

Security of Emergent Automotive Systems: A Tutorial Introduction and Perspectives on Practice

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Editor's note:

Emerging automotive systems are governed by various complicated hardware and software systems. Hence, security is an important issue in highly interconnected automotive systems. This article presents a survey of current automotive security research.

—Partha Pratim Pande, Washington State University

■ **THE LAST FEW DECADES** have seen a transformation in automotive systems from mechanical or electromechanical systems to electronic, software-based systems. Modern automotive systems are complex distributed systems involving the coordination of hundreds of electronic control units (ECUs) communicating through a variety of in-vehicle networks and the execution of several hundred megabytes of software. However, they induce two additional constraints that result in significant design complexities beyond traditional distributed systems. First, the systems are cyber-physical: the ECUs coordinate, monitor, and control a variety of sensors and actuators including light detection and ranging (LIDAR), cameras, radar, light matrices, devices for sensing angular momentum of the wheels, devices for automated brake and steering control, and so on. Second, many computation and communication tasks across different ECUs, sensors, and actuators must

be accomplished under hard real-time requirements. For example, a pedestrian detection algorithm must complete a slew of complex activities, including the capture of sensory data, aggregation, communication, analytics, image processing, security analysis, and so on, within the time constraints to enable

successful completion of the appropriate actuarial response such as warning the driver or automatic braking. Furthermore, the complexity is anticipated to rise sharply with increasing autonomy levels in vehicles. For instance, a future self-driving car with autonomy level 4 will include several elements not available in today's (level 2) systems. The following are some example elements.

- Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications with a variety of networks of different levels of trustworthiness.
- A diversity of sensors to detect driving conditions (e.g., potholes, moisture, pedestrians, etc.).
- Distributed computing elements to perform in-vehicle analytics and react to evolving conditions on the fly.

Security is obviously of paramount importance for automotive systems. Given that the system involves the complex interaction of sensory, actuarial, and computational elements, an innocent misconfiguration or error in one component may result in a subtle vulnerability that can be

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exploited in field with potentially catastrophic consequences. A recent work has shown that it is viable, and even relatively straightforward, to hack a vehicle remotely, get control over its driving functionality, and cause an accident. The situation will be exacerbated in the future with the increase in autonomy level and the reliance on sensors and communications—an attacker may hack a vehicle remotely through the interception or tampering of sensor data and/or V2V and V2I messages without requiring physical access or even proximity to the vehicle under attack, thus resulting in a sharp increase in the attack surface. Consequently, the proliferation and adoption of autonomous, self-driving cars critically depend on our ability to ensure that they perform securely in a potentially adversarial environment [125], [126]. Unsurprisingly, there has been a large interest in recent years in the security of automotive systems, with a flurry of publications demonstrating a diversity of security vulnerabilities and exploits, as well as techniques for defense against these vulnerabilities.

Unfortunately, in spite of this interest, there has been little effort to consolidate, structure, and unify this large body of research. Consequently, publications in the area typically appear as isolated approaches for specific attacks or defenses, rather than a disciplined study of security challenges or systematic approaches to counter them. Furthermore, much of the research on automotive security is conflated with other related areas on security assurance with analogous but different challenges, including wearables, the Internet of Things (IoT), or even traditional hardware and software designs. Finally, there has been an increasing divergence between academic research and industrial practice in the area, each of which has evolved independently with little interaction and, in some cases, with little understanding of the assumptions, issues, tradeoffs, and scales considered by the other. All this leaves a researcher getting initiated in this area with the daunting tasks of sifting through the various challenges, complexities, and research directions; identifying approaches applicable to automotive systems in particular; and comprehending evolving challenges caused by the rising complexity of these systems through the past, present, and future.

This article represents the first step to address the above problem. Our goal is to provide a comprehensive, systematic overview of both research and practice in automotive security. We develop a systematic categorization of research advances in various aspects of both attacks and defenses on automotive electronics. Furthermore, we discuss current practices in security assurance, point out the constraints and tradeoffs, and provide perspectives on the rationale involved. Our objective is to make this article a comprehensive one for a researcher to begin investigation on all aspects of the security of connected and autonomous vehicles.

Background

Electronics and software in modern automotive systems

The transformation of automotive systems from a mechanical or an electromechanical system to a chiefly electronic one arguably began with the development of engine control and fuel injection systems in the 1970s. Starting from the 1990s, the design complexity of automotive systems has been dominated by electronic parts, with more focus on software components in the last decade. Today's cars include electronics and software for infotainment, driver assistance [advanced driver-assistance system (ADAS)], and energy efficiency (e.g., emission control), to name a few. The electronic and software components in an automobile (which we will loosely refer to as electronics) are typically divided into five functional domains:

- *Telematics*: This includes the multimedia and infotainment components of the car, including radio, rear-seat entertainment, and navigation systems.
- *Body*: This includes air-conditioning and climate control, the electronic dashboard, power doors, seats, windows, mirrors, lights, park distance control, and so on.
- *Chassis*: This includes features such as the anti-lock braking system (ABS), stability control, adaptive cruise control, and so on.
- *Powertrain*: This includes the electronics for controlling the engine, fuel injection, transmission gear, ignition timing, and so on.
- *Passive safety*: This includes all the electronics designed to add safety mechanisms, including roll-over sensors, airbags, belt pretensioners, and so on.

Obviously, many automotive features cross-cut a variety of functional domains. For example, many modern cars include speed-compensated volume adjustment, that is, adjustment of multi-media volume in response to increasing speed of the car. This requires communication between the radio (part of telematics) and ADAS components. Other similar examples include automatic braking while reversing if the backup camera senses a child or small obstacle and showing the reversing trajectory on display (which requires computation of angular momentum of the wheels). To enable these features, automotive system architectures involve significant and complex communication among the different in-vehicle components. This is implemented through a variety of protocols including controller area network bus (CAN-Bus), local interconnect network (LIN), FlexRay, and media-oriented systems transport (MOST). Figure 1 shows a representative automotive architecture. In addition to in-vehicle communication, current and emergent vehicles also communicate with external entities (e.g., other cars, infrastructure components, etc.).

Security requirements

Traditionally, the security of functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic (E/E/PE) safety-related system includes the following foundational pillars: confidentiality, integrity, and availability, also referred to as the *CIA pillars* [57]. More recently, authentication and repudiation have been added as additional pillars, particularly for communicating systems and devices.

- *Confidentiality*: This refers to the requirement that sensitive, critical system information and data are not perceivable by parties who are not the intended recipients.
- *Integrity*: This refers to the requirement that an unauthorized entity cannot corrupt or modify sensitive data or information. In the context of communicating agents, integrity involves the requirement that data received is not different from what was originally intended to be sent. Furthermore, the data should be accompanied by a warranty that it was sent from the expected user at an expected time.
- *Availability*: This refers to the requirement that a legitimate user or application can access requested resources and perform functions within a guaranteed time limit. An obvious subversion on availability is a denial-of-service (DOS) attack.
- *Authentication*: The assurance that communicating parties can verify the identity of each other and that parties are only able to attain access to resources corresponding to their access level.
- *Nonrepudiation*: This refers to the assurance that a party cannot refute something they have done (e.g., sending a packet). It requires a mechanism to prove the history of a communicating party. This usually involves a combination of authentication and integrity.




Figure 1. Overview of an automotive system architecture. Each box refers to an ECU (controller). ECUs are connected with one another through buses and intranetworking protocols such as CAN and LIN. CAN is primarily used for core driving functionality and engine control as well as for sensors, comfort, infotainment, and the adaptive front-lighting system.

Of course, the above requirements are very general. Translating them for a specific application involves definitions of security policies targeted toward that system. For example, confidentiality requirements are enforced through security policies that stipulate how sensitive assets in the system can be accessed and the agents and devices authorized to access them [12], [13], [129]. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned five pillars can be used to systematize and categorize security attacks and defenses. In this article, when discussing security vulnerabilities

on automotive systems, we will use this taxonomy to categorize both attacks and defenses.

Some challenges with automotive security

At a high level, security attacks on automotive systems are obvious instances of general cybersecurity problems. In particular, a large number of electronic and software components that were not originally designed to be connected to the Internet are now connecting; therefore, it is unsurprising that security vulnerabilities exist which can then be exploited in the field. On the other hand, one challenge is that traditional cybersecurity solutions cannot be directly used to mitigate such attacks. In particular, automotive systems are in the field for a long time compared to traditional information technology (IT) systems, mobile systems, and wearable devices. For instance, a mobile phone remains in the field for a couple of years. On the contrary a car may remain in the field for a decade or more. This gives the hacker a long time to find vulnerabilities in deployed vehicles. Furthermore, even if there is no security problem at the time of deployment, security requirements can change within this long lifetime, adversely impacting the level of security assurance on a deployed, mature system. Furthermore, traditional security assurance solutions (e.g., encryption, authentication, and so on) are typically computationally intensive. It is difficult to deploy many of these solutions with the memory and computation constraints of automotive ECUs. Finally, such solutions may raise issues related to privacy. For instance, in connected platoons, strong authentication may be desirable to ensure that a V2V communication is indeed coming from an authentic vehicle; however, a strong authentication scheme may disclose the identity of the sending vehicle, which can then be used to extract various private information, including location and driving history.

Sampling of automotive security attacks

In the last decade, researchers and white-hat hackers were experimenting on advanced automotive systems to discover their vulnerabilities. Their primary purpose in doing this is to showcase the need for secure automotive systems as more and more capabilities are added to them over time. Each entity has used unique methods and experimental

setups to conduct their studies. We study one of these hacks in detail in the “Digging Deeper: A Car Hacking Case Study” section. In this section, we provide a high-level overview of different hacks to give a general flavor of the spectrum of techniques involved. Table 1 provides a summary of these hacks and the related publications organized by author, year, experimental surface (vehicle type), and citations.

One of the earliest comprehensive attacks on an in-field automobile (they did not publish details of the vehicle involved) was performed by Koscher et al. [87]. The work primarily involved exploits based on physical attacks. Subsequently, two other articles were published following up on the original hack [31], [50]. Checkoway et al. [31] expanded upon the work by Koscher et al. [87] with remote exploits that take advantage of the vehicle’s telematics system. Foster et al. [50] provide a thorough vulnerability analysis of the in-vehicle systems. They considered vulnerabilities of newly introduced (at the time of publication of their work) technologies, including new telematic control units (TCUs) to both direct and remote attacks.

A landmark study in automotive hacking was performed by Miller and Valasek [111] who exhibited a way to remotely control the driver assistance system of a 2014 Jeep Cherokee and drove it off the road. We discuss their work in some detail in the “Digging Deeper: A Car Hacking Case Study” section. This work is particularly relevant to the research community since it provides detailed documentation and explanation to enable the reproduction of their results.

Table 1. Summary of works that hacked on-road vehicles to study their vulnerabilities and potential exploits.

First Author	Year	Experimental Surface	Citation
Koscher	2010	Unknown	[87]
Checkoway	2011	Unknown	[31]
Foster	2015	Mobile Devices Ingenierie TCU used by Uber	[50]
Miller	2012	2010 Ford Escape & 2010 Toyota Prius	[110]
Miller	2015	2014 Jeep Cherokee	[111]
Keen Security Lab	2016-19	Tesla Model S, BMW	[155], [156], [157], [154]
Smith	2016	2006 Chevrolet Malibu	[144]

In addition, there has been work by white-hat hackers and research teams to discover and perform exploits on automotive systems primarily to facilitate research and awareness. One such team, the Keen Security Lab of Tencent [158], discovered exploits on several models of the Tesla Model S, including remote attacks through the CAN module and firmware over-the-air (OTA) updates. They also performed a thorough assessment of in-vehicle equipment in several BMW vehicle models and found many vulnerabilities. Another organization known as the *Car Hacking Village* [94], comprising several DefCon hackers, published a detailed guide for the ethical hacking of automotive systems [144]. They also include a list of recommended equipment to use. They demonstrate their approach on a 2006 Chevrolet Malibu Sedan, although their techniques apply to other vehicles.

Security of in-vehicle networks

The functionalities of automotive systems are typically implemented through the communication and coordination of ECUs and microcontroller units (MCUs) across several in-vehicle networks. For obvious reasons, these in-vehicle networks are the primary targets of automotive security exploitation—the goal is typically to fool the networks into communicating or delivering unauthorized messages. Since many of the messages carried by these networks can have significant impacts on vehicular functionality (e.g., messages through the CAN network can affect vital driving functions including braking and cruise control), a successful attack on the network would typically lead to the compromise of the entire system. Table 2 shows the differences between several common in-vehicle network protocols.

Wolf [168] discusses many inherent vulnerabilities of in-vehicle networks. For example, LIN uses a master–slave architecture, with all communications

initiated by the master [133]. If the master is compromised, then the entire sub-network of slave nodes can be disabled. Since LIN networks often control auxiliary features such as windows, lights, mirrors, fans, and so on, this can impact vehicle usability. Another example is the MOST protocol, which is primarily used for multimedia and infotainment. MOST networks use a ring or daisy-chain topology and have a single timing master node that continuously sends timing frames to synchronize slaves [58]. Since this is the only form of synchronization in the network, an attacker can send malicious timing frames to desynchronize nodes and disable the bus. This can render infotainment/telematics devices inoperable. An even greater vulnerability exists with CAN and FlexRay networks, as they are designed for high-speed, real-time systems and are often implemented in safety-critical applications. Both FlexRay and CAN are susceptible to exploits due to the lack of authentication or encryption [106], [145]. This can allow attackers to cause malfunctions in safety-critical systems such as stability control, antilock braking, and engine management, as well as in drive-by-wire systems such as electronic throttle and steering. In this section, we primarily focus on the security of CAN networks, since they have been ubiquitous and often form the primary communication bus in most vehicles. Many recent studies [31], [50], [87] have shown that it can be compromised by an attacker with relative ease, allowing them to enable or disable critical safety systems.

The two most common attacks for CAN-Bus exploitation are through diagnostic ports and telematics or infotainment systems. Figure 2 illustrates the different attack vectors. Diagnostic ports are a common entry point for an attacker due to the relative ease associated with launching an attack, assuming the attacker has physical access to the diagnostic port (i.e., access to the vehicle). Telematics and

Table 2. Comparison between several common in-vehicle network protocols.

Protocol	Interface	Topology	Bandwidth	Transmission	Arbitration
CAN [145]	Multi-Master	Bus	1 Mbps	Asynchronous	Bit-wise arbitration where lowest message ID gets control of the bus.
LIN [133]	Master-Slave	Bus	20 Kbps	Synchronous	All messages are initiated by the master and one or zero slaves will respond to a given message.
MOST [58]	Timing Master-Slave	Daisy Chain or Star	150 Mbps	Synchronous	Access token is passed around the bus in a circle. A node can only transmit data if it has the token, ensuring fair access for all nodes.
FlexRay [106]	Multi-Master	Star or Bus	10 Mbps	Synchronous and Asynchronous	Static segment with fixed interval messages and dynamic segment with CAN-like arbitration.

infotainment systems often use wireless protocols such as Bluetooth, cellular 2G/3G/4G, WiFi, and GPS, which enable attackers to remotely interface with these systems and launch attacks.

Attacks through physical access

In the United States, all vehicles sold since 1996 are required to use an On-Board Diagnostic II (OBD-II) port (specified in SAE J1962) to transmit emission-related codes and data for vehicular emissions testing. In addition, the US legislation requires all vehicles sold since 2008 to support the ISO 15765-defined CAN standard through this OBD-II interface. Although the requirement is only for emission-related information, most manufacturers use it as a primary diagnostic and reprogramming port as well. Since the port directly connects to several onboard computers via CAN, an attacker with physical access to the vehicle can easily launch attacks and compromise critical vehicle systems. The attacker could be an individual with legitimate access (e.g., a valet driver or mechanic), or someone who gains illegitimate access (e.g., through burglary). Once the attackers gain physical access, there is a wide array of OBD-II adapters available online to allow them to transmit and receive CAN messages.

Attacks through physical access, while easy to administer, have not been perceived as a real threat to automotive security. A standard response to such an attack has been that, if the attackers did have physical access, they could simply cut the brake wire or perform other similar damages, rather than hacking the vehicle through a CAN network. Nevertheless, as attention to automotive security has intensified in recent years, there have been efforts to mitigate such attacks. To combat exploits that utilize the physical OBD-II port, Markham and Chernoguzov [107] proposed a role-based access control policy: each commercial OBD-II device would be certified by manufacturers and would send a public key and X.509 certificate to the vehicle to prove its identity. Once a device is verified by the vehicle, it is given access to certain systems based on its privilege. Noncertified devices would only have permission to read the bus, whereas a certified mechanic's scan tool would have both read and write permissions. Nevertheless, note that attacks similar to the PassThru exploit [31] would circumvent this form of authentication.




Figure 2. Common internal and remote attack vectors on automotive software systems are the diagnostic ports and telematics system.

Remote attacks through infotainment/telematics

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has demonstrated exploitable hacks in vehicular infotainment applications such as the UConnect system in Chrysler, Jeep, FIAT, and so on [109]. They demonstrated that they could remotely control a vehicle via CAN-bus commands. Their hacking demonstrations resulted in several recalls, including 1.4 million Chrysler automobiles [56]. Since 2004, the Environmental Protection Agency requires all vehicles manufactured in the USA to support SAE J2534 PassThru devices, allowing Windows computers to communicate with a vehicle's internal bus networks. Consequently, many machinists and technicians use J2534 PassThru devices for diagnostics and emissions testing. PassThru devices connect to the OBD-II port in vehicles and communicate with the Windows machine via a wired or wireless network. Checkoway et al. [31] showed how it is possible to hack these devices remotely through a local WiFi network. Since the PassThru device used by Checkoway et al. [31] depended on external network security, its communication over the local wireless network was not secured. This allowed them to perform a shell injection and install malicious binaries on the PassThru device and use the PassThru to install a malicious code on a connected vehicle as well. Checkoway et al. [31] also demonstrated that a worm could be implemented to copy a malicious code between multiple PassThru devices on the same network, increasing the impact of this attack. Other remote attacks include the exploitation

of vulnerabilities in infotainment/telematics systems. These systems often include interfaces for Bluetooth, cellular, GPS, and other wireless protocols, as well as a communication channel to the internal CAN network; this makes them particularly attractive targets for remote attacks. Exploits to these systems often involve traditional hardware and software security exploits. For example, Checkoway et al. [31] showed a buffer overflow attack by installing a simple Trojan application on a connected Android phone; the application listened to Bluetooth traffic to determine whether a certain model of telematics unit was connected and, if so, delivered the attack payload. Furthermore, using the bridging capability of the infotainment system, they could send arbitrary CAN messages to the internal CAN network.

Integrity and availability attacks

CAN was designed for real-time systems and prioritized speed and reliability of delivery. CAN messages are broadcast to every node in the network, permitting anyone with bus access to perform packet sniffing. In addition, CAN messages do not contain any authentication information to verify senders, and the message ID is the only identifier used by a node to determine whether it should process a message. This enables attackers to easily perform replay attacks by sending packets with message IDs that match the IDs of legitimate messages they want to spoof. Since CAN messages control various driving functions, attacks on integrity and availability can be mounted through appropriate CAN messages. For instance, Koscher et al. [87] showed how to send specific CAN messages in consumer vehicles that utilize electronic stability and brake control (e.g., ABS braking) to enable and disable brakes at speed.

It is difficult to prevent replay and availability attacks on CAN networks without significant protocol changes. However, there has been interest in detecting attacks nonintrusively by checking for anomalous bus traffic. Several intrusion detection strategies have been developed to defend against attacks on in-vehicle systems. Taylor et al. [151] demonstrated a nonintrusive anomaly detector for identifying replay attacks on CAN networks. The algorithm measures interpacket timing over a sliding window, compares average times to historical averages to create an anomaly signal, and targets both replay and availability attacks. Note, however, that while such a solution is effective at detecting

availability and replay attacks for periodic messages, they are ineffective at detecting attacks involving nonperiodic messages due to their reliance on historic timing averages. In addition, since these methods do not check message data for anomalies (only message timing), an attacker who can modify data within periodic messages without affecting timing intervals would be able to subvert these methods. Cho and Shin [35] proposed an anomaly-based intrusion detection system (IDS) that utilizes the intervals and clock skews of periodic in-vehicle messages to create unique fingerprints for each ECU. Deviations from this signature indicate an intrusion into the network by a compromised ECU or another device. The proposed IDS was able to detect these intrusions with a false-positive rate of 0.055%.

Authentication and nonrepudiation attacks

CAN networks have many restrictions that make them difficult to implement many known authentication protocols. Van Herrewege et al. [161] discuss many of these restrictions. First, since CAN networks often have hard real-time constraints, one cannot introduce an authentication protocol that significantly impacts message timings. Second, each CAN message can only contain a maximum of 8 bytes, which means that extra authentication data cannot simply be appended to existing messages. Third, since CAN message IDs correspond to specific functions, it is not feasible to add extra IDs for authentication data. Finally, the unidirectional message-passing methodology used by CAN makes it difficult to directly address specific nodes without using a rudimentary method such as flags. The combination of these factors makes it difficult for vehicle manufacturers to implement secure access control policies without significant time or capital investment. Car manufacturers typically prevent unauthorized reflashing of the software on ECUs through CAN; however, the restrictions discussed above imply that only light-weight authentications can be implemented, which can be easily bypassed resulting in integrity and nonrepudiation attacks through unauthorized, OTA update. Koscher et al. [87] showed that, in a midrange consumer vehicle, the authentication scheme used to control write access is a simple challenge–response pair—the car will ask for a 16-bit key which, if provided, unlocks the ECU software. They demonstrated that this form of key can be cracked with brute force in a matter of days.

Some manufacturers choose to keep critical systems on a separate, high-speed bus instead of on the primary bus so that critical systems are not affected if the primary bus is disabled. This can help prevent attacks on critical systems; however, since it is relatively easy for an attacker to reflash ECUs, the attacker could compromise any ECU that communicates on both networks. For example, Koscher et al. [87] showed that the telematics unit (which communicates with both networks) was able to be reprogrammed from the low-speed bus to send custom messages on the high-speed bus. We will discuss a more detailed effect of this exploit in the “Digging Deeper: A Car Hacking Case Study” section. Furthermore, Koscher et al. [87] showed how to apply software reprogramming to launch nonrepudiation attacks as follows. One can introduce a Trojan software by reflashing the ECU such that the existing functionality would not be affected, allowing the original software and the malware to coexist. After the malware executes an attack (e.g., disabling the engine or locking the brakes), it would delete itself and relevant log data from the ECU to prevent detection during a forensic investigation.

Addressing the above attacks requires development of authentication protocols that can meet CAN’s real-time requirements. Van Herrewege et al. [161] presented a message authentication protocol named *CANAuth*, which inserts a hashed message authentication code (HMAC) between sampling points of a CAN bus interface. This is done using the CAN+ protocol proposed earlier by Ziermann et al. [180] to encode data at a higher frequency within a single CAN bit without interfering with the underlying CAN bus protocol.

Ransomware and thefts through CAN

The idea of a ransomware attack is to make a system functionality inaccessible to the user and demand ransom in exchange for returning access. In cybersecurity, this attack typically takes the form of encrypting important system files or locking functionality. In automotive systems, however, an attacker with the ability to send CAN messages can easily mount ransomware attacks by gaining control over a variety of in-vehicle functionalities. For instance, most vehicles today employ a central locking system and use CAN to control in-vehicle displays and user interfaces. Koscher et al. [87] showed that it is easy to control the locking of vehicle doors; turning on

the horn; activating and deactivating the heating, ventilation, and cooling (HVAC) system; or displaying arbitrary messages through the panel cluster display. In addition to ransomware, it is easy to use CAN to enable theft of the vehicle silently without activating the alarm (e.g., by sending messages to the telematics unit to successively unlock the doors, disable the immobilizer, and start the engine).

Security of vehicular communications

A key feature of emergent autonomous vehicles is the ability to communicate with other vehicles, with the infrastructure, and with other devices connected to the Internet. Many features of autonomous transportation depend on such communications, including platooning, cooperative route management, and so on. Consequently, there has been significant interest in designing effective vehicular communications. In this section, we look at the potential threats to such communications and the proposed defenses.

Vehicular communication or vehicular-to-everything (V2X) has been introduced as an amendment to the IEEE 802.11p standard. The standard was originally intended for V2V and V2I communications [3]. However, vehicle-to-Internet (V2IoT) communications are anticipated to be implemented and standardized in the near future [7]. The 5G-based Cellular-V2X is also being introduced by companies such as Qualcomm to compete against 802.11p as the leading V2X standard. 5G promises to be revolutionary for V2X due to its higher bandwidth capacity, smaller cell sizes, and new beamforming capabilities relative to 4G long-term evolution (LTE) [18], [104]. Figure 3 provides a visualization of the connected environment induced by V2X. A major part of security challenges in V2X is inherited from—and similar to—those in nonmobile *ad hoc* wireless networks. However, a compromise in V2X is much more serious since automobiles are safety-critical, electromechanical systems that influence major factors of people’s lives [48]. For this reason, there have been efforts from standard bodies including IEEE and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to develop standards and guidelines for V2X communication and intelligent transportation systems (ITS) to meet the security objectives [3], [45], [167]. However, due to the complexity of these systems and their subsystems, it is challenging to guarantee or even satisfy a majority of these security objectives [135].




Figure 3. Vehicular communication, also known as V2X environment, with traditional, connected, and autonomous vehicles. Each line corresponds to a type of one- or two-way communication channel for a specific application (V2V, V2I, and V2IoT). Each connectivity line may also represent a potential attack vector for an exploitation.

Attack vectors targeting V2X are large and diverse, as the methods used to compromise a vehicle's security depend on the kinds of entry points accessible to the attacker. V2X attacks are generally categorized by sophistication levels based on the distance between the attacker and the target vehicle. A direct/physical attack can be mounted by an attacker who is able to obtain physical access to the vehicle or hardware [e.g., on-board unit (OBU), CAN bus, and transceivers], either as the owner of the vehicle or via successful attacks/exploits of the CAN network as discussed in the "Security of In-Vehicle Networks" section. A remote attack is mounted by an attacker that does not have direct access to the vehicle.

Confidentiality attacks

Confidentiality may be breached if attackers directly access their OBU (as shown in the previous section) or purchases and implements 802.11p on a software-defined radio (SDR) to sniff packets containing private or critical information [23]. For example, they could track a nearby vehicle via the position, speed, and action identities (unique to the event and contains information about the originator) in V2V Decentralized Environmental Notification Messages (DENM) [135] or steal someone's

credit card information transmitted over the air for Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) [93]. Tracking may lead to identifying drivers' behaviors, personal interests, home/work address, and/or their real identity [24], [72]. In future, when peer-to-peer sharing is implemented, a key challenge will be to ensure the privacy of network traffic between vehicles, infrastructure, and IoT devices [48], [96].

To address the requirement for confidentiality, asymmetric key-based encryption methods have been proposed (e.g., elliptical curve cryptography) by IEEE [3]. However, these methods are costly and challenging to implement in the *ad hoc*, heterogeneous environment of V2V communications [135]. Another challenge is latency, which must be kept to a minimum (less than or equal to 50 ms for triggering events and resulting actions). Thus, ensuring that a cryptographic solution is both reliable and fast is a major challenge [135]. Furthermore, encryption methods should also be able to adapt to the situation (emergency or entertainment) to reduce energy and timing costs and ensure both safety and security. There have been proposed solutions [164], [165] which attempt to use the benefits of the dynamically changing physical environment to quickly generate highly random, symmetric cryptographic keys by adapting to the energy and timing constraints of V2X scenarios and the reciprocal fading properties of the wireless channel. Other solutions [44], [149], [170] attempt to algorithmically reduce the overhead of existing cryptographic solutions.

To prevent attacks on privacy, researchers have recommended using pseudonyms, sending data during only a part of the taken route (rather than all) [47], ensuring *k*-anonymity, and consistently updating unique identifiers such as the message authentication code (MAC) address, public key certificates, and probe message IDs [24], [98]. Some solutions provide domain-specific mitigation and prevention approaches for specific applications such as electronic toll booth collection [11], [74], [108].

Integrity, authentication, and nonrepudiation

Attacks on integrity and authentication typically involve tampering, fuzzing, and spoofing in some fashion. Tampering or fuzzing attacks involve the modification or injection of noise into packets sent over the air to confuse the involved parties, but they do not require attackers to masquerade as others. Besides remote V2X attacks, attackers may

maliciously alter the code of in-vehicle CPUs, for example, using malware or reflashing (via physical access to OBU or remote attacks to the telematics/infotainment from V2IoT [116]), or modify the original data before it is transmitted. Spoofing attacks, such as the Sybil attack, are detrimental to network productivity and breach both the integrity and authentication security objectives.

Douceur [43] proposed the Sybil attack. It involves a malicious node that adopts multiple addresses of legitimate (Sybil) nodes. This means that all messages will be rerouted to this malicious node instead of the legitimate nodes. Having these messages, the attacker can tamper with them and resend them to the legitimate nodes, or deceive nearby vehicles into believing that they are surrounded by traffic to get an empty route for itself once others choose alternate routes [32], [43], [89]. Another attack method (tunneling) involves imitating a short wireless channel between two legitimate nodes from both ends of a network [124]. It causes the two legitimate nodes to select the malicious node in their routing algorithms. This, in turn, allows the malicious node to infer information about the nodes, modify packets, and delay their communication attack availability. Timing-faking attacks were also shown to be effective against V2X systems. By delaying the timing of packets, road side units (RSUs) will end up making incorrect decisions and force vehicles to enter suboptimal routes with traffic, accidents, or other unforeseen circumstances [146].

Attacks on integrity and/or authentication could lead to a variety of impacts, including but not limited to traffic congestion and extra fuel costs, lower travel time for an attacker, ransomware, injury, and even murder. Garip et al. [52] showed how to simulate V2V attacks on connected autonomous vehicles using botnets (many bot vehicles in a targeted area). In their Manhattan grid experiments, they discovered that such attacks could overcome correlation-based defenses and cause traffic congestion (increase in the average trip time by 50%) when only 1% of traffic is in the botnet area. Various recent research studies [33], [54], [130], [131] discovered that traffic controllers were highly vulnerable to spoofing attacks. These attacks will lead to suboptimal signal timing plans at intersections or freeway ramps to cause more traffic congestion, reduced travel times for attackers, or even accidents due to spoofed or tampered traffic signal information or unexpected timing changes and distracted/unaware drivers. Wireless authentication is

also being implemented with electric vehicles (EVs) and the smart grid. In particular, there is a standardization where EVs would be able to use keys and certificates to wirelessly authenticate with a charging station and recharge the vehicle [29], [30]. However, an attacker (car thief) nearby may perform a substitution attack and use the victim's credentials instead of their own (which are invalid) to charge their vehicle.

Attacks that violate nonrepudiation typically either directly target-related security requirements (i.e., integrity, authentication, and availability) or directly target weak points in the nonrepudiation schemes. For example, an attack may involve deciphering a weak cryptographic key used in a nonrepudiation scheme (e.g., digital signature) or delaying mechanisms that verify the action history of a vehicle or node (e.g., voting, blockchain) [9], [41], [141], [162].

Defending against attacks on vehicular communications is of crucial importance to the proliferation of connected vehicles. In the 802.11p/WAVE standard, the necessary protection mechanisms provided for integrity include using a MAC (if using symmetric keys) over the data, and a digital signature (if using asymmetric keys and identities) via RSUs and/or authorities like the Department of Motor Vehicles [8], [36], [64], [98], [122], [123], [135], [147]. These solutions may ensure authentication and nonrepudiation as well. Combining these with a tamper-resistant cryptographic unit (e.g., the trusted platform module in [59]) can provide significant protection against the attacks discussed above. Maintaining timelines and freshness additionally requires time-variant parameters [8], [135]. However, note that these defenses may push development costs up and suffer from deterministic seeds, mismanagement of secret keys, and occasionally the tight resource constraints of embedded devices.

There has also been significant work on detection methods for integrity violations in vehicular communications. Relevant approaches include correlating messages from neighbors or using a reputation-based mechanism (via RSUs or authorities) to either infer the trustworthiness of messages or immediately detect tampered messages [21], [27], [52], [55], [62], [134], [176]. Plausibility checks on the received data (time and location) have been proposed to prevent usage of spoofed data or even detect Sybil attacks (based on GPS data [61], [118], [179]). Harsch et al. [64] proposed a low-cost, position-based routing protocol using digital signatures/certificates, plausibility checks, and

rate limitations to limit attacker capabilities. Another approach is to provide watchdog vehicles to monitor network traffic and identify potential attackers [67].

Availability

Since availability is intertwined with integrity and authentication, many of the attacks on integrity and nonrepudiation discussed in the “Integrity, Authentication, and Nonrepudiation” section also impact availability. Furthermore, there are many networking attacks unique to availability (e.g., flooding/spamming, blackholes/greyholes/wormholes, physical layer jamming, and malware). Impacts of blackholes/greyholes/wormholes are studied in many recent papers [19], [159], [163], which demonstrate attacks resulting in the network dropping packets in flight. Flooding and spamming attacks include message-based DOS [22], [65]. Basciftci et al. [14] demonstrated a physical layer jamming attack with SDRs from National Instruments and simulated the same jamming attack in an LTE network simulation platform to cause a performance drop of over 40% for more than 50% of users. Finally, after malware injection into a vehicle, infrastructure, or IoT device, an attacker may purposely interfere with the receptions and processing of data to reduce the operational effectiveness of a vehicle and its peers.

Given the close correspondence between availability attacks and integration/repudiation attacks, defenses against the latter also serve as defenses against the former. However, there are also specific detection and prevention methods against availability attacks. Kaur et al. [80] present a detection and prevention technique for wormhole attacks by forcing authenticated nodes to hash their routing-based messages and also increment the number of hops appropriately for a unique decision message. If the hops were modified by the attacker, then the hash will be different than the hashed version of the legitimate message and the malicious message will be discarded. Khatoun et al. [83] provide a solution to identify malicious nodes performing blackhole attacks by aggregating and analyzing information from RSUs and vehicles to measure the reliability and reputation of nodes. Jamming attacks may be mitigated or prevented via network coding techniques [53]. Zhang et al. [178] summarize the limitations of existing malware solutions and propose their own cloud-assisted framework to detect, prevent, and mitigate effects from malware in connected vehicle environments.

V2X and 5G

The upcoming complex 5G ecosystem is envisioned to include autonomous and connected vehicles, drones, air traffic control, transportation systems, health, smart factories, smart homes, smart cities, cloud-driven systems (robots and virtual reality), industrial processes, and much more [6], [28], [101], [103], [117]. By 2020, it is expected that over 25 billion IoT units will be connected via various wireless and wired networking protocols of all types (automotive systems alone are expected to utilize 3G, 4G LTE, IEEE 802.11p, intranetworking, Bluetooth, and ZigBee among others) [137]. The 5G ecosystem promises exciting business opportunities, but its extreme level of interconnectivity is also a double-edged sword and comes with risks.

Due to the interconnectivity of various devices under various protocols, the attack surface will be ever-growing and attractive for malicious entities and also terribly difficult for businesses to manage. Attacks may start from one endpoint to another endpoint in a completely different subsystem (e.g., smart home to connected autonomous vehicle). Devices and protocols that were once considered too complex for attackers to target or bother with are now more commonplace and well-understood by hackers. In 2016, there was a leap in malware attacks [66], [166], and in 2017 alone, there was a 250% increase in mobile ransomware attacks due to the rapid adoption of LTE and IoT [137]. It is clear that when devices with legacy security solutions will become connected, unless properly secured, 5G devices will become attractive targets for larger-scale attacks such as the Mirai distributed denial of service (DDoS) in 2016 [10], [86], [152]. The Mirai malware enabled attackers to seek out vulnerable devices via Telnet (incidentally Telnet was found to be potentially exploitable in several of the automotive aforementioned research works [31], [87], [111]) to take control over them, to prevent users from regaining control, and to utilize them to perform large-scale DDoS attacks on Internet service provider devices at the lower layer Internet protocols [15], [137], [152]. It would not be surprising if many ECUs in vehicular networks were exploited to become a part of large-scale botnet attacks (potentially up to the terabits per second traffic volume scale [152]) or even the target of DoS attacks. Further more, new types of networking protocols and applications resulting from 5G [e.g., software-defined networks (SDNs), virtual

mobile network operators (VMNOs), and mobile edge computing] reduce the gap and create softer boundaries between devices. Thus, they require new security designs and solutions to prevent access-related exploits. In particular, infotainment systems of connected and autonomous vehicles will be connected to all sorts of devices for many services (e.g., entertainment [113], performance such as battery management [103], and traffic control [48]). They will become attractive targets for threats such as ransomware or direct vehicle control. Finally, privacy concerns on identity tracking, behavior inferences, subscribed services, locations, and mobility patterns will rise because of the need for and capability to process massive data traffic flows through 5G [15], [20], [101]. Such vital user information may be exploited in unethical ways or may be used in spoofing attacks.

Despite these potential security risks, the large scale, virtualization, and inherent distributive properties of future 5G networks may be also useful to eliminate threats such as DDoS attacks [4], [15]. Improvements in security techniques such as firewalls, server load balancing, and FPGA-based Flexible Traffic Acceleration [137] and employment of physical layer security [164], [165], [173] will definitely help as well. In short, to address the risks of legacy software and hardware connecting with other devices through 5G, both business and service providers alike must strive to design their products with security in mind from the ground up.

Security of vehicular components

In addition to the communication mechanisms (whether in-vehicle or V2X), electronic components in the vehicle are also obviously subject to attacks. In this section, we consider these attacks and their effects on vehicular security.

Privacy attacks on infotainment components

Most modern consumer vehicles have voice control or hands-free calling to allow users to keep their eyes on the road while using infotainment systems or making phone calls. Note that the microphone remains active for the entire duration of phone calls. These technologies can be exploited by an attacker to covertly record audio inside the vehicle. Checkoway et al. [31] demonstrated how to use a compromised telematics unit to record audio from an in-cabin microphone and stream it through a cellular network. Furthermore, vehicle location data

can be extracted from the telematics unit as well, enabling attackers to monitor a user's location at all times. This could be used to identify high-value targets, such as owners of expensive vehicles who park at large corporations, to potentially find their home address for further surveillance or theft. The attacks on aftermarket TCUs demonstrated by Foster et al. [50] also facilitate these forms of data extraction.

Attacks on wireless key entry and ignition

Since the mid-1990s, radio frequency identification (RFID), remote keyless entry (RKE), and/or remote keyless ignition (RKI) have commonly been implemented for consumer comfort and vehicle security against thieves. Ironically, these wireless communication-based solutions are also insecure. There have been several works [25], [51], [144] that found vulnerabilities in all three applications primarily because of design errors. Furthermore, stringent cost requirements make the implementation of advanced and sophisticated protection in these areas challenging. In particular, signals to open or lock a car or start the engine could be stored, blocked, or relayed either wirelessly or over a cable. Such attacks could allow thieves to unlock and/or start a vehicle despite its owner being physically away. In 2005, a Texas Instrument RFID transponder used as an ignition key in millions of vehicles was also found to be hackable due to weak cryptographic keys [25]. Kamkar [79] developed and presented the RollJam attack on RKE. The RollJam exploit simultaneously stores and jams a signal sent to unlock the door. Then, when the driver sends an unlock signal to the door again, it is again blocked but the first stored signal is sent instead to the vehicle's receiver. This allows the attacker to use the second stored signal to unlock the car at will. Such an attack would only cost approximately \$32, and it was successfully tested on Nissan, Cadillac, Ford, Toyota, Lotus, Volkswagen, and Chrysler vehicles. Ibrahim et al. [73] demonstrated a three-step attack involving setup, jamming and recording, and hijacking. Their attacks were more flexible than the RollJam attack (remotely controller jammer, no need for precisely tuned jammer) and easier (constant jamming forces user to eventually use a mechanical key and not reset the RKE code). They tested their attack with various distance parameters (distance from user to vehicle and distance from user to attacker's logger device) on six vehicles Skoda

Yeti (2016), Skoda Octavia (2009), Mazda 6 (2009), Toyota Rav4 (2014), Mitsubishi Pajero (2015), and Nissan Sunny (2014).

Note that the challenges to securing wireless key entry and ignition systems include resource limitations of hardware and the high costs of cryptographic solutions. Most researcher recommendations include using RF signal properties to verify if a user is truly nearby or not [84], [115], [136]. Yang et al. [174] propose a low-cost (memory and complexity) solution that involves a challenge–response protocol based on distance bounding, where the verifier measures an upper bound of the actual distance to the prover so that the attacker cannot convince them that they are closer than they really are. Furthermore, a possible solution to wireless attacks on wireless authentication between EVs and the smart grid has been recommended through a cyber-physical authentication protocol which requires physical access of the charging cable to verify the identity and legitimacy of a vehicle [30].

Sensor attacks

Integrated and embedded sensors in automotive systems are crucial for the operation of connected and autonomous vehicles. With wireless communication, connected vehicles can exchange sensor data with each other for smarter applications and better control. Vehicles with autonomous capability need more informative and accurate sensors (e.g., LIDAR and camera), and more efficient and reliable algorithms for control (e.g., machine learning models) [72], [97]. Consequently, the security of sensors is critical to prevent severe functional and safety-critical impacts from exploits [169]. Unfortunately, these sensors and sensor data-based algorithms are heavily vulnerable to malicious environmental and wireless communication modifications.

Rouf et al. [75] developed an attack with a low-cost SDR that captured and read tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS) communication packets from a vehicle up to 40 m away. TPMS messages also include identifiers of tire sensors that are sufficiently unique for attackers to track the vehicle. Furthermore, they demonstrated the possibility of injecting packets into the TPMS network to trigger a fake warning signal [75]. Several of the hacking works mentioned in Table 1 have experimented and demonstrated TPMS remote attacks on their testbeds. There have also been studies of attacks on navigation systems [68],

[70], [71], [82], [177]. These studies found that the GPS receiver was vulnerable to spoofing. Spoofing attacks would provide false location information and may lead to longer trip times or, in worst cases, accidents. Correspondingly, radar, another sensory component used to measure distances [142], is also susceptible to jamming and spoofing [172]. Furthermore, recent research [63], [120] discovered that lasers or similar technology could spoof the existence of vehicles to LIDAR. Image-based machine learning algorithms and models can also be fooled to make incorrect and life-endangering decisions if small modifications were made to road signs or lines (e.g., stickers, markings, and delineation) [5], [37], [40], [69], [120], [121], [143], [154], [172].

In addition, given the complexity of autonomous and connected vehicles, there is a strong necessity to have miscellaneous sensors everywhere to ensure safety and performance. Examples include gyroscopes and ABS sensors as well as visible light, infrared, thermal infrared, odometric (accelerometers, gyroscopes, etc.), and acoustic sensors. Attacks on these types of sensors vary in difficulty because of their varying accessibility levels [72], [119], [160]. ABS sensors could be spoofed or jammed via an electromagnetic actuator that can be as far as 3 m away from the wheel speed sensors [138]. Visible light, infrared, and thermal infrared sensors can all be deceived or jammed with environment-based injections of the same medium (but attacks may be difficult due to limited ranges) [100], [119], [132]. Magnetic or thermal attacks may potentially affect odometric sensors to affect vehicle navigation but the success probability is low due to the hardware costs, range, and timing of such attacks.

For attacks that attempt to deceive the sensor-based algorithms with changes in the environment, Yan et al. [172] applied redundancy, logic checking, confidence priority, and attack detection along with sensor fusion. Petit et al. [120] applied low-cost software solutions such as random sampling, multiple sampling (for LIDAR), and a shortened pulse period. For eavesdropping and data spoofing attacks on network-based sensors such as TPMS, typical mitigation approaches include better logic consistency checks and low-cost cryptographic solutions with freshness and a strong source of randomness to prevent unauthorized access or usage of fake data [75], [135]. GPS and Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing may be prevented with Navigation Message

Authentication (NMA) and replay/spoofing detection methods [70]. Assuming a multiantenna array is being used, Danesmand et al. [39] proposed a low-cost method that first detects spoofing signals, maximizes authentic signals and then attenuates the spoofing signals. Another approach to detect and defend against deception-based attacks on sensors and their algorithms is to perform a design-time and runtime secure state estimation and identify which sensors are trustworthy through satisfiability solving [140].

Attacks on the battery subsystem

In modern combustion vehicles, the battery subsystem has evolved from being a simple lead-acid battery powering the vehicle electronics to a complex system that manages various energy-related demands such as engine start/stop technology, hybrid drivetrains, regenerative braking, and so on. These modern battery subsystems are generally connected with the CAN-bus network. In EVs, the battery and its subsystem take an even more crucial role. Most EVs use large lithium-ion battery packs due to their high energy density and power output. Consequently, lithium battery technology is extremely volatile and requires constant monitoring during charging and discharging to prevent thermal runaway (a positive feedback loop between cell temperature and internal heat generation), resulting in fire and/or an explosion. EV manufacturers struggle to meet the demand for higher battery capacity without compromising safety. This can lead to mysterious catastrophic battery failures such as the reports in 2019 of several parked Tesla vehicles catching on fire for no apparent reason [85]. EVs can also potentially present greater risks than combustion vehicles during accidents as shown by National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) crash tests in 2011, in which the Chevrolet Volt EV caught on fire twice, prompting the NHTSA to open an investigation into the vehicle's fire risk [42]. Furthermore, the widespread adoption of rapid charging technology (such as Tesla Superchargers) places even greater stress on EV batteries, requiring active cooling, dynamic charge rate based on cell temperature, and robust cell-balancing to ensure safe rapid charging. However, in the case that these safety measures fail, the results can be disastrous. For example, in two separate incidents in 2016 and 2019, a Tesla vehicle caught fire while plugged into a Supercharger station [91], [92]. Both fires were attributed to short circuits in the vehicles' electrical systems.

The aforementioned examples demonstrate that EV battery technology's complex architecture and high-risk factor present a large attack surface. The high impact of battery failures makes this subsystem an attractive target for attackers and presents a significant risk to EV owners. Since the battery management system is usually connected to the CAN-bus and several groups have already demonstrated cyber-physical attacks on EVs [69], [81], [154]–[156], it is only a matter of time before exploits targeting vulnerabilities of the battery subsystem are revealed.

Lithium-ion batteries have various failure modes ranging from reduced battery life/performance to complete battery failure and thermal runaway. The former failure modes can be triggered via excessive cell cycling, charging past 100% capacity, or malicious tampering of vehicle loads such as manipulating HVAC settings, disabling regenerative braking, or disabling the discharge limiter to deep discharge the battery. Complex, new EV control systems that use machine learning and artificial intelligence to improve efficiency such as that proposed by Lin et al. [99] are potential attack vectors to manipulate the battery subsystem and drivetrain of the vehicle. Several groups have shown that machine learning models are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks [46], [88], meaning that machine learning-based control systems can potentially be leveraged to attack the battery subsystem and result in these failure modes. Thermal runaway can be induced via a combination of factors including a high charging rate, poor cooling system performance, and internal or external short circuits. This failure mode is most likely to occur with rapid-charging devices as the high power output of the chargers increases battery cell temperatures significantly and requires complex thermal management in the vehicle. Some fast-charging systems require vehicles to run active cooling systems while charging to ensure battery temperatures do not reach critical levels. Despite these safety measures, the commands controlling charge rate and active cooling are usually sent via in-vehicle networks, such as CAN. In the "Security of In-Vehicle Networks" section, we showed the various ways in which attackers can gain access to in-vehicle networks; in this scenario, an attacker with access to the network could potentially manipulate bus traffic to induce thermal runaway. Although many battery subsystems have physical safety measures to prevent thermal runaway such as thermally triggered fuses,

these measures are usually irreversible, meaning attacks that induce these conditions can cause permanent damage to a battery pack and compromise its availability.

In addition to vehicle battery packs, battery subsystems are prevalent in sensors, mobile devices, and future V2IoT devices. In general, battery subsystems consist of three layers: application, battery management, and physical. Per each layer, the attack vectors used to gain access may vary and actual exploits may target the confidentiality, integrity/authentication, and availability of the battery subsystem and/or other connected subsystems [102]. Due to the need for low-cost production, battery subsystems tend to be lacking in security across all three layers [38].

At the application layer, attack vectors for battery subsystem attacks involve wireless communication (e.g., vehicular, remote battery management [150]), sensors, telematics, infotainment, EV charging station cables, wireless charging [105], and in-vehicle network ports. The primary attack vector for the battery management and physical layers is the automotive battery supply chain, which consists of many steps that are prone to various exploits (e.g., manufacturing, transportation, swapping, and recycling). Vulnerabilities in the latter layers include weak software security/hardware, leading to access to the

battery management software or the battery circuit. Attacks on confidentiality (via probes or in-vehicle network-based attacks) typically record data related to battery usage to infer user behavior patterns or user location information. Integrity/authentication exploits utilize attack vectors, such as the CAN-bus, to modify charging/discharging protocols (e.g., replay, spoofing, message tampering, and battery circuit tampering) to disturb battery functionality and/or the functionality of battery-dependent components [60]. Finally, availability exploits (via network-based attacks or battery circuit tampering) attempt to reduce or cut off energy provision to the components needing it [49], [77].

Attacks on map-based navigation

Map-based navigation is an application that both connected and autonomous vehicles may utilize to reduce trip time and improve passenger comfort. Map data may be stored already in the vehicle, received from RSUs, or received from cloud-based and mobile-based applications such as Waze and Google Maps [76]. Attacks that poison these maps in storage or deceive navigation applications with ghost cars may lead to less effective navigation by vehicles and eventually, traffic congestion [139], [175]. A summary of the notable works mentioned in the “Security of In-Vehicle Networks,” “Security of

Table 3. Notable works according to targeted applications, attack methods, descriptions, and complexity. We subjectively define complexity based on the requirements to launch the attack: deployment and resources (time, memory, and space). There are three levels (low, medium, and high), where one or more levels (ranges) are provided per attack category.

Year	Application	Attack Method	Attack Impact	Complexity	Citations
2010	In-Vehicle	Physical Access and Code Exploits	Vehicle Control	Low-High	[87]
2011	In-Vehicle	Remote Access and Code Exploits	Vehicle Control	Low-High	[25], [79], [73], [31]
2011	V2V / V2I	Timing Faking Attack	Suboptimal Routes/Traffic Congestion/Accidents	Low	[146]
2012	V2X	DDOS Blackhole Attack by Synchronization	Slightly Reduced Network Performance	Low-Medium	[22]
2015	V2V	Botnet-based Spoofing Attack	Suboptimal Routes/Traffic Congestion	Medium	[52]
2015	V2X	Greyhole Attack	Extremely Reduced Network Performance	Low	[163]
2015	V2X	Physical Layer Jamming	Slightly-Extremely Reduced Network Performance	Medium-High	[14]
2015	Autonomous Navigation	Camera and LIDAR Deception	Slightly-Extreme Reduced Network Performance	Low-High	[120], [121], [175]
2018	V2I and ITS	Data Spoofing to Traffic Controller or Traffic Sensors	Traffic Congestion	Medium	[33], [54], [130], [131], [175]
2018	Autonomous Navigation	Deception with Toxic Signs	Control and Performance Loss, Life-Endangering Situations	Medium	[169], [37], [143], [5], [121]
2008, 2015, 2018	Autonomous Navigation / Route Adaptation	GPS Spoofing	Control and Performance Loss, Life-Endangering Situations	Medium	[71], [68], [177]

Vehicular Communications,” and “Security of Vehicular Components” sections is summarized in Table 3 for works on attack methods and in Table 4 for works on defense methods.

Digging deeper: A car hacking case study

The preceding sections attempted to provide a structure and taxonomy to the diversity of attack surfaces on current and emergent automotive systems, and the corresponding defenses. Nevertheless, successful attacks demonstrated on automotive systems actually cross-cut many of these structures. In this section, we delve deeper into a specific, demonstrated attack on a modern automobile, that is, Miller and Valasek’s 2015 exploitation of a Jeep Grand Cherokee. They have described this attack in detail in a white paper [111], enabling researchers to identify the various vulnerabilities exploited to successfully compromise a deployed vehicle and get control over its functionality. These details make this work a good target for a pedagogical case study. In this section, we discuss the key elements of this attack and some of the high-level insights. Readers interested

in further understanding are referred to their white paper and to their online car hacking guide [110].

The Miller–Valasek work was done in the backdrop of two previous works, by Koscher et al. [87] and Checkoway et al. [31]. The work by Koscher et al. [87] showed that once an attacker can send CAN messages, they can easily control driving functionality; however, no means were provided for getting access to CAN messages remotely. Of course, an attacker with physical access to a victim’s car can cause physical damage in other forms (e.g., by cutting the brake wire). Consequently, while this demonstration was interesting, it was less than compelling. Checkoway et al. [31] reported the ability to get remote access to CAN, but no details were provided. The article by Miller and Valasek described the first compelling remote exploitation on a deployed vehicle with sufficient detail for the attack to be reproducible.

The hack proceeds in three key stages: first, compromising the head unit; second, identifying a pathway for access to CAN from the head unit; and third, message injection into CAN to compromise driving functionality. Note that each stage is nontrivial

Table 4. Notable works on defenses, their descriptions, and complexity. We subjectively define complexity based on the requirements to launch the defense: deployment and resources (time, memory, and space). There are three levels (low, medium, and high), where one or more levels (ranges) are provided per defense category.

Application	Defense	Description	Complexity	Citations
V2X	Voting Architecture	Multi Agent-based voting	Medium-High	[41]
V2X	Blockchain Architecture	Verification of Authenticity, Integrity and Non-Repudiation	High	[27], [141], [171]
V2X	Certificate Management, Digital Signatures, and Message Authentication Codes	Verification of Authenticity and Integrity of Data	Medium-High	[147], [74], [98], [135], [8]
V2X	Low Cost Cryptographic Schemes	Physical Layer Key Generation and Exchange, ID-Based Cryptosystem	Low	[135], [165], [164], [36]
V2X	Watchdogs and Data-Based Malicious Behavior Detection	Spoofing/Sybil/Black-Hole/Gray-Hole Detection, Position-based Routing	Medium-High	[32], [118], [55], [62], [67], [179], [176], [134], [80], [83], [64]
V2X	Location Privacy Preservation and Pseudonyms	Pseudonyms based on ID and Context	Medium-High	[11], [20], [108], [114], [47]
V2X	Network Coding	Jamming Mitigation or Prevention	Medium-High	[53]
V2X	Vehicular Visible Light Communication, Infrared, Radar	Reduced range of connection	Medium-High	[160], [100], [142]
In-Vehicle and V2X	Malware Detection	Cloud-based On-Board Malware Defense Manager	High	[178]
In-Vehicle	Intrusion Detection	Timing-Based CAN-Bus Anomaly Detector	Low	[151]
In-Vehicle	Intrusion Detection	Clock-Based ECU Fingerprinting	Low	[35]
In-Vehicle	Role-Based Access Control	Authentication of Physical OBD-II Devices with X.509 Certificates	Medium-High	[107]
In-Vehicle	Authentication and Access Control	Encoding HMAC on top of Existing CAN-Bus Messages	Medium-High	[161]

(e.g., CAN message injection requires significant analysis of CAN messages).

Compromising the head unit: The key idea behind this attack is to exploit a vulnerability in interprocess communication (IPC). IPC is a standard means for software processes to communicate with each other, either through standardized or proprietary protocols. The typical approach is for IPC services to be implemented through software daemons that use a variety of “sockets” to enable communication among processes. The IPC daemon in the Grand Cherokee was a standard daemon called *D-Bus*, which is a highly configurable IPC daemon used in a variety of embedded systems. Typically, communication through D-Bus requires authentication. The vulnerability exploited was an open, unmonitored port in D-Bus that enabled anonymous access. Consequently, any entity or process that could connect to that port would be provided access to the D-bus services. In particular, if a hacker could get into the wireless network of a vehicle, then, given the knowledge of the port number for the specific open port, they could anonymously connect to D-Bus without requiring further authentication.

Getting into the vehicle network: Obviously, the network of a car would not be open to public access—they are typically protected by a firewall. One option is for the hacker to physically hack into a connected electronic component inside the vehicle that is connected to the car’s network; however, that would require physical access to the car. This problem was circumvented by exploiting another feature of the Jeep Grand Cherokee—the ability to connect from any device subscribed to the network of the car’s wireless carrier. In particular, the network carrier for the cellular modem in the Jeep’s head unit was Sprint, and this carrier provided a feature that enabled any Sprint device to communicate with any other Sprint device through the Sprint wireless network. Consequently, it was possible to get a Sprint burner phone, tether it to any computer, and thereby give that computer access to the Sprint network where the address and port of the victim D-Bus daemon were visible.

CAN message injection: Given the above steps, it became possible to remotely compromise the head unit. This enabled the attacker to have full control over the in-car infotainment including radio volume, temperature control, and the heads-up display among others. However, there was no direct

connection between the head unit and the driving functionality of the car.¹ Achieving that would require the ability to inject arbitrary messages on the CAN-C bus that controlled the various ADAS components. Obviously, the head unit components were not directly connected to this bus. However, they could not be physically isolated either, since many features in the car require communication between ADAS and infotainment, for example, the ability to see the trajectory in the display while reversing—a feature available in most modern cars—would require communication of the angular momentum information from the wheels to the display component. To address this, the head unit includes two integrated circuits—an Advanced Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RISC) Machine (ARM) and a V850 with different components connected. The ARM component to which the radio was connected was not permitted to send CAN messages; the V850 could send CAN messages but was not directly connected to outside connections (and consequently, compromised head unit components). However, they were connected through a serial peripheral interface (SPI) link that enables communication between the two processors, and furthermore, the ARM processor could reprogram the V850 system through software. This enables the hacker to use a compromised ARM processor (through exploitation of the head unit) to reprogram the V850 to accept any command provided through the SPI link. Consequently, any subsequent communication from ARM (e.g., CAN messages representing directives to brake, steering, accelerator, etc.) would be accepted by V850 and passed on through the CAN-C network to the appropriate component, completing the compromise.

We should add that this compromise is not possible on today’s on-road vehicles (which have been patched by Jeep and Sprint). For example, Sprint has blocked all the traffic to the exposed D-bus port, thereby preventing the attacker from gaining access to the head unit of the vehicle over the Internet. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the cost—Jeep had to recall over 1.4 million vehicles in response to the hack. From the perspective of this paper, it is also important to realize that a practical hack of a car actually cuts across the taxonomy we developed and typically involves multiple compromises. Nevertheless,

¹Through the control of the infotainment, they could show a speed on the display that was different from the actual speed of the car, but they could not actually affect the speed of the car.

it is depressing that it is reasonably easy to perform such a hack on a deployed automotive system.

Automotive security validation in practice

Given the plethora of attacks as discussed above, how does the automotive industry approach the security validation of current (and emergent) vehicles? Unfortunately, the state of the art today is primarily manual. In particular, much of the practice is based on penetration testing [129], that is, performing security attacks on the car in a controlled environment. The Miller–Valasek hack discussed in the “Digging Deeper: A Car Hacking Case Study” section provides a blueprint of the approach that can be taken to approach this complex task. More generally, penetration testing for an automotive system typically involves three steps, namely finding an entry point, exploring and reverse-engineering various firmware code installed in the system, and finally identifying vulnerabilities in the firmware to gain control over the vehicle functionality. In this section, we provide a brief insight into the process.

Finding entry points in a vehicle

Physical access to a car can provide a multitude of entry points for a security hacker, for example, through access to CAN via an OBD-II connector. However, as discussed in the preceding sections, it is possible to get remote access to the car. In fact, every external input to the car is typically explored as a potential entry point. In particular, most modern cars connect to the Internet through a device with cellular connectivity, such as a mobile phone. If this connection is through another device, for example, via tethering with a mobile phone, that device becomes a point of vulnerability. If the car connects directly, for example, through a cellular chip, it is more complex to find an entry point. One potential area of exploration includes possible open ports that are sometimes accessible through the Internet. Another area is the variety of security certificates, for example, if the car connects through a secure socket layer (SSL), then that includes a variety of certificates, many of which include several configurations which can lead to the possibility of a misconfigured certificate. A third possibility is through a variety of remote commands. In particular, various vehicle functionalities can be accessed through mobile apps (e.g., remote engine start,

remote door lock/unlock, remote climate control, etc.). These commands typically use a middleware service, for example, a Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) broker [2], which can provide an entry point for an attack as well.

The above techniques provide some obvious low-hanging fruits for penetration testing, and are often successful. However, the Internet connectivity of most vehicles is generally more secure. In particular, most electronic components of a car are typically protected by a firewall and not accessible externally through the Internet. Accessing such components requires first getting access to a computer within the vehicle’s network. The Miller–Valasek work showed one way to do this, for example, through the feature provided by the network provider Sprint that enabled any Sprint device to communicate with any other device within the Sprint network, including devices that were within a vehicle. One avenue is to hack into one device of a car (possibly locally) and use the hacked device to enable access to other devices connected to the same network. Such attacks can be thwarted by not permitting devices in one vehicle to access devices in other vehicles even within the same network. When this is implemented, various other techniques can be used, for example, by implementing a cellular tower simulator/emulator, or applying fuzzing techniques [148] on various external-facing software including the Bluetooth stack, USB stack, and so on. In addition, many vehicles have a variety of exposed hardware interfaces including debug interfaces [e.g., Joint Test Action Group (JTAG)], serial consoles, and so on. Serial consoles are used during the development phase but sometimes inadvertently left open at deployment, sometimes including shells with root privilege. Finally, one can find entry points by observing or injecting CAN messages; sometimes, it is possible to reprogram a CPU through CAN messages as demonstrated by Miller–Valasek.

Obtaining and reverse-engineering firmware

Simply finding an entry point is not sufficient to compromise a vehicle; one must also find ways to modify its functionality. This is typically performed through reverse-engineering and modifying the firmware. Sometimes, the original firmware binary is directly available from the manufacturer’s website or through an insider in the dealership. If not, the firmware can sometimes be lifted directly from the

flash memory, or a root shell in the serial console. Once the firmware is obtained, various standard reverse-engineering tools can be applied to interpret the firmware, for example, Binwalk [78], Ida Pro [1], and so on. Note that this is not a trivial matter; for example, firmware is not structured and is often targeted for a variety of non-standard instruction set architectures (e.g., V850) with complex memory layout. Furthermore, they are large, for example, of the order of gigabytes in many cases. Therefore, it is not feasible to comprehend the entire functionality. However, it is often possible to short-change the process by identifying and interpreting specific functions or symbols. In particular, strings and symbols are sometimes left in the firmware which can provide convenient starting points for reverse-engineering.

Privilege escalation

The final step in a successful automotive hack is the ability to run arbitrary code or send arbitrary messages. In traditional computing systems, most software processes do not have this privilege. However, in embedded devices, it is often common for all software processes to run with administrator privilege. Since much of automotive software has been derived from embedded systems both in design philosophy and in implementation, this feature is often available there as well. Even if all processes do not have administrator privilege, most boot-up processes do and are obvious targets for a hack. Other processes to target are IPC daemons, for example, DBus, as demonstrated by Miller–Valasek. Finally, most automotive systems include processes for OTA firmware upgrades. These processes of necessity execute with administrator privilege and also have significant ability to control and modify the installed firmware; if such a process can be compromised, the hacker can exert significant control over the entire vehicular firmware.

Applicability of formal methods

It is clear that the above approaches are purely manual attacks, depending on deep human insight. It is certainly reasonable to ask why there are no systematic approaches to perform such hacks in today's practice. The answer to that question is complex, relating to unavailability and limited scalability of tools, and difficulty to integrate the tools into the complex security validation methodology. To illustrate this point, we take the example of one promising approach, formal methods. Formal methods

entail the use of mathematical reasoning to identify errors or vulnerabilities in design. In principle, it is very attractive since unlike the approaches discussed above it can provide a mathematical guarantee on the robustness of a system component or find corner-case vulnerabilities that are difficult to exercise otherwise. However, while there has been significant work on the use of formal methods for hardware and system security [34], [129] the application on automotive system-level security verification in practice is limited. There are several reasons for this. First, while there is some functional specification, a comprehensive specification of a vehicle functionality at the level of detail necessary for the applicability of formal methods is lacking. Second, even if available, such a specification would be extremely complex: even more pertinent, the implementation of an overall automotive system is extremely complicated with several cross-cutting modules related to hardware, software, and communication, together with both digital and analog/mixed-signal components. Automated formal methods such as model checking, has been used in some targeted applications for verifying functional safety in individual automotive parts, for example, individual SoC designs within an ECU [34], but it is difficult to scale such approaches beyond that level. Furthermore, a significant amount of collateral is missing at design time, for example, fuse configurations necessary for ensuring life cycle isolation are not available during the RTL design of automotive hardware where formal methods could be applicable.

The above is not to discourage the extremely important role formal methods can play in security. In fact, a greater application would only be welcome. However, for any methodology, it is important to understand its shortcomings to find potential areas for improvement. Perhaps, one way for formal methods to become applicable is through a better design management process, for example, by ensuring all specification and other validation collateral are available at the time necessary, and models are available at different levels of abstraction (perhaps through automatic abstraction) to enable applicability of formal methods at the vehicle level.

Security of automotive supply chain

The discussion in this article focused on automotive security at the vehicle level. Another component of automotive security entails vulnerabilities in the

complex, rich supply chain involved in automotive electronics production. The supply chain of automotive electronics is complex, with several potential vulnerabilities [127]. In this section, we briefly give a flavor of the challenges involved for the sake of completeness of the presentation. For further details, the reader is referred to a recent paper [128] that exclusively addresses this subject.

Consider an electronic part developed for an automotive system. Typically, it would be developed by some electronic part vendor, and go through several tiers of part suppliers, eventually to an automotive manufacturer who would integrate the part into an automobile. Each player in this process can introduce several sensitive assets to the part. These include cryptographic keys, digital rights management (DRM) keys (for infotainment parts), proprietary firmware, and so on [129]. Furthermore, each player in the supply chain can also include rogue or malicious agents, for example, a rogue employee, a malicious CAD tool, or even an untrusted foundry. It is critical to ensure that the system is robust against attacks by such players.

Supply chain security has been an active topic of research in the hardware security community, with several excellent treatises [16], [112], [117], [153]. The security threats considered in the literature include Trojan insertions, IP piracy, cloning, counterfeit ICs, and overproduction [17]. All of these threats carry over to the automotive systems as well. However, automotive systems carry their own supply chain challenges. In particular, assets should be protected, not only after the system is in-field but also when it is with the subsequent players in the supply chain.

- Assets introduced by the vendor should not be accessible to suppliers, automotive manufacturers, or end-users.
- Assets introduced by a supplier or automotive manufacturer should not be accessible to any other party, including the original vendor.
- All assets should be protected against side-channel attacks (e.g., voltage, temperature, or clock glitch attacks).
- Customer and third-party software should be protected against unauthorized access.

To exacerbate the problem, note that a part may return to the original part vendor, for example, after a field return. At this point, the part includes assets from all subsequent players in the supply

chain which must be protected from the vendor. Additional sources of complexity arise from the fact that assets may be sprinkled across different parts, and cross-cut hardware, firmware, and software; furthermore, calls are not statically provisioned but may be created on the fly as the system executes. Finally, note that test and debug interfaces add to the vulnerabilities. These interfaces provide the user with structured access to internal architectural and design features (e.g., scan chain, various design-for-debug features, etc.) for functional verification, manufacturing tests, and other related activities. Since these activities entail observability of internal states of the design (and consequently of assets stored), a key challenge is to ensure the testability of the part while preventing unauthorized access to assets. Finally, note that once a part moves from one player to another in the supply chain (referred to as *a change in the life cycle*), asset protection is adjusted through a configuration of fuses. On the other hand, fuse programming is performed through the use of the debug interface. This creates a circular dependency between the ability to program through this interface and the effect of the programming on the interface (e.g., a life cycle change may change the way the debug interface is accessed).

Addressing the above-mentioned problems in today's practice is primarily manual, based on the expertise of experienced architects and designers. However, with the growing complexity of automotive electronics, this practice is getting increasingly difficult to implement, with numerous bugs and vulnerabilities found late in production or even after deployment. Currently, the industry is exploring trust provisioning schemes to address this problem at the architecture level—the idea in which assets are provisioned by various stakeholders through a specific, centralized trust model. The trust model is typically defined by the supplier of the part who is also responsible for the architecture that enables various stakeholders to insert assets at different life cycle stages. The provisioning mechanism guarantees that a service that does not need an asset does not get access to it, and access and update to each asset satisfies the trust model. However, the approach is in infancy and its viability is not currently well understood. Furthermore, validation schemes have been explored to validate fuse configurations to ensure life cycle isolation, for example, through formal methods.

WE HAVE PROVIDED a summary of security challenges in current and emergent vehicles. The area is vast, and our goal has been to provide a structure to the plethora of attacks that we know of today and the defenses that have been considered for such attacks. We hope this article will be a useful starting point for researchers and practitioners in the area.

Of course, the attack surface will increase significantly as we move toward self-driving, autonomous vehicles. Nevertheless, they are coming soon, for example, major companies such as Waymo and Uber are moving toward launching close to 100,000 self-driving cars with level-4 automation in various urban cities by 2021–2022. The test vehicles are being deployed in different scenarios and have driven several millions of miles to cover the corner cases [95]. They will include advanced sensors such as Lidar, radar, etc., and multiple cameras. The computational resources needed for a self-driving car are also significantly higher to accommodate the processing of large amounts of sensor data. This, in turn, necessitates modifications to the conventional firmware and software running on the underlying ECUs. In addition, there will be a paradigm shift from cars being viewed only as production vehicles to widespread use as autonomous ride-sharing vehicles [90]. We are not even aware of how all these issues will affect the security of these vehicles. Furthermore, the increased connectivity of vehicles and infrastructure will broaden the potential attack surface significantly. The implementation of 5G and 802.11p connectivity enables unforeseen adversarial attacks not just on vehicles, but on infrastructure, traffic, and any Internet-connected systems. The security of V2X communication has not been studied in-depth, and regrettably, the industry currently does not consider security a priority for V2X development. Since V2X technology is in its infancy, it would be prudent for researchers to focus on methods to verify the security of vehicular communication systems before they become ubiquitous.

Despite the above, it is not all doom and gloom. There are certain unique characteristic features of a ride-sharing autonomous vehicle that are inherently beneficial for security [26]. For instance, the communication modules are highly customized to be locked down as there is no requirement for providing different user interfaces through Bluetooth, Web browsers, and so on unlike the production vehicles. In particular, the head unit comprising of

the telematics is no longer required in a ride-sharing vehicle, and the OBD-II port can also be locked in a nonstandard location. Finally, there is a certain amount of obscurity in the architecture which makes it difficult for the user to gain significant access to the vehicle, extract the firmware, and test for exploits. Nevertheless, the security of these vehicles is a critical threat, and it is crucial to comprehend, analyze, and mitigate security challenges in such vehicles. ■

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