition is summarized by the value to holding public office, which proves essential to the politician's incentive to take responsive actions on policy. If the value of holding public office is not very high compared to outside options, or if the expected compensation for responsive action will be similar to the payoff to selfish action, politicians may not be willing to enact policies that counter their narrow self-interest. If, instead, holding office provides tremendous financial, ego, or prestige benefits then politicians may be willing to sacrifice short-term self-interest to maximize their chances of re-election.

Similarly, rebels may be more willing to invest resources to engage in responsive governance if holding territory in a village is likely to yield comparatively high income from natural resources or material support from the population. Enforcement further requires citizens control, at least to some extent, access to these benefits. In democracies, the electorate retains the power to withdraw the politician's access to the benefits of political office in future elections (Ferejohn 1986; Besley 2006). In authoritarian regimes, the population excluded from access may hold elites accountable by threatening to rebel against, and subsequently punish, dictators; Boix (2003) calls this the *rebellion constraint*. In rebel regimes, in which civilian access to formal institutions of leadership and policy selection are typically limited, community members may threaten resistance against rebels—including collaboration with counterinsurgents—in order to hold rebel leaders accountable to public interests.

Though it remains the focus of existing political accountability theories, control

over selection into positions of power may not be the only mechanism through which citizens hold elites accountable, especially in nondemocratic regimes. The citizen-principal may attempt to hold the politician-agent accountable by manipulating the precise realized payoff to holding the position of power itself. In other words, the value associated with access to political power may be endogenous, rather than exogenous, to the principal's action. In the rebel regime context, citizens may organize political activism in order to manipulate rebel payoffs associated with territorial control in the area, even if they do not threaten to oust them outright. Civilians may pledge to honor a higher "revolutionary tax" rate—greater contributions of wealth, food, supplies, and other scarce resources to the rebels—if they engage in responsive rebel governance compared to that under non-responsive rebel governance that threatens community security. They may hide combatants from the enemy, pass on crucial intelligence, and provide open political support to boost rebel legitimacy. Communities may engage in *passive forms of resistance* (Scott and Kerkvliet 1986) in response to non-responsive rebel governance in order to discourage victimization. They may provide information and collaboration to the government, peacefully protest, withdraw or withhold the veneer of political legitimacy, and/or sabotage rebel resources; all of which reduce the benefits of controlling territory.

The second problem for accountability enforcement follows from the fact that any polity consists of many individuals who, though they may share some important common interests, also face distributional conflict over the allocation of scarce resources. Under certain conditions, these interest groups may face incentives to compete with each other to influence the rebel personnel to select actions that serve their private interests at the expense of common interests; what Bernheim and Whinston (1986) label a *common agency* problem. When distinct interest groups cannot commit to one another to cooperate in service of shared interests, rebels may be able

to divide-and-conquer the community, pitting neighbors against each other in order to expropriate the resources they need without paying otherwise steep governance costs. Belligerents may target groups with selective incentives or selective repression in order to convince them to defect from community collective action. In precarious conflict settings, even the most socially conscious community members may make uncooperative decisions to enhance their own security and livelihood, which erodes the community's capacity to hold rebels accountable to both common and parochial group interests. Common agency may be particularly severe in conflict situations in which the time horizon and the shifting distribution of power in society is difficult to predict or follow. This is precisely the fundamental problem that leads to the spiral of denunciation in the control-collaboration model of micro-level conflict processes (Kalyvas 2012).

## **Monitoring**

To hold a political agent accountable, the citizen-principal must be able to accurately identify the agent's actions. If the agent expects the principal's choice whether to reward or punish them is only loosely based on their actions and intentions, then they have little incentive to take costly action to serve public interests. In a complex environment in which policy is enacted to achieve specific goals, the agent's effort to serve public interests may, for unexpected reasons outside their control, yield undesirable outcomes. The monitoring problem arises from an information asymmetry; political agents typically enjoy privileged information regarding the actual actions taken, their motivations, and the wisdom of particular policy proposals (Ferejohn 1999, p. 132). In the canonical political agency model, instead of observing the extent to which the politician's chosen policy promotes public interest, the public observes only the ultimate outcome, which the politician only partially controls (Ferejohn 1986, 1999). The

citizens, therefore, may be unable to discern whether unfavorable outcomes resulted from selfish actions or from reasonable unforeseen circumstances despite best efforts. Likewise, citizens may be unable to identify whether favorable outcomes occurred due to, or in spite of, the agent's efforts.

This monitoring problem implies that, since they cannot be sure their efforts won't go to waste, a politician may abandon the bid for popular support and take selfish action to get what they can while they still have political power. In order to entice the politician to invest any effort at all, the public must reduce the performance standard demanded in exchange for the reward of collaboration, thus diluting accountability and reducing responsiveness. Again, the monitoring problem may be especially severe in rebel regimes. Because the fog of war obscures the link between belligerent actions and observable outcomes, civilians may be unable to separate responsive from self-serving rebel personnel. Though civilians can easily observe instances of rebel and counterinsurgent brutality made public as a coercive strategy to control the population, they may not be able to assign blame to one side or the other when civilians get caught in the cross-fire of insurgent or counterinsurgent operations against the enemy. Civilians may not be able to identify whether disruptions in their access to basic services are due to state weakness and neglect or because the rebels have pilfered goods intended for civilian consumption, such as when rebels intercept delivery of food and medicine aid to civilians in conflict zones for their own use.

## 2.6 Collective Action Capacity

Collective action capacity refers to the ease (or difficulty) with which communities are able to facilitate collective action across social cleavage lines to pursue common

interests. In particular, communities with greater collective action capacity are able to facilitate joint action, in which “groups composed of self-interested and interdependent individuals seek to develop and carry out cooperative plans,” (Ober 2008, p. 7). In the context of civil conflict, community members share an interest in limiting exposure to political violence and extortion by rebels or counterinsurgents and maximizing access to essential services. However, conflict conditions also aggravate distributional conflict in society. As access to resources and security become scarce, individuals may coalesce around tight-knit social groups to secure access to resources, at the expense of others in the community. In other words, communities exposed to civil war violence face particularly intense common agency problems. Collective action capacity boils down to the community’s ability to overcome these divisive pressures in order to mobilize broad-based efforts required to increase the overall level of access to resources and security.

The community’s capacity to mobilize collective action varies with four main features of the social structure: generalized trust, the strength of other-regarding preferences, inclusiveness of local institutions, and the density of cross-cleavage interactions. Each of these components influences how individuals and groups process information regarding structural incentives and form expectations of others’ behavior when faced with a collective action problem. First, in communities with high levels of generalized trust, a majority of people believe that most others will comply with social norms on daily interactions. Individuals assume that when others make commitments to engage in social or economic exchanges, that they will follow through to the best of their ability. Community members forego short-term incentives to preserve long term cooperation. Second, other-regarding preferences in the community influence the prospects for collective action by increasing individuals’ willingness to forego short-term self-interest to contribute to the community’s social welfare. Communities

in which norms lead individuals to identify direct or intrinsic benefits to community welfare possess mechanisms to facilitate the coordination of common goals and mobilize collective action. Strong norms of self-sacrifice and obligations to contribute to community facilitate an increased tolerance for policies and actions that have distributional consequences that benefit the community as a whole.

Third, inclusive institutions are those that grant access to members from all or most key social groups. In communities with broad representation in local political institutions, there already exists a functioning mechanism for generating compromise solutions to distributional conflict and policy issues. Fourth, the density of interactions across social group divides contributes to efficient modes of communication and familiarity across group boundaries. The density of interactions is greatest where individuals regularly participate in social organizations and activities with people they identify as belonging to other social groups. Community members from across cleavage lines buy and sell goods in the same markets, attend the same houses of worship, and join the same social organizations. Routine interaction across cleavages facilitates knowledge about others' preferences and their likely behavior in particular interactions. Groups enjoy technologies to communicate with and monitor the actions of other groups. These features may make cooperation easier as non-cooperative behavior is easily detected and sanctioned.

## **Social Structure and Social Capital**

The structure of community relations and the level of *social capital*, defined as “the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively,” (Woolcock and Narayan 2000, p. 226), are crucial observable foundations of collective action capacity in conflict-affected communities. Cohesive communities with cross-cutting cleavages

may already possess institutions, organizations and social networks that can be repurposed to organize collaboration with, or resistance against, rebels during periods of rebel territorial occupation. Communities with greater social cohesion, and social capital, may be able to sustain a collaborative relationship over a longer time horizon and mobilize a greater proportion of community members in the effort to hold conflict belligerents accountable to community interests and to influence public outcomes.

Putnam (2001) distinguishes two types of social capital crucial to collective action in society. *Bridging* social capital refers to networks that forge cooperative social and economic relationships across cleavages while *bonding* refers to dense ties within social identity groups. Though bonding may also increase cooperation by enhancing in-group policing (Fearon and Laitin 1996), I focus on bridging social capital because the literature suggests it is crucial to cooperation across social cleavage lines (Putnam 2001) and may reduce incentives for competition between social groups (Varshney 2001). Bridging has been found to enhance policy outcomes and government performance (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1994; Putnam 2001), management of common pool resources Ostrom (1990, 2000), public goods provision (Habyarimana et al. 2009), social and political movements (Tarrow 1994), and community health outcomes (Poortinga 2012). Bridging may increase generalized trust, facilitate collective decision-making on distributional conflict issues, and build inclusive political institutions and dispute resolution mechanisms, and as such represent an important bulwark against the spread of communal violence (Varshney 2001).

Bridging social capital is a property of social network structure. To operationalize bridging, and collective action capacity generally, I focus on the social ties that represent the foundation for communication and mobilization in a given polity. This operationalization draws upon the logic advanced in existing social network and col-

lective action theory literatures, which suggest that to understand the conditions conducive to successful collective action, and the causal processes that produce collective action, requires a social network approach.<sup>9</sup> In the Philippines, the focus of the empirical research in this dissertation, kinship ties and clan structures represent the foundation for political, social, and economic interaction at the community and supra-community level. Therefore, I measure collective action capacity using the structure of kinship-based social networks.

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<sup>9</sup>See, among others, Gould (1993); Chwe (1999); Siegel (2009); Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer and Tan (2012). For applications to political protest and resistance, see Chwe (2000); Larson (2016); Larson and Lewis (forthcoming).

## **A Political Accountability Theory of Rebel Regimes**

This chapter introduces the accountability theory of rebel regimes, which explains how communities' capacity to coordinate on common interests and mobilize collective action affects rebel territorial control and governance during irregular civil war. The theory focuses on the interaction between rebel personnel and a local community of non-combatants. I first define these actors and specify their interests. I describe rebels' motivation to control territory and their willingness to invest in governance as well as civilians' motivations to hold rebels accountable to community security and access to goods and services. After listing the accountability theory's key assumptions, I present the theory's deductive logic. I illustrate the conditions under which collective action capacity forces rebels to increase investment in rebel governance in order to maintain territorial control. Then, given these expectations, I characterize the conditions under which community collective action capacity encourages, and the conditions under which it deters, rebel investment in territorial control in the first place. I state these predictions in the form of theoretical propositions.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Though the propositions are not derived from a formal model, they are derived from the deductive logic laid out in the informal theory.

To maintain the theory's parsimony and isolate the effect of collective action capacity from other factors that affect rebel control and governance, I make a set of simplifying assumptions about a number of interesting characteristics of local level civil war dynamics. I focus on the strategic interaction between rebels and civilians, making assumptions about the state's role in shaping this interaction but the theoretical framework does not include the state as a strategic actor. I assume civilians have no partisan preferences for the rebels or the state, only that they are interested in security and access to goods and services. Rebels are interested in controlling territory to maximize resources rather than an intrinsic interest in providing governance. I address the implications for the theory, and possible extensions for future research, in the Conclusion (Section 7.3).

### **3.1 Actors: Rebel Units and Civilian Communities**

In the local level interaction, the rebel actor is a mobile semi-autonomous unit within the broader rebel organization. Though ultimately subordinate to the organization's central leadership, local units must possess some discretion over decisions regarding where to establish territorial control, and how to govern the local population, in their operational zones. These semi-autonomous rebel units enjoy access to information regarding local conditions unavailable to central leadership. Local personnel not only observe changes in enemy deployments and capabilities, but they also may build close relationships with civilians, assess community social and economic needs, and gather intelligence. Detailed local knowledge is necessary to identify opportunities to expand rebel territorial control and provides the basis for decisions regarding how best to govern the local population. Furthermore, local rebel units rely upon territorial

and population concealment to achieve intermediate military and political objectives as well as maintain unit survival, and therefore have the motivation to assess accurately the costs and benefits associated with establishing control in a particular area.

Communities are comprised of individuals and social groups with at least occasionally competing interests. But, in every community there are important dimensions along which members share a common interest, regardless of their position on social and political cleavage divides. In other words, the framework assumes the existence of non-trivial valence issues. Most notably, all community members share a common interest in maximizing access to basic goods and services, reducing the level of civil war violence, and minimizing the depletion of economic resources that usually accompanies conflict. Kalyvas (2006) argues that the micro-foundations of community interactions imply that distributional conflict within conflict-affected communities present incentives for social groups to compete rather than pursue these collective interests. Fearing others will take advantage of rebel entry to serve their own private interests, individuals may wish to exact revenge on local rivals in order to secure their own, or their in-group members', security and access to economic resources. The assumption of common interests does not remove this competitive dynamic nor the risk of the spiral of denunciation from the interaction. Rather, the framework proposed here complements the existing literature founded on the control-collaboration model by taking seriously the possible incentives for community members to resist these competitive pressures in order to pursue strategic cooperation. The framework presented here introduces a crucial explanatory factor, collective action capacity, that represents the community's ability to overcome the incentives for communal conflict in communities exposed to civil war violence.

Civil war, by definition, involves competition between the state and a rebel organi-

zation for territorial control and political authority in the contested region. Therefore, the state's attempts to bargain with local communities for their collaboration, and counterinsurgents' operations in contested areas, shape the rebel-civilian interaction; and by extension, the distribution of territorial control, governance, and violence. To maintain the theory's simplicity, the state and its counterinsurgent agents are not modeled as strategic actors in the framework presented here. Rather, the state's role is analogous to the challenging candidate in the canonical Ferejohn (1986) model of political accountability in democratic elections: the state represents the rebels' competitor in the expansion of territorial control and the community's outside option as a potential alternative political authority with which to collaborate in order to pursue security goals.<sup>2</sup> Treating the state-as-challenger's capabilities and interests as fixed environmental conditions provides the leverage to generate explanatory insights from a simple model.<sup>3</sup>

I assume the state's decisions where to target its counterinsurgent efforts—which units of territory it prioritizes contesting rebel presence—are not driven by variation in community collective action capacity, at least to the same extent that collective action capacity influences rebels' decisions where to contest territorial control. In other words, though collective action capacity also affects the counterinsurgents' costs to seizing territory, rebels are more sensitive to community collective action. Because they have limited military and administrative resources, rebels rely on population concealment to remain clandestine, and are therefore especially vulnerable to civilian defection. Counterinsurgents operate in the open, generally possess greater firepower, and are backed by state administrative and financial resources. Therefore, the state

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<sup>2</sup>Section 7.3 interrogates the possible implications of extending the framework to include the state as a strategic actor.

<sup>3</sup>Recall, this dissertation aims to supplement the robust literature addressing the strategic interaction between rebels and states with a framework to understand the interaction between rebels and civilians in contested conflict zones.

enjoys a freer hand in allocating resources to economically or militarily valuable villages regardless of community collective action capacity, while collective action capacity exercises a critical constraint for rebel investment in territorial control. As a result, variation in collective action capacity has greater influence on the rebels' incentives to seize territorial control.

### **3.2 Rebel Motivations to Control Territory**

The rebel unit seeks territorial control in order to extract the resources necessary to finance the rebellion, preserve unit survival, and access strategic military positions to gain an advantage over the counterinsurgents. Rebels off-set their overall material disadvantage relative to the state by concentrating their limited personnel and resources in order to establish a local advantage over counterinsurgents in selected units of territory. Because territorial control yields resources necessary to continue expanding the insurgency to additional villages, rebels prioritize specific villages to maximize their expected return-on-investment; the benefits extracted from the village less the costs to controlling territory.

Rebel return-on-investment includes two sources of income: territorial and population based benefits. Territorial benefits include valuable natural resources and other primary commodities rebels may exploit to finance the rebellion. Rebels typically seek access to “lootable” resources; those that are less costly to extract, easy to transport, and can be traded on the black market. Rebels also derive territorial benefits from particular characteristics of physical geography. Mountainous terrain, forest cover, swampland, poor road quality and other conditions favoring insurgency provide rebels with territorial concealment and reduce the state's capacity to project

power in the area, increasing the time horizon of territorial control (Boulding 1962; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Of course, rebels also face logistical challenges to establishing control in remote areas with rough terrain (see below), but generally these conditions favor lightly armed, mobile units which therefore cuts against the state's material advantage.

Population-based benefits are those the rebels derive directly from the population and depend, at least partially, on the civilians' willingness to collaborate. Rebels often survive by collecting financial contributions from households to support the armed struggle ("revolutionary tax"), or at a minimum access food and shelter while passing through communities. As a result, rebels may prefer to exert territorial control in communities with greater economic productivity and wealth, as they represent a larger tax base for resource extraction. Because they are clandestine organizations vulnerable to counterinsurgent reprisals, the rebels also rely on the community to provide information about counterinsurgent operations and, crucial to their survival, prevent information regarding their own vulnerabilities from reaching the counterinsurgents (population concealment). When threatened by counterinsurgent sweep operations, rebels may seek communities in which they enjoy dense social ties or deep political loyalties; communities in which they can blend in with the population to reduce counterinsurgents' ability to identify them.

Rebels face entry and governance costs associated with seizing and maintaining territorial control that at least partially off-set the aforementioned benefits. Entry costs include sending personnel and resources to the village in order to mobilize support as well as deter or defeat counterinsurgent reprisals. The state's local administrative and military capacity, assumed exogenous in the theoretical framework, clearly influences these entry costs. In communities closer to centers of state power,

in which the state possesses the infrastructure and administrative capacity for protection and service delivery, rebel organizations face stronger counterinsurgent forces. Community members may retain strong ties with the state, making it more difficult for the rebels to disrupt the social and political status quo with their political message or with coercive violence. And the state's local police and/or counterinsurgent agents retain an advantage in detecting insurgent activity before mobilization can occur. Communities with permanent counterinsurgent presence, or in which the counterinsurgents' force projection allows quick response to rebel operations, will have high entry costs for rebels. Counterinsurgents are likely to have more valuable intelligence assets in the community, even if they are not able to maintain a permanent presence. Under these conditions, rebels expect a higher probability of discovery upon entering the village, greater barriers to organizing support networks, and higher costs associated with military confrontation with counterinsurgents. Communities in which the counterinsurgents have not penetrated or cannot mobilize quickly to defend the village from rebel infiltration represent low entry costs for the rebels.

The community's institutional strength may raise rebels' entry costs consistent with the logic in Arjona (2016) and Kaplan (2013, 2017). Rebels must mobilize local support and co-opt local organizations and institutions to align with the rebels' political goals. Communities with strong local leaders with status quo interests are likely to require a greater investment in persuasive or coercive resources to secure rebel presence in the community. However, strong central leadership and organizational capacity also reduce the mobilization costs, allowing the rebels to retain broad collaboration at a lower price, provided they can secure the official support from pivotal community members.

Some of the same geographic conditions that favor insurgency by impeding the

state's projection of power, also increase the rebel organization's logistics costs associated with projecting both military and political power over territory. Like states, rebel organizations face lower costs to establish supply lines and move personnel and equipment to areas near major paved roads compared to areas only accessible by dirt paths through mountains or forests. Life is hard for rebel soldiers subsisting in these remote areas far from towns and markets monitored by counterinsurgents. Rebels often target inaccessible areas because they represent conditions that level the balance of capabilities vis-a-vis the state, but they must still consider the costs to keeping personnel adequately supplied and protected over rough terrain. In a conflict zone, the higher entry costs associated with rough terrain tend not to intersect with counterinsurgent strength and community resources for civil defense. This is precisely because the loss of strength gradient affects states, rebels, and communities alike. Sparsely populated communities in the periphery have high entry costs associated with the logistical challenges projecting power and resources over rough terrain, but rebels also face lower entry costs associated with counterinsurgent strength.

Governance costs represent investments in the personnel and resources necessary to maintain territorial control once established; in particular, the costs to maintaining a sufficient level of collaboration from the civilian population. To secure active behavioral support (even if not sincere attitudinal support) for the rebellion, rebels may devote effort to protect communities from civil war violence and maintain civilian access to basic goods and services in order to secure local collaboration. Rebels may expect to pay governance costs to protect community members from civil war violence and maintain community access to goods and services. If rebel presence reduces the community's physical security or prevents access to the resources necessary to meet basic needs, civilians may turn against rebel personnel. Strategic rebels are willing to pay the costs associated with providing responsive governance necessary

to control territory only if local collaboration from the village is sufficiently valuable. Local collaboration may outweigh the governance costs by increasing the expected population-based benefits, reducing the costs of mobilizing support and controlling information, and/or increasing the probability of victory over the counterinsurgents in battle to retain control over territory.

### **3.3 Civilians' Motivation to Enforce Rebel Accountability**

The civilian community has a shared interest in minimizing exposure to civil war violence and maximizing access to basic goods and services. Rebel presence in a village may increase the community's vulnerability to civil war violence, should the counterinsurgents launch clear operations in the area. Travel to and from the village may become costly, or even dangerous, disrupting economic activity as well as access to essential goods and services. Rebels' investment in governance may protect civilians from exposure to violence and maintain their access to basic goods and services. In villages that have been neglected or repressed by the state, rebel governance may even increase community security and access to resources. However, because rebels are motivated by organizational survival and political goals, their interests may not always be compatible with protecting public safety, especially when under threat from counterinsurgents.

Because rebel conduct clearly has significant impact on the community's physical and economic security, civilians have powerful incentives to hold rebels accountable to their interests. As noted above, rebels may depend on civilians for critical population-based resources and population concealment. Civilian collaboration gives rebels an

additional advantage in clashes with counterinsurgents, while community members' defection to support counterinsurgents increases rebel vulnerability to counterinsurgent clear operations. Communities leverage this dependence to create incentives for rebels to protect their interests. In the language of conventional political agency models, the civilian community (principal) attempts to contract the rebels (agent) to invest resources to secure community access to goods and services and protection from violence. The community (explicitly or implicitly) designs an incentive scheme, which I call a *selectoral contract*, in order to influence rebel conduct in the area.<sup>4</sup> The community manipulates the value to rebels associated with territorial control by mobilizing material support if, and only if, rebels protect community interests. Communities may reduce their collaboration, engage in "everyday forms of resistance" (Scott and Kerkvliet 1986), or provide information to counterinsurgents if rebels neglect community interests.

### 3.4 Additional Assumptions

The theory rests on several additional simplifying assumptions. First, at the organizational level, the state is assumed to enjoy a material advantage. However, at the local level in asymmetric civil war it is possible for either the counterinsurgents or the rebel unit to possess a material capabilities advantage. The state may not project its counterinsurgent capabilities and personnel uniformly throughout the territory. Counterinsurgent capabilities decline with distance from centers of state power, such as urban centers and military bases or police headquarters, as well as over rough terrain, as in the loss of strength gradient (Boulding 1962). A weak state may also

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<sup>4</sup>The *selectorate* is defined by the subset of a population that maintains the rights to participate in the formal processes of political leadership and policy selection (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2005). The *selectoral contract* represents the general concept of which the retrospective *electoral contract*, described in Ferejohn (1986), is a sub-type specific to electoral democratic regimes.

fail to establish the administrative and service delivery infrastructure necessary to retain political authority, provide public safety, protect the community from civil war violence, or deliver basic goods and services in the periphery.

Second, rebel units require a minimal level of support from the local population in order to escape annihilation at the hands of counterinsurgents. This assumption is similar to, though distinct from, the common assumption that rebel organizations as a whole require support from the population for organizational survival. Rebel units, the small mobile groups of combatants within the larger political-military organization that interact with communities at a local level, usually cannot subsist without the direct aid from civilians. The particular threshold of support needed depends on the unit's strength relative to local counterinsurgent units and its resource independence.<sup>5</sup> But, even the strongest groups must enjoy at least passive support from the community, so that critical information is not passed to the counterinsurgents. This assumption is fairly innocuous, and common in the existing literature. Exceptions, such as rebel groups operating in failed states lacking the capacity to challenge rebel authority, are rare. The universe of cases of irregular civil war represent a significant portion of civil war and political violence in the post-World War II era, especially in the years following the Cold War.

Third, civil war violence, or the presence of armed belligerents in a polity, may render pre-existing local institutions unclear or irrelevant to assigning power and authority. The strength of pre-conflict political institutions, and the extent to which

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<sup>5</sup>A substantial literature addresses the relationship between rebel access to natural resources used to finance the rebellion and rebel conduct during civil war. See, for example, Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009); Collier and Hoeffler (2004); Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009); Lujala (2009, 2010); Ross (2004), among others. Fortna, Lotito and Rubin (2018) argue that rebels' need for support from the population, their vulnerability to *legitimacy costs*, influences the incentives and constraints on the use of violence (specifically, terrorism).

these institutions hold up within rebel-controlled territory in conflict conditions, may vary considerably across the conflict zone. Arjona (2016), for example, emphasizes the legitimacy and efficacy of local institutions. Legitimate and effective local (state or traditional) institutions provide order and stability in the polity. By contrast, weak local institutions may contain contentious claims to legitimacy, unclear political selection processes, or ineffective dispute resolution mechanisms. Yet, even strong pre-conflict institutions are vulnerable to disruption or collapse under the pressures of civil war.

Fourth, this framework assumes that violent communal conflict, such as that described in Kalyvas (2006), is more costly than peaceful political and economic competition. Communities are better off avoiding folding the insurgency into their local rivalries, because communal violence imposes human and economic costs described at length in Kalyvas (2006) and others drawing upon the logic of the control-collaboration model. Rather than engage in destructive communal conflict or pledge unconditional support for the armed belligerent that enjoys (possibly temporary) control, under certain conditions community norms may encourage cooperative strategies to preserve physical and economic security, whether by collectively aligning with counterinsurgents or pursuing what Kaplan (2017) calls *autonomy strategies*. The costly communal conflict assumption represents a key departure from the control-collaboration literature; it allows for the possibility that community members may prefer to cooperate to manage the challenges of civil war violence. Under the control-collaboration model, civilians identify the potential benefits associated with violence against rivals but do not internalize social costs affecting the community nor any direct costs from social sanction in response to non-cooperative behavior.

Fifth, I assume rebels prioritize organizational and personal survival, as well as

their political and military objectives, over interests such as delivering benefits to the constituent population. Rebel units may, of course, value community security and well-being for its own sake, especially rebel units with kin and social connections to the area of control. However, by maintaining the assumption that rebels prioritize political goals and survival, the theory accounts for variation in rebel governance outcomes that cannot be explained by intrinsic motivation to provide goods and services to the community.

### **3.5 Collective Action Capacity, Rebel Governance, and Territorial Control**

Within areas of rebel control, how does community collective action shape rebels' investment in local governance? When deciding whether to establish territorial control in the first place, how do the observable community characteristics underlying collective action capacity influence rebel groups' *expected* governance costs, as well as the expected benefits, associated with controlling the territory? On the one hand, collective action capacity increases rebels' expected population-based benefits from the community; the income generated from revolutionary tax and access to information about counterinsurgent operations. Communities with greater collective action capacity are better equipped to mobilize personnel and resources to support and supply the rebels. Cohesive communities exercise greater control over the flow of information in the community. As a result, rebels also expect greater prospects of deterring or defeating counterinsurgents in the area when they have the support of a community with higher collective action capacity.

On the other hand, collective action capacity also, under certain conditions, en-

hances community bargaining power to demand higher levels of rebel governance. A community's collective action capacity influences its ability to mobilize the resources and cooperation necessary to enforce this informal accountability mechanism, and thereby demand rebel governance. Where communities possess greater bargaining power, rebels expect to pay higher governance costs, which reduce rebel return-on-investment associated with territorial control. As will become clear, collective action capacity influences the distribution of territorial control, at least in part, through its effect on the equilibrium level of rebel governance.

In summary, community collective action capacity affects rebel return-on-investment associated with territorial control through three channels: 1) the supply of population-based resources, 2) the capability to deter or defeat counterinsurgent clear operations, and 3) the governance costs required to maintain territorial control. Community collective action capacity may encourage or deter rebel territorial control through accountability enforcement depending on the balance of effects across these three channels. Collective action capacity increases rebel territorial control *only* if the population-based income and military advantages outweigh the governance costs to secure collaboration.

First, I specify in detail the direct relationship between collective action capacity and rebel governance. I then explore the effect of collective action capacity on rebel territorial control, through the mechanism of (expected) rebel governance.

## Collective Action Capacity and Rebel Governance

Recall that the community faces two types of challenges to hold rebels accountable: monitoring and enforcement.<sup>6</sup> The community cannot observe the rebels' actual effort to protect communities, only the security and economic outcomes during rebel territorial control, which are clouded by the fog of civil war. Barriers to effective civilian monitoring imply the community may respond collectively to poor security outcomes by punishing the rebels even if the military is responsible for civilian collateral damage, or vice versa. If belligerents do not expect their actions to correlate with civilian support in predictable ways, then the edifice of accountability breaks down. As mentioned above in Chapter 2, the fog of war may also obfuscate the publicly observable reference points used to coordinate expectations about others' intentions to participate in costly resistance in the first place. If individuals are not confident that others view events similarly, then they may fear others will not engage in collective resistance necessary to hold armed actors accountable.

As in state-based political regimes, citizens within rebel regimes face two crucial barriers to enforcing accountability: 1) the power asymmetry between rebels and civilians and 2) barriers to broad collective action in a population of individuals with disparate interests; the *free-rider* and *common agency* (Bernheim and Whinston 1986) problems.<sup>7</sup> First, communities have limited resources with which to manipulate rebel incentives. Rebels may use coercive violence to maintain control without investing resources to protect community interests, though greater reliance on coercion reinforces community members' incentives to take risks to collaborate with the counterinsurgents (Kalyvas 2006). The rebels' power to coerce civilians reflects what

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<sup>6</sup>The monitoring and enforcement problems are outlined in Section 2.5 above and draws upon the definitions advanced by Ferejohn (1986, 1999), Maravall (1999), and others.

<sup>7</sup>See Section 2.5 for a complete definition.

Stokes (2005) calls “perverse accountability,” in which those with political power use their position and resources not only to escape the constraints on their power associated with institutions designed to hold them accountable to public interests, but also to further influence members of the public to serve their private interests.

Indeed, this is a pervasive problem in conflict settings. As armed belligerents pursue their military and political goals, they inevitably clash with civilian interests and may use coercive force and other resources to ensure civilians do not threaten their organizational survival or ultimate political goals. Like politicians, rebels strive not only to retain power but also to maximize their autonomy for action. They may attempt to insulate their decision-making processes from the civilians’ oversight by influencing the public’s information, beliefs, and incentives (Maravall 1999). Rebels’ implicit or explicit threat of violence to control civilian behavior raises the community’s costs associated with enforcing accountability, and thereby lowers the level security and access to basic services they expect to enjoy during civil conflict.

Second, any previous institutions used to hold politicians and other leaders accountable do not generally constrain rebel personnel establishing a new local political order, at least to the same extent, and are unlikely to function consistently during civil war. To counteract the forces of perverse accountability during civil war, communities must overcome severe free-rider and common agency problems in order to mobilize effective collective action. Many individuals must sacrifice resources, and possibly their lives, in order to collaborate with or resist the rebel regime in the course of upholding the accountability mechanisms. Individuals may be forced to make compromises on issues over which there exists serious distributional conflict, in order for the community as a whole to achieve the level of collective action required to manipulate belligerent incentives.

Collective action capacity enhances a community's ability to overcome each of these barriers to establishing accountability. Collective action capacity is conceptualized as a technology for mobilizing individuals and resources in the village, representing the foundation of accountability enforcement in politically unstable environments, such as the rebel regime during civil war. Collective action capacity may help a community monitor rebel behavior; the community may organize community watch programs and collect and process individuals' testimonies of rebel conduct more efficiently to better surmise the responsiveness of rebel effort to community interests. And it is especially important to the community's ability to overcome free-rider and common agency problems. Communities with greater collective action capacity may mobilize resistance more effectively, which closes the gap in military capabilities between armed rebels and the civilian community members. Communities leverage collective action capacity to maximize their security and access to basic services.


In general, communities with greater collective action capacity are better able to hold rebels accountable to their interests, forcing rebels to invest a greater share of resources in rebel governance in order to maintain the benefits of territorial control. But, what if the rebels represent the best available option to realize those priorities? The community's ability to leverage collective action capacity to demand rebel governance depends on their outside options for access to protection from civil war violence and basic services. Because of its superior military and political-administrative resources, the state usually represents the community's primary alternative to rebel control. But, communities themselves may possess sufficient economic resources and arms to assert autonomy through self-governance (Kaplan 2017).<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>In conflicts including multiple rebel groups, communities have additional outside options to align with competing organizations. To maintain simplicity in the theoretical framework, I assume only one rebel group operates in the conflict zone.

The green *rebel governance* curve in Figure 3.1, representing the effect of collective action capacity on the level of rebel governance required to maintain territorial control, illustrates this conditional effect. First, note that the theory does not imply collective action capacity strictly increases rebel governance. In areas of extreme neglect or active repression by the state (the first quadrant in Figure 3.1 labeled “Repression”), the community may be willing to collaborate with rebels despite the increased risk to community security and interruption of access to services in order to contribute to ousting the repressive incumbent.

Figure 3.1: Effect of Collective Action Capacity on Rebel Governance and Territorial Control



The horizontal line at 0 represents a null effect of collective action capacity on the outcome of interest. Wherever the green curve is above (below) this line, the effect of collective action capacity on rebel governance is positive (negative). Wherever the blue curve is above (below) 0, the effect of collective action capacity on rebel territorial control is positive (negative).

The ideal type village facing these extreme circumstances are those under the state’s control subjected to harsh repression, especially villages in which the state gained control through “scorched earth” campaigns involving indiscriminate violence

against civilians. Under these conditions, community members may support the rebels covertly, despite the risk of state reprisals, with the hopes of ending state control. For example, many villages in Eastern Mindanao were abused by the Lost Command, a rogue unit of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, during the 1970's and 80's (Kessler 1989; Santos et al. 2010); including a number of villages selected for key-informant interviews during fieldwork in the region, discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 6. Many interview respondents recalled that the community welcomed New People's Army (NPA) insurgents when they arrived in the area. Communities supported NPA presence despite the increased vulnerability to violence through collateral damage associated with the increased risk of armed confrontation between the AFP and NPA, and the lack of governance the NPA were willing or able to provide.<sup>9</sup>

Under these conditions of severe government repression or neglect, greater collective action capacity actually reduces equilibrium rebel governance because the community realizes that withdrawing collaboration from rebels foregoes a critical opportunity to oust the repressive state from the village. Because the rebels recognize this, they can leverage community desperation to secure collaboration at lower governance costs; the community's bargaining power to demand rebel governance is very weak. However, this pattern does not imply that collective action capacity is somehow counter-productive for the community, or that it yields worse overall security outcomes. Rather, it reflects harsh reality during civil war in which, under severe conditions of state neglect or repression, civilians are willing to share the costs of resisting the oppressor. Communities accept that governance is costly, and therefore reduces the rebel group's military effectiveness. Communities mobilize their resources to address their greatest vulnerability, which in villages subjected to state repression may be the threat or state or counterinsurgent control. By this logic, the accountabil-

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<sup>9</sup>Don Alejandro, San Luis and Bayugan 3, Rosario.

ity theory can help to explain deviations from the predominant “control-collaboration” model, which implies that civilians collaborate with the actor that possess territorial control.

Outside these extreme circumstances of state repression, collective action capacity increases rebel investment in governance. Communities with greater collective action capacity—cohesive social structure and/or functioning institutions for resolving distributional conflict—are able to mobilize a greater share of local resources to supply rebels as a reward for investment in responsive governance. At the same time, high collective action capacity communities are also able to mobilize resistance to punish predatory rebels when the need arises. With sufficient outside options for protection and services, community members may be more willing to cooperate, and to sacrifice resources, in order to achieve collective goals such as enforcing rebel accountability, despite the incentive to free-ride.

Dense social ties facilitate collective monitoring of individual actions. Any individuals tempted to align with the state for personal gain, despite the community’s commitment to support the responsive rebel personnel, will expect their neighbors to notice and to punish their defection. Because social sanctioning is costly, especially in cohesive communities, rebels expect lower risk of exposure to counterinsurgents associated with territorial control in communities with greater collective action capacity *conditional on securing local collaboration*. As a result, high collective action capacity communities are better equipped to overcome common agency problems, and can therefore commit with greater credibility to enforce accountability as a cohesive unit. In communities with low collective action capacity, individuals may defect—for example, by providing actionable intelligence to the government—without suffering high social sanctioning costs. The risk of significant defections undermine the community’s

ability to credibly commit to deliver promised collaboration in response to responsive rebel governance, or foment resistance in response to non-responsive rebel actions.

Still, the extent to which the community may leverage collective action capacity for bargaining power to demand rebel governance depends on the outside options, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. In areas of low state/autonomous protection and services, greater collective action capacity translates into only slightly higher rebel governance at the bargaining table: a positive but substantively insignificant effect of collective action capacity on rebel governance (the green *rebel governance* curve slightly above 0). The community must be willing to accept rebel control at low levels of rebel governance, because the state cannot offer competitive levels of protection and services. Access to state or autonomous sources of protection and service provision magnifies the positive effect of collective action capacity on rebel governance. As outside options increase, the community has more to gain from deterring or resisting rebel control, and will therefore demand higher levels of rebel governance in exchange for collaboration: the green *rebel governance* curve slopes positive.

**Proposition 1.** *Collective Action Capacity and Rebel Governance:*

1. *Collective action capacity decreases rebel governance in areas of extreme state neglect or repression, but increases rebel governance in areas with sufficient state protection and services (at least low quality governance).*
2. *As the quality of state protection and services increases, collective action capacity has an increasing marginal effect on rebel governance. Collective action capacity slightly increases rebel governance in areas of low quality state protection and services, modestly increases rebel governance under moderate quality*

*state protection and services, and more substantially increases rebel governance under high quality state protection and services.*

## **Collective Action Capacity and Rebel Territorial Control**

The increasing marginal effect of collective action capacity on rebel governance directly impacts the rebel unit's incentives to seek territorial control. The level of rebel governance required to retain community collaboration cuts against the rebels' net profit from controlling territory. Rebels will be less willing to invest in territorial control for fear that operating in the community will leave them vulnerable to counterinsurgent reprisals triggered by civilian defections to support counterinsurgents. But, collective action capacity also increases rebels' expected income from population-based resources associated with territorial control as well as the rebels' probability of success in efforts to deter or defeat counterinsurgent reprisals. These enhanced benefits associated with controlling high collective action capacity communities, in turn, increase the rebels' incentives to invest resources to control territory.

Figure 3.1 illustrates the conditional effect of community collective action capacity on rebel territorial control (the blue *rebel control* curve), which changes in magnitude and direction with the community's outside option *because of* the effect of state service provision (as outside option) on the incumbent rebel governance costs.<sup>10</sup> In areas of state repression, collective action capacity not only increases the income from territorial control, but also reduces expected governance costs. Under low state/autonomous service provision, the effect of collective action capacity on rebel governance is positive, but small, only cutting against the benefits of territorial control by a slim margin. Therefore, collective action capacity increases rebels'

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<sup>10</sup>The community's outside option affects the community's bargaining power to demand rebel governance, discussed at length above, but does not influence the expected population-based benefits nor the impact of community support on battle outcomes.

expected surplus value of collaboration, for example the income from civilian collaboration and/or the military edge over counterinsurgents in battle, without adding substantial governance costs. In communities with weak outside options, collective action capacity substantially increases rebel territorial control: the blue *rebel control* curve passes above the 0 line by a considerable margin.

As access to state/autonomous protection and services enhances community bargaining leverage to demand investments in rebel governance (the green *rebel governance* curve's positive slope), the growth in governance costs associated with increases in collective action capacity outpaces the collaboration benefits. The net effect of collective action capacity on territorial control declines accordingly (the blue *rebel control* curve's negative slope). At the highest levels of state or autonomous protection and service provision, the community has more to gain from deterring rebel entry, and will therefore demand higher levels of rebel governance in exchange for collaboration. The expected governance costs, then, exceed the rebels' expected benefits from obtaining community collaboration. Under these conditions, collective action capacity deters rebel investment in territorial control in the first place (the blue *rebel control* curve crosses below 0).

**Proposition 2. *Collective Action Capacity and Rebel Territorial Control:***

1. *Collective action capacity increases rebel territorial control in areas lacking sufficient state protection and services, but decreases rebel territorial control in areas with sufficient state protection and services.*
2. *As the quality of state protection and services increases, collective action capacity has a decreasing marginal effect on rebel territorial control. Collective action capacity substantially increases rebel territorial control in areas of state*

*repression or neglect, modestly increases rebel territorial control in areas of low quality state protection and services, and only slightly increases rebel territorial control in areas of moderate quality state protection and services.*

Though collective action capacity has a substantively significant positive effect on rebel territorial control in areas of weak state protection and service provision, this does not mean that rebel territorial control is exceptionally likely in a particular region of state neglect overall. A state may repress or neglect the population for a number of reasons not investigated in this dissertation, even if the state possesses the local military capabilities to deter or defeat rebel challengers in the area. In areas under state control in which repression occurs, collective action capacity does increase the probability rebels will invest in the resources to establish presence in the village, but where the state possesses an overwhelming advantage in the balance of capabilities, the rebels face a strong deterrent from seeking territorial control outside the interaction with the local population. This dissertation does not claim a mono-causal theory of rebel territorial control; rather, collective action capacity contributes to rebel strategic decision-making alongside the structural factors examined in the existing literature. The baseline probability of rebel territorial control may be higher in remote areas outside state control in which the state employs repression, including villages in which the government has blocked the delivery of basic services, compared to villages closer to centers of state power in which the state represses restive populations.

It is worth noting again that the scope conditions for this theoretical framework are restricted to irregular (asymmetric) civil wars. Though a similar logic may apply in conventional civil wars and other types of armed political conflict, the conditions underlying community bargaining power to demand governance and the incentives to switch sides or pursue community autonomy (i.e. Kaplan (2017)) may differ accord-

ing to the structure of conflict in different types of civil wars. Irregular wars represent a plurality of ongoing wars today, and therefore represent an important category in which to begin inquiry about civilian agency and political accountability of armed actors.

# CHAPTER 4

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## Research Design

The remainder of the dissertation tests the political accountability theory of rebel regimes empirically, using complementary quantitative and qualitative methods to analyze unique village-level data from the communist insurgency in the Philippines. The empirical strategy uses a hypothetico-deductive approach; it explores the extent to which the accountability theory of rebel regimes is consistent with evidence from the Philippines compared to plausible alternative explanations.

Section 4.1 provides the historical background to the communist insurgency in the Philippines and the rationale for testing the theory in this case. It also describes the crucial role of extended family (clan) networks in Filipino society. Next, Section 4.2 presents the (quantitative) administrative data collected from various government agencies in the Philippines used to measure the key outcome and explanatory variables needed to test the theory's propositions regarding variation in territorial control. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) year-end intelligence assessments report village-level communist insurgent territorial control,<sup>1</sup> and household-level census data provided by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)

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<sup>1</sup>The data were provided to the author by the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP).

are used to measure collective action capacity. Section 4.3 introduces the village-level Key-Informant Interviews conducted in 75 villages, in 15 municipalities, in 3 conflict-affected provinces in Eastern Mindanao.

Section 4.4 presents the empirical strategy, which triangulates results from both quantitative analysis of administrative data and qualitative analysis of interviews with the village experts to test the accountability theory of rebel regimes. Section 4.5 derives specific hypotheses from the accountability theory testable in the data quantitative and qualitative data. Section 4.6 advances plausible alternative theories consistent with the expected correlation between community cohesion and communist insurgent territorial control. I specify hypotheses drawn from these alternative theories, testable in the qualitative interview data, that directly compete with the accountability theory's predictions.

## **4.1 The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines**

### **Origins and Rise of the Communist Party of the Philippines**

The current communist insurgency has organizational roots in the Huk rebellion, which began as a resistance to Japanese occupation of the Philippines in 1942. The Huk movement's popularity and support swelled in response to the politically-motivated expulsion from office of Communist-backed members elected to the Philippines Congress in 1946. The rebellion continued until President Ramon Magsaysay's administration launched a brutal counterinsurgency that decisively defeated the Huks in 1954. Though the organization largely disbanded following its defeat, its political and organizational infrastructure provided the foundation for the communist movement's revival as a popular resistance to the repressive dictatorship under President

Ferdinand Marcos. Marcos ascended to power in 1965 and soon after consolidated power, transforming the Philippines into a personalist dictatorship. The continued commercialization of agriculture and the urbanization of the previously rural elites, which eroded the cultural norms of the landowning patron's responsibility to his tenants, increased the social and economic gap between rich and poor (Kessler 1989, ch. 1).

Jose Maria Sison, an academic and political activist, lead the cadre that founded the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in 1968 out of the ashes of the defunct Huk movement. The CPP touted a Maoist political-military ideology and pledged an ultimate goal to overthrow the incumbent regime in Manila. The CPP advanced simultaneous political and armed struggles, launching the New People's Army (NPA) in 1969 to conduct a guerrilla campaign designed to eventually deliver the final blow to the regime. Marcos' declaration of martial law encouraged popular support for the variety of opposition movements in the Philippines, including the CPP. The CPP primarily drew support from the disaffected peasantry. The communist movement reached its peak in the 1980's following years of the Marcos regime's abuses under Martial Law.

The CPP also galvanized support by emphasizing the Marcos administration's blatant cronyism/corruption, stalled land reform, economic policies that favored the elites, and failed anti-poverty initiatives (Kessler 1989, ch. 1). The industrialization of agriculture in the Philippines rapidly replaced small farms with large elite-owned tracts of land and converted landowners to tenants and sharecroppers. Population growth accompanying the dwindling accessibility of land exacerbated social pressures that lead to rebellion against the privileged elite (Kessler 1989, p. 7). Institutionalized political and economic inequality have sustained the CPP-NPA message to the

landless rural poor even as Manila has engaged in massive anti-poverty programs, governance reforms, and security sector reforms over the past two decades.

The CPP-NPA continued the armed struggle despite Marcos' fall and the restoration of constitutional democracy in 1986, citing the failure to address the root of the conflict. To the CPP, the powerful Aquino family's ascendancy to the Presidency signaled only marginal changes in the political system. Though Corazon Aquino was democratically elected, the CPP leadership and its supporters claimed the new regime retained the consolidation of power in the hands of a few elite families and perpetuated political, social, and economic inequality in the country.

## **Communist Insurgency Expansion: Infiltrating Villages**

The NPA's insurgency strategy has emphasized an incremental process of expanding territorial control. NPA units established initial bases in the rural periphery and battled for control over select *barangays* (villages) as a means of building military and political power. CPP-NPA cadres penetrated remote communities neglected by the federal and local government, and expanded across the periphery in order to encircle urban/state power centers, Mao's initial "strategic defensive" stage of guerrilla warfare. The NPA attempted to gradually move closer to the urban centers by building up the local advantage in military capabilities and a defensive perimeter of controlled villages. Though the NPA achieved moderate progress towards this goal in specific areas, chiefly in areas far from major cities, overall the communist insurgency has remained in the "strategic defensive" phase of the revolutionary campaign since its birth.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Interviews with multiple active duty and retired military personnel confirmed this characterization of the NPA strategy: Brigadier General Alejandro Estomo (Ret.) on Sept. 14, 2015; Colonel Ding Carreon on Sept. 18, 2015; and Colonel Jake Obligado on Nov. 12, 2015. In addition, see

The CPP-NPA attempted to provide governance and establish administrative authority in some areas under its control as a strategy to contest the government adversary. In the 1980's after the Chinese government stopped providing funds, the CPP adopted a new official fundraising strategy in order to achieve "total financial self-reliance." The Communist Party set up a complex system of taxation and extortion, establishing commercial business ventures of their own, and implementing rural development plans, such as farmers' cooperatives, for both revenue-generation and political purposes (Kessler 1989, p. 74-75). The strategy is described concisely in Lieutenant-Colonel Ernesto Torres's U.S. Army Command and General Staff College thesis:

"In controlling the barangays, the [communist] party establishes a 'shadow government' parallel to the legitimate barangay government. In a clandestine manner, it runs the affairs of the barangay, dispenses requisite justice, and extracts revolutionary taxes from its people. It can be deduced that the strength of the communist insurgents is measured not only in terms of the size of its armed regulars but by the extent of its political influence as the number of communist-controlled barangays would indicate. The challenge therefore is on how to effectively isolate the insurgents from the barangays and deprive them of that critical source of support." (Torres Jr 2011, p. 6)

The CPP collected revolutionary taxes from individuals as well as businesses. NPA foot soldiers or political cadre members organized collection of a progressive tax on households; typically adjusting the cash or food demanded from individuals to their ability to pay. Businesses were often taxed per unit of output. The NPA even employed college students or recent graduates with accounting backgrounds to track mining, logging, and plantation companies' production and shipping. Even in communities supporting revolutionary goals, the NPA often relied on at least some level

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Torres Jr (2011, p. 6). For non-military sources, see Santos et al. (2010) and Kessler (1989).

of coercion (Kessler 1989, p. 75).

## Family and Clan in the Philippines

Much of Pre-colonial Philippines was organized socially and politically into groups of households under the the leadership of a local headman (*datu*), called the *barangay*. Though the term *barangay* used today to refer to these social and political units is derived from the Tagalog word, this mode of social organization under the *datu*'s authority was common throughout the archipelago. This includes the Muslim-majority areas even after exposure to Arab traders and the accompanying conversion to Islam.

As they expanded their authority throughout the archipelago, the Spanish colonial government converted local *datus* to Christianity and absorbed the *barangay* into the colonial administrative system; *datus* became the local *cabezas de barangay* responsible for collecting tribute from the households under their control. The family, or household, constituted the primary taxable unit. The colonial government relied upon the *cabezas de barangay* to collect and track household tributes; “a *barangay*, then, was a grouping of families and individuals who shared the common obligation to pay tribute to the same *cabeza*,” (Cullinane 1998, p. 286). Though, of course, patterns of migration, marriage, and life cycles affected the composition of barangay population growth and demography as well as the social and political networks within and across barangays, “even in the nineteenth century, Spanish regulations were aimed at maintaining the integrity of the *barangay*;” men were enrolled in the *barangay* of their father and women in their husband’s *barangay* upon marriage (Cullinane 1998, p. 285).

Throughout a history of state weakness, in which national government has failed

to consolidate power or regularly provide goods and services in the periphery, families have remained the primary social, economic, and political unit through which citizens obtain and maintain access to basic services and economic security. The family “provides employment and capital, educates and socializes the young, assures medical care...” and fulfills the basic purpose “to transmit its name, honor, lands, capital, and values to the next generation” (McCoy 1993, p. 7). The family unit, then, represents the appropriate unit to map social capital and investigate collective action capacity at the community level. The importance of family reputation provides a crucial foundation for cooperation across extended kin networks, or *clans*, as well as the battle lines along which communal conflict over limited land and resources are drawn. It is worth quoting at length from Kessler (1989):

“Philippine behavior is popularly seen as being based on an intricate value system emphasizing reciprocity among individuals and the smooth functioning of personal relations. The kinship circle that facilitated the expansion of cults is based on blood ties and ritual kin relations. Effective blood ties extend to the third cousin through both parents, creating a series of overlapping family circles. Identity is established within this ‘we-they’ network of extended familial ties that induces Filipinos to act in concert rather than alone. Likewise, the culture encourages Filipinos to perceive the world as hostile so that safety can be found only by belonging to a ‘strong in-group,’” (Kessler 1989, p. 22).

Within the clan network, “behavior... is regulated by ethics and norms that are unwritten and informal, depending for their effectiveness upon internalized sanctions” (Corpuz 1965, p. 83). The norm of *utang na loob* (“inner debt”) “refers to a debt of gratitude that fosters reciprocity and feelings of social obligation,” which “often extend beyond immediate relatives,” facilitates strong extended family units capable of fulfilling the governance and social service provision functions left unfulfilled by the weak state (Cruz, Labonne and Querubin 2017). Commitment to preserving family resources and reputation for future generations casts a long shadow of the future over interactions between families. As such, norms of trust and reciprocity within family

groups may reduce the costs to mobilizing collective action.

For these reasons, families are also the primary units for political competition. Even in national politics, “the major locus of congressional power... is at the local level... Members of the House of Representatives are elected through adept handling of a local network often centered on the family... and extended through their district by alliances and patronage” (Abinales and Amoroso 2005). Family groups may form political and economic alliances precisely because the “family is a more effective political unit than an individual... it has a permanent identity as a named unit, making its reputation, loyalties, and alliances transferable from members who die or retire to its new standard bearer” (Fegan 1993). Politicians organize bases of support through family connections and draw social and political capital from their clan. Querubin (2016) identifies a strong *dynastic incumbency advantage* in the Philippines; families with political power perpetuate and concentrate their power by passing on elected office to relatives. Cruz, Labonne and Querubin (2017) find that families more central in their community social networks, those with family ties across a larger portion of the community, are more likely to get elected to office. Powerful families perpetuate their power by creating patronage networks and extending their reach through strategic intermarriages with new family groups. Because locally powerful families control voting blocs within their patronage networks, national parties align with these families to access votes in exchange for political and economic resources.

Extended family networks serve as the organizing social and political institution through which individuals meet their basic needs in the absence of state provision of services and through which they mobilize support for access to political office or economic resources within the state apparatus. This social and cultural context

encourages cooperation within, but competition across, kin networks. Peace and cooperation between clans favors “particularistic behavior and dyadic alliances,” which “rather than bridging social gulfs it increases social distance, with cooperation among individuals intensifying rather than reducing conflict between individual alliances” (Kessler 1989, p. 23).

“The culture promotes a virulent struggle for power among individuals as they fight to raise their status. Higher status confers greater control over resources and hence greater rewards. Elites distribute benefits downward through their particular in-group and vie for a share of distributable resources to ensure the continued allegiance of their supporters. So long as the political system permits change, no group is able to dominate the resource base. Elites become skilled distributing benefits rather than promoting social change because change alters the balance of power in society,” (Kessler 1989, p. 23).

Building family-based connections through marriage bonds, then, increases the stability and depth of alliances across social cleavage divides. Intermarriages between clans represent *bridging* social capital, and may enhance collective action capacity by increasing the trust and communication across social cleavage lines. Extended family networks serve as the organizing social and political institution through which individuals meet their basic needs in the absence of state provision of services and through which they mobilize support for access to political office or economic resources within the state apparatus. Therefore, networks based on kinship ties represent the micro-level foundation from which I measure collective action capacity in the quantitative empirical test.

CPP-NPA personnel target their recruitment and control efforts in rural communities marginalized from local and national power. Families and family politics play an important role in the community and leadership positions are often hereditary, if not by religious or cultural rite then by virtue of family reputation. Local government and non-governmental leadership are, of course, drawn from families within the

community. The relationship between family networks and the CPP-NPA is a bit more complicated. Even in villages in which original CPP-NPA personnel in the area were outsiders, over time the village political cadre, and in some cases also the NPA unit, often include locals with family networks embedded in the community. The communist organization is able to maintain territorial precisely where they are able to mobilize sincere local support, even if only a minority of activists.

As CPP-NPA or AFP personnel attempt to establish control in contested or remote communities, they must often build trust and provide incentives to local leading families in order to win over the community's support. Securing the cooperation from local leaders is a crucial advantage to mobilizing and monitoring the community as well as to implementing service provision or other interventions designed to winning support. This complicates the clean distinction made in the theory separating the rebels from the local community. Community members' interests may be driven by family consideration in addition to, or rather than, the level of community protection and access to services that influence the credibility of commitments to align with the military against relatives staffing the NPA.

These distinct preferences are analogous to identity-based linkages between communities and rebels in ethnic conflict. In ethnic conflicts, civilians' freedom of choice between the belligerents may be restricted by identity affiliations. However, even in cases in which they local political cadres and NPA fighters have dense family network ties in the community, village expert interviews suggest that the community retains independent decision-making structures that frequently assess and reassess the wisdom of alignment with the CPP-NPA. Local leadership or organizations representing community interests can, and do, pressure even those individuals with family members in the CPP-NPA, or are CPP-NPA personnel themselves, to respect the community's

decision to align with the government if and when such a strategy best serves collective interests. In fact, some village experts openly attested that they were former NPA fighters and peacefully gave up their affiliation when the community decided to change allegiances.

## **Case Selection: Why the Communist Insurgency in the Philippines?**

The communist insurgency in the Philippines provides leverage to study territorial control in irregular civil wars. Since independence, the central government has gradually expanded its reach into the periphery. But, ultimately the Philippines remains a weak state with developing urban centers, while state-building has lagged in the largely subsistence or small-scale agriculture communities far from centers of state military and bureaucratic power.

The CPP-NPA has capitalized on the state's lack of service provision to court popular support in marginalized communities. At the height of the insurgency in the 1980's, the CPP boasted over 30,000 party members, while the NPA comprised near 20,000 armed personnel active in 50 provinces and "controlled or influenced about 20 percent of the Philippine population" in the mid-1980's (Kessler 1989, p. 28). Over the past decade, the NPA has been most active in the Davao and CARAGA regions on the island of Mindanao. According to an International Crisis Group (ICG) 2011 report, the CPP-NPA had approximately 300 guerrillas in 9 active Fronts in the CARAGA region, most active in Agusan del Sur, and approximately 800 guerrillas in 15 Fronts in the Davao Region, most active in Compostela Valley. The main activities of the NPA in Davao Region were fundraising and intermittent military operations against the AFP. The report cites AFP estimates of approximately \$890,000 worth of revolutionary taxes collected in Davao Region in 2010, nearly half of the approxi-

mately \$2.15 million collected in the entire country that year.<sup>3</sup>

Crucially, the time period for which the AFP intelligence data on communist territorial control is available corresponds precisely to the window in which the AFP has shifted from a predominantly enemy-centric towards population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. This provides the opportunity to examine the conditional effect of community collective action capacity across variation in counterinsurgent strategy and tactics. Furthermore, the time frame represents a weak point in the insurgency, providing a hard test for the accountability theory. Because counterinsurgent strength is, overall, much greater than insurgent strength and the state's reach extends further into the periphery than at any point in the history of the conflict. In other words, the sub-sample of villages in which the NPA has the capacity to seize territory is limited. If the positive relationship between community collective action capacity and territorial control holds even in this context that is especially hostile to rebel territorial control, this increases confidence in the generalizability of the theory.

The Philippines is a linguistically, ethnically, religiously, and geographically diverse and fragmented archipelago. Local communities, tribes, and kingdoms have long coveted autonomy from other groups and have greeted outsiders' efforts to annex or centralize political authority with suspicion as an affront to freedom (Kessler 1989, p. 5). Rival tribes and foreign conquerors in the pre-colonial era, Spanish and American colonial governments, and elite dynastic Filipino families/clans attempting to centralize power in Manila following independence have all confronted widespread and decentralized resistance. In other words, the Philippines has a deep cultural and political history of political power at the local level.

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<sup>3</sup>These figures are reported in the International Crisis Group Asia Report N° 202, “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks,” February 2011.

Local polities continued to resist authorities in Manila even after the Philippines was declared independent. Because the Spanish and American colonial systems institutionalized power in the center, favoring national elites in Manila, local communities and tribes either rejected the new state or leveraged ties with Manila as a means to bolster their own local autonomy. This fragmentation of power to the local level provides a context conducive to testing the accountability theory of rebellion, as local communities represent a politically relevant unit of analysis within which civilians may attempt to hold political authorities accountable to collective interests.

The importance of family networks to collective action capacity is by no means unique to the Philippines. In fact, in Kalyvas (2006), family feuds play a fundamental role in the theory of selective and indiscriminate violence in civil wars: “malicious” denunciation for private ulterior motives is common in cases as varied as the Greek Civil War, Viet Nam, the Spanish Civil War, Guatemalan civil war, the Iraq war, and others (Kalyvas 2006, p. 179-180). In these cases, conflict between families over land, honor, and resources drives the flow of information to the conflict belligerents. In some conflicts, the local cleavages pertinent to collective action capacity may manifest at higher levels of social organization, such as tribal, ethnic, or religious identity. Though the cleavages may differ across cases, the role of collective action capacity for civilian-rebel interaction remains salient.

The inferences drawn from examining this case generalize most directly to other ideological conflicts in weak states; especially communist insurgencies such as ongoing conflicts in India and Colombia and numerous historical communist insurgencies throughout the world. But the dynamics of rebel-civilian interaction illustrated in the case apply more broadly to other ideologically motivated, center-seeking rebel

groups attempting to overthrow the incumbent regime. This would include groups such as the Taliban, ISIS, Christian radicals like the LRA in Uganda, and other groups advancing politicized religious ideologies. Though there are crucial differences in the political philosophies, religious ideological groups likewise advance a gradual advancement in territorial control and movement legitimacy at the state's expense by convincing the population to support an alternative political system with the ultimate goal of regime overthrow. While not always purely fence-sitters, a majority of communities may plausibly support either side in the conflict.

The findings may not generalize as well to ethno-nationalist secessionist groups, especially those representing marginalized groups without recourse to align with the state. However, even in identity conflicts political allegiances are fluid, as demonstrated in Kalyvas (2006), and communities may still choose to align with a state dominated by an ethnic out-group if the state's provision of services and protection exceed that expected under co-ethnic rebels. Identity-based conflict add a layer of complexity to the population's outside options. Future research will engage with the extent to which the accountability theory applies in ethno-nationalist conflicts.

## 4.2 Government Administrative Data

### **AFP Intelligence Data: Measuring Communist Territorial Control**

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) intelligence service compiles yearly assessments summarizing insurgent activity nationwide. The reports include a 4-category ranking of communist insurgent “affectation” for each village: 0) unaffected (no CPP-

NPA presence) 1) threatened, 2) less-influenced, and 3) influenced.<sup>4</sup> The AFP data categorize villages based on the presence of communist party-affiliated political committees, estimates of armed personnel and firearms, and information (or lack thereof) gathered from local contacts.<sup>5</sup> “Influenced” villages contain a Barangay Revolutionary Council (BRC), the political leadership cadre formally affiliated with the CPP party branch, as well as social organizations for mass participation and an armed “people’s” militia. NPA units in the area are highly capable and entrenched enough to conduct planned attacks on the military or government outposts. “Less-influenced” villages contain social organizations for mass participation, but may have weaker party and/or militia participation. The insurgent forces may be capable of conducting targeted attacks only occasionally, under especially favorable circumstances, but still represent a significant threat to government personnel in the area. In “threatened” villages, CPP-NPA personnel are either at the infant stages of mass organization or are essentially rogue criminal organizations engaged in extortion.

The data are used not only within the military to inform counterinsurgent operations, but are also used to inform civilian peace-building and economic development agencies of the areas in which to avoid implementing programs for security reasons related to insurgent presence. The indicators of communist insurgent influence conform to the definition of territorial control laid out above. Greater insurgent manpower,

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<sup>4</sup>These data are not produced for public consumption, but rather to inform civilian government agencies involved in economic development and peace-building projects. It is unlikely that assessments reflect bias to favor the AFP’s reputation, which would put at risk government employees and programs. The reports are based on AFP contact with village populations and estimates of communist party membership, NPA soldiers and NPA firearms, and NPA-initiated violent incidents.

<sup>5</sup>Author interview with former Intelligence Officer, Mark Posadas on Feb. 28, 2015. Definitions in the AFP Summary Conflict-Affected Areas Report provided by OPAPP. For villages in which the AFP efforts to establish contacts and gather information are rebuffed by the local population, the intelligence unit increases the assessment that the village may be influenced by communist insurgents—organized support for the CPP-NPA may explain the local population’s rejection of state/military presence—though the final assessment considers this possibility alongside other indicators. Nevertheless, this is important for the validity of the measure, since otherwise the lack of information about CPP-NPA controlled villages would bias measurements.

firearms, and capabilities to launch attacks on military and government targets enhance the communists’ “capacity... to keep its enemies [government/military] out of a specific area” (Kasfir 2015, p. 26), and correspond to a lower probability of AFP and government presence in the area (Race 1973; Kalyvas 2006). The components of the categorization scheme related to local organization of civilian political and material support also correspond to the CPP-NPA dominance, or ability to exert social control, over the local population.

The Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) provided the the AFP’s communist insurgent influence data from 2011-2014 for research purposes. The data provided for 2012 does not distinguish between “less-influenced” and “influenced” nor between “threatened” and “unaffected” designations, instead collapsing to a binary classification. This binary categorization between villages in which the communists maintain at least some influence over the population and those in which they do not actually represents the substantively relevant distinction for testing the theory. Many “threatened” villages are those in which NPA units have devolved into criminal bands no longer under central command and control. Because the theory applies to armed units under the rebel organization’s central command seeking territorial control, predictions may not apply to criminally motivated armed units picked up in the “threatened” category.

A more comprehensive measure of territorial control would differentiate community self-protection as well as state or rebel territorial control. Nevertheless, because local collective action capacity has similar and simultaneous effects on community bargaining power based on the state or autonomous capacity, the distinction between these outcomes does not influence the theory’s predictions.

## DSWD Census Data: Measuring Collective Action Capacity

Measuring community-level social structure and collective action capacity within intrastate conflict is exceptionally challenging, which is one reason community political action is marginalized in the existing literature. I adopt a strategy that builds a measure of village-level collective action capacity in the Philippines from its micro-level foundations in extended kin relationships. The Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) generously provided data from its National Housing Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS-PR), a nation-wide census conducted from 2008-2010, which includes the full names of household heads.<sup>6</sup> I use the household list to construct family networks representing the basic social structure relevant to collective action.

Each individual in the NHTS-PR census has two family names. Names are assigned following strict conventions: men and unmarried women retain their father's family name as the last name and their mother's (paternal) family name as the middle name and married women replace the mother's family name with their husband's family name.<sup>7</sup> A full name, then, identifies a social tie of marriage between the respective families represented in an individual's middle and last names. In 1849, the Spanish colonial Governor Narciso Claveria, facing difficulty tracking household tax contributions, directed local officials to assign unique surnames to each family in their municipality using a list of approved names (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, p. 91). This peculiar history of name reassignment along with strict naming conventions suggests households sharing a surname within the same municipality can be confidently identified as members of the same family line rather than two different families with the

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<sup>6</sup>Replication data preserves household anonymity.

<sup>7</sup>These naming conventions are nearly universally followed. Legal constraints on individuals' ability to change their names reduce the possibility of biased measurement error in the network (Cruz, Labonne and Querubin 2017).

same name (Cruz, Labonne and Querubin 2017).<sup>8</sup>

To measure village-level collective action capacity, I construct village social networks in which each household head's full name defines an edge connecting family nodes.<sup>9</sup> Figure 4.1 illustrates a hypothetical example of a village with 10 unique families, A-H. Household 1 represents an edge between Family A and Family B, and so on. Figure 4.2 illustrates two examples of actual village networks. I summarize the structure of the village-level kinship networks, using network statistics to capture overall cohesion and social distances as proxy measures for the level of collective action capacity.

Figure 4.1: NHTS-PR Networks





Figure 4.1. Letters represent distinct families (nodes) in the village networks. Each household head's Middle and Last names represent a network edge.

<sup>8</sup>Though there may be incentives for households to misrepresent socioeconomic status relevant to household eligibility for poverty assistance, they do not have any incentive to misrepresent their name. Names are crucial for the government to locate the family in order to deliver services. Where DSWD noticed possible mistakes in the recorded names, enumerators returned to the village for verification.

<sup>9</sup>This is consistent with the procedure used in Cruz, Labonne and Querubin (2017), which provides an example of, and appropriate justification for, the use of the NHTS-PR data to build kinship networks in a peer-reviewed article.

Figure 4.2: Barangay Network Examples



The NHTS-PR data provide an extraordinarily fine-grained measure of collective action capacity and reflects the social and political importance of clan relations to local collective action in the Philippines. Fewer ties between family groups–clans–may signify at best limited social interaction across clan cleavages and at worst the manifestation of intense communal rivalry. Kinship ties that bridge family groups may be crucial for building trust and cooperation in the community. Families with ties to both competing clans are often essential to negotiating a peaceful resolution to disputes.<sup>10</sup>

CPP-NPA personnel seeking to control territory may not have access to as in-depth information on family networks as that available in the NHTS-PR census. Nevertheless, the network measures do proxy for the kind of information regarding community social structure that CPP-NPA personnel collect in order to inform the decision whether to invest in territorial control in a particular area. The CPP first sends political operatives to establish contacts in the village, estimate the local bal-

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<sup>10</sup>Interview with Professor Jowel Canuday, Ateneo de Manila University.

ance of capabilities with the counterinsurgents, assess community access to services as well as local grievances, identify victims of social injustice, map social and leadership structure, and estimate the local tax base (Kessler 1989, p. 66). By embedding political representatives in a community prior to seeking control, the CPP-NPA personnel gather information to determine whether armed rebel personnel will be met with support, complacency, or resistance among the local population. CPP-NPA personnel identify the local organizations through which they may mobilize support; one reason CPP-NPA operatives often organize through the local church is because it bridges other social cleavage divides.<sup>11</sup> CPP-NPA personnel occasionally even conduct a formal community needs assessment, the Social Integration and Class Analysis (SICA), to estimate the costs associated with territorial control in the community:

*SICA... is a process by the NPA of studying the social conditions of the community... they will find out what are the basic services that are lacking in the community... who are influential in the community, the [community] structure. Who are pro-government? Who have predicaments against the government?... So they target these communities.<sup>12</sup>*

Though important, families are certainly not the only social units relevant to collective action in Filipino society and marriages/kinship ties are not the only relationships relevant to social cohesion. CPP-NPA personnel mobilize support through community sectoral organizations, Church, and tribal institutions.<sup>13</sup> However, these alternative sources of mobilization are likely related to fluid intermarriage norms. They may generate cross-cutting cleavages expected to enhance amicable inter-clan relations, and family ties across clans may strengthen the functioning and inclusiveness of these institutions.

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<sup>11</sup>This account of CPP-NPA infiltration was independently confirmed by multiple AFP current and retired leaders interviewed during fieldwork between September-November 2015. It also conforms to historical accounts such as those in Santos et al. (2010).

<sup>12</sup>Interview with Colonel Jake Obligado on Nov. 12, 2015.

<sup>13</sup>Professional or sectoral associations include farmers, fisherman, youth and women's organizations. Interview with Brigadier General Alejandro Estomo (Ret.) on Sept. 14, 2015.

Cohesion measured by inter-clan marriages represents an appropriate, though certainly not perfect, proxy for the broader concept of collective action capacity. But the measurement strategy incurs key limitations associated with defining social connections exclusively by intermarriages and restricting measurement to a single snapshot of the community during the census period. The observed family-based social networks may be endogenous to conflict processes; conflict causes migration and displacement. Individuals exposed to civil war violence may flee temporarily to nearby communities, typically with family members, and especially to villages in which they have family ties. These patterns of conflict-induced internal displacement introduce the possibility of endogeneity bias threatening the validity of inferences made from the correlation between community collective action capacity defined as family network structure and rebel territorial control.

However, in most cases displaced households will return to their homes and communities when the threat has subsided, even if rebels remain nearby, in order to protect the ancestral home and economic assets; especially access to land. The norms governing marriages with particular clans are slow to change, and clan rivalries occasionally persist for many generations. Furthermore, fragmentation in support for the government, the insurgents, or local autonomy during conflict episodes typically breaks along these pre-existing cleavage lines. Together, these features suggest kinship networks may be plausibly exogenous to conflict dynamics in ways that other components of collective action capacity are not. Because vulnerable communities are situated in the periphery, and emigration to urban and state-controlled areas for economic reasons is more common than emigration to rural areas, measurement error inflates the family-based social capital measure in state-controlled areas less likely exposed to communist insurgents. These dynamics build in bias against the mobi-

lization hypothesis and reduce the risk of endogeneity bias, though the data cannot rule it out completely. I investigate the theory's mechanisms in greater depth in the qualitative interview data.

## Measuring Community Outside Options

As part of its transparency initiative and efforts to reform local government throughout the country, the Government of the Philippines collects measures of economic, political, and administrative dimensions of governance for each Local Government Unit (LGU), the municipality-level government entity. The Government of the Philippines aggregates these indicators to construct the Good Governance Index (GGI) as an LGU assessment tool designed to capture “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of the country’s economic and social resources for development” (Philippine Statistics Authority 2008). The Government of the Philippines publishes the GGI results to inform voters about their local leaders’ performance while in office. The aggregate measure incorporates indicators of financial resource management, poverty alleviation, rule of law and administration of justice, security and public safety, political participation, and delivery of services such as health, education, and electricity.<sup>14</sup>

Because local government performance is likely endogenous to conflict processes, the 2005 GGI score is an imperfect measure of the state’s service provision as the community’s alternative to rebel rule. Therefore, I also proxy for the state-as-outside option by exploring the effect of collective action capacity across geographic and temporal trends that correspond to variation in the state’s local capabilities and pen-

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<sup>14</sup>See specifics in the Appendix, and <http://nap.psa.gov.ph/ggi/techNotes.asp> for more details.

etration in the area, that are plausibly exogenous to conflict dynamics. The theory predicts that the positive effect of collective action capacity will be strongest in areas furthest from, and weakest (or negative) in areas closest to, centers of state power.

The theory also predicts that the positive effect of community social cohesion will wane over the course of the observed panel of CPP-NPA territorial control data. The time frame of the data tracks the progression from enemy-centric to population-centric COIN. Following the government's 2010 announcement of the strategic shift, the military began the infant stages towards the transition to population-centric COIN in 2011. The ideals of the population-centric strategy are far from perfectly implemented into the practical counterinsurgency strategy on the ground. But by 2014, the military had made substantial progress towards implementing population-centric elements into its counterinsurgency operations and delivering economic development programs in the periphery. Though COIN strategy is responsive to conflict developments, decisions are made at the national level and incorporate political and external security components exogenous to the conditions in particular villages.

### **4.3 The Barangay-Level Key-Informant Interviews**

Observing rebel territorial control, rebel governance, and community collective action capacity, especially at the local level, is extremely difficult. The available administrative data from the Philippines notably lacks indicators of rebel governance, required to verify the accountability theory's mechanisms, and relies exclusively upon measures of family-based social structure to operationalize social capital and collective action capacity. To complement the quantitative analysis, I draw upon Key-Informant Interviews in a sample of villages within three historically conflict-affected provinces in

south-eastern Mindanao: Agusan del Sur, Compostela Valley, and Davao Oriental. I developed a semi-structured questionnaire designed to trace the causal process linking community social cohesion and collective action capacity to CPP-NPA territorial control and governance within each village. For selected villages, I investigate the extent to which the conflict processes as described by the respondent are consistent with the accountability theory's proposed mechanisms, as compared to plausible alternative theories.

## **Design and Sampling Procedure**

Because the relevant unit of analysis for the theory and empirical investigation is the village, rather than the individual, I designed the data collection procedure to construct a representative sample of villages. To ensure the sample of villages remain representative of the three provinces while also maximizing the number of villages sampled given the budget constraint, I used a cluster random sampling procedure. First, municipalities were randomly selected, with probability proportional to the number of barangays in the municipality. Second, five barangays were selected at random within each selected municipality. The final sample includes 75 villages in 15 municipalities.

The recruitment of respondents is *not* designed to create a representative sample of individuals. Rather, I specifically targeted village experts to provide information on the community's history of interactions with the communist insurgents in the area.<sup>15</sup> Specifically, I recruited primarily village elders, because they were present in the community prior to the initial stages of communist insurgent presence, lived through periods of communist control, and remained in the village at the time of

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<sup>15</sup>Please see Appendix B for additional details on the recruitment procedure.

the data collection. As a result, elders are in the best position to recount the process by which communist party members and insurgents interacted with the local population, and the contemporary background conditions in the community at each stage. Enumerators affiliated with an independent research firm, the Association of Psychologists Helping Practitioners (APHP), conducted the interviews.<sup>16</sup>

The sampling frame was restricted to the three provinces because of resource and security constraints. In case of emergency, enumerators were not sent to interview sites too far from the base in Davao City.<sup>17</sup> Though restricting the sampling frame has its costs, many villages in these provinces have been affected by the communist insurgency at some point over the last few decades, making the region an appropriate area to study the dynamics of communist insurgent interactions with local communities. In fact, the AFP intelligence report provided by OPAPP suggests that Compostela Valley and Agusan del Sur were listed as the top two provinces in terms of the level of the communist insurgency in the first half of 2013. Davao Oriental ranked only the 21st most affected province, but it did rank the fourth highest in terms of communist insurgent manpower.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>APHP is a team of researchers whose director and personnel are faculty and affiliates at Ateneo de Davao University, mainly in the Psychology Department. The researchers have years of experience providing services for individuals exposed to violence and conducting research on sensitive topics related to the insurgency and human rights abuses, especially in the area of the sampling frame. I partnered with the APHP research team because in many areas included in the sample, locals were likely to be skeptical of foreigners asking about communist activity. The APHP team warned that potential respondents may assume an American asking about the history of communist organizations in the area must be a member of the CIA. In order to maintain the integrity of responses to the questionnaire and to reduce the security risks to the research team, I did not accompany the enumerators to the interview sites.

<sup>17</sup>Municipality centers are reachable by car and enumerators would be required to stay overnight in a local accommodation at most one night for each research trip.

<sup>18</sup>These rankings are reported in the AFP year-end intelligence assessment addressing the state of the communist insurgency, provided to the author by OPAPP. The rankings are based on a weighted average of the manpower, firearms, level of insurgent control over villages, and the number of violent incidents involving the communist insurgents recorded in the Province during the first half of 2013.

## Key-Informant Interviews

The main challenge in executing the interviews was to communicate with the interview respondents precisely what information about their village was needed. The concepts underlying collective action capacity and rebel governance are complex and difficult to observe with precision. Respondents had difficulty providing a dispassionate account of communist insurgent activity in the village; many found it challenging to distinguish their normative views about the communists and the government from the objective facts regarding insurgent and government/counterinsurgent actions in the community. Enumerators and respondents also occasionally misinterpreted or ignored important parameters set for the timeline of rebel control and governance. For example, when asked about NPA activities during its initial presence in the village, usually during the 1970's or 1980's, respondents often digressed towards recounting more recent history or devolved into speculation about what the NPA personnel did during their time in the village.

To focus the discussion and draw clear distinctions for the respondents, I adopted a strategy from Arjona (2010, 2016), using vignettes to describe hypothetical villages with varying characteristics on each particular dimension of collective action capacity, rebel governance, and accountability enforcement (observable collective action in response to rebel actions). For each concept dimension measured in the vignette module, the vignette presents a pair of descriptions of hypothetical villages. The first hypothetical village in each vignette pair is characterized on the positive pole on the range of the variable's observable values and the second hypothetical village is characterized on the variable's negative pole.<sup>19</sup> For each item in the vignette modules,

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<sup>19</sup>Goertz (2006) defines the positive and negative poles as the opposing extreme values on the underlying continuum of possible observable variation in a particular concept. For example, for a research question attempting to explain the outcome of international crisis bargaining, the positive pole may be war while the negative pole is peace, whether through negotiated settlement or maintenance of the status quo.

the enumerator read the descriptions of these two hypothetical villages and asked the respondent to indicate which village is more similar to their own. Consider the example of the first question from the Rebel Governance Vignette Module, designed to measure whether the CPP-NPA rebels provide dispute resolution in the village.

### **C1. Justice/Dispute Resolution Vignette**

- BARANGAY A
  - ARMED GROUP personnel administered a fair justice system. By this I mean the ARMED GROUP would provide mediation or adjudication in disputes between individuals or families over land, debts, allegations of theft, or marital disputes in order to avoid violence between disputants. It was clear to the members of the community the ARMED GROUP were an authority in resolving disputes and the criteria they used to make decisions.
- BARANGAY B
  - ARMED GROUP were not involved in settling disputes, or in creating a streamlined process for dispute resolution. When they did get involved in judicial matters, it was to tip the decision in favor of their own personnel or to privilege their more ardent supporters in the barangay.

Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about the ARMED GROUP during periods in which they were at their strongest presence in [BARANGAY NAME].

- BARANGAY A
- BARANGAY B

The positive pole in this example, represented in hypothetical Barangay A, describes a village in which the rebel group provided dispute resolution as a service to the community. The negative pole, represented in hypothetical Barangay B, describes a village in which the rebels did not provide dispute resolution.<sup>20</sup> The vignettes provide

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<sup>20</sup>As much as possible, the vignettes avoid normative language that leads respondents to judge the morality of particular actions or characteristics, or their absence, in a community. In this example, the description of the negative pole represented in Barangay B avoids language that evokes rebel neglect or repression, and rather attempts to present a more neutral description.

a simple representation of the concept in narrative form and contextualized in the local context familiar to the respondent. Of course, these vignettes impose an artificially restricted range of the possible variation. In the dispute resolution example, the rebels may set up surprisingly formal judicial institutions and set clear rules and procedures in certain areas. In others, they may simply get involved informally to prevent particularly intractable pursuits from escalating to violence. The vignette intentionally imposes a stark contrast to make clear the distinction central to the particular variable of interest, and force the respondent to make a clear choice which ideal type more closely matches their village.

The interview builds from the structured, but restrictive, vignette modules with semi-structured, open-ended discussion. The enumerator asks the respondent for additional context regarding the topics in the vignette modules and also asks a series of additional questions in order to develop a descriptive history of community's civil conflict experience. The respondents' narratives provide insights on the mechanisms linking community collective action capacity to rebel conduct, including the process by which rebels exert territorial control and interact with the community, essential to observing the conditions under which NPA are willing and able to exert territorial control and invest in local governance.

## **Limitations of the Interview Data**

The interview data suffer from a few key limitations worth noting, since they impose some constraints on the process-tracing of causal mechanisms. First, many interview respondents seemed adamant to avoid voicing what could be construed as support for the NPA. This leaves open the possibility that the responses may discount the ways in which NPA personnel may have invested resources and effort to provide benefits to

the community. In many interviews, it was difficult to establish a direct link between the community social structure and the cost-benefit calculus of the rebel personnel deciding whether and how to infiltrate the sampled village. This is the main reason the research design called for a medium-N sample sufficient to examine the patterns in CPP-NPA territorial control and governance rather than concentrate on a small number of villages for process tracing the precise causal chain linking community collective action to NPA activities.

Second, the transcripts reveal the possibility of some confusion regarding timeline in the interviews. The questionnaire was designed to elicit descriptions of past NPA behavior, specifically during the initial phase of NPA presence in the area and during time periods in which the local NPA units had greater control in the village. However, many interview respondents were either wary about assigning motives and intent to the NPA personnel in their area, especially since for many the peak of NPA presence occurred decades ago in the 1970's-80's, or simply assumed that the researcher would be more interested in recent conflict processes. Therefore, many respondents tended to shift the conversation towards more recent history of NPA activities. Despite the request for elder respondents for the interview, occasionally the municipality government officials in the area nonetheless set the interview with current leaders who were children at the time of heavy NPA presence in the community. Enumerators occasionally failed to correct the respondent's tendency to focus on recent history rather than describe the first periods of NPA presence. The recent history of the conflict unsurprisingly yields lower levels of rebel territorial control and governance, owing to counterinsurgent success and NPA disintegration over the last decade or so of the conflict.

Finally, because the procedure for recruiting interview respondents in sampled

villages operated through the research team's contacts in the municipality centers, the interview respondents are generally from central districts within the barangay rather than the outskirts in which the CPP-NPA generally operate. This respondent recruitment strategy was intentional; it was designed to ensure those interviewed were more centrally connected in the village and had knowledge of the entire village and its history rather than specific peripheral areas. But, it comes at the cost that some selected respondents had less exposure to NPA activities, having lived in the central districts, and possibly increases the level of interview respondents' bias against the NPA.

## 4.4 Empirical Strategy

The empirical strategy tests the accountability theory by investigating the extent to which the evidence drawn from the available quantitative administrative and qualitative interview data are consistent with empirical predictions derived from the accountability theory's propositions outlined in Chapter 3. Proposition 2, which specifies the conditional relationship between community collective action capacity and rebel territorial control, generates empirical predictions testable in the quantitative administrative data. Section 4.5 presents these predictions in the form of testable hypotheses regarding the relationship between community social structure and CPP-NPA territorial control, as measured by the network data constructed from the DSWD census and the AFP intelligence data, respectively. Chapter 5 tests the territorial control hypotheses using econometric analysis of the administrative data. The hypotheses are tested in a standard regression framework, covariate adjustment for potential confounders.

The econometric analysis of administrative data suffers from two main limitations. First, the observed family-based social structure in each village may be endogenous to prior exposure to civil conflict processes (including rebel territorial control and governance) or to other unobserved confounding factors. This possibility yields uncertainty regarding the inferences drawn from the regression results. Second, the administrative data available for econometric analysis do not include measures of rebel governance, required to investigate the accountability theory's mechanisms. To complement the quantitative analysis, Section 4.5 also presents hypotheses that specify the independent (exogenous) effect of collective action capacity on NPA investment in territorial control, and the effect of collective action capacity on investment in rebel governance (derived from Proposition 1), testable in the qualitative interview data.

Furthermore, in Section 4.6 I present plausible alternative theories for rebel conduct and specify hypotheses testable in the Key Informant Interview transcripts for each alternative theory. These alternative theories are consistent with the observed correlations in the econometric analysis, but propose theoretical mechanisms that contradict the accountability theory's mechanisms. If the qualitative interview data falsifies these alternatives, this increases confidence in the inferences supporting the accountability theory. I focus on two alternative theories. First, the endogenous collective action capacity theory argues that prior exposure to rebel territorial control increases community social structure as well as future rebel territorial control. Second, a predatory theory of rebel control suggests that community collective action capacity increases rebel territorial control by facilitating targeted coercion, permitting territorial occupation at lower costs of violent repression. The predatory mechanism directly contradicts the accountability theory's mechanism, which proposes that collective action capacity increases the expected value of population-based benefits and community bargaining power.

Chapter 6 tests the accountability theory against its alternatives using evidence from the interviews conducted with village experts in Eastern Mindanao. I select specific villages from the full sample in which to process-trace the emergence (or not) of communist insurgent territorial control and governance in the area. I summarize the evidence across selected villages to adjudicate between the accountability theory and its competitors.

The accountability theory of rebel regimes is falsified if one or more of the following empirical patterns emerge from the evidence: 1) the correlations between CPP-NPA territorial control and village social structure observed in econometric analysis are inconsistent with the empirical hypotheses derived from Proposition 2; 2) the qualitative interview evidence is consistent with an endogeneity (reverse causality) claim that the observed correlation results from the effect of prior CPP-NPA territorial control on village social structure *and* not the other way around as proposed by the accountability theory; or 3) the qualitative interview evidence reveals patterns of rebel governance consistent with the alternative predatory rebel theory and inconsistent with the accountability theory's Proposition 1. Weak support for the theory will occur if the first stage analysis is consistent with the accountability theory and either the robustness results and/or the qualitative evidence available to investigate causal mechanisms are inconclusive. This empirical investigation represents a first step in testing the accountability theory of rebel regimes. Future work will investigate the mechanisms in other conflict cases for comparison.

## 4.5 Hypotheses: Accountability Theory

### Rebel Territorial Control Hypotheses

Proposition 2 suggests that community collective action capacity increases territorial control under conditions in which the community expects little or no protection and access to basic services from the state or local power brokers, but that collective action capacity decreases territorial control in conditions under which the community expects greater benefits associated with ousting rebels from the village. Especially because of the national government's concurrent expanding state-building and economic development efforts and transition to population-centric COIN, the state represents the primary outside option for communities to obtain protection and services. I test the accountability theory's proposed conditional effect of collective action capacity, using the Good Governance Index (GGI): the central government's performance ratings for the Local Government Units (LGU), the municipality-level administrative unit. The GGI is designed to measure the quality of service provision and administration in the municipality, as defined above.

**Hypothesis 1.** *Collective Action Capacity, Local Government Performance, and NPA Territorial Control:*

*CPP-NPA territorial control increases with village social cohesion (bridging) in areas with low LGU performance. The positive correlation between village social cohesion (bridging) and CPP-NPA territorial control declines as the LGU performance increases, and reverses direction when LGU performance is sufficiently high.*

Because the quality of local government services may be endogenous to conflict processes and/or community social structure, I also investigate the conditional relationship by examining the geographic and temporal trends in the relationship between

community social cohesion and observed territorial control. The theory predicts that the positive effect of community social cohesion on rebel territorial control will be greatest in areas and during time periods in which the government administrative capacity is particularly low and in which the counterinsurgents use primarily enemy-centric tactics.

The observed panel of the AFP's data on CPP-NPA territorial control corresponds to the shift from enemy-centric to population-centric COIN under the IPSP-Bayanihan. Therefore, state-building efforts and population-centric COIN increase and expand into the periphery over time during the panel. The Aquino administration accompanied the shift in COIN tactics with investments to extend anti-poverty and economic development programs, reform local governance, and other state-building efforts to peripheral communities increases over the course of the panel.

**Hypothesis 2. Temporal Trends:**

*At the beginning of the observed panel (2011), village social cohesion will increase CPP-NPA territorial control. The positive correlation between village social cohesion and CPP-NPA territorial control will decline in magnitude and reverse direction from year-to-year over the course of the panel.*

In areas close to the central government's centers of power, especially the major political and economic centers in the National Capital Region and Cebu, the theory expects the effect of collective action capacity on CPP-NPA territorial control to be negative. For regions with a long history of state penetration into society, in which the government has developed a strong service-delivery infrastructure, communities on average have greater incentive to use their bargaining power to deter rebel entry. In areas distant from the government's centers of power, where the state has minimal presence or a history of neglect, the theory expects the effect of collective action

capacity to be positive.

**Hypothesis 3. *Regional Trends:***

*In regions furthest from centers of state power, village social cohesion increases CPP-NPA territorial control. In regions closest to centers of state power, social cohesion decreases CPP-NPA territorial control.*

Finally, it is worth clarifying that, whether or not conflict process also influence subsequent community social cohesion and organizational structure, the accountability theory implies pre-existing community collective action capacity has an independent effect on rebel decision-making regarding investment in territorial control. Though the quantitative data do not include village-level communist control measures prior to the family networks in order to examine endogeneity in the quantitative data, the claim underlying the exogenous effect of collective action capacity is testable in the qualitative analysis of interview data.

**Hypothesis 4. *Exogenous Collection Action Capacity:***

1. *Village experts report that CPP-NPA personnel intentionally seek out, and may be dependent on, pre-existing social and leadership structures to exert territorial control.*
2. *Village experts report that pre-existing social and leadership networks in the community facilitate communication with, organize support for, and influence/manage relationships with CPP-NPA personnel attempting or establishing territorial control.*

## **Rebel Governance Hypotheses**

Proposition 1 predicts that community collective action capacity generally increases rebel governance, with the exception of villages exposed to severe government neglect or repression (for example, villages exposed to the Lost Command or other military-perpetrated indiscriminate violence). Precisely because the theory implies the underlying relationship between collective action capacity and governance costs affects rebel territorial control in the first place, the observable relationship between collective action capacity and the level of rebel governance is not clear-cut. The increase in the demand for rebel governance has a deterrent effect on the NPA unit's decision whether, or to what extent, to invest the resources to control territory in the village. In other words, the theory implies that full range of variation in rebel governance is not necessarily observable in the empirical record, because villages with high community collective action capacity are less likely to experience rebel territorial control necessary to observe the level of governance. Therefore, tracing the causal process in selected village cases represents an especially critical method to empirically test the accountability theory's mechanisms.

The accountability theory implies that, in communities with adequate outside options, collective action capacity increases rebel governance by enhancing community bargaining power to demand better protection from civil war violence and access to basic services in exchange for material support. The theory predicts that village experts will describe NPA investment in governance activities to appease the local population and “win hearts and minds” in response to organized capacity for collective action. Local leadership may communicate, even pressure, NPA personnel to adopt particular policies or actions during periods in which they operate in surrounding territory. NPA personnel may consult local leaders to negotiate a revolutionary tax rate, limit recruitment of child soldiers, and exercise restraint regarding the use of

civilian-targeted violence as punishment for individuals supporting the government. In areas exposed to state repression or extreme neglect, the theory expects lower levels of rebel governance. The community may be willing to sacrifice resources or protect valuable information in defiance of counterinsurgents without the *quid pro quo* expectation of rebel governance.

**Hypothesis 5. Collective Action Capacity and Rebel Governance:**

1. *In villages with a history of military abuses (repression) or extremely low levels of pre-insurgency state service provision (neglect), village experts will report weak or no CPP-NPA investment in governance during periods of rebel control. Village experts may express the virtues of NPA presence and willingness to collaborate with CPP-NPA without expectation of governance.*
2. *In villages with at least moderate state capacity to provide protection and services, village experts will report CPP-NPA investment in governance traceable to community pressure. Village experts may report CPP-NPA consultation with community members regarding insurgents' presence in the community, access to resources, and/or established public order.*

## 4.6 Alternative Theories and Hypotheses

### Endogeneity to Prior Conflict Processes

Because the family structure data measuring collective action capacity may be endogenous to conflict processes or other confounding factors, the econometric results must be interpreted with caution. The empirical relationship between community collective action capacity and rebel territorial control observed in the data may be capturing the effect of antecedent conflict exposure on the observed village social

network structure. Existing research has advanced plausible mechanisms regarding the independent effect of conflict exposure on community cohesion. Some of these arguments undermine the accountability theory.

One plausible mechanism suggests that exposure to armed conflict between rebels and the government, and to rebel territorial control, may cause population displacement. Community members less sympathetic to the rebels, or with strong ties to the state, may flee rebel-controlled villages for fear of being targeted with violence for suspected collaboration with the state. Likewise, in areas secured by the state, community members that had supported the rebels may emigrate to avoid similar reprisals by the counterinsurgents. If this strategic sorting occurs, the underlying social cleavages in the community correspond to political cleavages over support for the civil war combatants. By extension, the targeted loss of community members on one side of the conflict divide may increase downstream community cohesion by retaining only those who share a common sympathy for either the rebels or the government, depending on which side gains control.

Scholars have also argued that common exposure to civil war violence may actually increase community cohesion and collective action capacity by shaping local norms and institutions rather than indirectly through displacement (Blattman 2009). Each of these mechanisms suggests identical predictions regarding the positive correlation between community cohesion and rebel territorial control. Specifically, these alternative theories predict that prior conflict exposure in the community influences the community collective action capacity as well as subsequent motive and opportunity for rebels to seek and maintain territorial control. If the qualitative evidence supports either of these mechanisms, there is cause for concern regarding inferences in support of the accountability theory.

Even if there exists evidence supporting a causal effect of prior rebel territorial control on community cohesion and subsequent rebel territorial control, it is not sufficient to negate the accountability theory. Rather, a valid threat to the accountability theory is one in which the endogenous process is if prior territorial control explains all, or most, of the variation observed in the data; and in which the independent effect of collective action capacity on territorial control is weak or non-existent. If respondents suggest that exposure to prior rebel control and civil war violence increased community cohesion as well as the community's vulnerability to subsequent rebel territorial control *and* refute the independent effect of community cohesion on CPP-NPA territorial control, then this would constitute evidence against the accountability theory.

**Alternative Hypothesis 1. *Endogenous Collective Action Capacity:***

*Village experts report that CPP-NPA territorial control increases community cohesion, and social and leadership structures do not influence CPP-NPA personnel decision-making regarding whether and how to exert control in the village.*

Alternatively, another set of prominent theories suggest that exposure to violence may, under certain conditions, decrease community cohesion. For example, the control collaboration model (Kalyvas 2006, 2012) suggests that civil war violence exacerbates distributional conflict within affected communities, increasing the possibility that rival groups across pre-existing social cleavage lines will spiral into a competition of denunciation and counter-denunciation to access resources and secure protection from the belligerent actor in charge. Because new violent political actors bring with them the potential to drastically alter the distribution of political power and economic resources, distinct social groups may be tempted to shirk cooperation in order to secure access to scarce resources. If prior exposure to rebel territorial control both decreases community cohesion and increases future rebel territorial control, then the

correlation detected in the econometric analysis underestimates the positive independent effect of community collective action capacity on rebel territorial control. If the village experts either refute the effect of prior rebel presence or suggest prior rebel control actually reduces collective action capacity by creating or exacerbating community cleavages, then the endogeneity of community collective action capacity to conflict processes would appear to be inadequate to explain the econometric results; this evidence increases confidence in the econometric evidence consistent with the accountability theory.

## **Predatory Rebel Control**

The predatory theory of rebel regimes argues that rebel groups leverage community mechanisms for collective action to apply coercion more effectively in efforts to control the population. Therefore, rebels are more likely to target communities with high collective action capacity—the costs to control the community are lower—and rebels may be more successful seizing and holding territory in communities with high collective action capacity because they can leverage community cohesion. The predatory theory makes identical predictions regarding the conditional relationship between community collective action capacity and rebel territorial control. Just as state presence may increase the rebels' costs of mobilizing voluntary collective action (accountability theory), it may also reduce the scale and efficiency with which rebels may apply coercive pressure to secure collaboration among the population.

But, the predatory theory's alternative mechanism linking collective action capacity to rebel territorial control makes competing predictions for the conditional relationship between community collective action capacity and rebel governance. In the accountability model, rebels gain collaboration by providing the equilibrium level of

governance. Where the community has sufficiently lucrative outside options, rebels increase investment in service provision and reduce their use of coercive civilian-targeted violence in response to collective action capacity. In the alternative predatory rebel model, rebels gain collaboration by coercing (involuntary) collaboration through the use or threat of targeted violence. Collective action capacity may be correlated with higher levels of rebel territorial control in communities with weak outside options, but the predatory theory predicts collective action capacity also increases insurgent exploitation and violence while reducing service provision.

The predatory theory suggests community collective action capacity may encourage local mobilization of civilian collaboration at lower cost, not through the efficiency of voluntary collective action as in the accountability theory, but rather by increasing the efficiency with which coercive tactics for controlling the population elicit (reluctant) collaboration. Rebels may seek to control communities with greater social and institutional cohesion because they can easily identify pivotal members of society with greater influence over the interests and actions of the population at large. By targeting influential members of society with coercion, rebels leverage their social and political power to corral support among the community as a whole. Rebels prefer to use coercion because it is less costly than investing in the governance apparatus otherwise necessary to garner popular support. In the predatory model, collective action capacity increases the community's vulnerability to rebel predation, and poses a barrier to effective civilian control over rebel personnel, rather than empowering the community to hold rebels accountable to their interests.

**Alternative Hypothesis 2. *Predatory Rebel Control and Governance:***

*Village experts will report CPP-NPA territorial and population control using targeted coercion of pivotal leaders and social organizations used to mobilize collective action*

*in the community; not only in areas of low quality governance/low state capacity, but also in areas with at least moderate governance/state capacity.*

## **Quantitative Evidence: CPP-NPA Territorial Control**

This chapter tests the accountability theory by examining the hypotheses drawn from Proposition 2, describing the relationship between community collective action and rebel territorial control, for their consistency with evidence from the communist insurgency in the Philippines. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 introduce the data and the main econometric model specifications used to test the hypotheses. Section 5.3 tests Hypothesis 1, which predicts that CPP-NPA territorial control will increase with village cohesion (bridging) in villages with poor local governance, and the positive effect will decline as the quality of governance increases. I regress the AFP village-level intelligence measure of CPP-NPA territorial control on network summary statistics drawn from the DSWD census data and potential confounders using the model specification presented in Section 5.2.

Section 5.4 then further interrogates the conditional effect of community collective action capacity on rebel territorial control proposed in the accountability theory by testing Hypothesis 3, which predicts that the direction and magnitude of the effect of community social cohesion will vary by region, and Hypothesis 2, which predicts

the positive effect of community social cohesion on CPP-NPA territorial control will decline over the time frame of the AFP intelligence data. I estimate separate regressions for each region and year, respectively. In the appendix, I further supplement the econometric tests by using alternative measures of CPP-NPA territorial control, community collective action capacity, state capacity, and confounding covariates.

## 5.1 Data

### Communist Insurgent Territorial Control

Recall from Section 4.2, the primary measure of communist insurgent territorial control in the Philippines used in quantitative analysis is drawn from Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) intelligence year-end assessments for the years 2011-2014. For theoretical and data availability reasons, the main analysis collapses the yearly 4-category scale to a cross-sectional dichotomous indicator for whether the NPA held control in a village during any of the four observed years. Additional robustness checks investigate alternative outcome measures using the full scale of the categorical variable and modeling the yearly observations separately.

The intelligence assessments do not include the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), a region in Western and Central Mindanao that has been the center of a self-determination struggle on behalf of the local majority/national minority Moro (Muslim Filipinos) population. The Moro conflict has a long history of violence extending back to the local sultanates resisting Dutch and Spanish influence in Mindanao. The current conflict erupted around the same time as the communist insurgency, largely in response to similar circumstances of government abuses starting with Filipino independence; the Moro leadership expected their own independent

state upon American withdrawal. Also parallel to the communist conflict, the Moro conflict escalated under the Marcos regime. There are strong theoretical reasons to exclude the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the sample. The CPP-NPA is not only inactive in the region, but does not aim to contest territory in Moro areas; the communists have largely avoided seeking territory in the region, chiefly due to the local population's strong identification with, and support for, the Moro struggle for autonomy/independence. Furthermore, the CPP-NPA has occasionally aligned with Moro nationalist groups in common cause against the government. Avoiding contesting Moro territory serves an instrumental strategic purpose to leverage the Moro population's commitment to fighting the government and the army to concentrate communist insurgent efforts elsewhere.

The intelligence assessments also do not report any CPP-NPA control in the National Capital Region (NCR). Though the CPP-NPA do profess the ultimate political goal to seize power in Manila and replace the current regime, the insurgency has yet to progress beyond what Mao (2007 [1937]) calls the initial “strategic defense” phase of the people’s war. Though there are certainly citizens and organizations in the NCR that sympathize politically with the communists, the NPA has been unable to even threaten territorial control in any areas within or near the NCR, where the headquarters of the armed services, the national police, as well as the national legislative and executive branches are based.

Figure 5.1a depicts the villages exposed to communist control during at least one year, the outcome variable in the main regression analysis: 1568 villages (4% of non-NCR/ARMM villages) were exposed to communist control during at least one year. Figure 5.1b and Table 5.1 summarize communist control over time. The number of communist-controlled villages declined precipitously over the panel, from 3% in

Figure 5.1: CPP-NPA Control 2011-2014




Figure 5.1a: The map illustrates the villages exposed to CPP-NPA control during at least one year of the 2011-2014 panel.

Figure 5.1b: presents the number of villages at least “less-influenced” in the given year.

Table 5.1: CPP-NPA Control by Year

|      | Influence (0-3) |             |             |             | Influence $\geq 2$ |             |
|------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|
|      | 0               | 1           | 2           | 3           | 0 & 1              | 2 & 3       |
| 2011 | 32535           | 4165        | 686         | 466         | 36700              | 1152        |
|      | <b>86%</b>      | <b>11%</b>  | <b>1.8%</b> | <b>1.2%</b> | <b>97%</b>         | <b>3%</b>   |
| 2012 |                 |             |             |             | 36761              | 1091        |
|      |                 |             |             |             | <b>97.1%</b>       | <b>2.9%</b> |
| 2013 | 33715           | 3122        | 621         | 394         | 36837              | 1015        |
|      | <b>89.1%</b>    | <b>8.2%</b> | <b>1.6%</b> | <b>1%</b>   | <b>97.3%</b>       | <b>2.7%</b> |
| 2014 | 36726           | 562         | 271         | 293         | 37288              | 564         |
|      | <b>97%</b>      | <b>1.5%</b> | <b>0.7%</b> | <b>0.8%</b> | <b>98.5%</b>       | <b>1.5%</b> |

No. Villages (excluding ARMM, NCR): 37852

2011 to only 1.5% in 2014. The period corresponds to a substantial shift towards population-centric COIN under Aquino. Despite COIN success under the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP), local NPA cells still thrive in remote areas especially in Mindanao, the large southern island with a history of low state penetration and economic exploitation of the indigenous population.

## Village-Level Collective Action Capacity

To measure village collective action capacity from its micro-level foundations, I construct overlapping kinship networks from the Department of Social Welfare and Development's (DSWD) National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS-PR) nation-wide census conducted during 2008-2010, using household head family names. Because of the peculiar history of name reassignment during the Spanish colonial regime (discussed in Section 4.2) and strict laws governing the passage of surnames to new generations, the census data can be used to extract these kinship networks, which represent the primary currency of social capital and collective action capacity in the Philippines, at the time of the census.

*Modularity* is a property of a social network that measures divisiveness in its structure Clauset, Newman and Moore (2004), the inverse of bridging social capital. It uses a community-detection algorithm designed to optimize divisions between groups of individuals in a network, in this case family groups, such that the number of network edges among group members exceeds the number between them. Community detection in the village-level kinship networks drawn from the NHTS-PR census identifies distinct family groups (clans). The modularity statistic compares the number of observed within-group edges to the *expected* number of within-group edges if edges were distributed randomly in the network.<sup>1</sup> The modularity statistic lies in the range  $[-0.5, 1]$ , where positive values indicate that the number of observed within-group edges exceed the number expected under random assignment (Clauset, Newman and Moore 2004; Newman 2006).

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<sup>1</sup>Modularity is calculated using the *igraph* package in R, <http://igraph.org/r/doc/modularity.igraph.html>, which uses the algorithm proposed in Clauset, Newman and Moore (2004).

Figure 5.2: Bridging Illustration





Figure 5.3: Barangay Network Examples



respect to social ties across insular groups described in the case context above. The appendix includes additional analyses using alternative network statistics to measure bridging social capital, yielding similar results.

Figure 5.2 illustrates the differences in network structure that generate variation in the bridging statistic. The household list in Figure 5.2a is represented as the network in Figure 5.2b (the same hypothetical network introduced above in Figure 4.1). Figure 5.2c represents a counter-factual network, if the heads of households 4 and 5 had decided to marry across clan lines rather than within the clan. The counter-factual with inter-clan marriages in Figure 5.2c has a higher bridging score because it contains two intermarriages across family groups (EH and DG), while Figure 5.2b contains no inter-group connections.

Figure 5.3 illustrates the variation in bridging in actual village examples drawn from the census data. The village in Figure 5.3a has a lower bridging score because there are clear delineations into three distinct family groups. The village in Fig-

ure 5.3b has a higher bridging score because intermarriages link households throughout the network.

Figure 5.4a illustrates the distribution of village-level bridging in the sample. The density of the distribution is concentrated at very low bridging scores, and exhibits significant variation from 1.43 standard deviations below to 10.64 above its mean. Figure 5.4b plots the distribution of bridging by the dichotomous measure of CPP-NPA control over the panel. The econometric analysis below is designed to interrogate whether the slightly higher observed bridging in insurgent-controlled communities may be an artifact of confounding factors.

Figure 5.4: Bridging Summary Statistics





Figure 5.4a plots the distribution of village network bridging in the sample. The boxplot in Figure 5.4b represents the distribution of bridging within and across the dichotomous indicator of CPP-NPA control from 2011-2014.

By design, the NHTS-PR conducted a full census of all households only in municipalities with estimated poverty incidence above 50% (Fernandez 2012); 710 of the total 1647 municipalities and cities in the Philippines, 595 of the sub-total 1497

municipalities and cities excluding NCR and ARMM<sup>2</sup> were assessed using the full census. These 595 municipalities contain 13479 villages. In the remainder of the municipalities, the NHTS-PR conducted a full census only in “pockets of poverty” identified by the government's own poverty assessment tools. In the areas of the municipality outside these pockets of poverty, the NHTS-PR invited households to apply for poverty assessment in order to determine their eligibility for program assistance. In these municipalities, non-poor households get included in the sample by a non-random process that differs in crucial ways from non-poor household inclusion in the full census municipalities.

Figure 5.5: NHTS-PR Assessment



<sup>2</sup>I exclude Isabela City and Cotabato City for the same reasons ARMM villages are excluded. Though they are not included administratively in ARMM, Isabela City is the capital of the ARMM island of Basilan and Cotabato City is the main city center in Moro-majority central Mindanao and the political headquarters of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) factions in Maguindanao Province of ARMM.

Figure 5.5 illustrates the geographic variation in the poverty assessment strategies: green regions are assessed using the full census and blue areas are assessed using the combination of full census in “pockets of poverty” and “on-demand assessment” in the rest of the municipality. Red areas are excluded from both samples, the National Capital Region (NCR) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Below, I discuss in greater detail the implications for analysis by describing the alternative village samples used due to missingness and imperfect data.

## Local Government Performance

Figure 5.6: Good Governance Index (2005) Summary Statistics




Figure 5.6a: plots the distribution of the GGI 2005 score in the sample. Figure 5.6b: scatter plot representing the correlation between bridging statistic and the GGI 2005 score in the sample.

I use the 2005 municipality-level Good Governance Index (GGI) score to measure local state/autonomous capacity to deliver services and provide public safety. Figure 5.6 plots the distribution of the 2005 GGI in the sample and its correlation with village network bridging. Crucial to investigating the conditional effect of collective

action capacity, there is substantial overlap between bridging and GGI across the range of both variables; correlation = -0.005.

The government does not assess the GGI in “highly urbanized cities,” so the sample drops 937 of 13487 villages (7%) in 26 of 595 municipalities (4%) when using the GGI score to measure local government performance. Because they are densely populated environments near centers of state power, do not experience CPP-NPA territorial control, and have very sparse networks (low bridging), excluding urban areas from the analysis is not without theoretical justification. The descriptive analysis examining the correlation between community social structure and NPA territorial control across regions and over time provides alternative, though rough, proxies of local communities’ outside options.

## Confounding Factors

The regression analysis includes covariate adjustment for potential confounders correlated with both family network structure and rebel control. Village size affects the extent to which the community may be divided into distinct groups and the possible density of ties within and across groups. In very small villages, families may be forced to marry outside the community, providing less opportunity for connections within or across groups. Large networks are typically sparse, because the number of possible connections grows exponentially with the number of nodes. The model specification controls for the number of families in the village network.

I measure the state’s cost to projecting power to the village using the municipality’s distance to the provincial capital, typically an urbanized center with comparatively high levels service provision and local headquarters for police and military

forces. As in many civil war contexts, the CPP-NPA insurgents seek territorial concealment in heavily forested and mountainous areas. I use geo-referenced Land Cover data to calculate the distance in kilometers between each village's centroid and the edge of the closest *densely* forested area.<sup>3</sup> I measure terrain roughness using NASA's Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) data covering the topography of the Philippines.<sup>4</sup> Community-level preference alignment with the communist insurgency is likely related to poverty incidence. I include the percentage of poor households in the village, with the expectation that poverty increases alignment with communist rebels. I do not include other development indicators from the census (dwelling construction materials, water access, electricity access, tenure status, health and education) because these components are aggregated to designate household poverty status. Including the component indicators introduces collinearity. In the supplementary appendix, I conduct robustness analysis substituting alternative control variables.

## The Sample used in Analysis

The main empirical analysis restricts the sample to municipalities assessed with a full census and excludes villages in ARMM.<sup>5</sup> Though the sample of villages in the main analysis is non-random, it represents a subset of particular importance to the study of community-level dynamics of insurgency. On each of the key covariates representing structural and community interest mechanisms predominant in the existing litera-

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<sup>3</sup>For villages with dense forests within their borders, the distance is 0.

<sup>4</sup>I calculate distances and the terrain ruggedness score using *rgdal*, *rgeos*, *raster* and *sp* packages in R. Clipped Land Cover and SRTM data for the Philippines were downloaded from the PhilGIS project website: <http://philgis.org/>.

<sup>5</sup>The main analysis excludes the entire National Capital Region (NCR), the seat of the national government and headquarters for all branches of the AFP and the Philippines National Police (PNP), and other highly urbanized cities, since the NHTS-PR conducted partial census in these areas. Because the insurgency has been confined to the "strategic defense" stage, primarily seeking control in rural areas, it has not obtained a foothold in these areas.

ture, the full census sample represents a higher risk of rebel territorial control. These are precisely the units of territory in conflict-affected states of greatest relevance for the theory emphasizing community collective action capacity, since the argument is designed to complement the existing research by explaining variation within areas in which structural and interest-based theories suggest rebel territorial control is feasible. Though analysis in this sample limits its scope of generalizability, it contributes to the literature by explaining the expansion and contraction of insurgency within the periphery, which is essential to advancing understanding of protracted civil conflict.

Table 5.2 describes the balance across full and partial census villages on key covariates. Villages in full-census municipalities are poorer, further from the provincial capital, closer to dense forests, have lower quality governance, more rugged terrain, and, crucially, a higher proportion of communist-controlled villages. Because the partial census method systematically under-reports non-poor households by design, I compare the social structure across full and partial census villages by examining networks constructed among poor households only. Note, the distribution of the bridging statistic within poor household networks is nearly identical across full and partial census villages.

Table 5.2: Covariate Balance

| Predictor                  | Full Census      | Partial Census   | Pr(Diff. in Means = 0) |
|----------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------------|
|                            | Villages         | Villages         |                        |
|                            | Mean (Std. Dev.) | Mean (Std. Dev.) |                        |
| Poverty Incidence          | 42.86 (11.89)    | 25.44 (14.2)     | < 0.01                 |
| Governance Score (2005)    | 131.53 (68.97)   | 153.68 (93.11)   | < 0.01                 |
| Dist. Provincial Cap. (km) | 42.49 (40.29)    | 32.25 (26.05)    | < 0.01                 |
| Terrain Ruggedness         | 234.35 (295.84)  | 151.41 (260.11)  | < 0.01                 |
| Dist. to Dense Forest (km) | 32.44 (45.81)    | 36.96 (24.92)    | < 0.01                 |
| Bridging (Poor HH only)    | -0.85 (0.12)     | -0.86 (0.14)     | < 0.01                 |
| CPP-NPA Control            | 0.04 (0.19)      | 0.02 (0.13)      | < 0.01                 |

Furthermore, the results are consistent in robustness checks using the full sample of full and partial census villages (excluding NCR and ARMM), in which community networks are constructed using only the population of poor households.<sup>6</sup> A village's poor population likely differs from the non-poor in important ways relevant to collective action capacity. But, examining networks among the poor population is nonetheless especially relevant, considering the CPP-NPA typically targets poor, aggrieved populations for mobilization. That the results are consistent across these two sets of sample selection and measurement choices reduces, but does not eliminate, concerns regarding biased inferences.

The final sample used in the main regression analysis includes 12472 villages in 569 municipalities. The remaining 1007 missing villages are excluded because there were no direct matches with the village units in the GADM database of Global Administrative Areas<sup>7</sup> used to calculate the geographic variables, including the distance to dense forests, terrain ruggedness, and the municipality distance to the provincial capital. These villages were incorporated, carved out of existing villages, after the GADM database was collected but before the 2014 official list of administrative units taken from the official Philippines government statistics agency.

## 5.2 Econometric Model

Because the predictors are time-invariant, in the main analysis I collapse the yearly observations of communist insurgent control into a cross-section. The outcome variable of interest is a dichotomous measure for whether the insurgents exerted control

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<sup>6</sup>The supplementary appendix provides further detail regarding the missing villages and municipalities, and presents the results of analysis using the full sample of villages (excluding ARMM) including villages assessed in a partial census.

<sup>7</sup><http://gadm.org/>

in the village during at least one of the observed years of the panel. The structure of the data requires adjustments to basic regression models. First, the primary measure of rebel control is dichotomous (discrete and bounded). Second, CPP-NPA control is spatially concentrated. Because a great deal of political power is vested in the municipal government and rebel mobility is constrained by limited resources, CPP-NPA control clusters geographically. Third, the theory proposes a conditional effect of collective action capacity on rebel territorial control, which requires exploring how the relationship between bridging and CPP-NPA control changes with local government performance and state presence.

I fit a multilevel logit model with municipality-varying intercepts to account for the dichotomous outcome variable and adjust coefficient and standard error estimates for geographic dependencies (Gelman and Hill 2006). The logit specification models the rebel territorial control outcome as a latent continuous variable corresponding degree of rebel control,  $C^*$ , divided into the observed discrete categories ( $C = \{0, 1\}$ ) based on *cut-points* in the continuous scale estimated within the model:

$$C_{ij} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } C_{ij}^* < c_1 \\ 1 & \text{if } C_{ij}^* \geq c_1, \end{cases}$$

where  $i$  indicates the village and  $j$  indicates the municipality.

The multilevel model assumes group (municipality)-level effects are uncorrelated with the random error. The results are vulnerable to bias if there exist unobserved covariates that correlate with the municipality effects. To examine robustness of the results, I relax this assumption and fit a logit model with province-level fixed effects. For space constraints, I report the results, which are substantively identical to the multilevel results, in the appendix.

I privilege the multilevel rather than fixed effects model for a few reasons. First, the fixed effects model identifies effects using within-group variation only, and therefore cannot explore variation across groups, though comparing the effects of collective action capacity across regions and stages of development is of explicit interest and primary relevance to testing the accountability theory of rebellion. Furthermore, because they lack variation on the outcome variable, groups cleared of communist control are dropped from the fixed effects analysis. Yet, comparing conflict-affected to cleared areas is of obvious importance. Second, using fixed effects precludes the use of group-level covariates in the regression model, since doing so introduces collinearity (Gelman and Hill 2006, p. 7, 68.). Because the available measures of local government performance and counterinsurgent capacity are at the municipality level, this precludes including municipality fixed effects.<sup>8</sup> However, municipality leaders exercise power over resources and policy-making and coordinate with AFP, and in certain cases with NPA, personnel to negotiate belligerents' movements through the municipality, making it the appropriate unit for grouping effects. Finally, the fixed effects model inflates the explanatory importance of the municipality-specific effects, especially in municipalities with fewer villages (Gelman and Hill 2006, p. 253). The multilevel structure leverages within- and across- municipality variation, and incorporates information from municipalities with little or no variation in CPP-NPA territorial control, by modeling the distribution of municipality-specific effects in order to estimate the average effect of the predictors of interest across all municipalities for which data are available.

To test the conditional effect of bridging on CPP-NPA territorial control pro-

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<sup>8</sup>For this reason, in the fixed effects model presented as a robustness check in the appendix, I include province-level, rather than municipality-level, fixed effects.

posed in Hypothesis 1, I fit Model 1, which includes a linear interaction between bridging and the GGI measure of local government performance.

**Model 1.**  $C_{ij} \sim \text{logit}^{-1}(\alpha_{j[i]} + \tau B_{ij} + \rho G_j + \kappa B_{ij} * G_j + \mathbf{X}_i \beta, \sigma_C^2),$

$$\alpha_{j[i]} \sim N(\delta_0 + \mathbf{W}_j \delta, \sigma_\alpha^2)$$

where  $C_{ij}$  is the dichotomous indicator for whether the village is under communist insurgent control (at least “less-influenced”) during at least one of the observed years in the panel,  $B_{ij}$  is the village network bridging measure, and  $G_j$  the municipality-level local government performance measure in village  $i$  and municipality  $j$ .  $\tau$  represents the estimated fixed effect<sup>9</sup> coefficient on  $B_{ij}$  when government performance is at 0, and  $\rho$  represents the coefficient on  $G_j$  when village bridging is at 0.  $\kappa$  represents the coefficient on the interaction term.  $\sigma_C^2$  represents the the unmeasured error in the distribution of village-level CPP-NPA territorial control.  $\alpha_j$  and  $\sigma_\alpha^2$  represent the municipality-specific intercept and variance, respectively.  $\mathbf{X}$  is a matrix of village-level covariates, including network size, distance to dense forests, terrain ruggedness, and poverty incidence;  $\beta$  is the vector of coefficients.  $\mathbf{W}$  is a matrix of municipality-level covariates, including local government performance and distance to the provincial capital;  $\delta$  is the vector of coefficients. In the analysis, all predictors are standardized; one-unit changes in most of the raw measures are substantively insignificant.<sup>10</sup> Municipality-specific effects are drawn from a normal distribution conditional on municipality-level covariates. The multilevel model calculates coefficient and standard error estimates accounting for inter-village dependencies by modeling municipality effects.

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<sup>9</sup>I use the term “fixed effect” here in the manner of Gelman and Hill (2006): the effect does not vary across groups in this *varying-intercept* specification, as it would in a *varying slope* specification.  $\tau$ ,  $\rho$ , and  $\kappa$  represent fixed effects in the sense that they represent the average effects of the corresponding variable across groups.

<sup>10</sup>For example, a one-unit change in the raw bridging score represents nearly its full range.

The linear interaction term requires a variety of assumptions, including the assumption that the effect of bridging changes linearly over the range of government performance. As an alternative Model 2 groups observations into quartiles of local government performance and includes a varying slope allowing the effect of bridging to vary across these ordered categories of government performance.

**Model 2.**  $C_{ij} \sim \text{logit}^{-1}(\omega_{h[i]} + \tau_{h[i]} B_{ij} + \mathbf{X}_i \beta + \mathbf{W}_j \delta, \sigma_C^2),$

$$\omega_{h[i]} \sim N(0, \sigma_\omega^2),$$


where  $h$  represents the specific level of local government performance,  $\omega$  represents the varying intercept for local government performance level, and  $\sigma_\omega^2$  represents the variance in government performance level effects. In the appendix, I include robustness checks using alternative ways of categorizing government performance.

### 5.3 Main Results

I first present the bivariate correlation between village-level network bridging and CPP-NPA territorial control, adjusting for possible confounders using the multilevel model structure. While this analysis demonstrates the overall relationship within the four years observed in the Philippines, it does not directly test the theory's implications, which suggests the relationship between collective action capacity and rebel territorial control should vary with the community's outside options associated with state presence.

Figure 5.7 presents the simple bivariate relationship between communist insurgent territorial control and community bridging: 5.7a plots the coefficient estimates

Figure 5.7: Bivariate Relationship between Communist Control and Community Bridging




| Sample   | Outcome Variable   | Varying Intercepts   |
|--|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>N: 49888</li> <li>Villages: 12472</li> <li>Municipalities: 569</li> <li>Years: 4</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1: Influence <math>\geq 2</math></li> <li>0: Influence <math>&lt; 2</math></li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Municipality</li> <li>Year</li> </ul> |

Figure 5.7a: dots represent coefficient estimates and line segments represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 5.7b: predicted probabilities of CPP-NPA influence over the range of the bridging score. The thick solid line represents the average marginal probability, averaged over all municipality-years. The vertical solid lines plot the middle 50% of municipality-year specific predicted probabilities at the given value of bridging. Vertical dashed lines represent the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the bridging score.

and 95% confidence intervals and 5.7b plots the predicted probabilities of CPP-NPA influence across the range of bridging. The coefficient estimate on bridging is positive and distinguishable from zero: on average, community social cohesion increases rebel territorial control in the Philippines (2011-2014) sample. The odds ratio suggests a one standard deviation increase in the bridging score is associated with a 15.1%, or between 6% and 24.9%, increase in the odds a village-year will be at least “less influenced.”

Figure 5.8: Model 1 Results



| Sample                | Outcome Variable        | Varying Intercepts |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| · N (Villages): 12472 | · 1: Influence $\geq 2$ | · Municipality     |
| · Municipalities: 569 | · 0: Influence $< 2$    |                    |

Figure 5.8a: dots represent coefficient estimates and line segments represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 5.8b: The marginal effect of village level bridging as it changes with the municipality-level governance score. The dotted black lines represent the 95% confidence intervals surrounding the estimate.

Hypothesis 1 predicts the positive effect of village bridging social capital on CPP-NPA territorial control is greatest where state/local governance and counterinsurgency capabilities are weakest, and that the magnitude of the effect will decline, and eventually reverse direction, as the state/local governance and counterinsurgent capabilities increase. To test Hypothesis 1, the main model specifications explore the correlation between community bridging and communist territorial control as it changes with the local government performance as measured by the Good Governance Index (GGI) in 2005. Figure 5.8 presents the results from Model 1, which specifies a linear interaction between village bridging and local government performance. Fig-


ure 5.8a plots the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals and Figure 5.8b plots the marginal effect of village bridging on CPP-NPA influence, which illustrates how the relationship between insurgent control and village bridging changes over the range of local government performance. The correlation between insurgent control and village bridging is positive with greatest magnitude at the lowest levels of municipality government performance, and the positive correlation declines as government performance increases.

Figure 5.9 presents the change in predicted probability of CPP-NPA control as bridging increases, holding local government performance constant at selected intervals and all other variables at their observed values. The slope of the curve representing the average marginal probability of communist control over the range of bridging is positive and steep at the minimum value of local government performance, and declines precipitously as government performance increases to its 75th percentile. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 1.

The effect of bridging, while distinguishable from 0 at 95% confidence intervals for a substantial portion of the range in municipality governance, may appear substantively insignificant at first glance. Because CPP-NPA influence is so rare (only 2.27% of village-years are at least “less-influenced”) while the costs of conflict are so high, even slight changes in the probability of rebel influence are consequential. Moreover, village-level bridging exhibits huge variance in the sample: 1.43 standard deviations below to 10.64 above its mean. Comparisons of the expected level of rebel influence across villages with substantial differences in network bridging are substantively relevant.

Next, consider the results from Model 2, which allows the effect of bridging to vary

Figure 5.9: Model 1 Predicted Probabilities




| Sample                | Outcome Variable        | Varying Intercepts |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| · N (Villages): 12472 | · 1: Influence $\geq 2$ | · Municipality     |
| · Municipalities: 569 | · 0: Influence $< 2$    |                    |

Figure 5.9: Plots the change in predicted probability of CPP-NPA influence over the range of the bridging score, holding the GGI 2005 score at its minimum (Figure 5.9a), 25th percentile (Figure 5.9b), 50th percentile (Figure 5.9c), and 75th percentile (Figure 5.9d). All other covariates are held at the values observed in the data at the specific bridging score. Thick solid lines represent the average marginal probability, averaged over all municipality-years. Vertical solid lines plot the middle 50% of municipality-year specific predicted probabilities at the given value of bridging. Vertical dashed lines represent the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the bridging score.

based on the level (quartile) of local government performance. Figure 5.10 reports coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals. Note that for the bottom two quartiles of government performance, the coefficient estimates on bridging are positive and distinguishable from 0 and the slope of the average marginal predicted probability of communist control is positive, while for the top two quartiles the coefficient estimates and slopes are negative or flat. This is consistent with the expectation that collective action capacity increases rebel territorial control in areas of weak state presence. Figure 5.11 plots the predicted probabilities of communist control over the range of bridging for each quartile of local government performance. Again, the slope representing the predicted probability of communist control in the bottom two quartiles of local government performance, but negative or flat for the top two quartiles of local government performance. Interestingly, the positive slope is steepest in the second quartile of local government performance rather than the first, suggesting the effect of bridging may not change linearly over the range of government performance. Overall,

Figure 5.10: Model 2 Results




| Sample                        | Outcome Variable        | Varying Intercepts  |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|
| · N (Villages): 12472         | · 1: Influence $\geq 2$ | · Govt. Performance |
| · Govt. Performance Levels: 4 | · 0: Influence $< 2$    |                     |

these patterns are consistent with the conditional relationship proposed in the theory.

## 5.4 Temporal and Geographic Trends

The main regression models include covariate adjustment for indicators of local government performance, but do not measure local-level geographic and temporal variation in state-building and COIN tactics. In this section, I first explore the temporal trends in CPP-NPA territorial control, paired with descriptive accounts of the concurrent progression in the government's state-building and counterinsurgency strategies, to investigate empirical evidence for Hypothesis 2, which suggests the positive effect

Figure 5.11: Model 2 Predicted Probabilities



| Sample                        | Outcome Variable        | Varying Intercepts  |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|
| · N (Villages): 12472         | · 1: Influence $\geq 2$ | · Govt. Performance |
| · Govt. Performance Levels: 4 | · 0: Influence $< 2$    |                     |

Figure 5.11: Plots the change in predicted probability of CPP-NPA influence over the range of the bridging score for the villages in the first quartile of local government performance (Figure 5.11a), second quartile (Figure 5.11b), third quartile (Figure 5.11c), and top quartile (Figure 5.11d). All other covariates are held at the values observed in the data at the specific bridging score. Thick solid lines represent the average marginal probability, averaged over all municipality-years. Vertical solid lines plot the middle 50% of municipality-year specific predicted probabilities at the given value of bridging. Vertical dashed lines represent the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the bridging score.

of village bridging social capital on CPP-NPA territorial control should decline and eventually reverse direction from year-to-year over the course of the panel. Next, I explore the geographic trends to test Hypothesis 3, which suggests village bridging should have a positive correlation with CPP-NPA territorial control in regions furthest from the central government's bases of administrative and military power but a negative correlation in areas closest to power centers. In this section, the outcome variable is observed yearly, even though the predictors are time-invariant. I fit a multilevel logit model with varying intercepts for municipality and year as well as municipality- and year-varying slopes for bridging.

**Model 3.**  $C_{ijt} \sim \text{logit}^{-1}(\alpha_{j[i]} + \gamma_{t[i]} + \tau_{jt[i]} B_{ij} + \mathbf{X}_i \beta, \sigma_C^2),$

$$\alpha_{j[i]} \sim N(\delta_0 + \rho G_j + \mathbf{W}_j \delta, \sigma_\alpha^2),$$

$$\gamma_{t[i]} \sim N(0, \sigma_\gamma^2),$$

where  $t$  represents the year of observation and  $\gamma$  represents the year-varying intercept.

Figure 5.12: Model 3 Results (Predicted Probabilities by Year)




Figure 5.12: Predicted Probabilities of CPP-NPA influence across the range of bridging for each year in the panel. Thick solid lines represent the average marginal probability, averaged over all municipality-years. The vertical solid lines plot the middle 50% of municipality-year specific predicted probabilities at the given value of bridging. Vertical dashed lines represent the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the bridging score.

Figure 5.12 plots the change in predicted probability over the range of bridging for each year. In 2011 and 2012, during which Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) state-building and population-centric COIN was in its infancy, community collective action capacity is positively associated with rebel influence. In 2011, the slope representing the change in predicted probability of CPP-NPA territorial control is flat for the bottom quartile of village bridging, but is positive for the top three quartiles and becomes especially steep for the top half of the distribution. In 2013, the trend only becomes positive closer to the 75th percentile and in 2014, by which time state-building had begun to expand into the periphery and population-centric COIN had matured, the trend is negative through the 75th percentile of village network bridging. Because the panel coincides with a simultaneous expansion in the reach

of state control and service delivery into the periphery and a strategic shift towards population-centric COIN, the temporal trend appears consistent with Hypothesis 1.

Figure 5.13 plots the change in predicted probabilities for each region.<sup>11</sup> Regions 1-4 and the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) are on the island of Luzon, where Metro Manila is located. Regions 4A-8 are in the Visayas island chain, closest to Cebu City in Region 7. In these areas nearest centers of state power, bridging appears uncorrelated, or negatively associated, with CPP-NPA control. Regions 4A and 8 are partial exceptions, but are on the outskirts far from Cebu. Regions 9-12 and CARAGA are on the historically marginalized island of Mindanao, in which state projection of power is weakest. In these regions, bridging is consistently positively associated with CPP-NPA territorial control.

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<sup>11</sup>Though the effect of bridging varies by municipality, I show the regional averages because there are too many municipalities to plot and discuss.

Figure 5.13: Model 3 Results (Predicted Probabilities by Region)




Figure 5.13: Predicted Probabilities of CPP-NPA influence for each observed Region. Each includes varying intercepts for municipality. Thick solid lines represent the average marginal probability, averaged over all municipality-years. The vertical solid lines plot the middle 50% of municipality-year specific predicted probabilities at the given value of bridging. Vertical dashed lines represent the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the bridging score.

# CHAPTER 6

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## **Qualitative Evidence: CPP-NPA**

### **Territorial Control and Governance**

Does community collective action independently influence NPA territorial control, or does prior NPA presence explain the correlation observed? Do communities leverage collective action to pressure armed groups to invest in responsive governance, or do armed groups exploit mechanisms for collective action to control communities through coercive violence? This chapter draws upon the interviews with select village leaders in communist insurgency-affected Eastern Mindanao to adjudicate between the accountability theory and plausible alternative explanations. First, Sections 6.1 and 6.2 provide operational definitions, and identify key indicators, of CPP-NPA territorial control and governance observed in Eastern Mindanao. The remainder of the chapter examines the competing hypotheses (outlined in Sections 4.5 and 4.6 above) linking community collective action capacity to variation in CPP-NPA territorial control and governance.

Section 6.3 traces the causal processes linking community social structure and collective action capacity to NPA personnel territorial control and governance in a select subset of the 75 villages in which the research team conducted interviews with

village experts. In drawing upon specific village cases, I illustrate the ways in which each respondent's account supports or contradicts the accountability theory as well as its alternatives; the endogenous collective action capacity and predatory rebel control mechanisms. I find considerable support for the accountability theory in interview respondent testimonies.

I also distinguish the accountability theory of rebel regimes from related, but distinct, theories addressing the relationship between community characteristics and rebel conduct proposed in recent contributions to the literature. In particular, Arjona (2016) has shown that legitimate, effective local leaders and political institutions strengthen the community's hand to retain autonomy from belligerents, including rebel groups, during armed conflict. I draw upon evidence from village expert interviews that demonstrate the importance of local leadership and institutions in shaping rebel investment in territorial control and governance as empirical support for the accountability theory. Local tribal institutions have deep historical roots, and are therefore exogenous to conflict dynamics. Therefore, evidence that local political institutions shape rebel territorial control and governance decisions helps to adjudicate between the accountability theory and the endogenous collective action capacity and predatory rebel control alternative theories, even if it cannot distinguish the accountability theory of rebel regimes from the theory advanced in Arjona (2016). Furthermore, the evidence regarding the importance of local political institutions in driving rebel conduct demonstrates that these forces influence not only the wartime social order, the outcome of interest in Arjona (2016), but also similarly affects rebels' investment in territorial control in the first place. This finding represents a unique contribution to the literature, though it is not the accountability theory's central contribution.

I distinguish the accountability theory from Arjona (2016) by drawing upon village expert interviews that link village social structure, community social and sectoral organizations, and other mechanisms for collective action independent of local leadership and political institutions to variation in NPA investment in territorial control and governance. I show that the accountability mechanism is distinct from the effect of leadership and institutions central to Arjona (2016), and find empirical support in the village expert testimony.

In Sections 6.4 and 6.5, I further interrogate the interview accounts that are consistent with the endogenous collective action capacity and predatory rebel control mechanisms, respectively. Overall, village expert descriptions corroborate the independent effects of community social and organizational structure on the processes by which NPA units seize and maintain territorial control. Though conflict processes do shape community social structure, they cannot account entirely for the relationship between community collective action capacity and CPP-NPA territorial control and governance. Furthermore, though the interview respondents reveal incidents of predatory rebel control, these accounts largely conform to the accountability's predictions.

The village expert interviews are primarily helpful in tracing the causal mechanisms through civilian experiences and perceptions. The accountability theory's proposed mechanisms, of course, also carry implications for the rebels' decision-making processes. Recall the theory posits that rebels estimate the downstream community demands, and possible actions, should they choose to seek territorial control in the village. Because rebels consider the consequences of their interaction with the community prior to deciding whether to seek territorial control, the theory expects they avoid territorial control in areas in which they expect to meet resistance or in which they face a harder bargain with communities. In other words, community action in

response to rebel transgressions represents “off equilibrium path” behavior; in many cases the causal chain may be unobservable in the interviews from a community leader’s perspective. I complement this limitation in the village expert interviews with historical accounts and interviews with military personnel, but further research is required to interrogate the accountability theory’s proposed mechanisms in interviews with NPA unit commanders.

To isolate the independent effect of community collective action capacity on territorial control and rebel governance requires information to measure territorial control and governance during the first period of CPP-NPA presence in the area, and assessing community collective action capacity and state presence immediately preceding this period. Measuring collective action capacity in the community prior to CPP-NPA presence or exposure to civil war violence removes the possibility that community social structure has been affected by conflict processes in a way that would introduce endogeneity bias. For many regions, and particularly the provinces of Eastern Mindanao included in the sampling frame for the Key-Informant interviews, the initial emergence of the NPA occurred within the period between the late 1970’s to the mid 1980’s, during the Marcos regime. Therefore, I draw upon the respondents’ descriptions of various indicators of territorial control and governance during this period in order to trace the causal mechanisms proposed by the accountability theory and its alternatives.

## 6.1 CPP-NPA Territorial Control

The primary indicator of communist insurgent control is the NPA’s ability to keep the state’s agents responsible for security and service provision—counterinsurgent forces

and local government units—from safely or consistently operating in the area. Military personnel seek information regarding insurgent presence in order to avoid moving through areas in which they will be vulnerable to insurgent attack (with given local capabilities). Local informants are essential to collecting this information. To the extent that locals declare the area unsafe for government or military personnel, this represents at least partial NPA territorial control, as defined by the ability to keep enemies—chiefly, the military—out of a defined area.<sup>1</sup>

Even in the detailed village expert interviews, it is typically very difficult or impossible to discern whether a lack of state presence results from NPA organizational or military efforts rather than because of other barriers to state administrative control. Nevertheless, some interview respondents did provide clarity on observable variation in the NPA’s ability to deter government presence in the community. For example, consider the account from the village expert in Magsaysay, Sibagat.

**Respondent:** *When the soldiers will ask if it is safe here, we answer that we are also unsure because we cannot tell if NPAs are still here or they have left the area. If we will say that it is safe, and then they will get shot, then that will tarnish our reputation.*

*...If we are to say that the community is safe, it is with the government and the soldiers. We cannot if there are contacts that have penetrated here because if we will also speak with them, it might be risky. It cannot be assured that it is safe here.*<sup>2</sup>

The respondent’s description illustrates at least partial NPA territorial control, because the military may not be safe from insurgent attacks in the area.

The breadth and depth of community political and social organization under the

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<sup>1</sup>This operationalization is consistent with the definition provided in Chapter 2 and, specifically, in Kasfir (2015).

<sup>2</sup>Magsaysay, Sibagat Interview, pgs. 1-2.

three main communist organizations (CPP, NPA, and NDF) represents a key indicator of communist insurgent control relative to the state adversary, and is considerably more feasible to observe compared to direct evidence of rebel deterrence. Indeed, the Armed Forces of the Philippines intelligence assessments ranking CPP-NPA territorial control are based, in part, on the sophistication of local social and political cadres in the village. In villages with an extensive network of communists and supporters, CPP-NPA personnel were able to access resources and information consistently, even during periods of counterinsurgent presence. In some villages, the CPP-NPA obtained detailed information about the wealth and economic productivity of specific households and businesses, in order to target revolutionary tax collection and discover individuals' efforts to avoid contributing the revolutionary taxes demanded. For example, in Patrocinio, Santa Josefa, counterinsurgents faced greater challenges to making contacts to access on-the-ground information about insurgent presence and capabilities because the NPA had eyes and ears to detect defections. By extension, the military faced higher barriers to winning local support and wresting control from the insurgents.

**Respondent:** *[The NPA] have people here who monitor everybody's business still. They know who is earning and who is not. So if you're earning, they also want a little piece of that. Mostly they ask from businesses operating here. You pay, otherwise they destroy your property. Your product will never reach the market. You wouldn't want to risk that.<sup>3</sup>*

In the villages with the most sophisticated and extensive CPP-NPA organizational structure, respondents described local cadres operating openly in the community and maintaining uninterrupted resource and information collection through formal networks. Interview respondents described a hierarchical organizational structure in which local political operatives were assigned clearly defined responsibilities. Cadres provided the CPP-NPA with information about military and government activities

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<sup>3</sup>Patrocinio, Santa Josefa Interview, pg. 3.

within and near the village, which aided the NPA in executing targeted attacks against the military and escaping counterinsurgent reprisals in order to live to fight another day. Cadres collected revolutionary taxes, including food and supplies to sustain NPA fighters, and thereby reduced NPA vulnerability to counterinsurgent operations. In areas with nearly segmented CPP-NPA territorial control, even community members who did not actively or enthusiastically support the NPA refrained from collaborating with the counterinsurgents.

By contrast, in areas of low territorial control, the CPP-NPA were unable or unwilling to establish the political and organizational infrastructure to access resources and information from the population on a consistent basis. Village experts described intermittent NPA presence and ad-hoc interactions between community members and NPA personnel, rather than sustained relationships. NPA personnel would simply “pass by” the community on their way to other areas, or in retreat from counterinsurgent operations. In these areas, support, also occurred on an ad-hoc basis, if at all. Community members may have provided food and shelter, simply following cultural and social norms that promote helping those in need or they may have surrendered resources out of fear of armed NPA soldiers’ response to resistance.

Interview subjects frequently described a process by which CPP-NPA political operatives “invited” local leaders or elders to discuss the CPP political program and the prospects for collaboration with the community. The NPA sent letters through local contacts requesting, or summoning, particular individuals to attend these political education and recruitment meetings. Meetings typically took place in the mountainous areas, in the forest, or in remote districts far from the village centers, where the risk of government or military detection was lower. In some cases, the NPA instead threatened local leaders with bodily harm, destruction of property, or even assassi-

nation if s/he refused to corral support for the movement or if s/he informed the government of NPA activities.

Local NPA personnel often relied upon alignments with local leaders and traditional governing bodies to exert territorial control in a community,<sup>4</sup> especially when they faced challenges related to either military presence or logistical costs of projecting power. These alignments came in multiple forms. In some villages, the arrangement resembled what Arjona (2016) calls *aliocracy*, a “rule-by-proxy” strategy granting local leaders autonomy over daily governance. On others, the NPA imposed what Arjona (2016) calls *rebelocracy*, a more direct-rule approach to governing the community. To win local leaders’ support, CPP-NPA personnel occasionally provided selective incentives in the form of essential goods, relief from revolutionary taxation, access to weapons, or other security and economic benefits.

In areas and during time periods in which they enjoyed relative strength, the local NPA personnel incorporated strict screening procedures to distinguish between what Weinstein (2007) calls *opportunistic* and *activist* recruits. For example, in areas under their control the NPA only accepted recruits that were able to bring their own weapons. This policy raised the cost associated with joining the movement and removed the incentive to join simply to access arms.<sup>5</sup> NPA personnel subjected recruits to rigorous training and education processes to weed out those that would be more difficult to mold into the organization’s structure and requirements. Moreover, the NPA personnel in these villages were able to rely on the recommendations from trusted local cadres.

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<sup>4</sup>Binicalan, San Luis, Agusan del Sur Interview, pgs. 7-8.

<sup>5</sup>Casoon, Monkayo, Compostela Valley Interview, pg. 7.

Where the CPP-NPA territorial control remained weaker, the NPA personnel relaxed screening mechanisms in order to attract recruits and supporters. They may have promised young, jobless, and uneducated individuals access to weapons or a salary unavailable to them in their home villages. Interview respondents in villages with limited CPP-NPA territorial control testified that one of the main reasons individuals from their village joined the NPA in the first place was based on the desire to access weapons for themselves.<sup>6</sup> This presents a strong contrast to the areas of greater control in which NPA required recruits to supply their own weapons.

## 6.2 CPP-NPA Governance

Rebel governance is categorically different from its state counterpart. Rebel organizations are severely resource-constrained; they typically do not have access to the funds, supplies, or logistical infrastructure to provide services at the same scale as the state's service provision, at least in its areas of administrative control. As the (often substantially) weaker party in an asymmetric war, rebels remain clandestine in order to avoid direct confrontation with the state and its counterinsurgent forces, which impedes efforts to build organizational capacity to rival the state. Moreover, precisely because rebel organizations emerge during wartime with the primary goal to contest a powerful incumbent state's authority, rather than to provide governance, rebel organizations rarely invest in the capacity to rival the state's administrative and service-delivery capacity in the short-to-medium term.

Though rebels cannot or will not provide governance at the scale to rival state service provision in centers of state power, the state's limited projection of military and

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<sup>6</sup>Causwagan, Banaybanay Interview, pg. 3.

administrative power into the periphery yields opportunities for the rebels' limited service provision to rival or exceed the state's service provision in specific localities. Here, I describe the various dimensions of NPA governance observed in the interviews conducted in Eastern Mindanao, and illustrate the range of variation in service provision on these dimensions.

The most important dimension of governance that rebels typically provide is security from external threats, including from exposure to civil war violence. In some villages in Eastern Mindanao that have been historically neglected or repressed by the state, civilians harbor equal if not greater suspicion for the military and the political elites compared to the communists. Under these conditions, NPA presence represented a critical source of security. In communities that suffered under the abuses of the infamous "Lost Command" of the AFP during the 1980's, for example, civilians welcomed the NPA as protectors.<sup>7</sup> The NPA may have extracted resources and imposed rules on the community, but they also, from the community's perspective, performed the valuable role of deterring military presence in the area.

The NPA also in some cases established local order and provided for general public safety through parallel police functions. In 23 (31%) of the sampled villages, interview respondents indicated their village more closely resembled a village in which the NPA were involved in providing public safety compared to one in which the NPA ignored community safety. The NPA may have deterred or disciplined thieves, violent offenders, and other criminals. NPA personnel also may have removed "lawless elements"—criminal syndicates or armed groups devolved into criminal activity—from the area.

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<sup>7</sup>Don Alejandro, San Luis, Agusan del Sur Interview, pg. 6.

**Enumerator:** When the NPA patrolled hereabouts, did it make you feel safe?

**Respondent:** *Ah, no bandits would come here when they know the NPA are in the area. And the soldiers did not come here either, not until the 1990's when they had an encounter near here with the NPA.*<sup>8</sup>

In many remote areas of the Philippines outside government control, another key public goods deficit is the lack of functioning institutions for dispute resolution. Without legitimate government- or tribal-run judicial institutions, disputes can spiral into violence and last generations, with great cost not only in terms of economic productivity but also in human life. This creates space for the rebels to establish legitimacy by enforcing peace and resolving disputes. In 24, or 32%, of the sampled villages, respondents reported their village resembled one in which the NPA played some role in managing disputes and establishing justice. For the most part, the highest degree of intervention in local judicial or dispute resolution institutions described by the interview respondents in the sample referenced only informal or irregular NPA judicial functions.<sup>9</sup>

Like any political organization seeking to establish authority and territorial control in a polity, rebel regimes rely on the threat and use of violence to control its subjects. Because civilians clearly have an interest in minimizing the degree to which rebels rely on coercive means to maintain order, responsive rebel governance is characterized by extremely selective use of violence over a limited set of conditions acceptable to the community. For example, if a community member was found, based on sufficient evidence, to have provided valuable private information about NPA troop movements or vulnerabilities that lead to a counterinsurgent raid, the NPA may have been “justi-

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<sup>8</sup>Cecilia, San Luis, Agusan del Sur Interview, pg. 6

<sup>9</sup>Cecilia, San Luis, Agusan del Sur Interview.

fied” under the social contract to punish that individual.<sup>10</sup> On the non-responsive end of the spectrum, NPA personnel may have been undisciplined in their use of violence. NPA personnel may have simply lacked the resources to adequately investigate alleged transgressions before carrying out sentences designed to deter community members from threatening rebel interests, or they may have deliberately adopted a strategy of excessive violence with the intent to deter non-compliance with the rebel regime.

For the most part, the CPP-NPA units did not have the resources to provide large-scale health and education services in the community. But, in 20 (27%) villages, the respondent suggested the NPA occasionally provided locals with access to medicine, doctors, or with assistance seeking treatments within or outside the village.<sup>11</sup> In select villages, the NPA personnel did enhance access to education in controlled villages. In a few, they provided transportation for students living far from the nearest school or brought books and other supplies to the community to facilitate access to instruction. In extreme cases the NPA even provided funding for selected students to attend secondary school outside the community.<sup>12</sup> Yet, in only 8 (11%) of the villages did respondents suggest the NPA contributed to the education system in the rebel governance vignette module.

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<sup>10</sup>By “justified” I do not mean to condone the use of violence against civilian in war for any reason. I intend to convey only that the use of violence against a community member for particular transgressions of the agreement between the community and rebel personnel may be unlikely to trigger resistance against the rebels, whereas the indiscriminate use of violence or excessive reliance on violence may incite a community response.

<sup>11</sup>Banag-Banag, Sibagat, Agusan del Sur Interview.

<sup>12</sup>Binondo, Baganga, Davao Oriental Interview, pg. 1.

## 6.3 Accountability in CPP-NPA Regimes

This section draws upon the interviews with village experts to trace the processes by which NPA personnel established and maintained control in select communities in Eastern Mindanao. I focus, in particular, on investigating the role, if any, that community social structure and collective action play in shaping NPA personnel strategic investment in territorial control and governance in select villages. I use village cases to illustrate the accountability theory's causal mechanisms and to investigate the (in)consistencies with the alternative endogenous collective action capacity and predatory rebel theories.

The expert interviews reveal that CPP-NPA personnel primarily relied upon pre-existing organizational and institutional structures in order to establish territorial control and maintain support among the local population. This evidence is consistent with the accountability theory and, crucially, inconsistent with the endogenous collective action capacity mechanism that would undermine inferences supporting the accountability theory. Frequently, the NPA organized support through tribal leadership, especially by forming alignments with the local *datu* (tribal leader). As discussed above, these tribal structures have a deep historical and cultural foundation that long pre-dates not only the communist insurgency of the past half-century, but also the independent Philippines state and its American and Spanish colonial predecessors.

Consider the village expert testimony from Binicalan, San Luis, Agusan del Sur:

**Respondent:** *You see when a datu is convinced to join, he brings the members of his clan with him. And when the datu says he doesn't want that any more, his clansmen will go with him. So sometimes, that's how the NPA recruits. They don't try to convince many people. In Lumad [Indigenous Peoples of Mindanao] areas, they just befriend the datu and if he goes with them, he brings along many men already. So they go up together, many of them. They come down together also. That made the NPA very angry. But they did not kill other people here. Only the*

*datu, when he came back here. His men all moved out now. They joined the CAFGU [government-funded armed civilian protection units] because they have no weapons any more. When you join the CAFGU they give you weapons again.*<sup>13</sup>

Consistent with the mechanism proposed in the accountability theory, rebel personnel strategically selected communities with strong and legitimate local leadership in order to secure territorial control at lower mobilization costs. Furthermore, the village expert in Binicalan, San Luis also suggested that the local leadership possessed agency over the decision whether to align with the CPP-NPA or the government, consistent with the accountability mechanism over the predatory rebel control alternative. In particular, the village expert recalls that the community rallied to switch allegiances and join government counterinsurgency efforts to punish the NPA personnel in response to NPA-perpetrated assassinations in the village and surrounding area. This dynamic stands in stark contrast to the predatory mechanism, which proposes that armed belligerents essentially dictate the terms of the relationship with powerless civilians.

The Binicalan interview illustrates one especially common strategy to hold NPA personnel accountable: the community leveraged mechanisms for collective action—the tribal leadership structures—to organize state-funded civil protection units (CAFGU). The government’s investment in resources to support local paramilitary units in the post-Marcos era—including funding, arms, and training for communities to organize militias—dramatically enhanced community outside options, alternatives to alignment with the NPA. Even where arming community protection units did not necessarily increase government control in a particular area, communities with CAFGU units became more self-reliant for security provision, which enhanced bargaining power vis-a-vis NPA personnel. This testimony clearly reveals the importance of state capacity

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<sup>13</sup>Binicalan, San Luis, Agusan del Sur Interview, pgs. 7-8.

in shaping the conditional effect of collective action capacity on NPA success in attempts to control territory.

Contrary to both the endogenous collective action capacity and predatory theories, village experts frequently claimed NPA units were unable to simply pressure local leadership through coercion. Rather, local leaders exercised agency to keep themselves at arms length from rebels and counterinsurgents alike. Consider the village expert account from Ampawid, Laak, Compostela Valley:

**Respondent:** *[W]hen [the NPA] penetrate the barangay, they will gather the people... They will of course look for the leader of the Purok [neighborhood]... What they asked from me is that they wanted to talk to the people of Purok 4, through the leader. But what I bargained from them is that I will not be the one to gather the people since they have their people on the grounds... That is why, when it comes to their favors from me, I don't entertain it because there is a conflict of interest especially because I am a Purok Leader and I am biased towards the government... So what I ask from them is that they let others do it, and not me.<sup>14</sup>*

...

**Enumerator:** Can you feel the pressure from them that they want to intervene in the management of the barangay and the interaction of the people in the barangay even though they don't stay in the barangay?

**Respondent:** *Yes, and that happened in some Puroks in the barangay. For my Purok Ma'am, they were supposed to organize the people and even appoint a leader... but it did not push through because the soldiers from the 25th [Infantry Brigade] came before they have finished organizing the people. But for other Puroks, they were able to organize them and they even assigned a president, vice president, secretary, even treasurer. But that didn't happen to our Purok.* <sup>15</sup>

The Ampawid, Laak respondent illustrates the extent to which NPA territorial control depended on organized political cadres of support, especially in areas of moderate-to-high state administrative and military presence. In response to NPA attempts to

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<sup>14</sup>Ampawid, Laak, CV Interview, pg. 1.

<sup>15</sup>Ampawid, Laak, CV Interview, pg. 2.

gain a foothold in Ampawid, organized local resistance from the leadership raised the costs such that the NPA personnel abandoned the effort to control the village. This is consistent with the accountability theory's claim that community collective action capacity has an independent effect on downstream rebel territorial control, even if past conflict experiences at least partially influences community organization and leadership.

The village expert from Santa Cruz, Sibagat also illustrated the importance of local leadership to NPA control. In Santa Cruz, NPA personnel adopted an inclusive governance strategy, consulting community members in order to secure popular collaboration and maintain control.

**Enumerator:** For the community participation before, do the NPA consult the community as to how they will implement their laws?

**Respondent:** *Yes, they consult the community. The process of consultation is done through a person who will conduct a survey, then he will bring along the law to be consulted with the people, then he will explain it. When the person tasked to explain can come back to the upland, they will then gather the people.*<sup>16</sup>

Of course, in villages in which NPA personnel brought coercive force to bear in order to control territory and extract resources, communities did not always leverage mechanisms for collective action in order to resist rebel rule. In some cases, the community may not have had sufficient resources to effectively resist armed predatory rebels and instead chose to acquiesce. Crucially, however, acquiescence to predatory belligerents does not necessarily mean communities devolve into selfish behavior that aggravates community divisions and promotes communal conflict (as discussed at length in Kalyvas (2006), among others). Rather, vulnerable individuals may seek out sources of strength and community in order to act collectively in response to the threats asso-

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<sup>16</sup>Santa Cruz, Sibagat, Agusan del Sur Interview, pg. 8.

ciated with civil conflict violence.

**Respondent:** *[W]hen they came in, they'd bring the tribe together... Our headman, the datu, he would say, "There's nothing we can do. We have to follow what they say." They had guns when they talked to the tribe. You know, the tribe would look to the elders for what to do... So he advised everybody to just do what they said.*<sup>17</sup>

Even when facing the pressures of civilian-targeted coercion, community members may cooperate by coordinating action through inclusive local institutions, consistent with the accountability mechanism. The village expert testimony from Wasi-an, Rosario illustrates how the community mobilized collective action to coordinate reluctant collaboration with the NPA under the threat of coercive violence. Instead of descending into rivalry with other social groups in the village, community members converged with the *datu* to follow a cooperative response as a community.

The cases above, in which community collective action operates through tribal leadership, are a useful starting point because tribal institutions, rooted in such deep social and political historical foundations, represent an exogenous source of collective action capacity. But, the role of legitimate, effective local institutions illustrates the mechanisms introduced in Arjona (2016). While useful for falsifying the alternative endogenous collective action capacity and predatory rebel control theories, this evidence is insufficient to support the distinct mechanisms proposed in the accountability theory of rebel regimes as opposed to the effects of leadership and local political institutions central to the contribution in Arjona (2016).

Nevertheless, these tribal structures are not the only mechanisms through which local communities mobilize collective action in conflict-affected communities. Other village experts confirmed that collective action capacity flows through community

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<sup>17</sup>Wasi-an, Rosario Interview, pg. 3.

and sectoral organizations. The Philippines is noted for its robust civil society, and many communities have local organizations for collective action or history with such organizations. Farmers sectoral organizations and cooperatives are common in the rural areas commonly affected by communist presence, where family farms represent the pillars of local economic activity.

**Enumerator:** Did they [NPA] ask for donations from the households here?

**Respondent:** *Yes. Rice. Money. Just a little, but it was monthly. Every family gave one sardine can of rice and five pesos. We were OGM - Organisadong Mang-uuma [Farmers Organization]. There were officials. So there was someone assigned to collect. All the puroks [neighborhoods] had contact persons. Wherever they went here they were safe because they had people everywhere. They would just come down and pick up the collection.*

**Enumerator:** Who determined how much each family would give?

**Respondent:** *We did. There was an OGM [Organisadong Mang-uuma (Farmers Organization)] meeting where it was decided that to make it easier, every family would just give one sardine can of rice and five pesos every month.*<sup>18</sup>

Because the community maintained a pre-existing forum through which to mobilize participation and discuss appropriate actions, the community members streamlined the collaboration process. As a result, the community was able to set the terms, dictating the revolutionary tax rate by leveraging the ability to effectively collect the required total contributions through an inclusive process. This account illustrates a key mechanism underlying the accountability theory: a community with greater collective action capacity can credibly offer collaboration of greater value to the rebels, increasing the net benefits associated with controlling.

Similarly, the village expert in Coalicion, San Luis, Agusan del Sur described how local networks were essential to the NPA's ability to collect supplies from the

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<sup>18</sup>Casoon, Monkayo Interview.

community. The NPA personnel were able to rely on a few political appointees from the village, using their social connections, to reach a broad base of the village population. As a result, the NPA were able to access the resources necessary to sustain their local operations without becoming vulnerable to counterinsurgent attacks.

**Respondent:** [The NPA] asked for rice. They assigned somebody they could trust to take up the collection. This person would go around to collect. Well, in some of the sitios, he did not have to go around. The people would just come to him bringing their donations. You see, not everybody would come to their meeting, but among those who would come, they would appoint certain persons during the meeting. They would then announce for everyone to give their donations to this person. They told us to tell our neighbors who were not at the meeting that everybody had to give. They had something like an election also, so the ones they assigned to collect were like political appointees.<sup>19</sup>

Tight-knit communities in the remote outskirts outside the main town or village centers maintain durable organizations of mass support. By exercising collective control over the flow of information in the area, the community may allow the NPA to move freely and access resources without inciting counterinsurgent reprisals.

**Respondent:** [M]ost of the mass are located in the remote areas near the school, near Cabuyuan, the people up there are part of the mass. And that's the reason why we tell the soldiers that "You're in Cabuyuan, in Silika, such places, always be attentive." We inform them, from the people who lives down here. It is because they even attacked the engineering soldiers who made the water source. They really attacked them. They set up landmines and so the soldiers who were working with our water source fell down.<sup>20</sup>

Contrary to the predatory mechanism, village respondents linked effective pre-existing organizations for collective action to surprising NPA restraint used to prosecute anti-revolutionary actors in the community. The village expert from Baylo, Monkayo, for example, described great effort invested to verify claims and follow what amounts to

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<sup>19</sup>Coalicion, San Luis, Agusan del Sur Interview, pg. 1.

<sup>20</sup>Cabuyuan, Mabini, Compostela Valley Interview, pg. 11.

due process before punishing suspected defectors.

**Enumerator:** Let's say one has been wrongly accused. Could he make representations and appeal to the NPA?

**Respondent:** *Yes. They gave you time while they were doing the investigation.*

**Enumerator:** Usually, what were these issues that people here brought to the NPA? The intrigues, so to speak.

**Respondent:** *Sometimes, someone would tell on the demonyo* [Community members that denounce neighbors to the government, outing them as NPA supporters]. *Like, who told the soldiers about where the NPA were. But of course the NPA would still investigate these claims. So if it was not you, you could call witnesses, or show proof. The NPA did not like that. That was what they hated the most when someone betrayed their location and they got raided.*

**Enumerator:** So how does one prove his innocence?

**Respondent:** *There was no formal court here. The NPA would ask the neighbors. Sometimes, the neighbors would say if the accusation is true or not. Sometimes, they would also tell the NPA that this was just grudge talking to get the accused in trouble. So until the NPA really had—what do you call that?—corroborating evidence? Yes, until someone else vouched for the truth of the accusation, they would not act on it. But they did not kill people immediately. If the damage was just minimal, sometimes the offender just got off with a warning.*<sup>21</sup>

In Baylo, high levels of cohesion kept in check the opportunistic denunciations that threaten the unraveling of local order. NPA personnel were able to verify the information by consulting other community members with adequate knowledge. But, most importantly, directly inconsistent with the predatory theory, the NPA exercised restraint by refraining from immediate responses to claims of individual collaboration with the counterinsurgent. Examples such as the account in Baylo illustrate communities' success in forcing NPA personnel to remain selective in their use of violence, and even to follow procedures that at least approximate due process.

Consistent with the mechanism proposed by the accountability theory, the NPA appear to have identified an incentive to invest at least some resources and effort to

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<sup>21</sup>Baylo, Monkayo, Compostela Valley Interview, pgs. 4-5.

demonstrate value to the community. NPA personnel in some cases protected civilians from state neglect and repression and in other cases even provided limited goods provision, in order to secure local collaboration in the village. The village expert from Binondo, Baganga recalled that the NPA provided basic medical services and even provided funding for some students to pursue an education outside the community. Providing education was in many respects an investment in future leaders and sympathetic teachers, but nonetheless represents a major contribution to the community.

**Respondent:** *If there are groups who will enter our community bringing things that are beneficial for us, why shouldn't we welcome them? As long as it is beneficial, and not harmful for our community, we welcome them... Back then, they offer services such as circumcision. In our barangay, they do circumcision for the community because the Armed Forces were not visible in the upland areas. Even my wife is involved in such activities. We - my wife and I, with the rebel groups, provide free circumcision... The rebel groups provide assistance for education for some members of the [Indigenous Peoples] group... they provide scholarships... They sponsor children and send them to college to take up Education. Eventually, these students will then teach in their schools. And these are the same people that tell us that the rebels support them and send them to school while their own parents cannot even send them to school.*<sup>22</sup>

The Binondo respondent's testimony also supports the community security- and governance-seeking logic underlying the accountability theory. In Binondo, where the government and the military were unable or unwilling to provide protection and basic services, the community may welcome a bid from the communist rebels to provide governance in exchange for support. Because the state was absent from the community, the rebels secured local support even with fairly minimal investment in services. The CPP-NPA were even able to provide services in ways that served their strategic interests; the contribution to education also served the organization's recruitment and propaganda efforts.

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<sup>22</sup>Binondo, Baganga, Davao Oriental Interview, pg. 1.

Interview respondents also described the conditions for organized resistance against armed NPA personnel in response to violations of community interest, consistent with the accountability theory's proposed mechanism over the predatory mechanism. Child recruitment and local leader assassinations, in particular, emerged as a common issues that inspired the strongest community responses. In many rural villages, NPA personnel recruited impressionable young boys with few employment prospects by promising access to weapons and a salary that were unavailable to them in their home village. Families, especially mothers, not surprisingly voiced their disapproval of these recruitment tactics. In addition to threats to withhold food and supplies for the NPA personnel, aggrieved community members occasionally provided valuable intelligence to the military. Consider the respondent's testimony in Causwagan, Banaybanay:

**Enumerator:** How about those who are against the NPA, how do the civilians express their disapproval?

**Respondent:** *There are also some civilians who are against the NPA... They show their intolerance by reporting the presence of the NPA to the military, because the military also have some sort of intel.*

...

**Enumerator:** What issues have stirred up the conflict, and have triggered the people?

**Respondent:** *Those unwarranted and those issues that are not beneficial... Like, when they [NPA] try to involve the youth and some young children.*

**Enumerator:** You mean, recruit?

**Respondent:** *Yes. This is aggravated by the fact that the mother is not aware of it... they will complain. .. The people here are very vigilant about things like that. Although there is really no proof as to its validity, they are still very cautious for the fear that their own children will be involved.*<sup>23</sup>

Communities were especially pro-active about protecting their youth from NPA recruitment. They organized to educate young boys about NPA recruitment tactics, and make clear the very difficult life of the guerrilla soldier sleeping in the forests and

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<sup>23</sup>Causwagan, Banaybanay, DO Interview, pg. 1-4.

the mountains without regular access to food and shelter. These efforts, of course, increased the mobilization costs for the NPA personnel.

In extreme cases, communities mobilized armed resistance against the NPA in response to violations of community interests. In some cases, violent resistance grew exclusively from grassroots mobilization, drawing upon local social networks and local resources. In response to NPA abuses in the 1980s and 1990s, many communities joined the *Alsa Masa* movement of organized resistance against the communist political and armed wings alike.

**Respondent:** *My father was among [the NPA's] supporters until they became very demanding. [The NPA] were already asking for more than we could give. That was when my father joined the Alsa Masa. The Alsa Masa became popular here. Their former supporters who turned against them. That was around the time when the 8IB started operating here. Actually, it was the 8IB that organized the Alsa Masa. That was when we became peaceful. Colonel Apda and the 8IB. Around 1982.*<sup>24</sup>

There were also prominent examples of ad-hoc armed resistance against the NPA in response to egregious instances of NPA-perpetrated violence, as in the account from Kikomay, Laak.

**Enumerator:** Do the civilians retaliate if they have something that they do not like or are they scared which reduces them not to say anything?

**Respondent:** *No one retaliated before, Sir. But our barangay captain at Aguinaldo who was said to have committed a mistake that is believed to be of minor seriousness, was murdered along with his wife and a[nother] man. That eventually caused the people of Aguinaldo to revolt against them. It was the barangay of Aguinaldo that initiated it, and then went to the other barangays carrying with them deadly bolos [machetes]. That circumstance was actually rooted from the NPA believing a petty rumor... The people are pitiful because they were angered. Our barangay was always frequented. We have joined that movement, we were around 100 then. No NPA confronted us because we were so many.*

*... The people were not in approval of their doings anymore, that is why*

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<sup>24</sup>Santa Cruz, Rosario Interview, pgs. 1-2.

*that unfaithful circumstance happened.*<sup>25</sup>

Clearly, the community's organized resistance to non-responsive NPA units is inconsistent with the predatory rebel theory. If rebels simply manipulated community social structures to enforce collaboration through coercion, then village resistance would be rare, or originate in government efforts to arm and mobilize pro-government militias. Instead, village experts recounted bottom-up local resistance independent of government intervention. The bottom-up mobilization also illustrates the mechanism rooted in social structure and collective action capacity that distinguishes the accountability theory of rebel regimes from the emphasis on leaders and political institutions in Arjona (2016).

## 6.4 Endogenous Collective Action Capacity

The village expert interviews also provide some evidence that conflict processes influence social cohesion in affected communities, consistent with the endogenous collective action capacity theory. Consider, for example, the village expert testimony from Kikomay, Laak quoted above. The village expert recounts extraordinary collective response to rebel abuses and is consistent with arguments in the literature that suggest exposure to civil war violence increases community cohesion and collective action capacity.<sup>26</sup>

Nevertheless, the account does not undermine the independent effect of community collective action capacity on rebel behavior. As discussed at length in the research design chapter above, to undermine the independent effect of collective ac-

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<sup>25</sup>Kikomay, Laak, Compostela Valley Interview, pgs. 3-4.

<sup>26</sup>See, for example, Blattman (2009).

tion capacity it is not sufficient for the evidence to suggest that communities foment collective action, prioritizing common over competing interests, when the threat to community welfare escalates to an unacceptable threshold. In fact, the accountability theory proposes exactly that communities will react to non-responsive rebel governance by engaging in collective action capacity to punish rebels in response. Rather, to undermine the accountability theory’s proposed mechanism the evidence must suggest that it is primarily this conflict exposure that represents the source of collective action rather than exogenous sources such as underlying social structure or pre-conflict mechanisms for collective action. In Kikomay, the village expert indicates that the community’s collective action galvanized around pre-existing social and cultural norms prioritizing community welfare. The Kikomay and similar village examples, even if they appear to validate endogenous collective action capacity on the surface, suggest collective action was at least partially, if not substantially, rooted in underlying social structure independent of conflict exposure.

The interviews, in fact, provide some evidence that exposure to armed actors may have increased communal conflict—decreased community cohesion—rather than the other way around, consistent with the “control-collaboration” model and its emphasis on the divisive effects of conflict exposure (Kalyvas 2006). Areas previously exposed to rebel control may also be more likely to experience rebel control in the future, implying that the divisive effect of prior rebel control promotes a negative correlation between collective action capacity and subsequent rebel territorial control. If valid, this pattern would bias against finding support for the accountability theory in the econometric results reported above as well as in the qualitative analysis of interviews presented in this chapter. Many respondents cited family connections, opportunities to access weapons, socioeconomic or tenure status as prominent reasons for some to cooperate with armed groups even if doing so drew resources from, or put

at risk, the rest of the community.

Respondents also reported instances of community defectors aligning with the NPA as well as with the notorious “Lost Command” of the AFP, soldiers associated with widespread victimization and human rights abuses in the area, for selfish gain. In Don Alejandro, San Luis, the village expert suggested that some community members colluded or cooperated with the Lost Command to secure protection from atrocities, threatening others.

**Respondent:** *Remember the Lost Command [rogue military unit infamous for violence against civilians during the 1980's]? Some families here were protected by those soldiers. It was very bad. When they were here, the residents quarreled among each other and the soldiers would discipline those who were antagonistic to their friends. They beat up people in public. They would burn houses. So we were happy when the NPA came.*<sup>27</sup>

The account from Don Alejandro references the devolution of community cohesion in response to military abuses, suggesting communities' general vulnerability to the competitive dynamics that emerge in response to civil war violence. Even outside the areas exposed to severe government repression or neglect, incidents of predatory NPA control lead to dissolution of community cohesion. Some interview respondents noted incidents in which NPA presence lead to community members strategically spreading rumors about other families in order to maintain their own security or access to scarce resources, consistent with the denunciation spiral in Kalyvas (2006).

**Enumerator:** After that experience... [in the] 80's with the rebels, did it affect the trust of the community? For example, your neighbors, can you trust your neighbors?

**Respondent:** *In the beginning, there was really no trust ... One of the factors were the intrigues... the people who were killed in our area are our barangay captain, my mother, and they also killed a driver. In other*

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<sup>27</sup>Don Alejandro, San Luis Interview, pg. 13.

*barangays, they also killed other people. It was highly due to the intrigues, sir, really the intrigues.*<sup>28</sup>

The village expert in San Isidro, Monkayo reported similar problems, in which neighbors denounce each other during periods of active conflict between the NPA and the government.

**Respondent:** *There was a time that we were called to run errands [for the NPA]... We just get phone calls because their contact number is in our phone book because we should really give our contact. So they tell us to get to a certain place. Bring antibiotics, wrist watches, their black jackets. And last time, I got really mad: two .45 guns with bullets... They asked us to get it from the highway, then they just took it from our house because they can't get caught... When the soldiers arrive, our neighbors tell them that we are a rumored part of the NPA. But we don't have much of a choice since we're really not part of the NPA. We were just used because when they started interacting with us, we were falsely accused so we really didn't have a choice since that was the time when we started getting close interactions with the NPA. That's our life in the mountains.*<sup>29</sup>

Overall, the interviews do not lend much support for the brand of endogenous collective action capacity that undermines the accountability theory. There are incidents referenced in which the community banded together rather spontaneously in response to threats related to NPA actions; for example, in Kikomay, Laak. However, in most cases community social relations and institutionalized mechanisms for collective action, independent of conflict processes, drove collective action during conflict. Pre-existing leadership structures and norms of trust and reciprocity are resilient to NPA and government abuses. To the extent that community collective action capacity is endogenous to exposure to conflict violence and belligerent territorial control, the interview evidence supports the notion that conflict reduces community cohesion, which biases against the accountability theory and the empirical finding that higher

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<sup>28</sup>Ilangay, Lupon Interview, pg. 4.

<sup>29</sup>San Isidro, Monkayo Interview, pg. 4.

collective action capacity is positively associated with NPA territorial control in areas of state neglect. The interview data thereby increases confidence in the conclusions drawn in support of the theory. The competitive communal violence dynamics central to Kalyvas (2006), Balcels (2017), and others suggests the pattern observed in the Philippines case may underestimate the effect of community collective action capacity on the distribution of territorial control and its importance to the dynamics of rebel accountability to civilians.

## 6.5 Predatory NPA Control

Some village experts reported predatory CPP-NPA territorial control in their village. In a few cases, NPA personnel relied upon the threat or use of civilian-targeted violence to deter resistance while imposing the social order that served the insurgents' political or military interests. In these villages, consistent with the predatory mechanism, NPA personnel did not actively court attitudinal support within the population. Rather, the NPA established control in order to occupy strategically valuable, or militarily accessible, territory with little interest in population-based income. But, consistent with the accountability theory, village experts that reported predatory NPA conduct also reported a history of state repression or neglect, low community cohesion, or both.

For example, Don Alejandro, San Luis, Agusan del Sur was devastated by the abuses of the Lost Command of the AFP. NPA personnel did not provide and services or even sustained protection from the military's repression. Nevertheless, the Don Alejandro, San Luis village expert expressed gratitude for the periods of NPA presence during the 1980's, as they provided at least temporary protection from the

Lost Command atrocities.

**Respondent:** [The NPA] *came here because of the Lost Command. These soldiers were very abusive. They even abused our women. They'd just take any woman they fancied, even the young ones. Even the married ones. So it was better that the NPA came here because they would fight Lademora's men. We welcomed the NPA because they protected us from the abuses of the soldiers*<sup>30</sup>

*... if the crime involved a member of the Lost Command, say they hurt someone among us, then the NPA would sometimes make them an example, or retaliated in our behalf. But no investigations. They just killed them.*<sup>31</sup>

*... we wanted [the NPA] here. They were the solution to the abuses of the Lost Command. We did not have guns and we could not defend ourselves. The NPAs were enemies of the Lost Command. When they were here, it became dangerous for the Lost Command to go here.*<sup>32</sup>

Even in this case in which the village expert cited predatory NPA behavior, the interview also reveals that the local NPA personnel refrained from using excessive violence to expropriate more than the community was willing and able to provide. That the NPA exercised (mild) restraint even though the neglectful state provided no security to the community contradicts the predatory theory. Whereas the predatory theory would predict the NPA leverage its capacity to employ coercive violence in a vulnerable community, the accountability theory implies that the NPA are better off leveraging attitudinal support among the community. The village expert testimony from Don Alejandro appears consistent with the accountability theory, rather than the predatory alternative, even though the NPA engaged in non-responsive governance practices in the area.

This process underlying non-responsive rebel governance was not unique to Don Alejandro or surrounding areas. The village expert in Bayugan 3, Rosario described

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<sup>30</sup>Don Alejandro, San Luis, Agusan del Sur Interview, pg. 6.

<sup>31</sup>Don Alejandro, San Luis, Agusan del Sur Interview, pg. 7

<sup>32</sup>Don Alejandro, San Luis, Agusan del Sur Interview, pg. 14

a similar relationship with NPA personnel in the village. The village lacked access to basic government services and the Lost Command also passed through the community and threatened local security. As a result, the community welcomed the NPA as a protector without demanding substantial investment in governance.

**Respondent:** [In the 1980's] *The government hadn't started yet. The government really lacked providing services to the people. I guess that was why people were easily swayed by the leftists, especially when Lademora brought his Lost Command here. That was one of the more compelling reasons for people to be sympathetic to the NPA... [The Lost Command] gave the soldiers a very negative image here. The people were very discouraged. It created conditions that made it very easy for the NPA to brainwash the people. There was after all no denying the atrocities the Lost Command committed. They raped, They pillaged. They used people for target practice. They were heartless. They forced the tribesmen here to cooperate with the companies, to allow them in. They used force to get the tribesmen to agree... So, the Lost Command was a law unto itself. There were miners discovering gold here. The Lost Command would confiscate the gold. They would take over the dig. Or they would borrow money and never pay it back. You gave at the point of the gun. You know you're not going to see your money again... [The NPA] exploited that. They used their semi-legal arm to exploit the sentiments of the people here. And the NPA, they were quick to lend an ear to the people's grievance. They would kill those Lost Command when they had the chance. The people felt they were vindicated. They felt the NPA was on their side.*<sup>33</sup>

Inconsistent with the predatory theory of rebel control, some village experts that reported predatory NPA control also reported resistance to NPA abuses. In Bayugan 3, Rosario, the village expert went on to report that the community organized resistance against the NPA once the NPA over-stepped by imposing unacceptably high revolutionary taxes and engaging in violence against community members. Consistent with the accountability theory, but not the predatory theory, the Bayugan 3, Rosario community leveraged collective action capacity to hold the NPA accountable, once

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<sup>33</sup>Bayugan 3, Rosario, Agusan del Sur Interview, pgs. 1-2.

their outside options improved sufficiently (once the Lost Command were ousted).

**Respondent:** *So, some people here were killed by the NPA. That was when the people here started to have a change of heart also. So in 1986, the people here joined the Alsa Masa... It was a very strong movement. This was a reaction to the imposition of revolutionary tax, as well as the killings and the abduction of residents here. That was when the people reacted... [The NPA] also organized people for the communal [collective farming]... Those who became members of the communal, they were bled hard. They had a farm, but they were made to work it. The NPA got all the benefit from it. Then they asked them to give more. But it came with strings attached. Those in the communal were given obligations to fulfill. They had to contribute rice.*<sup>34</sup>

...

*That was how it went. Once they asked for revolutionary tax and you refused to pay, they would make it impossible for you to operate. They did it to all the companies here. I think the people joined Alsa Masa to protect their interest. Of course, they also did not want to share the gold they found.*<sup>35</sup>

The village expert testimony from Punta Linao, Banaybanay provides another example of predatory NPA conduct.

**Enumerator:** How did the citizens or the leaders influence the armed groups?

**Respondent:** *The citizens do not really have a say about them because they fear the armed groups...*

...

**Enumerator:** So what are the ways that the civilians will show their support or their collaboration with the armed groups?

**Respondent:** *We usually hide because safety is our priority. Back then, we dig holes under our houses and use it as a hiding place. On top of the hole that we dug, we covered it with a wooden piece. Our houses back then, are not of the same structure and design as those we have now.*<sup>36</sup>

...

**Enumerator:** How did the NPA obtain the support of the community?

**Respondent:** *It was through a direct attack. They did not follow any protocol, they directly attacked the community.*

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<sup>34</sup>Bayugan 3, Rosario, Agusan del Sur Interview, pg. 2

<sup>35</sup>Bayugan 3, Rosario, Agusan del Sur Interview, pg. 4.

<sup>36</sup>Punta Linao, Banaybanay Interview, pg. 12.

NPA personnel in Punta Linao relied heavily on the threat of coercive violence to operate in the community safely, without triggering counterinsurgent reprisals, and extract sufficient resources. Yet, the outcome is consistent with the accountability theory. The village expert lamented the lack of government services at the outset of the insurgency. On education, the respondent recalled that “a lot of students are forced to drop out and eventually a lot were not able to finish their studies.”<sup>37</sup> The respondent reported low levels of healthcare and access to medicine<sup>38</sup> and limited access to clean water<sup>39</sup> The state also failed to support judicial institutions or dispute resolution mechanisms, and the community had poor transportation infrastructure<sup>40</sup> Overall, the interview evidence characterizes Punta Linao as low state presence in the pre-insurgency era. Non-responsive NPA governance is consistent with the accountability theory’s predictions.

The village expert in Banlag, Monkayo characterized NPA control in the 1980’s, and again more recently leading up to the 2010 elections, as predatory.

**Respondent:** *We’re still afraid, Sir. Of course we do not have anything do defend ourselves with. What can we do compared to what the NPA has. It’s easy to hurt people.*<sup>41</sup>

As in many other instances of predatory NPA control, Banlag, Monkayo was beset by internal divisions and low levels of state service provision. The village expert described social relations that parallel the dynamics of communal conflict in Kalyvas (2006). Attempts to influence rebel conduct, when it did occur, happened at the

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<sup>37</sup>Punta Linao, Banaybanay, DO Interview, pg. 4.

<sup>38</sup>Punta Linao, Banaybanay, DO Interview, pg. 5.

<sup>39</sup>Punta Linao, Banaybanay, DO Interview, pg. 5.

<sup>40</sup>Punta Linao, Banaybanay, DO Interview, pg. 5.

<sup>41</sup>Banlag, Monkayo Interview, pg. 14.

individual level rather than through group or community-wide collective action. Individuals did not trust other community members to contribute to common interests, and feared their neighbors would denounce their behavior to the NPA personnel or to the Army detachment nearby.<sup>42</sup>

Though this account describes predatory rebel behavior, it is also consistent with the accountability theory of rebel regimes. Barriers to trust in the community may make collective action to hold rebels accountable to community interests more difficult. Low collective action capacity, then, may lead to low CPP-NPA territorial control (the village expert mentioned the NPA “just passed by”), and reliance on coercion rather than programmatic politics when NPA personnel did enter the community.

Overall, among the village experts describing predatory rebel behavior, there is insufficient evidence to support the predatory theory over the accountability theory. In most interviews that illustrate repressive NPA control, the respondent also referenced very low government service provision, lack of police or military presence, and/or exposure to military-perpetrated violence. This pattern within very low state capacity villages, while consistent with the predatory theory, is also consistent with the accountability theory. The interviews yield substantial evidence that communities, far from powerless victims of armed group coercion, frequently exercise agency by mobilizing collective action to discipline non-responsive rebels.

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<sup>42</sup>Banlag, Monkayo Interview, pgs. 14-15.

## 6.6 Summary: Qualitative Evidence

The qualitative evidence gleaned from in-depth village expert interviews provides robust support for the causal mechanisms proposed in the accountability theory of rebel regimes. Interview respondents reveal examples of community mobilization through pre-existing social ties, organizations, and institutional structures to influence the conduct of NPA personnel. Village experts described how these pre-existing mechanisms for collective action yielded NPA investment in responsive rebel governance.

Though some interview respondents did describe processes by which NPA presence influenced community social structure and collective action capacity, the evidence nonetheless supports the accountability theory for two main reasons. First, by reconstructing the initial period in which NPA emerged in the vicinity of the community, the village expert interviews can begin to isolate the effect of collective action capacity on rebel control and governance. Subsequent changes to social relations cannot explain the initial decision by NPA personnel to seek territorial control in the community, nor the content and governance during the initial rebel regime period.

Second, the interview testimony emphasizes the *negative* impact of NPA presence and civil war violence on community collective action capacity. The process parallels the dynamics discussed in Kalyvas (2006), in which the introduction of competing armed actors may spark communal rivalry along existing social cleavages. This negative influence cuts against the positive correlation between CPP-NPA territorial control and community collective action capacity detected in the econometric analysis and described at length in the in the selection of interviews analyzed. In short, to the extent that community collective action capacity is endogenous to prior exposure to civil war violence and CPP-NPA territorial control, it biases against finding support for the accountability theory. This suggests that, if anything, the empirical patterns

observed underestimate the positive effect of community collective action capacity on CPP-NPA territorial control in moderate-to-high-state capacity villages.

Examples of predatory NPA behavior largely conform to the accountability theory's expectations that rebel exploitation will occur in communities with weak outside options. In the body of interviews, predatory NPA control was reported in villages in which the government has a history of neglect or inability to deliver basic services, or where the community has suffered military-perpetrated civilian-targeted violence. Little evidence from village expert testimony is consistent with the predatory theory. As a result, though the interview data may not be invulnerable to other sources of bias, the evidence on balance increases confidence in the accountability theory or rebel regimes.

Finally, the interview evidence provides support for Arjona (2016), which emphasizes the legitimacy and efficacy of local political institutions as a key mechanism through which civilians shape rebel conduct. The evidence presented here yields the additional insight that the variation in local political institutions also affects rebels' decision whether to seek territorial control in the first place. But the interview evidence also reveals the distinct mechanisms proposed in the accountability theory—underlying social structure and collective action capacity—also determine variation in conflict processes. This insight contributes to the burgeoning literature examining the ways in which civilians influence belligerent conduct during civil war.

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## Conclusions and Policy Implications

This dissertation contributes a new theoretical framework to link explanations of rebel territorial control, use of violence, and governance during intrastate war. In particular, the dissertation addresses a crucial gap in the surprisingly thin literature explaining local-level variation in territorial conflict—the expansion and contraction of insurgency—in civil wars. Despite the growing attention to civilian agency in civil wars, existing research explaining territorial control has largely marginalized the role of non-combatants. The accountability theory of rebellion complements existing models of civil conflict dynamics prominent in the literature that emphasize structural, military, economic, and political interest mechanisms.

The empirical findings provide support for the theory's expectations. In the Philippines, CPP-NPA territorial control increases with bridging social capital at the village level, particularly in geographic areas in which state administrative capacity is weak and during time periods in which the military engages in enemy-centric rather than population-centric counterinsurgency. The appendix shows this correlation persists using a variety of measures for rebel territorial control, village collective action capacity, and the state's local capacity to provide protection and services. The findings are robust to alternative model specifications. Key informants from three

provinces in Eastern Mindanao, a region in the Philippines that has been historically affected by the communist insurgency, suggest the insurgents were more willing to incur governance costs in order to secure territorial control in communities with higher collective action capacity. Interview evidence reduces concerns related to endogeneity bias and demonstrate the accountability theory's causal mechanisms improve explanatory power over the predatory theory of rebel control.

Due to acknowledged limitations in the data, future research is required to further verify the inferences drawn in support of the theory. Focusing on local level dynamics in the Philippines has the advantage of internal validity, and the uniquely detailed measurements available from a large sample of villages in the quantitative analysis permits a novel econometric test of the theory's implications. However, empirical investigation in additional cases is required to generalize the theory to other specific incidents and types of civil war.

Because the distribution of territorial control influences variation in subsequent conduct and outcomes of civil war, understanding rebel groups' incentives and constraints on where and when to seek and maintain territorial control has implications for a broad range of conflict processes; including the strategic use of violence, conflict duration, and the form and stability of post-conflict political order. The theory also carries crucial policy implications for counterinsurgency strategy, state-building, and economic development policy in conflict-affected states. I address these implications in this concluding chapter.

## 7.1 Implications for Theories of Political Violence and Civil War

This dissertation's conclusions complement existing structural explanations for the distribution of territorial control rooted in economic, political, geographic, and military balance of power explanations as well as important contributions have begun to address the importance of civilian agency in explaining belligerent conduct during civil war (Petersen 2001; Arjona 2016; Balcells 2017; Kaplan 2017). This dissertation relates most closely to the contributions in Arjona (2016), which emphasizes the legitimacy and efficacy of local political institutions to explain variation in social order and rebel governance within areas of rebel control, and Kaplan (2017), which argues that community social structure and organizational capacity influences popular participation in resistance to rebels within areas exposed to rebel presence.

The accountability theory of rebel regimes advances this literature by exploring how civilian collective action shapes not only rebel conduct in areas in which they operate, but also how these forces shape rebels' incentives to seek territorial control in the first place. Communities most capable of enforcing high levels of governance are also the most self-sufficient or best positioned to deter combatants, especially resource-constrained rebels, from controlling territory. Contrasting views regarding civilians' agency in shaping armed conflict revealed in the existing literature may be reconciled by including a theory to explain the antecedent process of territorial control that determines the cases in which rebels may decide how to govern. In conflicts, or areas within conflict zones, where the community suffers weak outside options—incapacity for self-governance or a weak/repressive state—community collective action capacity may enable predatory rebel control dynamics and result in poor rebel governance. However, under conditions in which civilians enjoy at least moderate outside

options, the more sanguine interpretation of civilian agency in civil war may prevail. Acknowledging this selection into the distribution of territorial control is crucial to understanding how civilian agency shapes the subsequent rebel conduct investigated in the existing literature. Specifically, the accountability theory of rebel regimes suggests collective action capacity may increase rebel incentives to seek territorial control only when the state's administrative (service delivery) and counterinsurgent capacity are sufficiently weak, while encouraging responsive governance only when the state's administrative capacity is sufficiently strong.

Territorial control is a prerequisite for rebels to invest rebel governance (Mampilly 2011; Stewart 2018; Kasfir 2015), so understanding selection into the areas of rebel territorial control is critical to explaining rebel governance. Many scholars have argued, or assumed, that community collective action capacity may increase rebel groups' incentives to control territory through predatory means. This perspective implies that cohesive communities are uninterested or unable to influence combatant behavior to achieve more favorable conditions during armed conflict. The predatory perspective clashes with recent advances in the literature that find rebels impose less intrusive social control and lower levels of civilian-targeted violence in communities with greater institutional and organizational capacity (Arjona 2016; Kaplan 2017).

This dissertation has shown that, though rebels do engage in predatory behavior under specific conditions, the accountability theory's proposed mechanisms through voluntary mobilization is crucial to explaining variation in territorial control during civil war. Under a variety of common conflict conditions, rebels seek to partner with cohesive communities because they are better collaborators. By extension, rebels may be more willing to invest in responsive forms of governance in order to maintain control in communities with high collective action capacity, in order to continue to

reap these benefits. For communities with insufficient state administrative presence, collective action capacity increases rebel control *and* investment in governance.

The distribution of territorial control also represents a critical factor shaping conflict belligerents' strategic decisions regarding the form and scale of political violence used in prosecuting the conflict. Rebels and states alike refrain from indiscriminately targeting civilians in areas securely under their own control as well as in highly contested areas, in which there exists parity in local control (Kalyvas 2006). Balcells (2017) further establishes that the form and extent of violence depends on the historical political cleavages present in the locality. This dissertation finds that the human geography of non-combatant social structure and collective action capacity influences where rebels are likely to control territory in the first place. The accountability theory of rebel regimes suggests that community cohesion and capabilities shape conflict belligerents' strategic use of violence, rather than, or in addition to, the distribution of territorial control between the belligerents themselves.

More importantly, the accountability theory confronts a foundational assumption in the "control-collaboration" model of civil conflict processes; the model assumes that individuals prioritize physical security above all else, and that individuals do not internalize social costs associated with violating community interests and norms. This dissertation has explored the implications associated with taking seriously individuals' preferences and constraints as drawn from their social environment. In the accountability theory, individuals may expect to face punishment from other community members should they take self-serving action at the expense of community welfare. Even if armed belligerents pressure individuals to defect from social obligations Kalyvas (2006, 2012), civilians must balance the carrots and sticks imposed by armed groups against the expected responses from community members, and the

impact on their social position in the community. Future research is needed to explore the conditions under which these social costs supersede the constraints imposed by conflict belligerents. I strongly suspect a variety of fairly common conditions will lead individuals to prioritize their standing in their social network over the possible threats from belligerent actors. For example, especially in cases where the belligerents are from outside the polity, individuals may expect the risks associated with resisting belligerents' demands are temporary, while the time horizon for interactions with community members is indefinite.

The accountability theory also provides a framework for understanding research addressing the provocation and outbidding strategies of political violence.<sup>1</sup> In particular, the monitoring problem inherent in establishing political accountability is a common, though rarely explicitly stated, assumption in each of these theories. The provocation strategy follows a disturbing, though at least occasionally valid, logic: rebels deliberately take actions to encourage the enemy (government) to respond by targeting civilians (deliberately or by accepting the risk of collateral damage) in order to alienate the population from the government, and thereby mobilize support for their cause within the affected population. For the provocation strategy to work requires that civilians either cannot decipher the rebels' intention to put civilian lives at risk, or that the civilians nevertheless find collaborating with the rebels in their best interest. The accountability theory suggests that provocation may operate when target populations lack the collective action capacity necessary to effectively monitor rebel actions or coordinate responses to conflict processes as they unfold.

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<sup>1</sup>See Kydd and Walter (2006) for an overview of the both the provocation logic and outbidding logic. See Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007); Carter (2016) for prominent arguments and empirical assessment of the provocation theories of terrorism. See, especially, Horowitz (1985); Bloom (2005) for arguments supporting the outbidding logic.

The outbidding logic addresses the dynamics associated with multiple non-state belligerent actors competing for the loyalty and support of the same marginalized population. Outbidding theories suggest that distinct rebel organizations may attempt to project their legitimacy by demonstrating their willingness and capability to deploy violence against the government or perceived enemy populations; triggering a spiral of political violence. Though hard-line armed actors representing their interests may enhance community bargaining power with the state under certain conditions, rebel violence may also erode or delay the opportunities for peaceful settlement and conflict termination. The outbidding literature has thus far provided little guidance for understanding the puzzle underlying civilian support for inefficient violence detrimental to a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The accountability theory suggests that a possible explanation lies in the population's weak or eroding accountability mechanisms necessary to keep rebel groups' belligerent strategies in check. Further research is necessary to interrogate the accountability theory's explanatory power to account for variation as yet unaccounted for in existing provocation and outbidding theories of political violence.

## 7.2 Implications for Political Accountability Theory

The project also contributes to the political science literature addressing political accountability, a fundamental topic in the discipline. The project contributes to an understanding of armed belligerents' political accountability to civilians during armed conflict, but the theoretical framework applies more generally to political accountability in the context of weak institutions.

Conventional political accountability theory emphasizes institutional sources of

accountability in stable regimes, beginning with electoral democracy and extended to authoritarian regimes. Citizens' capabilities to hold politicians accountable to public interest are rooted in the political regime and its electoral (*electoral*) institutions. However, inter- and intra-state armed conflict may erode existing accountability institutions, presenting new challenges to non-combatants attempting to influence belligerents' actions. As new political entrepreneurs emerge and attempt to establish control in a particular polity, the public must develop accountability mechanisms in real time.

This dissertation suggests that community social structure and collective action capacity represent one set of factors that influences a population's capabilities to enforce accountability. It identifies social structure and norms as fundamental to explaining the subsequent emergence of political institutions and regimes. The role of collective action capacity is clearest in unstable or emerging political regimes, but carries implications for understanding the origins of state-based democratic and authoritarian regimes as well. Social structure and norms, through local collective action capacity, may shape the reference points underlying self-enforcing democracy introduced in Fearon (2011) as well as the conditions under which marginalized populations may mobilize to execute the "rebellion constraint" that represents the foundation of political accountability to the public in authoritarian regimes (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2001, 2006).

## 7.3 Extensions for Future Research

### The State and Strategic Investments in Local Capacity

The existing theory focuses on the strategic interaction between local rebel personnel and a community of civilians. To retain simplicity, it marginalizes the state's strategic decision-making; fixing the state's local capabilities and interest in seizing territory as not only exogenous but also independent of community collective action capacity. These simplifying assumptions are justified by the claim that the state and its counterinsurgent agents are less sensitive to community collective action capacity compared to the rebels. Rebels, as the weaker party, depend on community collective action capacity for survival. Local state capacity is determined, instead, by structural factors like terrain and overall state resources, as well as local level economic factors and the history of state interaction with the local population.

To the extent that the assumption rebels are more sensitive to local collective action capacity compared to state holds true, a three-actor model is expected to yield similar insights to the simpler theory focusing on the rebel-civilian interaction. If the community's collective action capacity has smaller magnitude in the state's cost-benefit analysis, then their strategic decisions to challenge territory will be determined by political, economic, and military incentives and constraints rather than community collective action capacity. However, collective action capacity does, at least, influence the counterinsurgents' prospects of military victory when challenging rebel territorial control. Therefore the combination of local political alignment and collective action capacity should, at a minimum, affect the state's assessment of the costs and probability of counterinsurgent success in a village and therefore its incentive to challenge rebels. Future research is needed to explore the joint process by which rebel and counterinsurgent investments in resources are projected on the map

of the conflict zone, and incorporate these insights to assessing the role of civilians presented here.

A more complex model with three actors introduces two new strategic dynamics: 1) the community bargains with rebels and counterinsurgents simultaneously; and 2) the rebels and counterinsurgents bargain over territorial control by strategically investing resources to enhance their capabilities relative to the adversary in particular villages. The rebel-community interaction is affected by the simultaneous bargain between counterinsurgents and the community in ways consistent with those captured in the simpler version of the theory; in particular, the emphasis on the community's outside option associated with state control. The full three-actor bargaining process would reveal insights on the factors that influence the strength of the community's outside option associated with state control, but would not fundamentally change the key insight that the effect of community collective action capacity on rebel territorial control depends on that outside option.

Given finite resources, the state must prioritize selected areas in the periphery in which to project its military and administrative resources, just as discussed above for the rebels. This is especially true for weak states, which are more vulnerable to rebellion. In a dynamic interaction, the rebel and counterinsurgent units may strategically invest in resources in areas of particular value in the civil war, affecting the balance of capabilities (probability of retaining territorial control). Rebels and states alike have incentives to invest capabilities in villages with greater territorial and population-based economic benefits as well as military strategic value. Therefore, introducing the three-actor model may refine the simplistic incentives-based propositions from the current theory, and suggest that rebels are more likely to invest resources in territorial control in communities with greater economic endowments in

some areas but less likely to invest in economically valuable communities in other areas, depending on the constraints associated with the state's counterinsurgent investments.

Including the state as a strategic actor in this theory linking civilian agency and the distribution of territorial control in civil war will encourage scholars to think about how the human geography within the state shapes sub-national variation in the state's territorial control, as distinct from state capacity. While the two concepts are often conflated, and scholars often use the state's local control and governance as indicators of state capacity and vice versa, a state's investment in control and governance in particular localities may be strategic. In other words, states may possess the capacity to establish control and deliver governance in certain areas, but choose not to for a variety of reasons that are relevant to understanding civil conflict processes. How do communities' collective action capacity, combined with the outside option of rebel or civil protection units, shape state penetration into the periphery? The gap between state capacity to project power and what the state actually does in a particular locality is an important phenomenon to explain.

## **Community Partisanship and Rebel Organizational Characteristics**

The theory assumes civilians have no partisan preferences for the state or the rebels. Civilians are interested exclusively in security and access to basic goods and services. They are willing to collaborate or resist any belligerent actor in order to maximize these primary interests. Of course, communities may have shared partisan preferences for one side or the other in the conflict, or different social groups in the community may have clashing preferences on the vertical conflict cleavage which exacerbate communal conflict. In an ideological conflict, community partisanship may be shaped

by socio-economic status, but generalizing to ethno-nationalist conflicts, partisanship may also be determined by identity linkages. Including community partisanship in favor of one side or the other may refine the theoretical implications by affecting community outside options. Where the community is tied to one actor over another, they may surrender some bargaining leverage associated with maintaining the outside option to collaborate with the adversary. However, as Kalyvas (2006) suggests, communities may be willing to collaborate with whichever side best protects its security. Therefore, partisanship may influence the strength of the outside option, but it is unlikely to remove it altogether.

The theory also ignores the relationship between community collective action capacity and rebel organizational characteristics; group ideology, the role of ethno-linguistic or religious identity in group claims or recruitment, political goals, funding sources, and other features that influence how rebels interact with civilians. The theoretical framework assumes rebels are interested in controlling territory in order to collect the resources and political support necessary to advance the insurgency and achieve ultimate political goals, whatever they may be. However, variation in rebel group characteristics on these and other dimensions may be relevant to the effect of collective action capacity on the distribution of territorial control. Rebels that are socially embedded in the community may prioritize goals differently than those that are outsiders controlling territory for material or political gains. Rather than seeing governance as a cost incurred to achieve other primary objectives, socially embedded rebel units may see governance as a goal in itself; protecting their own family members, homes, and property. Certain types of rebel groups may have ideological proclivities towards governance, or against controlling territory and populations through violence. In fact, Maoist groups like the CPP-NPA, at least ideally, are ideologically conditioned to make common cause with the population, which may

motivate decisions related to investment in territorial control and governance. Ignoring these possible conditional factors maintains the theory's parsimony and isolates the role of collective action capacity from these other factors. But, extending the theory to explore how the effect of community collective action capacity changes based on community partisanship and various rebel group characteristics is an important avenue of theoretical refinement for future research.

## 7.4 Policy Implications

### Counterinsurgency Strategy

The accountability theory of rebel regimes contributes to the dense literature on the interaction among civilians, insurgents, and counterinsurgents in modern war. Civilian collaboration is central to belligerents' capabilities to implement particular strategies and tactics in war, and their prospects for strategic and operational success. Yet, tremendous debate still exists regarding the effects of various forms of violence and insurgent/counterinsurgent tactics on civilian actions.

Schutte (2017) succinctly divides the existing theories of civilian reactions to violence into the "deterrence" and "alienation" camps. The deterrence mechanism suggests that civilian-targeted violence instills fear of punishment that prevents individuals from joining or supporting the enemy, while the alienation mechanism suggests that individuals exposed to violence are likely to balance against the perpetrator by collaborating with the enemy to seek protection or revenge. Schutte (2017) finds evidence that indiscriminate civilian-targeted violence, or at least tactics that incur high collateral damage, lead to civilian collaboration with the enemy, in line with "alienation" theories of civilian reactions to civil war violence.

The empirical literature has found support for both the deterrence mechanism (Downes 2007; Lyall 2009; Lyall and Wilson 2009) *and* the alienation mechanism (Kocher, Pepinsky and Kalyvas 2011; Condra and Shapiro 2012; Lyall, Blair and Imai 2013; Schutte 2017), despite their opposing predictions. The conditions under which distinct forms of civilian-targeted violence increase or decrease support for the perpetrator and the enemy have not only the clear normative importance, but also crucial policy implications. States must consider the consequences not only for operational success against the insurgents, but also the follow-on effects on civilian responses, when crafting counterinsurgency strategies and developing its capabilities and operational procedures governing decisions over the use of particular tactics.

The deterrence and alienation arguments share a focus on the civilians' interests and incentives to collaborate with particular belligerents. The accountability theory of rebel regimes introduces a novel approach emphasizing communities' capabilities to mobilize collective action to act on these interests. Current counterinsurgency doctrine is focused on removing the civilians' incentives to collaborate with insurgents, whether by avoiding civilian casualties or advancing state-building and governance reforms to "win hearts and minds" in the competition for support, especially valuable information. This dissertation reveals that states must consider the landscape of civilian capabilities to mobilize collective action when making tough choices regarding where and when to invest in various counterinsurgent operations throughout the conflict zone.

The accountability theory suggests, first, that the consequences of civilian-targeted violence for patterns of collaboration are likely magnified in communities with high collective action capacity. Counterinsurgents should be particularly averse to tak-

ing actions that drive civilians to support the insurgents in areas with high social cohesion and collective action capacity. Second, the accountability theory implies that one explanation for the contradictory empirical findings in the literature may be that the levels of civilian participation may depend on collective action capacity. By influencing the scale of the collective response, collective action capacity influences the prospects for counterinsurgent success, and therefore influences the observable correlations between strategy and outcome in ways unaccounted for in existing theories. Future research is necessary to investigate in greater depth the effects of specific counterinsurgency strategies conditional on community social structure and norms in the target population.

The accountability theory presented here does not seek to marginalize the importance of shaping civilians' interests and incentives. Rather, the goal is to expose the challenges presented by variation in civilians' capabilities in order to inform the conditions under which the various strategies to address community incentives will have the desired effect. Civilian communities' capabilities may explain why in some cases attempts to "win hearts and minds" yields tangible collaboration from the population while in other cases these efforts fail to garner local support.

## **Economic Development and Aid Programs in Conflict Zones**

The dissertation carries implications for understanding the economic as well as peace-building effects of a variety of development aid programs in the context of intrastate conflict and political violence. The conditional effect of community collective action capacity on rebel incentives to invest in territorial control and governance during the insurgency may help to resolve some of the debate growing from mixed, seemingly contradictory, empirical findings in the existing literature.

Some scholars have found that aid and development programs decrease civil conflict violence and support for insurgents. Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2011) find that US Army reconstruction projects in Iraq lead to a reduction in violence against US forces, either because civilians were more willing to provide valuable information about insurgent attacks and location or because economic stimulants raise the opportunity costs of rebellion. Others have found that programs designed to “win hearts and minds”—raise the opportunity costs associated with rebellion—actually increase violence under certain circumstances. Nunn and Qian (2014) find that food aid increased conflict, as insurgents attempted to seize valuable resources and interdict government support that might endear the population to the state. Weintraub (2016) finds that a conditional cash transfer program in Colombia increased conflict. Khanna and Zimmermann (2014) find that a program designed to reduce rural unemployment in India actually increased conflict violence.

In the Philippines, in particular, the government and the World Bank, along with other partners, have aggressively expanded the scale and diversity of social, political, economic development programs designed to lift the country’s population out of poverty and improve governance, but also to serve counterinsurgent goals to undermine support for the CPP-NPA in the periphery. Increasingly popular in conflict-affected countries, community-driven development (CDD) programs are designed to build local community capacity for self-governance as a bulwark against insurgency expansion. Crost, Felter and Johnston (2014) examine the effects of a large-scale CDD program implemented in the Philippines on insurgency-related violence, using a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of access to the program on the trends in exposure to violence. They find that access to the program increases exposure to violence, likely because insurgents launch attacks in the early stages of

the program (Crost, Felter and Johnston 2014). The insurgents' motivations may be to interdict state support that will likely erode support for the insurgents, or to control territory with more valuable resources. By contrast, the same authors find that a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program in the Philippines *reduced* exposure to violence and insurgent territorial control in treated villages (Crost, Felter and Johnston 2016). Do the differences in program outcomes have to do with the nature of the intervention interacting with civilians' incentives to align with the state or the insurgents? Or, does the context in which the programs were implemented shape the potential outcomes?

The dissertation's findings suggest that sequence matters. CDD programs may prove ineffective or counterproductive if implemented prior to, or as a substitute for, investment in state-building and local governance, as rebels may leverage community cohesion to secure local control. It may be the case that whether development aid reduces violence or backfires depends on whether the state is able to secure territorial control, rather than merely deliver services and abdicate state-building. If the counterinsurgents create a temporary window for service delivery but neglect to build the security and governance infrastructure to influence communities' long-term incentives, the delivery of aid may fuel conflict and leave areas vulnerable to insurgent capture or re-capture. Furthermore, whether securing territorial control is cost-effective may depend on the local collective action capacity. Future research may reconsider existing findings in regarding the consequences of local-level economic development interventions on conflict and post-conflict dynamics.

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# **Appendix A: Quantitative Data and Robustness Checks**

## **Quantitative Administrative Data**


Family-based village networks were constructed from a 2008-2010 census conducted by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS-PR). I used the *stringr* package to parse unique family names in each municipality. I then assigned a unique ID code to each name and used the *igraph* package to convert the list of municipality-specific name IDs into a network object from which to calculate the modularity and other network statistics. The R script accompanying the online appendix includes the code used to create the variables included in regression analysis. I do not include the raw data from which the name assignments and network statistics were calculated because the data were provided with the stipulation to preserve household anonymity and a commitment not to share publicly the household data. Researchers wishing to replicate the analysis or use the data for their own research purposes may file a request with the National Household Targeting Office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development in the Philippines. They have a standard process to share

data with researchers, but given that I requested access to information on names I had to receive direct approval from the Secretary and sign a memorandum of agreement with a confidentiality clause. The data can be requested by contacting DSWD at <http://www.dswd.gov.ph/contact-us/> or the Research Monitoring and Evaluation Office directly, rmeo@dswd.gov.ph.


## Logit Model with Province Fixed Effects

Figure A.1: Model 4 Results

(a) Coefficient Plot



(b) Marginal Effects



| Sample                | Outcome Variable                                | Fixed Effects |
|-----------------------|---|---------------|
| · N (Villages): 12472 | · 1: Influence $\geq 2$<br>· 0: Influence $< 2$ | · Province    |

Figure A.1a: dots represent coefficient estimates and line segments represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.1b: The marginal effect of village level bridging as it changes with the municipality-level governance score. The dotted black lines represent the 95% confidence intervals surrounding the estimate.

The multilevel model specification is vulnerable to bias if there exist omitted variables that, because they are not included in the model, induce correlation between

the group-level effects and the bridging predictor of interest. As a result, I also fit Model 4, a Logit model with Province fixed effects as an alternative.

**Model 4.**  $C_{ijk} \sim \text{logit}^{-1}(\alpha_k z_{k[i]} + \tau B_{ijk} + \rho G_{jk} + \kappa B_{ijk} * G_{jk} + \mathbf{X}_i \beta + \mathbf{W}_j \delta),$

where  $z_{k[i]}$  represents the series of dichotomous indicators for the village's membership in a Province:  $z_{k[i]} = 1$  if village  $i$  falls within Province  $k$  and  $z_{k[i]} = 0$ , otherwise. This specification results in a series of dummy variables representing the separate intercepts for each Province. Figure A.1 presents the results from fitting the cross-sectional Logit model with Province fixed effects. Consistent with the theory's predictions and with the correlation detected using the multi-level logit specification, the effect of bridging on communist territorial control is positive at lowest levels of local government performance and the estimated effect declines as government performance increases.

## TSCS Multilevel Logit with Municipality and Year

### Varying Intercepts and Linear Interaction

**Model 5.**  $C_{ijt} \sim \text{logit}^{-1}(\alpha_{j[i]} + \gamma_{t[i]} + \tau B_{ij} + \rho G_j + \kappa B_{ij} * G_j + \mathbf{X}_i \beta, \sigma_C^2),$


$$\alpha_{j[i]} \sim N(\delta_0 + \mathbf{W}_j \delta, \sigma_\alpha^2),$$

$$\gamma_{t[i]} \sim N(0, \sigma_\gamma^2),$$


Because the predictors are time invariant, in the main model specification reported in the paper, I presented the results from fitting the model with the yearly assessments of communist control collapsed to a single cross-section. Here, I present the fixed effects estimates from Model 5, which treats the yearly observations for

Figure A.2: Model 5 Results

(a) Coefficient Plot



(b) Marginal Effects



| Sample                | Outcome Variable        | Varying Intercepts |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| · N (Villages): 49888 | · 1: Influence $\geq 2$ | · Municipality     |
| · Municipalities: 569 | · 0: Influence $< 2$    |                    |

Figure A.2a: dots represent coefficient estimates and line segments represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.2b: The marginal effect of village level bridging as it changes with the municipality-level governance score. The dotted black lines represent the 95% confidence intervals surrounding the estimate.

communist control as separate observations. In addition to varying intercepts for municipality, the model includes varying intercepts for years in order to model the temporal trends that are unaccounted for by including the available time-invariant predictors. The results are consistent with the main results reported in the paper.

# Alternative Measures of Local Government Performance

Figure A.3: Model 1, 1980 Literacy Rate measures Community Outside Options





Figure A.3a: dots represent coefficient estimates and line segments represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.3b: The marginal effect of village level bridging as it changes with the municipality-level governance score. The dotted black lines represent the 95% confidence intervals surrounding the estimate.

Because the 2005 Good Governance Index may be endogenous to conflict dynamics, I fit Model 1 substituting alternative measures to capture community outside options. I include, alternatively, the adult literacy rate and the rural population percentage from the 1980 census. Since the 1980 census, there have been many new municipalities created out of one or more municipalities in existence in 1980. This process also required dropping some villages that, since they were created from municipalities that were divided into multiple different municipalities, cannot be confidently placed within one municipality or the other in order to assign the appropriate 1980 census data.

Using the 1980 census data, the overall pattern detectable in the conditional re-

Figure A.4: Model 1, 1980 Rural Population measures Community Outside Options



| Sample                | Outcome Variable        | Varying Intercepts |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| · N (Villages): 12982 | · 1: Influence $\geq 2$ | · Municipality     |
| · Municipalities: 569 | · 0: Influence $< 2$    |                    |

Figure A.4a: dots represent coefficient estimates and line segments represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.4b: The marginal effect of village level bridging as it changes with the municipality-level governance score. The dotted black lines represent the 95% confidence intervals surrounding the estimate.

lationship is consistent with the results supporting the accountability theory, but the effect appears attenuated and the results are not statistically distinguishable from 0. This may be due to the fact that the literacy rate and rural population percentages are imperfect measures of local state capacity, especially the specific aspect of community outside options for protection and governance. Unlike the GGI, the measure does not include indicators of state-provided public safety, for example, and does not calibrate the efficacy of local government administration. The weaker results may also be related to the complications associated with changes in municipality administrative boundaries that complicates the ways in which municipality-level effects map onto village-level processes.

## Alternative Sample: Poor Household Networks

Figure A.5: Compare Bridging across Samples

(a) Full-Census Municipalities      (b) All Municipalities, Poor HH Networks






Figure A.6: Model 1 (Poor HH Networks) Results

(a) Coefficient Plot




(b) Marginal Effects Plot



| Sample                 | Outcome Variable        | Varying Intercepts |
|------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| · N (Villages): 32333  | · 1: Influence $\geq 2$ | · Municipality     |
| · Municipalities: 1388 | · 0: Influence $< 2$    |                    |

Figure A.6a plots the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the model specification interacting the bridging and good governance (2005) scores. Figure A.6b plots the marginal effect of the bridging score on NPA influence over the range of the 2005 good governance score.

Figure A.7: Model 1 (Poor HH Networks) Predicted Probabilities



| Sample                 | Outcome Variable        | Varying Intercepts |
|------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| · N (Villages): 32333  | · 1: Influence $\geq 2$ | · Municipality     |
| · Municipalities: 1388 | · 0: Influence $< 2$    |                    |
| .                      | .                       | .                  |

Figure A.7: Plots the change in predicted probability of CPP-NPA influence over the range of the bridging score, holding the GGI 2005 score at its minimum (Figure A.7a), 25th percentile (Figure A.7b), 50th percentile (Figure A.7c), and 75th percentile (Figure A.7d). All other covariates are held at the values observed in the data at the specific bridging score.


In the main regression analysis, I used only the sample of villages within municipalities in which the NHTS-PR conducted a full census, excluding the municipalities assessed using the “pockets of poverty” assessment strategy. I restricted the sample in this way because the non-poor households included in the areas of “pockets of poverty” assessment are not included by a random process nor by a process that can be argued is independent of community social structure. Non-poor households were included based on their own request for assessment, and therefore may be related to their connections with other families that were assessed by the NHTS-PR. For robustness, I estimate the same regressions included in the main empirical analysis on an alternative sample that includes all of the villages, save for those in ARMM and NCR. In this sample, measures of network structure (including bridging) are all calculated on only the sample of poor households. These are incomplete networks, but the subset of poor households are targeted for full assessment in the villages in which the government conducted only a partial census such that the population of poor households is at least roughly comparable across the census collection strategies.

Figure A.5 demonstrates the differences in the distribution of network bridging across the full-census and pockets of poverty assessment samples. To explore the robustness of the results to including information from the broader sample of villages, I fit Model 1 with an adjustment to measure bridging among the poor population only. This measure includes information among only the poor sub-sample of each village, but includes a larger sample of villages. It is also worth noting that instead of using the percentage of sampled households identified as poor to measure poverty, I use municipality-level poverty incidence collected by the Government's National Statistics Coordination Board. I use the poverty incidence from 2009. Finally, I also added a municipality-level covariate to indicate whether the village is in a municipality targeted with the complete census or partial census data collection strategy.

Using the larger sample of villages including those assessed with a partial census yields the same substantive results. Figure A.6a reports the coefficient plot and Figure A.6b plots the marginal effect of bridging on communist control over the range of local government performance. Figure A.7 presents the change in predicted probability of CPP-NPA territorial control over the range of bridging at selected intervals of the governance score. The effect of bridging is positive at low levels of local governance and declines as the quality of governance improves, consistent with Hypothesis 1.

# Alternative Measures of Collective Action Capacity

Figure A.8: Model 1, Largest Component Size measures CAC




| Sample                | Outcome Variable        | Varying Intercepts |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| · N (Villages): 12472 | · 1: Influence $\geq 2$ | · Municipality     |
| · Municipalities: 569 | · 0: Influence $< 2$    |                    |

Figure A.8a: dots represent coefficient estimates and line segments represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.8b: the marginal effect of the bridging score on NPA influence over the range of the 2005 GGI score.

Network bridging measures the divisions in social networks to proxy for the barriers to bridging social capital. But it is also a complex measure that is dependent on the community detection algorithm. For robustness, I also substitute alternative measures for the community network structure. Figure A.8 presents the results using the size of the largest component in the network as a percentage of network size. Communities in which the largest component of the network represents a greater share of the overall network may have better communication across social cleavage divides, consistent with bridging social capital. Social ties through family connection link a greater percentage of the villagers together. Figure A.9 presents the results

Figure A.9: Model 1, Density measures CAC



| Sample                | Outcome Variable        | Varying Intercepts |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| · N (Villages): 12472 | · 1: Influence $\geq 2$ | · Municipality     |
| · Municipalities: 569 | · 0: Influence $< 2$    |                    |

Figure A.9a: dots represent coefficient estimates and line segments represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.9b: the marginal effect of the bridging score on NPA influence over the range of the 2005 GGI score.

using overall network density to measure social capital.

Consistent with the accountability theory, the coefficient on each of these alternatives to the bridging (modularity) measure of community social structure suggest the effect of collective action capacity is positive and statistically distinguishable from 0 at low-to-moderate levels of local governance, and decline as local governance increases. Like bridging, each of these measures also have limitations to capturing bridging social capital in the village network. Triangulating among the alternative measures may strengthen confidence the results are not sensitive to the specific choice in measurement, or alternatively may begin to falsify the conclusions drawn in the main empirical analysis.



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## **Appendix B: Supplementary Information for Village Interviews**

### **Recruiting Key Informants and Conducting Interviews**

For each sampled municipality, APHP's director and research team called contacts in the Local Government Unit (LGU) office for assistance identifying and recruiting village experts in each of the sampled villages within the municipality. While elders, especially those that served in leadership positions in the past, were prioritized, younger barangay political office holders (present or former barangay captains or council members) and other community leaders with especially deep knowledge of the barangay and its history were also considered eligible respondents. To reiterate, the individuals selected for interviews were not selected to be representative of the village population; rather, they were selected for their knowledge of village history and their ability to comment on the CPP-NPA activities in the village since the late 1970's. When requesting potential village experts to participate as interview respondents, the APHP personnel used the IRB-approved recruitment script.

Because some sampled villages remain within or near communist insurgent pres-

ence, all interviews were arranged to take place at selected safe areas within the respondent's municipality, often but not exclusively the municipality capital. Where necessary for security reasons, APHP personnel coordinated with military officers stationed in the area to ensure safe passage for the enumerators and village experts.

Interview respondents were provided reimbursement for their travel to the interview site as well as a meal during their stay in the area. For the most part, especially for municipalities very far from Davao City, interview respondents from each of the five barangays within the sampled municipality were interviewed during the same field trip. Enumerators arranged a day or consecutive days for which the five selected interview respondents were all available to travel to a mutually convenient interview site within the municipality for their respective interviews. The design called for interviews to be conducted privately so that a respondent's responses were not influenced by others. Nonetheless, logistical challenges that caused the enumerators to arrive late to appointments in a few municipalities far from Davao City required collective interviews. When citing responses from any of these collective interviews, I note the deviation from standard protocol in a footnote following the quoted text.

In accordance with the IRB-approved procedure, at the beginning of each interview, the enumerator presented the respondent with the Information Sheet, a copy of which is included here. The information sheet explains the purpose of the study and the interview process the respondent is being asked to participate in. Because I expected there to be a slight chance some respondents may be uncomfortable with a paper trail linking them to the interview, the respondents were not asked to sign the consent form. Instead, the enumerators, approved by the local Research Ethics board at Ateneo de Manila University (and approved by the Columbia University IRB), certified that the interview respondent verbally, and unequivocally, consented

to participate in the interview.

Once the enumerator obtained consent, they proceed to the Interview Questionnaire, a complete copy of which is included in this Appendix. The enumerators were instructed to follow the questions in order. Though Sections A-F were designed for quick responses and minimal discussion for measurement purposes, at times the respondent interjected with comments on their thoughts about the issue at the heart of a particular question. Open-ended responses in this manner are included in the analysis of open-ended discussion in the main qualitative empirical chapter.

## Key Informant Interview Questionnaire

Accountability in Rebel Regimes

Co-Investigator: Michael A. Rubin

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### A. Municipal Expert Background on Barangay

ENUMERATOR: “First, I will ask you a few questions to understand how confident you feel in your knowledge about life in the barangay and its history with the conflict in the area.”

**A1.** Please tell me how you would rate your level of knowledge of [BARANGAY NAME]. And your confidence in your ability to describe accurately the history and conflict dynamics of [BARANGAY NAME].

- 1. Expertise: I can confidently comment on all aspects of life in the barangay
- 2. Very Knowledgeable: I can confidently comment on most but not all aspects of life in the barangay.
- 3. Somewhat knowledgeable: I can confidently comment on certain aspects of life in the barangay but there are many things I cannot comment on.
- 4. I do not know enough to comment

**A2.** Do you have any family connections to [BARANGAY NAME]?

- Yes

No

**A3.** Do you live in [BARANGAY NAME]? If not, how often do you visit [BARANGAY NAME]?

- 1. I live in the barangay
- 2. I live nearby, and travel to the barangay at least a few times a week
- 3. I live nearby, and travel to the barangay a few times per month
- 4. I live nearby and travel to the barangay a few times per year.

**A4.** What is the name of the Barangay Captain in [BARANGAY NAME]?

ENUMERATOR: check whether they answered correctly or incorrectly

Correct

Incorrect

**A5.** What would you say was the first year [ARMED GROUP] started to exert significant control over aspects of daily life in the barangay?

## B. Pre-Conflict State of Goods and Services

“Now, I would like to ask you a few questions about the social and economic conditions in the barangay *before* the [ARMED GROUP] first established political authority in the barangay. For each of the major governance issues listed below, please tell me how you would assess the state of service provision.”

### B1. Education:

Do schools have adequate resources and staff for the students in the barangay? Are the schools affordable for the families? Is the quality of instruction appropriate?

- 1. High quality/plentiful access
- 2. Tolerable quality/reasonable access
- 3. Poor quality/difficult access
- 4. Very poor quality/no access

**B2. Health:**

Do citizens have adequate access to medical care, including doctors, medicine, and facilities to receive proper care?

- 1. High quality/plentiful access
- 2. Tolerable quality/reasonable access
- 3. Poor quality/difficult access
- 4. Very poor quality/no access

**B3. Justice/Dispute Resolution:**

When citizens are involved in disputes over land, property, or other issues, is there a clear mechanism for resolving these disputes? Is dispute resolution generally effective?

- 1. High quality/plentiful access
- 2. Tolerable quality/reasonable access
- 3. Poor quality/difficult access
- 4. Very poor quality/no access

**B4. Land Ownership/Distribution:**

How concentrated is the wealth generated from land use? Is land ownership and/or the wealth produced concentrated in a few families or do the landless receive adequate shares?

- 1. High quality/plentiful access
- 2. Tolerable quality/reasonable access
- 3. Poor quality/difficult access
- 4. Very poor quality/no access

**B5. Transportation Infrastructure:**

Are roads adequately maintained? Are roads easy to use and provide access to essential locations like markets, water sources, health and education facilities?

- 1. High quality/plentiful access
- 2. Tolerable quality/reasonable access
- 3. Poor quality/difficult access
- 4. Very poor quality/no access

**B6. Access to Clean Water and Food:**

Do members of the community have access to adequate sources of water and food? Or are these basic resources under-provided in the community?

- 1. High quality/plentiful access
- 2. Tolerable quality/reasonable access
- 3. Poor quality/difficult access
- 4. Very poor quality/no access

### **B7. Economic Livelihood:**

Access to jobs with living wages and opportunities for income to support one's family.

- 1. High quality/plentiful access
- 2. Tolerable quality/reasonable access
- 3. Poor quality/difficult access
- 4. Very poor quality/no access

### **B8. Public Safety:**

Protection of the community from crime such as theft of animals and other property or use and sale of illegal drugs, escalating family conflict, and other threats to public safety.

- 1. High quality/plentiful access
- 2. Tolerable quality/reasonable access
- 3. Poor quality/difficult access
- 4. Very poor quality/no access

### **B9. Security:**

Protection from the violence perpetrated by private armed groups, [ARMED GROUP], or the police and military related to the conflict.

- 1. High quality/plentiful access
- 2. Tolerable quality/reasonable access
- 3. Poor quality/difficult access
- 4. Very poor quality/no access

### **B10. Protection of Traditional Culture and Religion:**

Protection of traditional leadership and cultural practices, access to houses of worship, and freedom to practice religion or express cultural heritage.

- 1. High quality/plentiful access
- 2. Tolerable quality/reasonable access
- 3. Poor quality/difficult access
- 4. Very poor quality/no access

## C. Rebel Governance Vignette Module

“Now, I will describe to you the conditions during periods of [ARMED GROUP] authority in **two other** barangays that are similar to [BARANGAY NAME]. I would like to ask you to think about the periods of time in [BARANGAY NAME] during which [ARMED GROUP] were at their strongest and most active in the barangay. By this I mean the [ARMED GROUP] was in charge of some important aspects of daily life in the community and were not severely threatened by the military or other armed groups.

I will refer to these other Barangays simply as “Barangay A” and “Barangay B” for shorthand. For each pair of descriptions, I would like you to tell me which barangay, A or B, most resembles [BARANGAY NAME] based on your best knowledge of the history and social conditions there.”

### C1. Justice/Dispute Resolution Vignette

#### **BARANGAY A**

[ARMED GROUP] personnel administered a fair justice system. By this I mean the [ARMED GROUP] would provide mediation or adjudication in disputes between individuals or families over land, debts, allegations of theft, or marital disputes in order to avoid violence between disputants. It was clear to the members of the community the [ARMED GROUP] were an authority in resolving disputes and the criteria they used to make decisions.

#### **BARANGAY B**

[ARMED GROUP] were not involved in settling disputes, or in creating a streamlined process for dispute resolution. When they did get involved in judicial matters, it was to tip the decision in favor of their own personnel or to privilege their more ardent supporters in the barangay.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about the [ARMED GROUP] during periods in which they were at their strongest presence in [BARANGAY NAME].*

- BARANGAY A
- BARANGAY B

## C2. Public Safety Vignette

### **BARANGAY A**

The [ARMED GROUP] personnel maintained safety and order in the community. [ARMED GROUP] personnel were trusted and effective at detecting and responding to criminal activities like theft of animals or other property, the use and sale of illegal drugs, and other criminal activities that might occur. Even if there were some instances of crime or problems with illegal drugs, the [ARMED GROUP] were critical to containing the problem from becoming worse.

### **BARANGAY B**

The [ARMED GROUP] may have monitored threats to community stability, but mostly focused on security matters that related to encounters with government and military. Handling crime in general was the prerogative of the citizens themselves without much help from the [ARMED GROUP]. The [ARMED GROUP] may have responded to criminal activity occasionally, but in general it was not their role in the community.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about the [ARMED GROUP] during periods in which they were at their strongest presence in [BARANGAY NAME].*

BARANGAY A

BARANGAY B

## C3. Service Provision Vignette

### **BARANGAY A**

[ARMED GROUP] personnel in the community were generally helpful to the citizens. . When members of the community fell on hard times, [ARMED GROUP] personnel made an effort to ensure citizens had access to adequate food, water, shelter and any other goods that were necessary for survival.

### **BARANGAY B**

[ARMED GROUP] personnel did not take any special actions to ensure broader access to basic goods and services in the community. They were concerned with accessing basic goods for their unit, but their role as members of the [ARMED GROUP] did not include delivering goods and services to others in the community.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about the [ARMED GROUP] during periods in which they were at their strongest presence in [BARANGAY NAME].*

BARANGAY A

BARANGAY B

#### C4. Labor Vignette

##### **BARANGAY A**

[ARMED GROUP] personnel contributed to the community by offering help when citizens needed a hand. They may help local farmers harvest their crops when they are short-handed. If the community tried to build public works projects like wells, markets, or schools, the [ARMED GROUP] personnel would pitch in to help the project to completion.

##### **BARANGAY B**

The [ARMED GROUP] personnel mainly focused their efforts on activities that contributed to the [ARMED GROUP] unit's resources or which contributed to their own income-generating activities. It was not their role as members of [ARMED GROUP] to contribute their labor to the community as a whole or to provide assistance to others in the community who needed help in their income-generating activities.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about the [ARMED GROUP] during periods in which they were at their strongest presence in [BARANGAY NAME].*

BARANGAY A

BARANGAY B

#### C5. Transportation Vignette

##### **BARANGAY A**

If the community did not have any roads, or the roads were very inaccessible, the [ARMED GROUP] personnel may have built simple dirt roads. [ARMED GROUP] personnel attempted to enhance access to markets through farm-to-market roads, medical services, houses of worship and other essential locations.

##### **BARANGAY B**

The [ARMED GROUP] were not involved in efforts to improve the quality of roads or the conditions for citizens to travel within the community. They may have been concerned with improving their own mobility within and between communities to remain protected from the military, but they were not actively engaged in improving quality of transportation for the citizens.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about the [ARMED GROUP] during periods in which they were at their strongest presence in [BARANGAY NAME].*

BARANGAY A

BARANGAY B

## C6. Healthcare Vignette

### **BARANGAY A:**

[ARMED GROUP] personnel attempted to increase the accessibility of basic healthcare services. If the community lacked medical facilities and equipment to treat the sick and elderly, the [ARMED GROUP] brought doctors and medicine into the community to provide treatment.

### **BARANGAY B:**

[ARMED GROUP] personnel may have accessed doctors or medicine to provide medical care for their own personnel or their supporters in the community. But it was not the role of the [ARMED GROUP] personnel to help the community in general get access to healthcare.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about the [ARMED GROUP] during periods in which they were at their strongest presence in [BARANGAY NAME].*

BARANGAY A

BARANGAY B

## C7. Education Vignette

### **BARANGAY A**

Because [BARANGAY NAME] had limited resources available for education, the [ARMED GROUP] ensured teachers and the proper materials were available to run local schools and provide quality instruction to the children.

### **BARANGAY B**

Though the resources available for schools was limited, it was not the role of the [ARMED GROUP] to improve access to education or to find resources to improve schools in the community.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about the [ARMED GROUP] during periods in which they were at their strongest presence in [BARANGAY NAME].*

BARANGAY A

BARANGAY B

## C8. Land Ownership Vignette

### **BARANGAY A**

The [ARMED GROUP] personnel were addressed the community's problems involving the distribution of wealth and income from land use. They tried to help landless citizens, for example by increasing the tenants' share of the profits from production, decrease the rent for tenants, or raise the wages for farmworkers.

### **BARANGAY B**

The [ARMED GROUP] personnel were not involved in the land reform efforts of the local community. It was not the role of the [ARMED GROUP] personnel to implement or support changes in the distribution of land or the wealth generated from the use of land in the community.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about the [ARMED GROUP] during periods in which they were at their strongest presence in [BARANGAY NAME].*

- BARANGAY A
- BARANGAY B

## C9. Recruitment Vignette

### **BARANGAY A**

[ARMED GROUP] personnel actively recruited citizens in the barangay to join their armed forces and political organizations. They would offer incentives to individuals to join and provided political education to convince community members of the nobility of their cause. [ARMED GROUP] personnel rarely or never used intimidation or coercion to get people from the barangay to join their organization.

### **BARANGAY B**

[ARMED GROUP] personnel actively recruited citizens in the barangay to join their armed forces and political organizations. They may offer some incentives to the community members who would join, but primarily they used intimidation and coercion to force people to join these organizations.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about the [ARMED GROUP] during periods in which they were at their strongest presence in [BARANGAY NAME].*

- BARANGAY A
- BARANGAY B

## C10. Community Participation Vignette

[ARMED GROUP] activities usually have consequences for the citizens in the community. Clashes with the government can threaten the physical safety of community members and [ARMED GROUP] demands for support put a strain on family income. I will now describe two different barangays and how the [ARMED GROUP] implemented decisions in the community.

### **BARANGAY A**

[ARMED GROUP] personnel consulted with the members of the community to make sure their requests for community support and the rules they imposed were not causing problems for the citizens. Community leaders were in regular contact with [ARMED GROUP]. When community members voiced concern over [ARMED GROUP] activities, the [ARMED GROUP] personnel were generally open to addressing these concerns.

### **BARANGAY B**

[ARMED GROUP] personnel excluded community members from the decision making process. [ARMED GROUP] demanded particular forms of support from the citizens without consulting community leaders. The [ARMED GROUP] were concerned with access to resources and only secondarily for the livelihood of community members.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about the [ARMED GROUP] during periods in which they were at their strongest presence in [BARANGAY NAME].*

- BARANGAY A
- BARANGAY B

## C11. Culture and Religion Vignette

### **BARANGAY A**

The [ARMED GROUP] personnel respected the cultural and religious practices of the citizens in the barangay. They communicated with traditional and religious leaders and did not make their revolutionary activities incompatible with the community's adherence to cultural or religious traditions.

### **BARANGAY B**

The [ARMED GROUP] may have tried to co-opt local traditional or religious leadership but they were not active advocates for the cultural traditions. They may have even treated local cultural institutions and traditional leaders as a threat to their efforts to organize their supportive revolutionary committees.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about the [ARMED GROUP] during periods in which they were at their strongest presence in [BARANGAY NAME].*

- BARANGAY A
- BARANGAY B

## C12. Taxation/Extortion Vignette

In most communities in which [ARMED GROUP] personnel maintained a presence, they would ask for some money, food, or other resources from the community in exchange for protection and as a way of supporting the political goals of the organization. Now I would like to describe two different barangays and the way in which the [ARMED GROUP] personnel went about collecting contributions from families and businesses in the community.

### **BARANGAY A**

[ARMED GROUP] personnel pressured households to contribute a portion of their income or their crops. They did this by convincing people of the nobility of the cause and promised some current or future benefits to the community. People contributed to the [ARMED GROUP] because they recognized some benefits to the [ARMED GROUP] presence in their community or perhaps out of frustration with the lack of government services.

### **BARANGAY B**

[ARMED GROUP] personnel pressured households to contribute a portion of their income or their crops. They may have offered some promises of benefits to the community, but primarily they forced families and businesses to contribute their income and resources under threat of violence. People who refused the [ARMED GROUP] personnel or tried to give less than the share demanded may be hurt or killed and their property, businesses, or homes may be destroyed or damaged.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about the [ARMED GROUP] during periods in which they were at their strongest presence in [BARANGAY NAME].*

- BARANGAY A
- BARANGAY B

## C13. Violence Vignette

In most communities in which [ARMED GROUP] maintained a presence, they had to enforce the rules and make sure the citizens were not doing anything that could help the military. Now I would like to describe two different barangays and the way in which the [ARMED GROUP] personnel handled individuals suspected of violating these rules in the community.

### **BARANGAY A**

When specific members of the community were found to violate basic rules of conduct, including helping the military, the [ARMED GROUP] took measures to punish those responsible. The [ARMED GROUP] personnel may even use violence or harsh punishments, but only in extreme cases and not very often. The [ARMED GROUP] personnel were very careful to only punish those individuals that have intentionally defied the [ARMED GROUP] or put the community at risk.

### **BARANGAY B**

When there were transgressions against the rules in the community, or when there were instances of information getting to the government, the [ARMED GROUP] personnel committed acts of violence and harsh punishment to deter additional transgressions. The difference in this community was that the [ARMED GROUP] personnel did not dwell too much on getting proof of individuals violating the rules. They were not concerned with punishing the particular individuals responsible but rather in striking fear to deter others from committing similar transgressions.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about the [ARMED GROUP] during periods in which they were at their strongest presence in [BARANGAY NAME].*

- BARANGAY A
- BARANGAY B

## **D. Accountability Instruments Vignette Module**

### **D1. Dependence on Civilians Vignette**

#### **BARANGAY A**

The [ARMED GROUP] personnel depended on citizens for important resources, such as food, shelter, and financial contributions. The [ARMED GROUP] personnel needed citizens to willingly help and cooperate with them. They could not simply take these resources on their own nor could they rely solely on coercion because the community would not respond well to this kind of treatment.

#### **BARANGAY B**

The [ARMED GROUP] did not depend on the community's willingness to support them, since they could take what they needed from the community by themselves, or using coercion. They did not require sustained cooperation from the community and they were not threatened by any community initiatives deny them the resources they needed.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about the [ARMED GROUP] during periods in which they were at their strongest presence in [BARANGAY NAME].*

BARANGAY A

BARANGAY B

## D2. Coordination Vignette

### **BARANGAY A**

Managing the challenges presented by the conflict between [ARMED GROUP] and the government was a community-wide effort. Community members and leaders across clan or family groups and from various ethnic and religious groups cooperated whenever there were issues arising related to the conflict or to [ARMED GROUP] actions that required a response from the community.

### **BARANGAY B**

Community members organized with members of their own clan or ethnic group to meet the challenges associated with the conflict. There was unlikely to be any effort to collaborate across clan or ethnic lines, and individuals looked to the leaders of their clan or ethnic group to make decisions in their group's best interest rather than the community as a whole.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about the [ARMED GROUP] during periods in which they were at their strongest presence in [BARANGAY NAME].*

BARANGAY A

BARANGAY B

## D3. Civilian Resistance Vignette

In most communities in which [ARMED GROUP] maintained a strong presence, there inevitably arose certain issues in which the [ARMED GROUP] took actions that may have caused some problems for the citizens in the community. I will describe how two different barangays have handled these kinds of issues during the history of the conflict.

### **BARANGAY A**

In the event [ARMED GROUP] took actions or imposed rules that caused an excessive burden on the community, citizens would take action to influence [ARMED GROUP] personnel to change their actions. Citizens may withdraw material support to the [ARMED GROUP] or express disapproval of the [ARMED GROUP].

### **BARANGAY B**

Citizens were powerless to influence [ARMED GROUP] decision-making. When the [ARMED GROUP] took actions that were against community interests, the citizens

generally accepted the situation rather than resist because they had no other choice.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about the [ARMED GROUP] during periods in which they were at their strongest presence in [BARANGAY NAME].*

BARANGAY A

BARANGAY B

## E. Coordination Capacity Vignette Module

“Now I would like you to think about the barangay *before* the time [ARMED GROUP] established the strength to assert real political authority over daily life in the barangay. For each pair of barangay descriptions below, please tell me which description best matches how life was in [BARANGAY NAME] before [ARMED GROUP] established authority there.”

### E1. Community Trust Vignette

#### **BARANGAY A**

Most of the community members who were living in the barangay could be trusted. If someone in the community was in need of help, they could turn to a stranger or someone from a different family or ethnic group within the community to help them without fear that person would take advantage of the situation.

#### **BARANGAY B**

Citizens in the community as a general rule trusted family members but few if any others. Asking for help from individuals outside the family was considered risky, since those who are not blood may take advantage when you are vulnerable.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about [BARANGAY NAME] before the [ARMED GROUP] achieved a strong presence in the barangay.*

BARANGAY A

BARANGAY B

### E2. Inclusiveness Vignette

#### **BARANGAY A**

All members of the community had a voice in the community’s decision making and political processes. That is, the opportunity to participate in decisions did not depend on family name, ethnic/tribal background, religion or socioeconomic status. All community

members enjoyed access to public services.

**BARANGAY B**

Certain families or people from particular tribal or ethnic groups had greater power to influence the decision making process in the community compared to others. The leadership was usually selected from the same tribal or ethnic groups. Access to crucial goods and services also privileged these groups more than others

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about [BARANGAY NAME] before the [ARMED GROUP] achieved a strong presence in the barangay.*

BARANGAY A

BARANGAY B

**E3. Good Will Vignette****BARANGAY A**

Most people in the community generally believed it is their duty to help the community as a whole, including helping people from other families, tribes, or ethnic groups in time of need. People were willing to contribute to projects and programs that were meant to improve the overall conditions in the community, even if they were not strictly required to do so and even if the project would benefit other families or groups.

**BARANGAY B**

In general, people supported the use of community resources for initiatives that benefit their family or members of their own ethnic group. People saw it as their responsibility to exert effort and spend resources to help their family, and did not see it as their responsibility to support other families or groups of people in the community.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about [BARANGAY NAME] before the [ARMED GROUP] achieved a strong presence in the barangay.*

BARANGAY A

BARANGAY B

**E4. Density/Integration Vignette****BARANGAY A**

Families in the barangay were socially and economically integrated. People from different families, tribal, or ethnic backgrounds traded with each other in the markets,

attended each other's' social gatherings, and cooperated on efforts to improve life in the community when needed.

**BARANGAY B**

Families and individuals mostly participated in organizations, traded in markets, and attended social gatherings with members of their family, tribe or ethnic group. It was not common to interact regularly with members of other groups.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about [BARANGAY NAME] before the [ARMED GROUP] achieved a strong presence in the barangay.*

BARANGAY A

BARANGAY B

## **E5. Communal Violence Vignette**

**BARANGAY A**

The barangay has a history of intense conflict between certain families. These families are very hostile to each other, and have long-running disputes over a critical issue like land ownership or family honor. These conflicts occasionally escalate to violence, revenge killing, or destruction of property.

**BARANGAY B**

Family feuds are rare or mild. Violence is rarely used to resolve disputes or take revenge. Disputes between families may occur but they are handled peacefully by the leaders of the respective families or the local elders/community leaders.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME]. Remember to think about [BARANGAY NAME] before the [ARMED GROUP] achieved a strong presence in the barangay.*

BARANGAY A

BARANGAY B

## **F. Alternative Explanations Vignette Module**

### **F1. Institutional Effectiveness Vignette**

**BARANGAY A**

In this barangay, most people recognized and respected the authority of the local

leadership. It was clear who had the power to make decisions, and the community members accepted that the decisions made were fair. People recognized the appropriate ways to resolve disputes and they accepted the decisions made by the mediators.

### **BARANGAY B**

In this barangay, people disagreed over who had legitimate power to make decisions. Not everyone agreed on what the appropriate procedures were for resolving disputes. It was not clear that decisions would be made fairly, or that all groups were equal before the law in the barangay.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME].*

- BARANGAY A
- BARANGAY B

## **F2. Organizational Capacity Vignette**

### **BARANGAY A**

The community had strong organizations of community activism. If there were major challenges or problems that affected the whole community, such as a poor harvest or the need for a new well to draw water for the local population, people were organized quickly to design and implement a solution.

### **BARANGAY B**

There were few or weak community organizations. Families or small groups of families may have helped each other but there was weak capacity to organize on a broader level. If there were major challenges or problems that affected the whole community, such as a poor harvest, it was not easy to mobilize the population to action.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME].*

- BARANGAY A
- BARANGAY B

## **F3. Support Vignette**

### **BARANGAY A**

Even before the [ARMED GROUP] established political authority rivaling the government, the citizens in the community were generally sympathetic to the activities of [ARMED GROUP]. Perhaps not all of the citizens were completely supportive, but there

was a significant level of active support for the [ARMED GROUP].

**BARANGAY B**

The citizens were generally resistant to the [ARMED GROUP] asserting political authority in their community. Even if they shared grievances with the government or the goals advanced by [ARMED GROUP], they did not support the activities of the group because of the consequences for the community.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME].*

BARANGAY A

BARANGAY B

**F4. State Penetration Vignette****BARANGAY A**

Historically, the local government unit has been active in providing goods and services; such as police presence, healthcare, education, and infrastructure. Even if the status of those services are lower than in other places in the country, the community is at least familiar with the process of service delivery from the government.

**BARANGAY B**

The state has historically provided few or intermittent services in the community. Police presence has been very low and the police do not regularly maintain order in the community. The community had little experience actively engaging with the state and no easy way to request services.

*Please tell me which of the two barangay described above better describes the conditions in [BARANGAY NAME].*

BARANGAY A

BARANGAY B

**G. Qualitative Interview Questions**

**G1.** Can you describe the activities [ARMED GROUP] personnel performed in the community on a daily basis?

- I am interested in particular the activities these individuals conducted in their role as members of [ARMED GROUP], rather than the activities they were engaged in simply as members of the community.
- Did the [ARMED GROUP] provide any benefits to the community on a regular

basis? How did this change over time?

- How did the [ARMED GROUP] personnel try to win the support in the community?

**G2.** Do the citizens or their community leaders participate in the [ARMED GROUP] decision making on issues that have consequences for the community?

- How do citizens and leaders influence [ARMED GROUP] personnel?

**G3.** What are the ways in which civilians support or collaborate with the [ARMED GROUP]?

- What resources do they contribute to the [ARMED GROUP]
- do they make decisions about how to contribute based on [ARMED GROUP] actions in the community?

**G4.** Were there any aspects of community life over which the members of [ARMED GROUP] and others in the population had conflicting interests?

- Were there disagreements over the rules the [ARMED GROUP] personnel expected community members to follow, the ways in which they enforced rules, or the mechanisms they used to adjudicate disputes?

**G5.** Are you aware of instances in which members of the community would voice disapproval of decisions made or actions taken by the [ARMED GROUP] personnel?

- What kinds of issues sparked these disagreements?
- How did the citizens go about voicing their concerns?
- How did the [ARMED GROUP] personnel respond?

**G6.** Can you describe the relationship between people of different family, tribal, and ethnic groups in the community?

- In general, is there harmony among the different groups or are people skeptical of members of other groups, suspecting that they support different armed groups?
- Do individuals generally interact with people from other ethnic or religious groups for routine economic exchanges and social interactions?
- How do the social relationships in the community impact how the community interacted with [ARMED GROUP] personnel?